IN RE ALFADAWI MINORS

Court of Appeals, State of Michigan
ORDER
IN RE ALFADAWI MINORS
Docket No. 371381
LC No. 2022-001555-NA
Sima G. Patel
Presiding Judge
Micheal J. Riordan
Brock A. Swartzle
Judges
This Court’s opinion and order, entered on July 18, 2025, vacated the trial court’s best-
interests analysis, and remanded, while retaining jurisdiction, for further proceedings. Specifically, this
Court ordered the trial court to “determine whether termination of respondent’s parental rights is in the
children’s best interests.” On remand, the trial court determined that termination of respondent’s parental
rights was in the children’s best interests and entered an order terminating respondent’s parental rights to
the children.
On remand, the matter was scheduled for a half-day bench trial on September 8, 2025. On
August 25, 2025, the trial court issued a summons for respondent to appear at the bench trial. The proof
of service reflects that the summons and notice of hearing were served on respondent by certified mail.
There is no indication in the record whether respondent signed for and received the certified mailing.
Respondent’s guardian ad litem was present at the hearing, but neither respondent nor an attorney on his
behalf appeared at the bench trial. Testimony reflects that respondent was in a serious car accident on
August 25, 2025, was hospitalized with a head injury, and was heavily sedated at the time of the bench
trial. The matter was rescheduled to November 17, 2025. The record does not reflect whether respondent
was served with the new bench trial date.
Respondent’s prior attorney, Frank Becker, appeared on November 17, 2025, and objected
to the trial proceeding without respondent present. Becker stated that he had been unable to speak with
respondent and was told by family members that respondent was “not in a position to see anyone” and
that medical professionals had instructed that he should not see anyone. Because the foster-care worker
present at the hearing had not had any recent contact with the children or the mother, the trial court
adjourned the trial until December 5, 2025, to give the foster-care worker an opportunity to obtain a
current status. The record does not reflect whether respondent was served with the new bench trial date.
Attorney Becker appeared at the December 5, 2025 bench trial and indicated that he
formerly represented respondent but had been excluded from all contact from respondent. Becker argued
that it was a “total lack of due process that my client’s serious rights as a father being adjudicated without
his presence, and without him really being represented.” The trial court declined to adjourn the matter.
Following additional testimony, the trial court concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination was in each of the children’s best interests despite their placement with the mother.
“It is well established that parents have a significant interest in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of their children.” In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 109; 499 NW2d 752 (1993).

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“This interest has been characterized as an element of ‘liberty’ to be protected by due process.” Id. “The
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 92;
763 NW2d 587 (2009) (opinion by CORRIGAN, J.). This requires notice of court hearings:
The “opportunity to be heard” includes the right to notice of that opportunity. An
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections. [Id. (cleaned up).]
The Legislature requires that a parent named in a termination petition receive personal
service of a summons before the court may conduct a hearing:
After a petition shall have been filed and after such further investigation as the court may
direct . . . the court may dismiss said petition or may issue a summons reciting briefly the
substance of the petition, and requiring the person or persons who have the custody or
control of the child, or with whom the child may be, to appear personally and bring the
child before the court at a time and place stated: Provided, That the court in its discretion
may excuse but not restrict children from attending the hearing. If the person so summoned
shall be other than the parent or guardian of the child, then the parents or guardian, or both,
shall also be notified of the petition and of the time and place appointed for the hearing
thereon, by personal service before the hearing, except as hereinafter provided. Summons
may be issued requiring the appearance of any other person whose presence, in the opinion
of the judge, is necessary.
Any interested party who shall voluntarily appear in said proceedings, may, by writing,
waive service of process or notice of hearing. [MCL 712A.12 (emphasis added).]
“[S]tatutes requiring notice to parents must be strictly construed.” In re Atkins, 237 Mich
App 249, 251; 602 NW2d 594 (1999). “[P]ersonal service not only provides a parent notice, but also
apprises the parent of the charges levied against him or her and affords a reasonable time to prepare a
defense.” In re Dearmon, 303 Mich App 684, 694; 847 NW2d 514 (2014), citing In re Brown, 149 Mich
App 529, 541-542; 386 NW2d 577 (1986). The statutory requirement of personal service protects a
parent’s due-process rights. See id. See also In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1; 22; 934 NW2d 610 (2019). “A
failure to provide notice of a termination proceeding hearing by personal service as required by statute,
[MCL 712A.12], is a jurisdictional defect that renders all proceedings in the trial court void.” Atkins, 237
Mich App at 250-251, citing In re Adair, 191 Mich App 710, 713–714; 478 NW2d 667 (1991); Brown,
149 Mich App at 534–542. Notably, this Court determined in Brown, “the fact that respondent had actual
notice does not cure this jurisdictional error.” Brown, 149 Mich App at 541.
In cases where personal service is impracticable, MCL 712A.13 provides for service of
process by alternative methods, including publication:
Service of summons may be made anywhere in the state personally by the delivery of true
copies thereof to the persons summoned: Provided, [t]hat if the judge is satisfied that it is
impracticable to serve personally such summons or the notice provided for in the preceding

