COA 363495 C-SPINE ORTHOPEDICS PLLC V FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY Opinion - On Remand SCt - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/7/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
ANTONIO HAMMOCK,
Plaintiff,
and
C-SPINE ORTHOPEDICS, PLLC,
Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
July 07, 2026
10:27 AM
v No. 363495
Macomb Circuit Court
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF MICHIGAN and FARM BUREAU
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF
MICHIGAN,
LC No. 2020-002102-NF
Defendants-Appellees.
ON REMAND
Before: RICK, P.J., and PATEL and GARRETT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This matter returns to us on remand in light of our Supreme Court’s recent ruling in C-
Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Mich Ins Co, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025)
(Docket Nos. 165537, 165538, and 165964). Having reviewed the matter in full, we vacate and
remand.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
When this case was initially before us, we summarized the pertinent facts as follows:
Intervening plaintiff C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC (C-Spine) appeals as of
right, challenging an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant

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Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan in this case arising under
the no-fault act.1 We reverse and remand.
Plaintiff, Antonio Hammock, filed a lawsuit for no-fault personal injury
protection (PIP) insurance benefits against defendant following an alleged
automobile accident. C-Spine intervened in the lawsuit as a purported assignee of
Hammock’s rights. C-Spine had treated Hammock’s injuries, leading to an
outstanding balance of $450,677.57. Although C-Spine had entered into numerous
bulk purchase and sale agreements for accounts receivable with multiple different
factoring companies—of which Hammock’s were included—at a later date, C-
Spine agreed to counter-assignments of Hammock’s claims with the same factoring
companies.
Subsequently, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition as to C-
Spine’s claims, arguing that the case should be dismissed under MCR 2.116(C)(8)
and (C)(10) because C-Spine was not a real party in interest, and therefore, had no
standing to bring the suit. The trial court agreed with defendant and granted the
motion, dismissing the case. C-Spine now appeals as of right. [C-Spine
Orthopedics v Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co, unpublished per curiam opinion of the
Court of Appeals, issued February 1, 2024 (Docket No. 363495), pp 1-2.]
1 We refer to Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan as
“defendant.” Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Michigan was never
formally dismissed from the case, but was not a proper defendant according to
defendant’s answer to C-Spine’s complaint, and did not participate in the case in
any manner.
On appeal, relying exclusively on this Court’s published opinion in C-Spine Orthopedics,
PLLC v Progressive Mich Ins Co, 344 Mich App 626; 2 NW3d 71 (2022), this Court held that the
trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition. C-Spine, unpub op
at 4. This Court found that, because C-Spine had statutory standing under MCL 500.3112, it was
the real party in interest, despite assignments to third parties. Id.
Defendant thereafter sought leave to appeal to our Supreme Court. In lieu of granting leave
to appeal, and having previously held the matter in abeyance pending its decision in C-Spine
Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Mich Ins Co, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket
Nos. 165537, 165538, and 165964), our Supreme Court vacated this Court’s opinion and remanded
for reconsideration, stating:
By order of July 2, 2024, the application for leave to appeal the February 1,
2024 judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decisions
in C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Michigan Ins Co (Docket Nos.
165537-8) and Wallace v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp (Docket No.
165964). On order of the Court, the cases having been decided on July 3, 2025,
___ Mich ___ (2025), the application is again considered. Pursuant to
MCR 7.305(I)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and REMAND this case to that court for reconsideration in

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light of C-Spine Orthopedics and Wallace. [Hammock v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co,
___ Mich ___; 25 NW3d 336 (2025).]
We now address this matter on remand.
II. ANALYSIS
C-Spine argues that it retained the right to pursue PIP benefits under MCL 500.3112
despite assigning its accounts receivable to factoring companies. C-Spine alternatively argues that
any real-party-in-interest defect was cured by counter-assignments returning the claims to C-
Spine. We reject the contention that C-Spine remained the real party in interest when suit was
filed, but agree that the counter-assignments could restore C-Spine’s status, subject to proper
procedural action in the trial court.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Maiden
v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). We likewise review de novo questions of
law, including whether a party is the real party in interest under MCR 2.201(B)(1). C-Spine
Orthopedics, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 17.
C-Spine first contends that it retained the right to pursue payment of PIP benefits under
MCL 500.3112, notwithstanding its assignments of accounts receivable to third-party factoring
companies. We are not persuaded by C-Spine’s argument on this point. Although MCL 500.3112
confers statutory standing on medical providers to bring a direct action against an insurer for
unpaid PIP benefits, standing alone does not resolve whether a party is the real party in interest.
C-Spine Orthopedics, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 17-20; Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of
Ed, 487 Mich 349, 372; 792 NW2d 686 (2010). The real-party-in-interest requirement, derived
from MCL 600.2041 and MCR 2.201(B)(1), mandates that an action be prosecuted in the name of
the party who possesses the substantive right being asserted and serves to protect defendants from
multiple suits for the same claim. Kearns v Mich Iron & Coke Co, 340 Mich 577, 581; 66 NW2d
230 (1954).1 In other words, statutory standing addresses whether a class of plaintiffs is authorized
by statute to bring a claim in the abstract, while the real-party-in-interest requirement concerns
whether the particular plaintiff before the court possesses the substantive right being asserted in
the litigation. Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n, 487 Mich at 372. Accordingly, a plaintiff may have statutory
standing to sue under MCL 500.3112 but nevertheless fail to qualify as the real party in interest if
it has transferred away its ownership of the claim through assignment. C-Spine Orthopedics, ___
Mich at ___; slip op at 17-20.
1 Our Supreme Court’s decision in Wallace v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, ___
Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025), which was consolidated with C-Spine Orthopedics, reinforces
this distinction. In Wallace, our Supreme Court reaffirmed that statutory standing does not obviate
the requirement that an action be prosecuted by the party possessing the substantive right at issue,
and that defects in real-party-in-interest status are subject to correction only through appropriate
action within the litigation. Id. at ___; slip op at 33. Accordingly, Wallace confirms that C-Spine’s
statutory standing under MCL 500.3112 does not, standing alone, resolve whether it was the real
party in interest when this action was commenced. Id.

