COA 376199 CAD V RYAN CUONG LE-NGUYEN Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/14/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
ARNOLD CHRISTOPHER DANIEL, as Next
Friend of CAD, Minor,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
January 14, 2026
10:54 AM
v No. 376199
Washtenaw Circuit Court
RYAN CUONG LE-NGUYEN also known as
RYAN CYONG LE-NGUYEN and MICHELE
INHMATHONG,
LC No. 21-000786-NO
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and GARRETT and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
On June 6, 2021, defendant, Ryan Le-Nguyen, was inside his residence when he heard a
commotion outside, which he described as loud bangs, like a hard, heavy object hitting the exterior
of the house. Previously, Le-Nguyen had some conflict with young children in the neighborhood
who left toys and bicycles in front of the house, which displeased him. Part of the commotion that
Le-Nguyen heard that day appears to have resulted from the children knocking on the front door
of the house, a beverage being thrown at the front door, or both. In response to this commotion,
Le-Nguyen recklessly fired a gun through the front window, which struck six-year-old CAD in the
arm, as the child was standing on the sidewalk. Le-Nguyen pleaded nolo contendere to two
felonies,1 and stipulated to entry of a civil judgment in favor of plaintiff Arnold Christopher Daniel,
as Next Friend of CAD. The present appeal does not involve any claims against Le-Nguyen.
Rather, the two questions presented pertain to counts of negligence and nuisance brought against
the owner of the house, Michele Inhmathong, who was not present at the time of the incident, but
who allowed Le-Nguyen to live in the house, knew that Le-Nguyen kept his firearms in the house,
and allegedly knew he had some conflict with neighborhood children. The trial court granted
1 Discharging a weapon in a building causing injury, MCL 750.234b(3), and possession of a
firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b(1).

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summary disposition to Inhmathong pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the basis that she did not
owe a duty to CAD, meaning she could not be liable for negligence, and that Le-Nguyen’s criminal
misconduct was not foreseeable to Inhmathong, such that plaintiff could not prove his public
nuisance claim. We affirm.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed the subject complaint against both defendants on July 21, 2021, alleging
causes of action for negligence and nuisance. Factually, plaintiff alleged that CAD was retrieving
his bicycle from defendants’ yard on June 6, 2021, when Le-Nguyen accidentally shot the minor
in the arm. Plaintiff further alleged that Le-Nguyen was a cohabitant of the house, and that
Inhmathong was a cohabitant and owner. The premises were alleged to have been maintained in
“a reckless and dangerous condition in the form of a loaded firearm.” Additionally, defendants
allegedly knew, prior to the accident, that children played in their yard and the immediate area,
and that defendants had not warned those children of the “dangerous condition or danger of being
shot.” Finally, plaintiff alleged that Inhmathong should have known of Le-Nguyen’s “propensity
and or aggressive behavior to the children in the neighborhood.”
Plaintiff’s negligence claim, as averred in the complaint, can be summarized as follows:
(a) defendants created a dangerous condition by having a loaded firearm at their home; (b)
defendants breached the duty of reasonable care owed to plaintiff by failing to maintain safe
premises, and by failing to inspect, test or assess the dangerous condition, i.e., the loaded firearm;
(c) defendants breached the duty of reasonable care by failing to take precautions that would
maintain a safe environment, failed to warn of dangerous conditions on the land, and failed to
protect plaintiff from foreseeable dangers; and (d) CAD suffered injuries and damages as the direct
and proximate, foreseeable result of those breaches of the duty of reasonable care.
As for the nuisance claim, plaintiff alleged that having a loaded firearm at defendants’
home created and maintained their premises in a reckless, dangerous, and hazardous state so that
it constituted a nuisance that caused the injuries to CAD.
Inhmathong filed an answer to the complaint admitting that she owned the premises where
Le-Nguyen lived. She asserted several affirmative defenses, including that plaintiff’s complaint
failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.