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section, he may order service by registered mail addressed to their last known addresses,
or by publication thereof, or both, as he may direct. . . .
“When determining whether personal service would be impractical, the trial court must
determine if reasonable efforts were made to locate the party.” In re Lovitt, 351 Mich App 237, 244; 34
NW3d 645 (2024). “Substituted service is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.” In re SZ, 262
Mich App 560, 565; 686 NW2d 520 (2004). However, as this Court determined in Atkins, “receipt of the
amended petition by respondent’s attorney cannot be deemed a proper substitute for personal service on
respondent.” Atkins, 237 Mich App at 251.
The court rules reinforce the necessity of personal service. MCR 3.920(G) states that
“[a]fter a party’s first appearance before the court, subsequent notice of proceedings and pleadings shall
be served on that party or, if the party has an attorney, on the attorney for the party as provided in subrule
(D), except that a summons must be served for trial or termination hearing as provided in subrule (B).”
(Emphasis added.) MCR 3.920(B)(4) states:
(a) Except as provided in subrule (B)(4)(b), a summons required under subrule
(B)(2) [1] must be served by delivering the summons to the party personally.
(b) If the court finds, on the basis of testimony or a motion and affidavit, that
personal service of the summons is impracticable or cannot be achieved, the court may by
ex parte order direct that it be served in any manner reasonably calculated to give notice of
the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, including publication.
Similar to MCL 712A.12, MCR 3.920(F) provides that a respondent may execute a written waiver of
notice of hearing or service of process.
In this case, there is no evidence that respondent was personally served with notice of the
petition or the time and place for hearing. There is also no evidence that petitioner moved for alternate
service or that the trial court determined that personal service on respondent would be impracticable.
Moreover, respondent never executed a written waiver of service of process or notice of hearing.
In addition, a parent has the right to retain an attorney and, if financially unable to do so,
the right to request and receive a court-appointed attorney as a matter of statute and court rule. In re
Powers Minors, 244 Mich App 111, 121; 624 NW2d 472 (2002). While attorney Becker attended and
participated in the bench trial, he stated that he was respondent’s former counsel and had been denied
1 MCR 3.920(B)(2) states in relevant part:
(2) When Required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, the court shall direct the
service of a summons in the following circumstances:
* * *
(b) In a child protective proceeding, a summons must be served on any respondent and any
nonrespondent parent. . . .

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access to respondent to discuss the matter following respondent’s accident. There is no evidence in the
record that respondent wished to retain Becker or, instead, request a court-appointed attorney.
Because respondent was not served in accordance with the statutory mandates, the trial
court lacked jurisdiction and thus erred by proceeding with the best-interests hearing. See Atkins, 237
Mich App at 250-251; see also Lovitt, 351 Mich App at 247. The lack of jurisdiction renders all trial court
proceedings void. Lovitt, 351 Mich App at 244. On this basis, we must vacate the trial court’s order
terminating respondent’s parental rights to the children and remand for a new best-interests hearing.
Respondent must be served with notice of the best-interests hearing in accordance with the statutory and
court-rule mandates.
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings. We retain jurisdiction.
_______________________________
Presiding Judge
August 18, 2026

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