COA 373750 PEOPLE OF MI V KOSTA LAKOVIC Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/28/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
July 28, 2026
2:38 PM
v No. 373750
Allegan Circuit Court
KOSTA LAKOVIC, LC No. 2022-025563-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MALDONADO, P.J., and RIORDAN and YOUNG, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(b) (sexual contact with a household member between the
ages of 13 and 16). On appeal, defendant argues that his due-process right to a fair trial was
violated by the admission of other-acts evidence and testimony about grooming. Further,
defendant argues that his conviction for CSC-II was supported by insufficient evidence because
insufficient evidence was offered to show that he touched KC for a sexual purpose. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant’s conviction stems from an incident that occurred in August 2022. At that time
defendant was dating and living with Shannon Pitcock and her three daughters: SP, TP, and KP.
The victim, KC, was also living with Pitcock. On August 18, 2022, KC, who was 15 years old,
went upstairs to take a nap. Shortly thereafter, defendant came upstairs and into the bedroom
where KC was napping. Defendant placed his hand on her waist, slid his hand under the blanket,
and touched KC’s upper thigh and between her legs in a “squeezing” and “groping” manner. KC
was wearing a tank top and shorts, so defendant was touching her skin. KC told TP about the
incident, and the police were notified. When defendant was interviewed by the police, he admitted
to touching KC and that KC had grabbed his wrist and asked him to stop. However, defendant
denied “groping” KC. The Allegan County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office charged defendant with
one count of CSC-II.

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Before trial, the prosecution provided defendant with a notice of intent to offer other-acts
evidence under MCL 768.27a(1).1 The notice indicated that the prosecution sought to admit
information in a police report that accused defendant of committing other inappropriate acts
against Shannon’s three daughters, including: (1) evidence of grooming, accosting, and
inappropriate touching; (2) evidence that defendant grabbed TP’s breast during a game and made
sexual comments; (3) evidence that defendant made SP play games with “sexual overtones” and
made sexual comments; and (4) evidence that defendant made sexual comments to Pitcock’s 9-
year-old daughter, KP. Defendant objected, arguing that there were no allegations of defendant
grooming or accosting in the police reports, so such allegations were inadmissible unless the
prosecution provided a bill of particulars regarding the allegations. Similarly, defendant objected
to the admissibility of testimony accusing defendant of making sexual comments unless such
comments were actually described. Defendant also argued that evidence of defendant touching
TP’s breast during a game was inadmissible because such conduct was not a listed offense against
a minor.
The trial court determined that it would allow the prosecution to present the other-acts
evidence; however, it required the prosecution to articulate the “sexual comments” more
specifically in a supplemental report of some kind, and articulate “any accosting and grooming
behavior” in a “better way” at trial.
At trial, KC testified about the incident discussed earlier. TP, who was then 17 years old,
also testified about the uncomfortable interactions she had with defendant. On one occasion,
defendant told TP: “Be careful. You might get frosting on your boob,” as she carried a cake. On
another occasion, defendant tagged TP on her chest while playing a game of Marco Polo in a pool.
SP, who was then 16 years old, testified that on one occasion defendant grabbed her waist to move
her out of the way. She also testified defendant told her that she reminded him of the song, “Crazy
Girl” or “Crazy B word,” which SP listened to and testified that it contained sexually explicit
content about a girl having sex. Both TP and SP also testified about an instance when defendant
made up an inappropriate game, requiring them to draw a picture of a penis. The trial court also
heard testimony from the detective that interviewed defendant. The detective was asked to define
grooming. Defendant objected, but the objection was overruled and the detective defined
grooming as “when somebody’s building the relationship, building trust, building communication
with a younger adult, a child, in [an] attempt to exploit them, to manipulate them, and to abuse
them.” On cross-examination, the detective testified that the word “grooming” did not appear in
his police report.
