COA 378627 IN RE MILLER/HENTON MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/14/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
July 14, 2026
9:28 AM
In re MILLER/HENTON, Minors.
No. 378627
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC Nos. 2022-000278-NA;
2022-000279-NA
Before: RICK, P.J., and MURRAY and BORRELLO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the order terminating her parental rights to her minor
children, MBM and SJH.1 We affirm.
I. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent argues the trial court clearly erred when it found MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g),
and (j) were proven by clear and convincing evidence.
A trial court must find at least one statutory ground for termination under MCL
712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing evidence to terminate parental rights. In re
Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 272; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). This Court reviews for clear error a trial
court’s determination that a statutory ground was met. Id. “A decision qualifies as clearly
erroneous when, ‘although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’ ” In re
Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009), quoting In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-
210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). This Court defers to “the special ability of the trial court to judge the
credibility of witnesses.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 711; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “If the trial
1 At the time of trial, MBM was 12 years old and SJH was 9 years old.

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court did not clearly err by finding one statutory ground existed, then that one ground is sufficient
to affirm the termination of respondent’s parental rights.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 273.
Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), a trial court is authorized to terminate parental rights under
the following circumstances:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or
more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the
court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time
considering the child’s age.
“Termination may be proper under this ground when ‘the totality of the evidence amply
supports’ a finding that the parent has not achieved ‘any meaningful change in the conditions
existing by the time of the adjudication.’ ” In re Brown, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2025) (Docket No. 371986); slip op at 7, quoting In re Williams, 286 Mich App at 272. “This
statutory ground exists when the conditions that brought the children into foster care continue to
exist despite ‘time to make changes and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety of
services[.]’ ” In re White, 303 Mich App at 710, quoting In re Powers Minors, 244 Mich App 111,
119; 624 NW2d 472 (2000). When a respondent refuses “to address the main barriers that her
mental health pose[s]” to the children’s care, termination under MCL 712A.19b(c)(i) may be
proper. In re Smith, 324 Mich App 28, 48; 919 NW2d 427 (2018).
More than 182 days elapsed between entry of the initial dispositional order in March 2023
and the termination hearing in September 2025. If the “conditions that led to the adjudication
continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within
a reasonable time considering the child’s age,” MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) is established. The petition
alleged respondent neglected or refused to provide care and custody of the children, and the home
or environment was an unfit place for children to live.
As the trial court found, respondent obtained housing for about eight months during the
proceedings but was unable to maintain it for financial reasons, and thus did not demonstrate that
she is capable of keeping a stable place for the children to live. Significantly, respondent did not
complete parenting classes despite multiple referrals in the three-year pendency of the case.
Respondent did not prioritize taking parenting classes, citing scheduling conflicts while
concurrently denying she needed such instruction. Respondent completed her psychological
evaluation but did not complete individual therapy as recommended. The necessity of parenting
classes and individual therapy is reflected in respondent’s treatment of her older son JMM and her
later denial of the allegations in the petition. According to petitioner, respondent was
“inappropriate” during parenting time with JMM, got into loud verbal arguments with him, and
tried to take his clothes away because “she bought them.” JMM tried to walk away from these
arguments, but respondent would not “leave it alone.” Respondent’s treatment of JMM is
“probative” of how she may treat MBM and SJH. In re LaFrance Minors, 306 Mich App 713,
730; 858 NW2d 143 (2014) (explaining that the doctrine of anticipatory neglect suggests a parent’s

