COA 375547 D ETTA WILCOXON V CATHY M GARRETT Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/22/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
D. ETTA WILCOXON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
July 22, 2026
8:59 AM
v No. 375547
Wayne Circuit Court
CATHY M. GARRETT, GIL FLOWERS, and
JANICE WINFREY,
LC No. 24-007307-CZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: MALDONADO, P.J., and RIORDAN and YOUNG, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this action, plaintiff, D. Etta Wilcoxon, brought claims involving alleged violations of
the Michigan Election Law (MEL), MCL 168.1 et seq., and the Michigan Campaign Finance Act
(MCFA), MCL 169.1 et seq., against election officials for both Wayne County and the city of
Detroit.1 Defendants Cathy M. Garrett and Gil Flowers (hereinafter collectively referred to as the
“county officials”) moved for summary disposition of the claims against them under
MCR 2.116(C)(8), for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Defendant Janice
Winfrey concurred in the county officials’ motion. The trial court granted the motion on April 3,
2025, dismissing the claims against the county officials with prejudice. Further, on April 23, 2025,
the trial court dismissed the claims against defendant Winfrey with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals as
of right from the order of April 23, 2025, which is the final order in this matter. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In May 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment against defendants
related to plaintiff’s candidacy for the 2024 general election. Plaintiff alleged that the county
officials should have waived late filing fees plaintiff owed for her earlier campaigns because she
1 Plaintiff sued each individual in their official capacity: Cathy M. Garrett, as Wayne County Clerk;
Gil Flowers, as Wayne County Campaign Finance Manager; and Janice Winfrey, as Detroit City
Clerk.

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established her right to waiver of the past-due filing fees. Plaintiff also alleged that Winfrey
violated MCL 168.560b because plaintiff’s full first name was used in media reports about the
election, which did not match how plaintiff requested that her name appear on the ballot.
In August 2024, Garrett disqualified plaintiff from the November 2024 general election
because plaintiff owed over $25,000 in late filing fees and fines for her earlier campaigns when
she ran for Detroit city council and Detroit city clerk. Garrett also found that plaintiff falsely stated
in her affidavit of identity that she had paid all late filing fees and fines. Therefore, plaintiff was
not permitted to appear on the ballot as the Green Party candidate for the United States House of
Representatives.
Before the November 2024 election, plaintiff moved for a writ of mandamus and an order
to have the county officials show cause why plaintiff’s name should not appear on the 2024 general
ballot. Plaintiff argued that the county officials previously waived enforcement of any outstanding
fees she owed or that the county officials were estopped from enforcing the late campaign fees,
some of which dated back to 2005. The trial court disagreed with plaintiff’s arguments and
concluded that the county officials did not err in ruling that plaintiff was disqualified from the
ballot because plaintiff did not prove her entitlement to have the late fees waived under
MCL 169.215(1)(f).
After the November 2024 election, the county officials moved for summary disposition for
plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, MCR 2.116(C)(8), arguing
that plaintiff’s claims were moot because the election had already occurred and there was no longer
an actual controversy. The county officials further argued that plaintiff failed to establish a right
to have her past-due filing fees waived. Winfrey concurred in the county officials’ motion. The
trial court agreed that there was no actual controversy because the election had passed and
plaintiff’s complaint was limited to her candidacy in 2024. Nonetheless, the trial court addressed
the merits of plaintiff’s claims and ruled that plaintiff had failed to show that the county officials
erred by refusing to waive past-due filing fees, MCL 169.215(1)(f). The trial court also determined
that there was no actual controversy regarding plaintiff’s claim against Winfrey. Accordingly, the
trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claims against the defendants in their entirety with prejudice. This
appeal follows.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition. El-Khalil
v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). Summary disposition is
available under MCR 2.116(C)(8), for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the claim based on the factual
allegations in the complaint. Id. at 159. When considering a motion under (C)(8), the trial court
must accept all factual allegations as true and decide the motion on the pleadings alone. Id. at 160.
The motion may only be granted when the claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual
development could possibly justify recovery. Id.
“Whether an issue is moot is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” In re
Tchakarova, 328 Mich App 172, 178; 936 NW2d 863 (2019). Lastly, we review a trial court’s

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decision on a motion to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. Milne v Robinson, 513 Mich
1, 7; 6 NW3d 40 (2024).