The trial court provided the jury with the following instruction concerning the admission
of other-acts evidence:
You have heard evidence that was introduced to show that the defendant
has engaged in improper sexual conduct for which the defendant is not on trial. If
you believe this evidence, you must be very careful to consider it for only one
1 Defendant first proceeded to trial in March 2024. However, this trial ended in a hung jury. This
appeal concerns defendant’s second jury trial for the charged offense. The prosecution filed the
notice of intent to offer other-acts evidence before the first trial.

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limited purpose. That is to help judge the believability of the testimony of [KC]
regarding the acts for which the defendant is now on trial. You must not consider
this evidence for any other purpose.
For example, you must not decide that it shows the defendant is a bad person
or that the defendant is likely to commit crimes. You must not convict the
defendant here because you think he’s guilty of other bad conduct.
Defendant was found guilty of CSC-II. This appeal follows.
II. ANALYSIS
A. OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE
On appeal, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because the other-acts evidence
was inadmissible under MCL 768.27a and was unfairly prejudicial. We conclude that the other-
acts testimony was admissible.
We review this preserved evidentiary error for an abuse of discretion. People v Thorpe,
504 Mich 230, 252; 934 NW2d 693 (2019); see also MRE 103(a)(1). “A trial court necessarily
abuses its discretion when it admits evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law.” People v
Denson, 500 Mich 385, 396; 902 NW2d 306 (2017). “The questions of law involved in the
admission of evidence” and constitutional issues are “reviewed de novo.” People v Pinkney, 316
Mich App 450, 474; 891 NW2d 891 (2016). “A decision on a close evidentiary question ordinarily
cannot be an abuse of discretion.” Thorpe, 504 Mich at 252. “The United States Constitution and
the Michigan Constitution each guarantee that a criminal defendant receives due process of law.”
People v Horton, 341 Mich App 397, 401; 989 NW2d 885 (2022). “Implicit in this guarantee is
that each criminal defendant enjoys the right to a fair trial . . . .” Id. Admitting certain evidence
against a criminal defendant may violate due process when that evidence “is so extremely unfair
that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice.” Dowling v United States, 493 US
342, 352; 110 S Ct 668; 107 L Ed 2d 708 (1990) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Generally, “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of an individual is inadmissible to
prove a propensity to commit such acts.” People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785
(1998), citing MRE 404(b). As our Supreme Court explained in People v Watkins, 491 Mich 450,
470; 818 NW2d 296 (2012), other-acts evidence is not precluded because a defendant’s criminal
history and propensity for committing a particular crime is irrelevant. Rather, “it is because of the
human instinct to focus exclusively on the relevance of such evidence that the judiciary has
traditionally limited its presentation to juries.” Id., quoting People v Pattison, 276 Mich App 613,
620; 741 NW2d 558 (2007).
However, MCL 768.27a allows the prosecution to offer such evidence against a defendant
charged with listed offenses against a minor, as defined in Section 2 of the sex offenders
registration act, MCL 28.722. MCL 768.27a(1) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[I]n a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of committing a listed offense
against a minor, evidence that the defendant committed another listed offense

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against a minor is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter
to which it is relevant.
Notably, MCL 768.27a allows the prosecution to introduce evidence of defendant’s other sexual
offenses against minors, even if those offenses did not result in charges or a conviction. See People
v Petri, 279 Mich App 407, 411; 760 NW2d 882 (2008); Pattison, 276 Mich App at 618-619.
Further, as the statute allows other-acts evidence to “be considered for its bearing on any matter to
which it is relevant,” it may be used to establish a defendant’s propensity to commit the charged
offense. In this way, MCL 768.27a permits the admission of evidence for propensity purposes that
MRE 404(b) precludes, establishing an exception for cases involving sexual misconduct against a
minor. Watkins, 491 Mich at 470-471.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the charged offense—CSC-II—is a listed offense
under Section 2 of the sex offenders registration act, satisfying the first requirement of
MCL 768.27a. Defendant also does not argue that the prosecution’s notice of intent to introduce
other-acts evidence under MCL 768.27a was improper. Rather, defendant contends that the
testimony that he engaged in other acts was improperly admitted at trial because it did not involve
defendant “committ[ing] another listed offense against a minor.” MCL 768.27a(1).
