COA 373085 PEOPLE OF MI V ERIK LYNN PAWLICKI Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 10/8/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
October 08, 2026
1:50 PM
v No. 373085
Iron Circuit Court
ERIK LYNN PAWLICKI, LC No. 2024-010183-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: WALLACE, P.J., and CAMERON and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench-trial convictions of possession with intent to deliver
methamphetamine, MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i), possession with intent to deliver fentanyl,
MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(ii), possession of buprenorphine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(ii), possession of
ammunition by a felon, MCL 750.224f(7), possession of a firearm by a felon (felon-in-possession),
MCL 750.224f(6), carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), MCL 750.227(2), possession of
tramadol, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(ii), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced, as a second-offense habitual offender,
MCL 769.10, to 10 to 30 years’ imprisonment for the methamphetamine conviction, 18 months’
to 10 years’ imprisonment for the fentanyl conviction, 18 months’ to 3 years’ imprisonment for
the buprenorphine and tramadol convictions, 18 months’ to 7 years, 6 months’ imprisonment for
the ammunition, felon-in-possession, and CCW convictions, and two years’ imprisonment for the
felony-firearm conviction. We reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress,
vacate defendant’s convictions, and remand.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2022, defendant was sentenced to two years’ probation for felony delivery of a
controlled substance, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). The conditions of his probation required that he
(1) not violate any criminal law, (2) not leave Michigan without permission, (3) not possess any
controlled substances without a prescription, and (4) not possess any weapons. Defendant was
also required to submit to warrantless searches of his personal property, including his cell phone,

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if law enforcement had “reasonable cause to believe” that he possessed items in violation of his
probation conditions.
In September 2023, law enforcement obtained a search warrant for defendant’s cell phone
records. The affidavit supporting the warrant stated that defendant’s cell phone number had
exchanged multiple text messages with a man police had arrested for possessing
methamphetamine. According to the affidavit, the messages appeared to pertain to drug
distribution. The warrant directed defendant’s cell phone carrier, Verizon Wireless (Verizon), to
provide specific information, including real-time GPS location updates “for a period of 30 days
from the date of search warrant service.”
On October 25, 2023, law enforcement obtained a second warrant continuing the
surveillance authorized by the initial warrant. Like the first warrant, the second warrant authorized
the collection of real-time GPS location updates “[f]or a period of 30 days from the date of search
warrant service.” After receiving the second warrant, Verizon e-mailed the requesting officer and
confirmed that the “location warrant [had] been provisioned until 2023-10-27 11:25 to 2023-11-
24 00:00 Eastern.”
Despite the expiration of the authorized tracking period on November 24, 2023, Verizon
continued to provide defendant’s real-time GPS information to law enforcement. As a result, law
enforcement continued to track defendant’s movements on November 25, 2023. The next day,
officers discussed defendant’s movements in a group text message, including potential locations
where they might conduct a traffic stop. Officers also notified nearby troopers that defendant was
in the area and was suspected of trafficking narcotics.
Nearby troopers subsequently stopped defendant as he entered his driveway. The troopers
explained the stop was based on defendant’s lack of insurance and illegal window tints. But
testimony indicated that defendant’s license plate was run before the troopers even encountered
defendant’s car. Moreover, defendant had been stopped two or three times in the preceding weeks
while driving the same vehicle. Yet, the officers conducting those stops did not cite defendant for
his window tint and found no controlled substances.
During the stop, a drug-detection canine was deployed around defendant’s car. According
to the canine’s handler, the dog indicated the presence of narcotics inside the car. Officers then
searched the entire car and discovered various controlled substances in different quantities, a
firearm, and ammunition. Defendant was arrested and charged as noted.
Before trial, defendant moved to quash the search warrants and to suppress all the evidence
gathered from the stop. Following a hearing, the trial court concluded that the traffic stop was
supported by probable cause based on defendant’s illegal window tint and lack of insurance,
regardless of whether the canine had indicated drugs were in the car. Accordingly, the trial court
denied the motion to suppress. Defendant was subsequently convicted after a bench trial and
sentenced as noted. He now appeals.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“A trial court’s factual findings made when ruling on a motion to suppress are reviewed
for clear error.” People v Woodard, 321 Mich App 377, 382; 909 NW2d 299 (2017). Clear error