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court should not have granted summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(8) by allowing the County to retroactively apply an administrative rule
adopted in 2022, which disqualified plaintiff from the general ballot in November 2024 because
of her failure to pay past-due filing fees incurred before 2022, and because plaintiff established
good cause to support her requests to waive past-due filing fees she still owed. Plaintiff also argues
that the trial court should not have dismissed her claims against Winfrey because Winfrey violated
MCL 169.560b. Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims are moot and without merit. We address
each in turn.
A. CLAIMS AGAINST THE COUNTY OFFICIALS
1. MOOTNESS & AMENDMENT
Defendants argue that this action is moot because plaintiff stated in her complaint that she
was a candidate only for the November 2024 general election and by the time the trial court ruled
on the motion for summary disposition, that election had already been held. This Court will not
reach moot issues, because there must be a real controversy between the parties, not a hypothetical
one. In re Detmer/Beaudry, 321 Mich App 49, 55-56; 910 NW2d 318 (2017). An issue is moot
if this Court’s decision would not have any practical legal effect on the existing controversy or a
subsequent event renders it impossible for this Court to fashion a remedy. Garrett v Washington,
314 Mich App 436, 449-450; 886 NW2d 762 (2016).
MCR 2.605(A)(1) provides that, “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, a
Michigan court of record may declare the rights and other legal relations of an interested party
seeking a declaratory judgment, whether or not other relief is or could be sought or granted.”
However, without an actual controversy, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to issue a declaratory
judgment. McGill v Auto Ass’n of Mich, 207 Mich App 402, 407; 526 NW2d 12 (1994). In the
context of an action seeking declaratory judgment, an actual controversy exists when a declaratory
judgment is necessary to guide the plaintiff’s future conduct in order to preserve the plaintiff’s
legal rights. Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 588-589; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). Where
the injury sought to be prevented is only hypothetical, an actual controversy does not exist. Recall
Blanchard Comm v Secretary of State, 146 Mich App 117, 121; 380 NW2d 71 (1985). The
plaintiff must allege and prove an actual justiciable controversy. Shavers, 402 Mich at 589.
When the trial court ruled on plaintiff’s motion for a writ of mandamus, it generally
addressed the merits of plaintiff’s request for a declaratory judgment shortly before the election.
When the county officials later moved for summary disposition, the election had already occurred.
Accordingly, there was no actual controversy as a trial court order granting plaintiff relief
surrounding her candidacy for an election that had already occurred would have no practical effect.
See Garrett, 314 Mich App at 449-450. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted summary
disposition for defendants regarding plaintiff’s claims involving the 2024 election.

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However, because the trial court granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8),
the trial court was obligated to consider whether plaintiff should be permitted to amend her
complaint. MCR 2.116(I)(5) provides that when a court is asked to rule on a motion brought under
MCR 2.116(C)(8), “the court shall give the parties an opportunity to amend their pleadings as
provided by MCR 2.118, unless the evidence then before the court shows that amendment would
not be justified.”
Before the trial court ruled on the motion for summary disposition, plaintiff filed a motion
to amend her complaint. However, for unknown reasons, the trial court did not rule on the motion
to amend. In her proposed amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that she intended to run in the
2026 general election, and all subsequent elections, which showed that there was an actual
controversy. Plaintiff also advised the trial court, when the trial court granted defendant’s motion
for summary disposition, that she had taken steps to become a candidate in 2026. Therefore,
because plaintiff will continue to have problems running for public office in the future, until the
issues with her late filing fees are resolved, it is apparent that there continues to exist an actual
controversy between the parties. Plaintiff may also face real injury in the future, by not having her
name on the ballot in other elections. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it failed to address
whether plaintiff could amend her complaint.
Nonetheless, the amendment of the complaint was not justified. The amendment of a
party’s pleadings is not justified if it would be futile. Liggett Restaurant Group, Inc v City of
Pontiac, 260 Mich App 127, 138; 676 NW2d 633 (2003). “A determination of futility must be
based on the legal insufficiency of the claim on its face.” Id. at 139. Where the amended claim
merely restates allegations already made, it is considered futile. PT Today, Inc v Comm’r of the
Office of Fin & Ins Servs, 270 Mich App 110, 143; 715 NW2d 398 (2006).
Plaintiff continued to argue in her proposed amended complaint that she was entitled to
have her late filing fees waived for the reasons she included in her original complaint. But as
discussed later, the trial court properly granted judgment for the county officials with regard to its
decision not to waive the fees, due to lack of good cause. Therefore, plaintiff has not shown that
the trial court’s failure to rule on her motion to amend her complaint prejudiced plaintiff because
her amended complaint was not justified.