1. TOUCHING OF TP
With regard to the testimony about defendant touching TP’s breast during a game, we
conclude that this evidence was properly admitted under MCL 768.27a.
This testimony satisfies the elements of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-IV),
MCL 750.520e(1)(a), a listed offense for purposes of MCL 768.27a when committed against a
minor. See People v Beck, 510 Mich 1, 19; 987 NW2d 1 (2022). “A person is guilty of [CSC-IV]
if the person engages in sexual contact with another person and if any of the following
circumstances exist: (a) That other person is at least 13 years of age but less than 16 years of age,
and the actor is 5 or more years older than that other person.” MCL 750.520e(1)(a). Sexual contact
is defined, in relevant part, as follows:
[T]he intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts or the intentional
touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s
intimate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for
the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, done for a sexual purpose, or in a
sexual manner for:
(i) Revenge.
(ii) To inflict humiliation.
(iii) Out of anger. [MCL 750.520a(q).]
Further, intimate parts is defined to include “the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttock,
or breast of a human being.” MCL 750.520a(f).

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The testimony demonstrated that defendant engaged in sexual contact with TP by
intentionally touching her breast, an intimate body part, during a game. TP was between 13 and
16 years old when this conduct occurred in 2021, and defendant, who was born in 1974, was
decades older than her. A reasonable jury also could have concluded that defendant touched TP
for a sexual purpose. TP testified that defendant’s contact with her breast made her feel
uncomfortable. Although TP acknowledged that the purpose of the game was to tag an opposing
player and that defendant may have touched her unintentionally, it was inappropriate and
extraordinary for an adult man to touch the breasts of a 13 to 16 year old girl, even in the context
of a game. Notably, the trial court determined that this other-acts evidence qualified as a listed
offense regardless of the fact that it occurred during a game. A “trial court’s decision on a close
call cannot be an abuse of discretion.” Horton, 341 Mich App at 410. Accordingly, the testimony
established that defendant engaged in a listed offense against a minor and was properly admitted
under MCL 768.27a.2
Defendant also argues that this testimony should have been excluded under MRE 403 as
unfairly prejudicial. Under MRE 403, a court may exclude relevant evidence when “its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.” Although “evidence admissible under MCL 768.27a remains subject to
MRE 403, . . . courts must weigh the propensity inference in favor of the evidence’s probative
value rather than its prejudicial effect.” Watkins, 491 Mich at 496. Therefore, this evidence was
highly probative of defendant’s propensity to inappropriately touch young girls in his household.
Further this probative value was not substantially outweighed because defendant’s cross-
examination of TP’s testimony and the trial court’s limiting instruction both sufficiently minimized
any prejudicial effect. See People v Mullins, 322 Mich App 151, 173; 911 NW2d 201 (2017); see
also Weeks v Angelone, 528 US 225, 234; 120 S Ct 727; 145 L Ed 2d 727 (2000). Therefore, this
testimony was properly admitted as evidence of defendant engaging in a listed offense against a
minor under MCL 768.27a.
2. THE REMAINING OTHER ACTS
Unlike the evidence involving inappropriate touching of TP, the rest of the other-acts
evidence presented by the prosecution was not admissible under MCL 768.27a because
defendant’s actions and comments did not qualify as listed offenses.3 This evidence includes: (1)
TP’s testimony that defendant made the following remark to her as she carried a cake: “Be careful.
You might get frosting on your boob”; (2) testimony alleging that defendant asked TP and SP to
2 Even if the trial court erred by admitting this evidence, it would nevertheless be admissible under
MRE 404(b) for the same reasons discussed later.
