COA 376415 IN RE Z R WEST MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
January 12, 2026
8:35 AM
In re Z. R. WEST, Minor.
No. 376415
St. Joseph Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2025-000260-NA
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and KOROBKIN and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the
minor child, ZW, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (failure to rectify conditions that led to the
adjudication), (3)(c)(ii) (failure to rectify other conditions), and (3)(g) (failure to provide proper
care and custody).1 Because respondent was not served in accordance with the requirements of
MCL 712A.13 and the court rules, we vacate the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s
parental rights and remand for further proceedings.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from respondent’s failure to comply with her guardianship plan or stay in
contact with her child, ZW. When ZW was just four months old, she was placed under the
guardianship of a relative. Because ZW had extensive mental-health needs and required an
inordinate amount of support, the relative transferred ZW’s guardianship to a second pair of
guardians. Two years after the transfer, these guardians shifted ZW’s care to a third pair of
guardians, who are the petitioners in this case. Respondent had no contact with ZW throughout
the second and third guardianships. Respondent was subject to a support order payable to the
second guardians, but she did not make any payments unless she was arrested and ordered to make
a payment. In 2024, respondent petitioned to terminate the guardianship, but witnesses testified
1 The father of ZW was designated a respondent in the child protective proceedings, and his
parental rights were terminated. However, ZW’s father is not a party to this appeal, or any other
appeal, despite the termination of his parental rights.

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that she did not present any evidence that she had complied with her guardianship plan, and the
court denied her petition on the merits. Intending to adopt ZW, petitioners sought the termination
of respondent’s parental rights.
Respondent and ZW’s father were absent and could not be located throughout the lower
court proceedings. At the pretrial conference, the parties’ respective trial counsel were concerned
that they would not be able to personally serve and provide notice of the upcoming adjudication
and termination hearing to respondent and ZW’s father. Counsel for ZW’s father suggested that
the trial court order alternate service by publication while counsel for petitioners continued their
efforts to locate respondent and ZW’s father. The trial court accepted that plan. A week later,
counsel for petitioners submitted a motion for alternate service explaining, “We have contacted a
process server to attempt to locate [respondent] and personally serve her the petition and the Notice
of Hearing for the Adjudicatory/Termination Trial, but want to ensure that service is perfected by
filing this Motion contemporaneously with those efforts.” The motion requested to publish the
Notice of Hearing in a newspaper that was local to respondent’s last known address.
The next day, the trial court granted the motion and ordered alternate service by
publication. The newspaper published the notice in compliance with the court order on May 15,
2025. On June 11, 2025, the trial court held a combined adjudication trial and termination hearing.
Respondent was not present, but the trial court determined that the notice by publication was
adequate and proceeded with the hearing. The trial court exercised jurisdiction and terminated
respondent’s parental rights on the same day. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Generally, whether child protective proceedings complied with a respondent’s substantive
and procedural due process rights is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. However,
an unpreserved claim of constitutional error is reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights.”
In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 268; 976 NW2d 44 (2021) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). Respondent did not raise the issue of whether service of process was proper in the trial
court, thus, the issue is not preserved and is reviewed for plain error on appeal. See In re TK, 306
Mich App 698, 703; 859 NW2d 208 (2014). Accordingly, respondent “must establish that (1) error
occurred; (2) the error was ‘plain,’ i.e., clear or obvious; and (3) the plain error affected [her]
substantial rights. And the error must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings[] . . . .” In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 29; 934 NW2d 610 (2019)
(quotation marks and citations omitted; second alteration in original).
III. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Respondent argues that reversal is required because she was not properly served with the
summons and notice of the combined adjudicatory and termination hearing, at which she was not
present. We agree.