2. MICH ADMIN CODE, R 168.2
Turning to the merits of plaintiff’s claims, plaintiff argues that the county officials
improperly disqualified her from the ballot in 2024 by retroactively applying Mich Admin Code,
R 168.2 to late fines and filing fees owed by plaintiff, which were imposed before the new rule
went into effect in 2022. We disagree.
Rule 168.2 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) For the purposes of the candidate’s statement that as of the date of the
affidavit, all statements, reports, late filing fees, and fines required of the candidate
or any candidate committee organized to support the candidate’s election under the
Michigan campaign finance act, 1976 PA 388, MCL 169.201 to 169.282, have been
filed or paid, an outstanding notice of error or omission is not a statement, report,

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late filing fee, or fine for the purposes of section 558(4) of the Michigan election
law, 1954 PA 116, MCL 168.558. A candidate with an outstanding notice of error
or omission may be disqualified based on the unfiled or unpaid statement, report,
late filing fees, or fines upon which the notice was based.
* * *
(3) The filing official shall examine the campaign finance records of the
secretary of state and county clerk for any county in which the candidate previously
sought nomination or election, if applicable, to determine whether the candidate
made a false statement in the affidavit of identity.
(4) The filing official shall disqualify a candidate who falsely states that as
of the date he or she signed the affidavit of identity, all statements, reports, late
filing fees, and fines required of the candidate or any candidate committee
organized to support the candidate’s election under the Michigan campaign
finance act, 1976 PA 388, MCL 169.201 to 169.282, have been filed or paid.
Candidates disqualified on this basis cannot reverse disqualification by filing a
corrected affidavit. [Emphasis added.]
MCL 168.558 also provides that candidates are required to file accurate affidavits of
identity, subject to perjury, and that an officer must not certify a candidate who files a false
affidavit of identity. Amendments have been made to both MCL 168.558(4) and Rule 168.2(3) to
specifically provide that candidates who file false affidavits of identity are not to be certified and
to require that officials check state and county records to ensure that a candidate has made accurate
statements in the affidavit. However, the requirements that candidates pay late filing fees and
accurately attest that any late fees have been paid are not newly imposed duties on candidates for
public office.
Plaintiff’s primary argument is that Rule 168.2(3) adopts a new duty for election officials
to affirmatively check a candidate’s affidavit of identity before certifying that candidate for an
election; therefore, Rule 168.2 should not apply to her because the records show that she owed late
filing fees dating back to at least 2013, and possibly even 2005, before the rule went into effect.
However, even if Rule 168.2(3) imposes new obligations on election officials, it does not adopt
new legal obligations for candidates or impact candidates’ vested rights. The adoption of
Rule 168.2 does not impose new requirements on candidates, or adopt new penalties for false
affidavits of identity, because candidates have been required to make truthful statements in their
affidavits of identity even before December 2022. Although Rule 168.2(3) now expressly requires
that an officer must compare statements in an affidavit of identity to campaign records for the state
and county before certifying a candidate, we do not agree with plaintiff that Rule 168.2(3) does
not apply to her.
Moreover, Rule 168.2 was not retroactively applied to plaintiff. In Warren City Council v
Buffa, 346 Mich App 528, 548; 12 NW3d 681 (2023), this Court explained that legislative
amendments are prospective only, unless the Legislature indicates an intent to apply an amendment
retroactively. Retroactive application is disfavored if (1) it would impair vested rights, (2) create
a new obligation and impose a new duty, or (2) attach a disability to past transactions. Id. Because

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the retroactive application of an amended statute may cause unfairness by upsetting settled
transactions or depriving individuals of legitimate expectations, a statute applies retroactively if it
does not impact vested rights. Id.
However, considering events that occurred before a rule was enacted does not in and of
itself constitute retroactive application. Id. at 549-550. The Buffa Court rejected the argument
that an amendment to a city charter, barring the mayor of Warren from serving the greater of three
terms or 12 years, could not apply to the then mayor, who had already served four terms and was
running for his fifth term. Id. at 532, 548-550. The term limit was added by an amendment in
2020, but provided that any terms or years served before the amendment was adopted would count
toward an individual’s term limit. Id. at 534. This Court relied on the following factors in its
analysis of whether the amendment was intended to apply retroactively:
First, we consider whether there is specific language providing for retroactive
application. Second, in some situations, a statute is not regarded as operating
retroactively merely because it relates to an antecedent event. Third, in determining
retroactivity, we must keep in mind that retroactive laws impair vested rights
acquired under existing laws or create new obligations or duties with respect to
transactions or considerations already past. Finally, a remedial or procedural act
not affecting vested rights may be given retroactive effect where the injury or claim
is antecedent to the enactment of the statute. [Id. at 549, quoting LaFontaine
Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC, 496 Mich 26, 38-39; 852 NW2d 78 (2014).]