3 These listed offenses include, in general terms: all CSC offenses, MCL 750.520b through
MCL 750.520g; first and second-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(2) to (3); exploitation and
solicitation, MCL 750.145c, MCL 750.145a, MCL 750.145d; and kidnapping and human
trafficking, MCL 750.349, MCL 750.135, MCL 750.462a through 750.462h. See MCL 768.27a
(cross-referencing, MCL 28.722). Defendant’s inappropriate actions and comments do not satisfy
the elements for any of these listed offenses.

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draw a penis; (3) defendant telling SP that she reminded him of a song that includes sexually
explicit content; and (4) defendant touching SP’s waist.
However, even though this evidence was not properly admitted under MCL 768.27a, it was
admissible under MRE 404(b). See People v Smith, 282 Mich App 191, 205-206; 772 NW2d 428
(2009). As this Court has explained:
Where listed offenses are at issue, the analysis begins and ends with MCL 768.27a.
If listed offenses are not at issue, even where an uncharged offense may genuinely
constitute an offense committed against a minor that was sexual in nature,
MCL 768.27a is not implicated, but this is not to say that evidence of the offense is
inadmissible. We do not construe MCL 768.27a as suggesting that evidence of an
uncharged sexual offense committed against a minor is inadmissible if the offense
does not constitute a listed offense. Rather, the analysis simply turns to
MRE 404(b) to decipher admissibility. Only where the evidence does not fall under
the umbrella of MCL 768.27a, nor is otherwise admissible under MRE 404(b),
should the court exclude the evidence. [Id.]
Accordingly, we must analyze whether this other-acts evidence was admissible under
MRE 404(b).
Before evidence of other crimes, acts, or wrongs may be admitted under MRE 404(b), the
evidence must pass a four-part test as established by our Supreme Court in People v VanderVliet,
444 Mich 52, 55; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994). See People v Sabin
(After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 55-56; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). To be admissible, (1) the evidence
must be “offered for a proper purpose under MRE 404(b)”; (2) the evidence must be relevant; (3)
the evidence’s probative value cannot be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice; and (4) “the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting instruction to the jury.”
VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 55.
First, the prosecutor must have articulated “a proper noncharacter purpose for admission”
of the other-acts evidence. Crawford, 458 Mich at 385. Other-acts evidence may be admissible
for purposes other than propensity, “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident.” MRE 404(b)(2). Evidence of a noncharacter purpose is admissible even if it also
reflects on defendant’s character. People v Mardlin, 487 Mich 609, 615; 790 NW2d 607 (2010).
In the present case, the earlier described other-acts evidence was admissible to prove
motive, intent, scheme, plan, or system. Specifically, the other-acts evidence suggested that
defendant had intentionally touched KC in a sexual way, and why he may have touched KC, i.e.,
for a sexual purpose. In addition, the trial court could have admitted the evidence to show scheme,
plan, or system because it demonstrated defendant’s pattern of engaging inappropriately with the
young girls in his household. See People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 90-91; 732 NW2d 546
(2007). Specifically, this evidence of pattern would have provided the jury with the full context
of defendant’s interactions with the young girls in his household. See Smith, 282 Mich App 191,
205. Accordingly, the first part of the VanderVliet test is satisfied.

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Second, the prosecutor must have demonstrated the relevance of the other acts.
VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 55. [L]ogical relevance,” i.e., the second part of the VanderVliet test is
“the ‘touchstone’ of the admissibility of other-acts evidence.” Denson, 500 Mich at 401. “Other-
acts evidence is logically relevant if two components are present: materiality and probative value.”
Id. Materiality requires that the “evidence be related to any fact that is of consequence to the
action.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). A fact is “of consequence to the action” if it
is “directed at an element of the crime or an applicable defense” or if it “is ‘in issue’ in the sense
that it is within the range of litigated matters in controversy.” Sabin, 463 Mich at 57 (quotation
marks and citations omitted). “[A]ll elements of a criminal offense are ‘in issue’ when a defendant
enters a plea of not guilty.” People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 69; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), mod on other
grounds 450 Mich 1212 (1995).