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As noted, C-Spine assigned its accounts receivable to certain factoring companies. An
assignment transfers the assignor’s rights or interests to the assignee. Mecosta Co Med Ctr v Metro
Group Prop & Cas Ins Co, 509 Mich 276, 284; 983 NW2d 401 (2022). A party that has fully
assigned its rights generally may not thereafter maintain an action to enforce them. Jawad A Shah,
MD, PC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 324 Mich App 182, 201; 920 NW2d 148 (2018). While
Michigan law permits limited assignments, the dispositive inquiry in this matter is not what a
plaintiff could have done, but what it actually did. C-Spine Orthopedics, ___ Mich at ___; slip op
at 29-30. Here, the plain language of the bulk purchase agreements demonstrates that C-Spine did
not merely assign proceeds or accounts receivable while retaining litigation authority. Instead, it
agreed to “sell, transfer, assign, and convey” its “legal and equitable rights and interests” in the
accounts. It also expressly transferred its “Rights, Title, and Interest” to the factoring companies.
Nothing in the agreements preserved C-Spine’s authority to litigate the claims for its own benefit,
and several provisions instead contemplated enforcement by the factoring companies themselves.
Thus, as was the case in C-Spine Orthopedics, C-Spine fully assigned away its rights and was not
the real party in interest at the time it filed suit, notwithstanding its statutory standing under
MCL 500.3112. C-Spine Orthopedics, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 30-31.
C-Spine alternatively argues that any real-party-in-interest defect was cured by counter-
assignments and amended agreements executed with the factoring companies. We agree to a
limited extent. Counter-assignments may restore a plaintiff’s real-party-in-interest status by
returning the right to litigate or by clarifying that the plaintiff possessed that authority. C-Spine
Orthopedics, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 32. However, a real-party-in-interest defect cannot be
cured by unilateral, out-of-court action alone. Id. at ___; slip op at 23, 32. Rather, a plaintiff must
take some action within the litigation, such as amending the complaint, substituting or joining the
proper party, or otherwise invoking the court’s authority, so that the trial court may assess the legal
effect of the asserted cure. Id.; see also MCR 2.201(B)(2). Since the burden of establishing that
a real-party-in-interest defect has been properly cured rests with the plaintiff, see C-Spine
Orthopedics, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 23, 32, C-Spine must demonstrate that the counter-
assignments were legally effective to restore its right to litigate the claims, and that it took
appropriate procedural action within the litigation to invoke the trial court’s authority to recognize
that cure.2 See MCR 2.201(B)(2). Such procedural action is necessary to permit the trial court to
determine whether any correction relates back to the filing of the original complaint under
MCR 2.118(D), or whether the claim is barred by the one-year-back rule governing recovery of
PIP benefits. See MCL 500.3145(2); Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 491 Mich 200, 203; 815 NW2d
412 (2012). Because the trial court resolved this matter solely through the lens of standing and
did not consider whether C-Spine could cure the real-party-in-interest defect through appropriate
procedural mechanisms, remand is required.
2 We emphasize that the availability of such procedural mechanisms does not mean that any
particular attempt to cure will be legally effective. Rather, C-Spine bears the burden of
demonstrating that the proposed cure satisfies MCR 2.201(B)(2) and restores its authority to
litigate the claim at issue. C-Spine Orthopedics, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 23, 32.

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III. CONCLUSION
We vacate the trial court’s order granting summary disposition and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion and our Supreme Court’s decision in C-Spine
Orthopedics. On remand, the parties may raise issues not previously addressed by the trial court,
including whether C-Spine may file amended complaints under MCR 2.118 and the effect, if any,
of MCL 500.3145 on the claims at issue. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

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