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treatment of one child is indicative of how they may treat other children). The trial court suggested
respondent’s refusal to permit her children to go on vacation with relatives was motivated by spite.
At the termination hearing, respondent denied all the allegations in the petition, despite
having pleaded no-contest to the factual basis of the allegations in the petition at the adjudication.
Respondent suggested J. Henley fabricated the story and instructed the children, MBM
specifically, to lie “to gain financial currency from the courts.” Respondent argued she was not
neglectful and there was no reason for the children to be in the care of petitioner, the Department
of Health and Human Services.
Evidence supported the conclusion that respondent took no responsibility for the children
being in care and took virtually no steps to improve her parenting ability or address her mental
health issues, despite having three years to effectuate change. While respondent intermittently
made progress finding suitable housing, her ability to maintain stable housing is unproven.
Respondent did not demonstrate that she can provide proper care and custody, maintain income,
or maintain appropriate housing. As such, it was not clear error for the trial court to conclude that
the conditions leading to adjudication remain and there was no reasonable likelihood they would
be rectified within a reasonable time considering the children’s ages. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
Because only one statutory ground is sufficient to terminate a respondent’s parental rights,
we need not address MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j).
II. BEST INTERESTS
Once the trial court has determined that one or more statutory grounds for termination have
been proven by clear and convincing evidence, it must assess whether petitioner proved, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the children’s best interests. In re White, 303
Mich App at 713. A trial court’s best-interests determination is reviewed for clear error. Id. “A
decision qualifies as clearly erroneous when, ‘although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.’ ” In re Williams, 286 Mich App at 271, quoting In re JK, 468 Mich at 209-210.
The best-interests analysis is focused on the child, not the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich
App 76, 87-88; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The trial court must “decide the best interests of each child
individually.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). To
determine a child’s best interests, the court should weigh all available evidence and consider a
variety of factors. In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. “A child’s placement with relatives is a
factor that the trial court is required to consider” and that weighs against termination. In re Atchley,
341 Mich App 332, 347; 990 NW2d 685 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The evidence showed that MBM enjoyed spending time with respondent, but that he also
indicated to foster care worker Angelina Fadhil that “he does not have an interest in being reunified
with her and living with her again on a full-time basis,” as he would prefer to reside with J. Henley.
Fadhil believed termination was in MBM’s best interests because he enjoys the stability and
routine of living with J. Henley. MBM also liked his school, where he had many friends and
excelled academically. Respondent offered contradictory testimony, suggesting MBM was upset
when respondent obtained an apartment and he did not move in with her at that location. We give

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deference to the trial court in matters of witness credibility, and it is apparent the trial court relied
more heavily on Fadhil’s testimony. In re White, 303 Mich App at 711. Notwithstanding this
parent-child bond, MBM expressed his preference to remain with J. Henley, who is in the process
of adopting him into her stable home where his needs are met. Accordingly, MBM’s well-being
in care, the advantage of stability and permanence at J. Henley’s home and at the school, and J.
Henley’s willingness to adopt MBM outweigh the parent-child bond and MBM’s placement with
a relative, supporting a finding that termination is in MBM’s best interests. Id. at 713-714; In re
Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347.
SJH has been in foster care for three years, and although he “has a strong love for
[respondent],” Fadhil indicated he has expressed misgivings “about being . . . reunified or
continuing to . . . allow[] [respondent] to have rights over him.” Fadhil argued the stability and
permanence at A. Henton’s home outweighed the strong bond between SJH and respondent,
especially considering SJH’s age and the length of time he has been in her care. SJH adapted to
life with A. Henton and it would be disruptive to continue with a goal of reunification. SJH already
waited three years for respondent to “get it together,” and making him continue to wait would
deprive him of permanence and stability. Again, respondent’s testimony contradicted Fadhil’s.
She indicated SJH is “constantly” asking when he can return to her, and cries at the end of
parenting time sessions because he does not want her to leave. While A. Henton allegedly told
respondent SJH was “not doing well without seeing you,” SJH did well in his placement,
completed mental health services, and excelled academically. A. Henton is also currently in the
process of adopting SJH. While there is a strong bond between SJH and respondent and SJH is
placed with his paternal grandmother, SJH’s well-being in his preadoptive home, the advantages
of that stable environment, and SJH’s preference for remaining there suggest termination was in
SJH’s best interests. In re White, 303 Mich App at 713-714; In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347.
Further, respondent was only partially compliant with her Parent Agency Agreement
(PAA). Although the trial court found that she demonstrated “financial stability at best,”
respondent still struggled to maintain housing. Her eight-month period of housing stability ended
because respondent lost her primary source of income and could not afford rent. Respondent was
transient between leaving the apartment and moving into a house in Detroit. It is unclear whether
that house was suitable for the children. Respondent did not have contact with Fadhil from about
March 2025 through May 2025 and was often hostile when communicating with her. Parenting
time went well until about December 2024, when respondent began arguing with JMM and R.
Henley during parenting times. After parenting time was moved to the agency, respondent chose
not to attend for about five months because she and the children were allegedly uncomfortable at
that location. Respondent claimed at the termination hearing that her parents refused to schedule
parenting time at the agency.
Respondent’s psychological evaluation recommended she participate in individual therapy,
which she did not complete. Respondent believed she did not need parenting classes and did not
complete them, citing scheduling conflicts. As described earlier, the record suggests respondent’s
unaddressed mental health concerns, failure to complete parenting classes, and refusal to
acknowledge the issues that brought the children into care are directly linked to her parenting
ability. Respondent’s noncompliance with critical elements of her PAA, deficient parenting
ability, and inconsistent attendance at parenting time, as well as inappropriate behavior at parenting

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time, support a conclusion that the trial court did not err in finding that termination was in the
children’s best interests. In re White, 303 Mich App at 713-714.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello

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