In the present case, defendant denied that he touched KC for a sexual purpose. The
testimony regarding defendant’s sexual comments to other young girls of the household, the
testimony regarding defendant having the young girls draw a penis, and the testimony of defendant
touching the waist of one of the girls all supported the inference that defendant’s interaction with
KC was for a sexual purpose because he had engaged in behavior that could reasonably be
interpreted as inappropriate and sexual with other young female members in his household—the
same household as KC. Further, inappropriate touching for a sexual purpose is a required element
of the charged offense. Therefore, the other-acts evidence was related to a fact of consequence.
The other-acts evidence must also have probative value. “Evidence is probative if it tends
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Denson, 500 Mich at 401-402
(quotation marks and citations omitted). “In the context of prior acts evidence, however,
MRE 404(b) stands as a sentinel at the gate: the proffered evidence truly must be probative of
something other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime.” Id. at 402 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). At the time of trial, MRE 401 stated that “ ‘relevant evidence’ means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
For the same reasons just discussed, the other-acts evidence made it more probable that defendant
touched KC for a sexual purpose.
The challenged evidence was also probative because it demonstrated defendant’s scheme,
plan, or system. Notably, it revealed a pattern of defendant engaging inappropriately with the
young girls that were within his household. See Dobek, 274 Mich App at 90-91. “[W]hether the
other-acts evidence forms a pattern is relevant to determining its probativeness.” People v Beck,
510 Mich 1, 24 n 14; 987 NW2d 1 (2022). Defendant’s acts ranged from touching that made the
young girls uncomfortable to inappropriate sexual comments, and then ultimately escalating to the
inappropriate sexual contact that was the basis of defendant’s conviction. Further, as discussed
later, the other acts and charged offense were sufficiently similar to support the inference that
defendant employed a common plan, scheme, or system because defendant acted inappropriately
on several occasions with the young girls in his household. See Dobek, 274 Mich App at 84, 90-
91.

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In addition, as indicated by the trial court, this other-acts evidence also lends credibility to
KC’s testimony. The testimony regarding defendant’s other inappropriate behaviors with the
young girls in his household make it less likely that KC fabricated her testimony regarding the
sexual nature of defendant’s touching. Defense counsel also attacked KC’s credibility in his
closing argument; therefore, the other-acts evidence was useful to rebut defense’s claim that KC’s
testimony was inconsistent. Accordingly, the other-acts evidence was probative of the issues of
intent, scheme, plan, and system, as well as on credibility and presenting the full picture to the
jury. See id. at 91. Therefore, the second part of the VanderVliet test is satisfied.
Third, the probative value of the other-acts evidence must not be “substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
MRE 403. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger that marginally probative
evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.” Mardlin, 487 Mich at 627
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has provided a list of considerations
for courts to assess when determining whether other-acts evidence should be excluded:
(1) the dissimilarity between the other acts and the charged crime, (2) the temporal
proximity of the other acts to the charged crime, (3) the infrequency of the other
acts, (4) the presence of intervening acts, (5) the lack of reliability of the evidence
supporting the occurrence of the other acts, and (6) the lack of need for evidence
beyond the complainant’s and the defendant’s testimony. [Watkins, 491 Mich
at 487-488.]
In the present case, defendant only contests the similarity of the other acts to the charged offense
and the need for evidence beyond KC’s testimony. We conclude that these factors weighed in
favor of admitting the other-acts evidence at trial.
Although none of the other acts were exactly like the charged offense, they all involved
defendant engaging inappropriately with young girls in his home by making sexual comments,
playing games with sexual undertones, or touching the girls in a way that made them
uncomfortable. Considering the similarities between the victims and the fact that both the other
acts and charged offense all demonstrated defendant had a tendency to act inappropriately or in a
sexual manner, this factor weighs in favor of admission. Notably, as discussed, the other-acts
evidence did form a pattern which further adds to its probative value. See Beck, 510 Mich at 24
n 14.