Approximately one year after the filing of the complaint, after the court-ordered discovery
period ended, Inhmathong filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10),
arguing that plaintiff’s case was an intentional tort case disguised as an action brought forth under
theories of premises liability, negligence, or both, and that Ihhmathong’s only nexus to the
shooting incident was that she owned and lived at the subject premises. She noted that Le-Nguyen
pleaded no contest to criminal charges arising out of the shooting and was currently in prison as a
result. Inhmathong alleged it was undisputed that she was not even present at the time the shooting.
She argued that the trial court was not bound by the labels that plaintiff attached to the complaint,
that plaintiff failed to identify how he was injured by any defect on the premises, and that plaintiff
had not proven or even articulated a cognizable premises liability claim because there was no
allegedly defective condition on the land. Inhmathong further argued that, under MCR
2.116(C)(10), because plaintiff offered no evidence during discovery demonstrating that she owed

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a duty to plaintiff, or that she committed any act that would breach a duty to plaintiff, she was
entitled to summary disposition. Finally, Inhmathong argued that plaintiff could not prove
causation in this matter because an intervening, illegal action, caused plaintiff’s injuries.
In support of his response to Inhmathong’s motion, plaintiff filed his own signed affidavit,
the allegations of which can be summarized as follows: (1) neighbors told plaintiff that Le-Nguyen
drove recklessly on the street, (2) Le-Nguyen told him he was going to order a gun, (3) plaintiff’s
children and other children told plaintiff that Le-Nguyen chased children out of his yard and threw
their bikes and toys in his trash, (4) plaintiff has seen Inhamthong sitting on the front steps of the
house while children were playing in the yards, (5) neighbors have informed plaintiff that Le-
Nguyen was upset about neighbors parking in front of the house, (6) plaintiff is aware that the
township received complaints about defendants working on cars in the garage and failing to
maintain the property, and (7) it was generally known that Le-Nguyen was hostile, aggressive to
children and neighbors in the neighborhood and was in need of mental health treatment.2
Plaintiff also attached portions of the defendants’ deposition transcripts. According to
plaintiff, those transcripts establish that: Inhmathong was the sole owner of the house, Le-Nguyen
has lived there since she purchased the house in 2016, Le-Nguyen kept two firearms at the house
that he purchased for protection as a result of crime in the neighborhood, Inhmathong told Le-
Nguyen that she did not want a firearm in her home but Le-Nguyen did not comply with her
preference, Le-Nguyen had frequent conflicts with neighbors that included taking toys belonging
to neighborhood children and throwing bicycles in a dumpster, neighbors complained to the
township about Le-Nguyen, and Inhmathong has a doorbell camera through which she could see
children playing in the neighborhood.
Relying on the police report for the subject incident, as well as a news story that plaintiff
found on the internet, plaintiff’s response asserted that children were playing on the sidewalk in
front of defendants’ residence on the date of the incident, that Le-Nguyen came out of the house
and threatened to hit the children with a hammer, that one of the children knocked on defendants’
door after Le-Nguyen returned inside, that Le-Nguyen perceived the knocking as a threat and fired
a gun blindly through the front window of the house, and the bullet struck CAD while he was
standing on the sidewalk in front of defendants’ residence.
Despite Inhmathong’s assertion to the contrary, plaintiff argued that his complaint asserts
a claim for nuisance, not premises liability. Relying upon Wagner v Regency Inn Corp, 186 Mich
App 158, 163-164; 463 NW2d 450 (1990), plaintiff argued that Inhmathong created a nuisance in
fact arising from her negligence with respect to Le-Nguyen’s aggressive behavior towards the
neighborhood children and the two guns he possessed in the residence, all of which were known
to Inhmathong. Thus, plaintiff essentially argued that Inhmathong’s knowledge of Le-Nguyen’s
conflict with local children, combined with his possession of firearms on the premises, created a
question of fact for a jury as to whether it constituted a public nuisance that caused CAD’s injuries
for which she could be found liable.
2 We note that at least four of the statements contained in plaintiff’s affidavit arguably constitute
inadmissible hearsay.