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exists when, “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Lanzo Const Co, 272 Mich App 470,
473; 726 NW2d 746 (2006). “But the application of constitutional standards regarding searches
and seizures to essentially uncontested facts is entitled to less deference.” Woodard, 321 Mich
App at 382 (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). “We review de novo whether the
Fourth Amendment was violated and whether the exclusionary rule applies.” Id. “We also review
de novo the trial court’s ultimate decision on a motion to suppress.” Id. at 383.
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the real-time location data generated by his cell phone, and
because the time period authorized by the search warrant had expired. He further argues that the
good-faith exception does not apply. We agree.
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its counterpart in the
Michigan Constitution guarantee the right of persons to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). “A search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment occurs when the government intrudes on an individual’s reasonable, or justifiable,
expectation of privacy.” Id. (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). “The touchstone of
[the Fourth Amendment’s] protections is reasonableness, which is measured by examining the
totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Ordinarily, searches
or seizures conducted without a warrant are unreasonable per se, and when evidence has been
seized in violation of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, it
must be excluded from trial.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). But the exclusionary
rule is subject to the good-faith exception. People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 542; 682 NW2d 479
(2004). “Under the good-faith exception, evidence obtained through a defective search warrant is
admissible when the executing officer relied upon the validity of the warrant in good faith.” People
v DeRousse, 341 Mich App 447, 465; 991 NW2d 596 (2022). “[T]he primary purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter official misconduct by removing incentives to engage in unreasonable
searches and seizures[,]” and so “suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance
on a subsequently invalidated search warrant produces marginal or nonexistent benefits and cannot
justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
With respect to real-time GPS tracking of an individual’s cell phone, the United States
Supreme Court has held that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI [cell-site location information].”
Carpenter v United States, 585 US 296, 310; 138 S Ct 2206; 201 L Ed 2d 507 (2018). Although
Carpenter concerned historical location data, its reasoning applies equally to real-time location
data as well, because “individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their
physical movements.” Id. The use of GPS data to track an individual over time “provides an all-
encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts.” Id. at 311. Such data, whether collected in
real time or recorded for later review, “provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing
not only his particular movements, but through them his familial, political, professional, religious,
and sexual associations.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). Defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his physical movements as monitored by his cell phone real-time GPS
data. Id. In this case, law enforcement obtained warrants for defendant’s real-time GPS cell phone

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data. Each warrant, however, contained an express time limitation. Specifically, both warrants
authorized access to the data for 30 days “from the date of search warrant service.”
The prosecution argues that the second warrant was not “served” until October 27, 2023,
when Verizon acknowledged receipt. We disagree. The warrant was sent to Verizon on October
25, 2023. Although the warrant does not define “service,” and no statutory provision specifically
defines the term in this context, the ordinary legal meaning of word “service” refers to delivery,
not acknowledgment of delivery. Indeed, “service” and “proof of service” are distinct concepts.
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed) defines “service” as “[t]he formal delivery of . . . legal
process . . . to a litigant” or “the legal communication of a judicial process.” (Emphasis added).
By contrast, “proof of service” is a “document filed . . . in court as evidence that the process has
been successfully served on a party.” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed) (emphasis added). See
also, e.g., MCR 6.102(C)(2) (noting that a summons may be “served” by way of different delivery
methods). In other words, “service” is delivery of the legal process itself; acknowledgement or
proof of that delivery is a separate matter. Here, the evidence establishes that the second warrant
was delivered to Verizon on October 25, 2023. Therefore, the 30-day period began on that date
and expired on November 24, 2023. Law enforcement’s subsequent use of defendant’s cell phone
data from November 25, 2023 and November 26, 2023 was outside the period authorized by the
warrant.
Nor can defendant’s probation term that he must “submit to” a warrantless search of his
cell phone justify the search here. Relevant to this case, Merriam-Webster defines “submit” as “to
yield oneself to the authority or will of another” or “to permit oneself to be subjected to
something.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (12th ed). In other words, in order for
defendant to “submit to” a warrantless search of his cell phone, he had to take some sort of
voluntary action in providing the requested item to a requesting officer. That is not what occurred
here. In fulfilling law enforcement’s request, Verizon may have “submitted to” the search, but
defendant did not.
Alternatively, the prosecution argues that suppression is unwarranted because the officers
in this case acted in good faith and probable cause to arrest defendant continued to exist.
According to the prosecution, even if “service” means delivery, the officers in this case reasonably,
although mistakenly, believed that service was not complete until Verizon acknowledged receipt
of the warrant. In support of this argument, the prosecution relies on Verizon’s continued
provision of defendant’s GPS data after November 24, 2023.
The record does not support the prosecution’s argument. First, the receipt e-mail on which
the prosecution relies explicitly stated that the data was to be provided only until November 24,
2023. Thus, Verizon’s acknowledgement of receipt did not indicate that the warrant authorized
collection of data beyond that date; in fact, it indicated the opposite. Second, the police were aware
of the limited monitoring period because they included the 30-day limitation in their affidavits.
Therefore, the officers knew, or should have known, that the warrant contained a 30-day limitation
and the 30-day period was tied to the date of service. Moreover, the officer’s testimony concerning
service of the warrant undermines, rather than supports, the officers’ claimed good-faith belief.
One officer twice characterized his act of sending the warrant to Verizon as having “served” the
warrant before retreating from that characterization and stating that October 25, 2023 was merely
the date the warrant was “sent.” This testimony suggests that the officers understood delivery of

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the warrant constituted service and did not contemporaneously believe that service depended on
Version’s acknowledgment of receipt. Accordingly, the good-faith exception does not apply, and
the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
We reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress, vacate defendant’s
convictions, and remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin

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