In addition, the only evidence of the charged offense was KC’s testimony. As discussed
earlier, defendant attacked KC’s credibility. Therefore, the testimony of the other acts was
necessary to lend credibility to KC’s testimony and provide additional context regarding
defendant’s interactions with the young girls in his household. Accordingly, this factor also
weighs in favor of admission.
However, the factors are “a tool to facilitate, not a standard to supplant a trial court’s
MRE 403 analysis.” People v Berklund, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket
No. 367568); slip op at 10 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, to assess the

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probative value against the prejudicial effect, several other factors must be balanced. People v
Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 462; 751 NW2d 408 (2008). These factors include:
the time required to present the evidence and the possibility of delay, whether the
evidence is needlessly cumulative, how directly the evidence tends to prove the fact
for which it is offered, how essential the fact sought to be proved is to the case, the
potential for confusing or misleading the jury, and whether the fact can be proved
in another manner without as many harmful collateral effects. [Id.]
In the present case, the other-acts testimony was brief, and defendant does not assert that
it took an undue amount of time or delayed the proceedings. It was also not cumulative to other
evidence. Moreover, there was minimal potential for confusing the jury because the other acts did
not involve the victim of the charged offense. The evidence was also presented in a way that
minimized harmful collateral effects because it was brief, and the prosecution did not unduly
emphasize the other acts. Moreover, the testimonies about defendant’s sexual comments,
inappropriate games, and uncomfortable touching were no more inflammatory than what was
already testified about by KC—that defendant squeezed and groped her upper thigh and between
her legs while she was in bed napping.
Therefore, we conclude that, although this other-acts evidence was not admissible under
MCL 768.27a, it was admissible under MRE 404(b). However, because the trial court did not
engage in an analysis under MRE 404(b), the trial court abused its discretion.
3. HARMLESS ERROR
Regardless, defendant is not entitled to relief because these errors did not affect the
outcome of the trial.
Under harmless error review, a judgment or verdict should not be reversed unless “the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” Thorpe, 504 Mich at 252, quoting
MCL 769.26. A miscarriage of justice occurs when a defendant demonstrates that, without the
evidentiary error, a different outcome to the trial was more probable than not. Id.; People v Bass,
317 Mich App 241, 255; 893 NW2d 140 (2016).
Although the evidence was improperly admitted under MCL 768.27a, it was still
admissible under MRE 404(b); therefore, the trial court’s error did not result in the introduction of
inadmissible other-acts evidence. See Smith, 282 Mich App at 205-206 (considering the
admissibility of other-acts evidence under 404(b) when not admissible under MCL 768.27a).
Moreover, although the prosecution did not provide notice indicating that it was requesting
admission of the other-acts evidence under 404(b), defendant had notice and the opportunity to
object to the admission of the evidence before trial because of the prosecution’s notice of intent to
introduce the same evidence under MCL 768.27a. Accordingly, defendant did not suffer “unfair
surprise” from the introduction of this testimony at trial. People v Jackson, 498 Mich 246, 261;
869 NW2d 253 (2015).
Additionally, the other evidence of defendant’s guilt was enough to sustain a conviction.
Specifically, KC testified that defendant entered the bedroom, placed his hand on her waist,
reached under her blanket, and squeezed his fingers between her legs in a groping manner.

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Defendant later admitted to going into the bedroom and touching KC when interviewed by law
enforcement. Although defendant alleged that he merely attempted to wake KC up, this testimony
was not persuasive enough for the jury to reach a different outcome at trial. In light of defendant’s
concessions and KC’s testimony, the jury had sufficient evidence to render a guilty verdict, despite
any evidentiary errors.
The trial court record also indicates that defendant confronted the witnesses about their
other-acts testimony to further limit its prejudicial effect. On cross-examination, TP
acknowledged that defendant touched her breast during a game that required intentional contact
with other players. TP also indicated that defendant may not have touched her breast intentionally.