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Plaintiff also argued that the same evidence created a question of fact as to whether
Inhmathong was negligent. Again, relying upon Wagner, plaintiff claimed that a property owner
has a duty to prevent risk to the public from wrongful or criminal activities by third parties about
which the landowner knew or should have known. Plaintiff alleged that Inhmathong knew or
should have known that Le-Nguyen would act violently and unlawfully towards the children
because of his history of conflicts with the children and his possession of firearms in the house.
Plaintiff also alleged that other evidence suggested that Inhmathong should have known Le-
Nguyen would act violently, including the fact that he was involved in a motor vehicle accident
that resulted in a total loss of Inhmathong’s car and his suffering a closed head injury (for which
he received no medical treatment, and due to which he suffers from daily headaches).
In reply, Inhmathong argued that plaintiff’s response contained multiple
misrepresentations of the fact. First, while plaintiff argued that Le-Nguyen had frequent conflicts
with the neighbors, Inhmathong noted that the response provides no evidentiary support for this
allegation. Second, while plaintiff alleged that Le-Nguyen took toys from the neighborhood
children and threw bicycles in the garbage, Inhmathong’s deposition testimony contends that she
received no such complaints and Le-Nguyen never talked to her about any complaints he received.
Le-Nguyen likewise testified at his deposition that he did not tell Inhmathong about the complaints
he received. Accordingly, Inhmathong argued that plaintiff’s claims failed because he could not
even demonstrate an issue of material fact as to whether Inhmathong had notice of any problematic
activity, let alone the alleged ongoing, illegal, dangerous activity.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied Inhmathong’s motion for summary disposition
in November 2022. Inhmathong then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court also
denied the following month.
Inhmathong then filed an application for leave to appeal, which this Court denied in April
2023. CAD v Le-Nguyen, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, issued April 5, 2023 (Docket
No. 364545).
Two years later, in April 2025, after much trial preparation, Inhmathong filed another
motion for summary disposition, this time relying upon both MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10).
Inhmathong argued that plaintiff’s negligence claim failed because: she owed no legal duty to
plaintiff to prevent the criminal act of another, there was no special relationship between her and
CAD, she had no ownership interest relevant to plaintiff’s location on the sidewalk, and she could
not have foreseen the criminal act committed by Le-Nguyen. In addition, Inhmathong argued that
because the shooting was unforeseeable, plaintiff could not establish proximate cause. Regarding
the nuisance claim, she argued there was no evidence of any dangerous condition on the property
and no indication that she created, maintained or permitted an ongoing hazard.
Plaintiff responded by objecting to the motion for summary disposition on the basis that:
the original scheduling order required such a motion to be heard by October 2023, the trial court
denied Inhmathong’s prior motion for summary disposition and subsequent motion for
reconsideration, and this Court denied Inhmathong’s application for leave to appeal from those
rulings. Plaintiff also filed a brief in support of the response, essentially restating the arguments
made in his brief in response to Inhmathong’s first motion for summary disposition.

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Inhmathong’s reply again contended plaintiff’s lacked evidentiary support for his factual
allegations and made multiple misrepresentations of fact, that plaintiff’s reliance on Wagner is
distinguished, and that the nuisance claim fails because Le-Nguyen is not a condition of the
property and his one-time use of the firearm was an intentional criminal act that was not
foreseeable.
At the motion hearing, the trial court stated that it was granting Inhmathong’s motion for
summary disposition. First, the court explained that it did not find an issue of material fact that
Le-Nguyen’s action in discharging the firearm was foreseeable. The court indicated plaintiff had
not established that Inhmathong owed a duty to plaintiff. Further, the court noted that Le-Nguyen’s
criminal act, which occurred when Inhmathong was not home, involved a firearm that she did not
own. Had Inhmathong owned the gun, the court suggested, she might have owed a duty to secure
the weapon, but there is no such allegation or evidence here. The court did not agree that Le-
Nguyen’s having yelled at children in the neighborhood made it foreseeable that he would shoot a
firearm out the window. In summation, the court held that it could not find, under Michigan law,
that Inhmathong owed a duty to plaintiff, that Le-Nguyen’s action was foreseeable, or that the facts
of this matter constituted a public nuisance, and granted Inhmathong’s motion pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10).