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A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” Sanborn,
337 Mich App at 268 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This requires notice of court
hearings:
The “opportunity to be heard” includes the right to notice of that
opportunity. An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections. [In re Rood, 483 Mich 73,
92; 763 NW2d 587 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
The notice requirements for child protective proceedings are established in court rules, statutes,
and caselaw. For example, MCR 3.920(B)(2)(b) requires that a summons be served on any
respondent in a child protective proceeding. Personal service is required unless the court finds that
it is impracticable or impossible. MCR 3.920(B)(4). For a hearing to terminate parental rights,
personal service must occur at least 14 days in advance, but service by publication must occur at
least 21 days in advance. MCR 3.920(B)(5)(a)(i) and (c).
MCL 712A.12 also provides a statutory requirement for service of process on a
noncustodial parent:
After a petition shall have been filed and after such further investigation as
the court may direct, . . . the court may dismiss said petition or may issue a
summons reciting briefly the substance of the petition, and requiring the person or
persons who have the custody or control of the child, or with whom the child may
be, to appear personally and bring the child before the court at a time and place
stated . . . . If the person so summoned shall be other than the parent or guardian
of the child, then the parents or guardian, or both, shall also be notified of the
petition and of the time and place appointed for the hearing thereon, by personal
service before the hearing, except as hereinafter provided.
Similar to the court rule, the statute provides for alternate service by publication if personal service
is impracticable, but it has a different timing requirement than the court rule:
Service of summons may be made anywhere in the state personally by the
delivery of true copies thereof to the persons summoned: Provided, That if the judge
is satisfied that it is impracticable to serve personally such summons or the notice
provided for in the preceding section, he may order service by registered mail
addressed to their last known addresses, or by publication thereof, or both, as he
may direct. It shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction if (1) personal service is
effected at least 72 hours before the date of hearing; (2) registered mail is mailed at
least 5 days before the date of hearing if within the state or 14 days if outside of the
state; (3) publication is made once in some newspaper printed and circulated in the
county in which said court is located at least 1 week before the time fixed in the
summons or notice for the hearing. [MCL 712A.13.]

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“When determining whether personal service would be impractical, the trial court must
determine if reasonable efforts were made to locate the party.” In re Lovitt, ___ Mich App ___,
___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367124); slip op at 3. For example, counsel may attempt
to locate the respondent by contacting family members or making an inquiry with nearby
correctional systems. See In re Adair, 191 Mich App 710, 714; 478 NW2d 667 (1991). Counsel
could also attempt to contact the relevant Friend of the Court (FOC) and the respondent’s last
known address or telephone number. See Lovitt, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4. Failure to
comply with these statutory requirements “is a jurisdictional defect that renders all proceedings in
the trial court void.” Id. at ___; slip op at 3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also
Ferranti, 504 Mich at 22.
B. DISCUSSION
The trial court did not comply with the statutory requirements for service of process
because it did not sufficiently determine whether reasonable efforts were made to locate
respondent. At the pretrial conference, petitioners’ counsel informed the trial court that he planned
to reach out to a process server to try to locate respondent. He promised the court that himself and
petitioners would do “whatever we need to do” to ensure that notice was given before the statutory
deadline. Counsel for ZW’s father suggested that the trial court allow service by publication while
the parties attempted to locate respondents. The trial court accepted that strategy.
In petitioners’ motion for alternate service, they explained that they had contacted a process
server to locate respondent, but they intended the order for service by publication to run
“contemporaneously with those efforts.” (Emphasis added.) Stated alternatively, the only attempt
by petitioners to properly serve respondent between the pretrial conference and the filing of their
motion was petitioners’ counsel contact of a process server. However, the trial court’s order
checked a box stating that service was “impracticable or cannot be achieved,” despite failing to
provide the basis for that finding.
In short, the trial court put the cart before the horse. A trial court must determine if
reasonable efforts were made to locate the respondent before it orders alternate service. See Lovitt,
___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3. Instead, the trial court ordered service by publication while
knowing that counsel had not completed attempts to locate respondent. Despite these obvious
failings to properly serve respondent, the trial court nevertheless went forward with the
adjudicatory and termination hearing in respondent’s absence, without verifying whether any other
efforts were made to contact her.2 At the time when the trial court ordered alternate service, the
only record of any attempt to locate respondent was that counsel had contacted a process server.
Contacting a process server, without more, is not a reasonable effort, particularly given the
significant interest parents have in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their
children. In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 108; 499 NW2d 752 (1993). The record is absent of any
indication of the process server’s efforts or results in reaching respondent, including contacting
2 A more appropriate response to respondent’s absence would be to adjourn the subject hearing to
allow sufficient time for counsel to make reasonable efforts to locate respondent, then order
alternate service.

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respondent’s sister who possessed respondent’s contact information, or communicating with the
FOC or any local incarceration facilities, shelters, or rehabilitation centers.
The trial court essentially cut corners with respondent’s due-process rights in the interest
of judicial efficiency. In doing so, it failed to establish personal jurisdiction over respondent and
plainly erred by proceeding with the combined adjudicatory and termination hearing despite this
defect. See Lovitt, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4. See also MCR 3.972(B)(1). The lack of
personal jurisdiction renders all proceedings in the trial court void.3 See Lovitt, ___ Mich App at
___; slip op at 3.
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
3 Because all proceedings in the trial court are void for lack of personal jurisdiction, we need not
address respondent’s other arguments regarding the trial court’s findings as to the statutory
grounds for jurisdiction or termination.

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