This testimony provided the jury with the additional context behind the touching, which could
have allowed the jury to find that defendant did not engage in sexual contact with TP. Defendant
also elicited testimony showing that an adult was present when defendant asked the girls to draw
a penis while playing a game, which could indicate that defendant did not nefariously make the
request, given that another adult was present when the request was made. As noted by the trial
court in its limiting instruction, the jury was free to determine whether it believed defendant had
actually committed the other acts introduced by the prosecution.
The trial court’s limiting instruction also specifically addressed how the other-acts
evidence should be used. The trial court instructed the jury that the other-acts evidence should
only be used to judge KC’s credibility and not considered as evidence that the defendant was likely
to commit crimes. “Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions, and instructions are
presumed to cure most errors.” Mullins, 322 Mich App at 151; see also Weeks, 528 US at 234.
Thus, any potential for unfair prejudice arising from the admission of other-acts evidence,
assuming there was any, was mitigated by the court’s instruction. See People v Roscoe, 303 Mich
App 633, 646; 846 NW2d 402 (2014).
Accordingly, the error of admitting this other-acts evidence under MCL 768.27a did not
affect the outcome of the trial. See Thorpe, 504 Mich at 252. As a result, defendant is not entitled
to reversal on this ground. See MCL 769.26.
B. GROOMING TESTIMONY
Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair trial because testimony about grooming
was improperly admitted despite the evidence being not relevant and unfairly prejudicial.
Specifically, defendant challenges the detective’s testimony defining grooming. Although we
agree that this evidence was improperly admitted, we conclude that any error was harmless.
MRE 402 states the general rule that all relevant evidence is admissible unless excluded by
another rule of evidence. Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence,” and “the fact is of consequence in determining
the action. MRE 401. As discussed earlier, a fact is “of consequence to the action” if it is “directed
at an element of the crime or an applicable defense” or if it “is ‘in issue’ in the sense that it is
within the range of litigated matters in controversy.” Sabin, 463 Mich at 57 (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Whether defendant engaged in grooming behaviors was not at issue because
defendant was not on trial for grooming and the prosecution was not required to prove that
defendant engaged in grooming behaviors. Instead, the “fact of consequence” was whether

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defendant engaged in sexual contact with a victim between the ages of 13 and 16. See
MCL 750.50c(1)(b). Accordingly, this testimony was not relevant.
Even if the evidence was marginally relevant, it was still not admissible under MRE 403
because it was unfairly prejudicial and likely confused the jury. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial
when there exists a danger that marginally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive
weight by the jury.” Crawford, 458 Mich at 398. In the present case, the evidence was unfairly
prejudicial because it was not relevant and it carried the risk that the jury would convict defendant
because he was a bad person who grooms young girls, rather than upon the evidence for the
charged offense. Further, the grooming evidence also carried the risk of confusing the jury
because, defendant was not on trial for grooming so it was possible that the jury would be confused
about what offense defendant was on trial for.
Nonetheless, reversal is not warranted because, despite this error, defendant cannot show
that the admission of this evidence “resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” See Thorpe, 504 Mich
at 252.
In the present case, grooming was only briefly referenced during the detective’s testimony.
In fact, the detective only discussed grooming when asked to define it. The detective’s definition
did not refer to defendant and the detective did not claim that defendant groomed KC or any other
minor. Moreover, after the detective made this lone reference, the prosecution did not elicit any
further testimony about grooming or accusing defendant of grooming. Instead, it was defendant
who highlighted the inadmissible testimony. During cross-examination, defendant asked the
detective how many times the word grooming appeared in the police report. In engaging in this
line of questioning, defendant highlighted the inadmissible testimony and prejudiced his own trial.
Defendant continued to prejudice his trial by discussing grooming during his closing argument.