On May 7, 2025, the trial entered an order granting Inhmathong’s second motion for
summary disposition. The trial court entered an order denying plaintiff’s timely filed motion for
reconsideration of that order on June 9, 2025. Plaintiff filed a timely claim of appeal to this Court
within 21 days of entry of the June 11, 2025 judgment against Le-Nguyen, the final order in this
matter.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary disposition de novo. Krieger
v Dep’t of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy, 348 Mich App 156, 170; 17 NW3d 700 (2023).
MCR 2.116(C)(8) provides that a defendant may move for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) if the plaintiff “has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.” “[A]
motion for summary disposition is granted [under MCR 2.116(C)(8)] if the claim is so clearly
unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.”
Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 654; 532 NW2d 842 (1995). Such a motion “is tested on the
pleadings alone, and all factual allegations contained in the complaint must be accepted as true.”
Id.
A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual
sufficiency of a claim.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665
(2019).
When considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence submitted
by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. A
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine
issue of material fact. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves

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open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. [Id. (quotation marks and
citations omitted).]
“If no facts are in dispute, and if reasonable minds could not differ regarding the legal effect of
those facts, whether summary disposition is proper is a question of law for the Court.” Estate of
Miller v Angels’ Place, Inc, 334 Mich App 325, 330; 964 NW2d 839 (2020).
III. ANALYSIS
A. NUISANCE
On appeal, and again relying upon Wagner, 186 Mich App at 163, plaintiff argues that
Michigan law recognizes a landowner may be liable for a nuisance in fact arising from criminal
behavior occurring on the property when such conduct is ongoing and known to the landowner.
However, plaintiff’s reliance upon Wagner is misplaced. As plaintiff argues, the principle
announced in Wagner was that “creating or allowing continuing patterns of criminal activity on
[the] premises which endanger” invitees could impose liability upon the landowner. Id. at 162-
163. In the present case, however, plaintiff does not rely upon evidence demonstrating that
defendant allowed continuing patterns of criminal activity on the premises; rather, plaintiff’s
evidence, consisting of the above-referenced affidavit and the depositions of Le-Nguyen,
Inhmathong, and plaintiff, support that there was a potential civil dispute between Le-Nguyen and
the neighbors. Certainly, the fact that Le-Nguyen owned firearms that he kept in the house is not,
by itself, a criminal activity, yet plaintiff nonetheless implies that it is. Likewise, the disputes that
are alleged to have existed between Le-Nguyen and the neighbors, including Le-Nguyen yelling
at the neighborhood children and removing the children’s toys and bicycles from his yard are not
crimes. Removing those items from his yard and allegedly throwing them in a dumpster might
constitute a civil property dispute, but it certainly could not be deemed to equate to the type of
ongoing criminal activity that was the subject of the civil action in Wagner.
Plaintiff also argues that contradictions between the contents of his affidavit, the deposition
testimony of Inhmathong, and the testimony of Le-Nguyen, created questions of fact as to the duty
element, and, more specifically, on the issues of notice and foreseeability. However, none of the
contradictions referenced by plaintiff create a genuine issue of material fact in this matter.
Specifically, plaintiff points to inconsistencies between Le-Nguyen’s and Inhmathong’s testimony
as to whether Inhmathong had ever asked Le-Nguyen to remove his guns from the home. But,
even if we assume that Inhmathong did, in fact, ask Le-Nguyen to remove his guns from her home,
and even if Le-Nguyen did not comply with that request, those facts do not support a finding of
the type of ongoing criminal activity described in Wagner; rather, considering those facts in the
light most favorable to plaintiff, those facts demonstrate a simple dispute among housemates,
without any criminality involved.
Because plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material
fact on his nuisance claim, we find that the trial court did not err when it granted summary
disposition on that claim.

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B. NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff next argues that Inhmathong was negligent because she permitted a foreseeable
dangerous condition to persist, relying upon Ross v Glaser, 220 Mich App 183, 186-187; 559
NW2d 331 (1996). Plaintiff argues that Inhmathong was aware of Le-Nguyen’s possession of the
firearm he used to shoot the six-year-old, requested that he remove it from her home, but failed to
take steps to remove the guns or “mitigate the threat.”