Thus, defendant amplified the inadmissible evidence regarding grooming at trial, further
prejudicing his own trial. See People v Butsinas, ___ Mich App ___, ____; ___ NW3d ___ (2025)
(Docket No. 364778); slip op at 22 (stating that a defendant cannot assert a claim of error on appeal
for testimony that he purposefully invited). Accordingly, reversal is also not warranted on this
ground. See id.; Thorpe, 504 Mich at 252-253.
C. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that he touched KC for a sexual purpose. We disagree.
“We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.” People v Savage, 327
Mich App 604, 613; 935 NW2d 69 (2019). “We review the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution and determine whether the jury could have found each element of the charged
crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
arising therefrom may constitute proof of the elements of a crime.” Id. (quotation marks, citation,
and alteration omitted). “We are also required to draw all reasonable inferences and make
credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“In determining whether the prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction,” we must determine “whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier

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of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 722-723;
597 NW2d 73 (1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The sufficient evidence
requirement is a part of every criminal defendant’s due[-]process rights.” Id. at 723. This
requirement attempts “to give concrete substance to those rights, by precluding irrational jury
verdicts.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In reaching a verdict, a jury may draw
reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence presented at trial to establish factual support
for an element of a crime. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992),
amended on other grounds 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Additionally, to obtain a conviction “the
prosecutor need not negate every reasonable theory consistent with innocence.” People v Nowack,
462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). Rather, “it need only convince the jury in the face of
whatever contradictory evidence the defendant may provide.” Id. at 400 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Here, defendant was convicted of CSC-II under MCL 750.520c(1)(b), which requires proof
(1) that defendant engaged in sexual contact with the victim, (2) that the victim was at least 13
years old but younger than 16 years old, and (3) that the victim and defendant are members of the
same household. As discussed earlier, sexual contact is defined, in relevant part, as:
[T]he intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts or the intentional
touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s
intimate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for
the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, [or] done for a sexual purpose[.]
[MCL 750.520a(q).]
Further, intimate parts is defined to include “the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttock,
or breast of a human being.” MCL 750.520a(f).
“[W]hen determining whether touching could be reasonably construed as being for a sexual
purpose, the conduct should be viewed objectively under a reasonable person standard.” People v
DeLeon, 317 Mich App 714, 719-720; 895 NW2d 577 (2016) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Further, “[b]ecause of the inherent difficulty of proving a defendant’s state of mind,
only minimal circumstantial evidence from which intent may be inferred need be presented.”
People v Cameron, 291 Mich App 599, 615; 806 NW2d 371 (2011).
We conclude that the jury was presented with sufficient evidence from which it could be
inferred that defendant touched KC for a sexual purpose. KC testified that defendant touched her
between her legs, i.e., her inner thigh, as she lay in bed. KC’s inner thigh is an intimate body part.
MCL 750.520a(f). Moreover, evidence indicates that defendant intentionally touched her inner
thigh, as there was no indication the touching was accidental. To the contrary, KC alleged that
defendant placed his hand underneath the blanket covering her and squeezed and groped her thigh
for about three minutes. Defendant touching, squeezing, and moving his hands in a groping
manner on the inner thigh of a 15-year-old girl who was lying in bed suggests that he did so for a
sexual purpose, as there is not an otherwise socially reasonable or lawful explanation. See DeLeon,
317 Mich App at 719-720. If defendant had merely intended to wake KC up by touching her, as
he alleged, he would not have needed to place his hand under the blanket or between her legs.

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Additionally, KC’s testimony alone is sufficient for a jury to conclude that defendant
touched her inner thigh for a sexual purpose, because “[t]he testimony of a victim need not be
corroborated in prosecutions [for CSC-II].” MCL 750.520h. Therefore, sufficient evidence
supported defendant’s conviction for CSC-II.
Affirmed.4
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
4 In light of our decision to affirm defendant’s convictions, we need not address defendant’s request
to have this case remanded to a different judge, as this issue is moot, People v Smith, 502 Mich
624, 631; 918 NW2d 718 (2018).

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