The underlying facts in Ross are not reasonably comparable to the present case. In Ross,
the defendant, John Glaser, had a son with a history of paranoid schizophrenia and other mental
disturbances. Prior to the conduct at issue in Ross, there was a history of tension between the
defendant’s family and the decedent’s family, and a group of people that included members of the
decedent’s family assaulted or harassed Glaser’s son, which led Glaser’s son to purchase three
guns. Ross, 220 Mich App at 184-185, 187. On the date of the incident, neighborhood youths
were taunting Glaser’s son. While in an agitated state, Glaser’s son entered their house, asked the
defendant to hand him one of the guns, and the defendant complied. Id. at 185. Glaser’s son then
left the house (despite the defendant trying to physically restrain him), drove away in a car, found
the plaintiff’s decedent at a nearby store, and shot him to death. Id. The plaintiff sued the
defendant for negligently handing his son the gun, which he alleged was a proximate cause of
plaintiff’s decedent’s death. The trial court granted summary disposition to the defendant. Id. at
185-186.
This Court reversed, holding that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty and that there was
a question of fact on the issue of proximate cause. The Ross Court noted that its case was not one
for nonfeasance or passive inaction, but rather, because the defendant handed the gun to his son,
it was a case of alleged misfeasance or active misconduct. Id. at 186-187. It held that the harm to
plaintiff’s decedent was foreseeable because of the defendant’s son’s chronic mental instability
(including psychosis and repeated hospitalizations), an intense neighborhood conflict existed
between his son and the decedent’s family and their “backers,” and his son purchased three guns
because of the conflict, had been harassed that very day, and ran into the house and yelled for
defendant to get his gun. Id. at 187-188. Given those circumstances, this Court held that, when
the defendant handed his son the gun, it was foreseeable that he would shoot someone. Id. at 188.
But the Court stressed that it was not finding that the defendant “had a duty to act where he failed
to act.” Id. at 190. Rather, “he had a duty not to act if, by doing so, he would create an
unreasonable risk of harm,” i.e., under the circumstances presented, he “had a duty not to hand his
son a loaded weapon.” Id. at 189-190.
This Court in Ross also found that a question of fact existed on the issue of whether the
defendant’s actions were a proximate cause of the death of the plaintiff’s decedent. Although the
defendant argued that his son’s act of getting into a car, driving to the store, and shooting the victim
were superseding acts that cut off liability, this Court noted that “[w]hen a defendant’s negligence
enhances the likelihood that the intervening act will occur, the act is reasonably foreseeable and
the defendant remains liable.” Id. at 193. The Ross Court concluded that, because “reasonable
minds could differ on whether the [defendant’s son’s] intervening actions superseded the
defendant’s actions, thus cutting off liability,” summary disposition on this issue was
inappropriate. Id. at 193-194.

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Unlike Ross, the present case does not involve allegations of misfeasance, but rather,
plaintiff’s allegations against Inhmathong sound in nonfeasance. “Generally, with respect to
nonfeasance, there is no legal duty that obligates a person to aid or protect another. An exception
has developed where a special relationship exists between the persons.” Ross, 220 Mich App at
186-187 (citations omitted). While the defendant in Ross handed a gun to his son who was in an
agitated state and suffered serious mental illnesses, which constitutes alleged misfeasance,
Inhmathong in the present case was indisputably not involved in the subject incident, which
occurred when she was not at home. Instead, plaintiff alleges that Inhmathong failed to act, i.e.,
the allegations sound in nonfeasance. The only similarity between Ross and the present case are
that a shooting occurred and that the respective defendants were aware that the shooter possessed
a gun. Unlike the defendant in Ross, Inhmathong did not hand a gun to Le-Nguyen in
circumstances where his shooting someone was foreseeable, i.e., there was no misfeasance.
Likewise, unlike Ross, there is no allegation in this matter that Le-Nguyen had a history of
psychosis or that Inhmathong was aware of any such history. The mere fact that Inhamthong
testified that she did not want Le-Nguyen’s guns in her house does not equate the facts of the
present case with the facts of Ross, in which the defendant literally handed his agitated, mentally-
disturbed son a gun just after he had a confrontation outside of his house.
In his brief on appeal, plaintiff acknowledges that there is no legal duty in Michigan to
protect others from the criminal acts of third parties, but citing Bailey v Schaaf, 494 Mich 595,
614; 835 NW2d 413 (2013), he argues that an exception to that rule exists “where the risk is
foreseeable, or a special relationship exists.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff materially misstates
Bailey’s holding. The exception in Bailey applies when a special relationship exists, such as the
relationship between a premises possessor and their tenants and other invitees, and the risk is
foreseeable. See id. at 609-610, 612-614. The owner and operator of the apartment complex in
Bailey were found to owe a duty to the plaintiff based upon longstanding Michigan common law,
which requires landlords and merchants to reasonably expedite police involvement when given
notice of a specific situation occurring on the premises “that would cause a reasonable person to
recognize a risk of imminent harm to an identifiable [tenant or] invitee.” Id. at 615 (alteration in
original) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The plaintiff in Bailey was attending a barbeque in the common outdoor area of the
defendants’ apartment complex where his brother was a tenant when a person entered onto the
premises with a gun and threatened “to kill somebody.” This situation was brought to the attention
of the defendants’ security guards, who allegedly failed to contact the police. Id. at 617. The
Court found that these allegations were sufficient for plaintiff to state a claim for negligence
against the owner and operator of the apartment complex, where he “was an identifiable victim of
that harm because he was within the range of the risk of harm created by [the gunman’s] conduct.”
Id. at 617-618.
The special relationships referenced in Bailey “are predicated on an imbalance of control,
where one person entrusts himself to the control and protection of another, with a consequent loss
of control to protect himself.” Id. at 604 (quotations marks and citation omitted). “Michigan law
has recognized that a special relationship exists between owners and occupiers of land and their
invitees, including between a landlord and its tenants and their invitees and between a merchant
and its invitees.” Id. (quotations marks, brackets and citation omitted). But plaintiff fails to
establish that Inhmathong had a special relationship with CAD. The evidence in this matter

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indicates that CAD was shot while he was standing on the sidewalk in front of defendants’ house
and not on her premises (and while Inhmathong was not home or alerted to any specific or
imminent harm). Also, plaintiff makes no argument that CAD was an invitee. While the owner
and operator defendants in Bailey owed a duty to the plaintiff, due to the special relationship
between the defendants and their tenant’s guest who, “was an identifiable victim of that harm
because he was within the range of the risk of harm created by [the gunman’s] conduct,” plaintiff
in the present case has not demonstrated that Inhmathong owed a duty to CAD.3
In addition, even if we determined that Inhmathong owed a legal duty to CAD, we agree
with the trial court that no reasonable jury could decide that it was foreseeable to Inhmathong that
Le-Nguyen would shoot the six-year-old victim, based on the argument proffered by plaintiff: that
he owned two guns and had an ongoing conflict with children in the neighborhood that allegedly
included chasing them out of the yard and throwing their toys and bicycles in the trash.
As a result, we find that the trial court did not err when it granted summary disposition on
plaintiff’s negligence claim.
Having found that the court did not err in granting summary disposition on plaintiff’s
claims of nuisance and negligence, we affirm the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion
for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).4
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
3 Again, to be clear, plaintiff does not argue that CAD was an invitee or a licensee of Inhmathong.
Rather, throughout this case plaintiff has argued that his claims do not arise out of common law
premises liability principles.
4 Because the trial court did not rule on whether Inhmathong was entitled to summary disposition
of plaintiff’s nuisance and negligence claims under MCR 2.116(C)(8), we will not decide that issue
in this matter, in which we affirm the trial court’s holding that plaintiff failed to establish a genuine
issue of material fact as to the elements of those claims under MCR 2.116(C)(10).

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