Applying the above factors, this Court explained that the amendment to the city charter did not
apply retroactively, but that did not prevent the mayor’s previous terms from being counted under
the terms of the amendment. The inclusion of antecedent events did not render the amendment
retroactive. Buffa, 346 Mich App at 549-550. Furthermore, there was no effort to apply the
amendment against the then mayor, by removing him from office in his fourth term. Id. at 550.
This Court held that the amendment need not apply retroactively in order to account for the terms
previously served by the mayor. Id.
As discussed, applying the amendments to both MCL 168.558 and Rule 168.2, adopted
after plaintiff incurred the disputed late filing fees, does not impact any vested rights of plaintiff,
because before those amendments were adopted, plaintiff still was required to file her affidavit of
identity, under penalty of perjury, affirmatively stating that she had paid all outstanding late fees
and filed all campaign reports. Before Rule 168.2 was adopted, election officials were also
required to review affidavits of identity and disqualify those candidates who submitted false
affidavits. Accordingly, while plaintiff may have appeared on ballots in the past when she owed
late filing fees, that did not give her a vested right to continue to appear on ballots after Rule 168.2
was adopted, requiring that election officials perform some investigation into the status of each
candidate’s campaign finance records history before certifying the candidate’s name to appear on
a ballot. Similar to the amendment in Buffa, 346 Mich App at 549-550, Rule 168.2 does not apply
retroactively, but election officials may rely on antecedent events, including records of a
candidate’s failure to pay filing fees.
Therefore, the trial court did not err when it agreed with the county officials’ decision to
disqualify plaintiff because of her past-due filing fees.

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3. WAIVER OF FEES
Plaintiff next argues that the county officials should have waived her obligation to pay the
fees assessed, per MCL 168.215(1)(f). We disagree.
MCL 169.215(19)(d) provides that, “[t]he clerk of each county shall do all of the
following: . . . (d) Upon written request, waive the payment of a late filing fee if the request for a
waiver is based on good cause as prescribed in subsection (1)(f).” Notably, MCL 169.215(1)(f)(i)
provides that “incapacitating physical illness, hospitalization, accident involvement, death, or
incapacitation for medical reasons of a person required to file, a person whose participation is
essential to the preparation of the statement or report, or a member of the immediate family of
these persons” constitutes good cause. Plaintiff is correct that MCL 169.215(1)(f) uses the term
“shall,” which is mandatory, Ellison v Dep’t of State, 320 Mich App 169, 180; 906 NW2d 221
(2017), MCL 169.215(1)(f). However, MCL 169.215(1)(f) only requires that the county clerk
grant a waiver when there is good cause and adequate documentation. Because both of those
requirements have not been established by plaintiff, the county officials were not under a
mandatory duty to grant her requests for waivers.
Here, plaintiff offered two grounds for waiver of her late filing fees. First, she produced a
letter from her personal physician, dated August 27, 2015, that states that plaintiff suffered from a
gastrointestinal condition which prevents her from sitting for long periods of time. Second,
plaintiff offered the death of her campaign treasurer as good cause for waiving her late fees. We
conclude that neither established good cause to waive the late fees.
The letter from plaintiff’s physician indicated that plaintiff suffered from a medical
condition in August 2015 that limited her ability to sit for long periods of time. However, the letter
does not explain whether the condition existed beyond 2015 and would have impacted her ability
to make the required filings. Moreover, it is not apparent that the inability to sit for long periods
prevented plaintiff from completing the appropriate paperwork, for instance, if she took frequent
breaks or had assistance. Accordingly, plaintiff’s letter from her physician did not prove good
cause to waive the late fees, even those due in 2015.
The death of plaintiff’s campaign treasurer also does not prove good cause for not timely
filing all the paperwork due over multiple years. First, plaintiff has not produced adequate
documentation to prove that the death impacted the ability to file the necessary reports. Despite
plaintiff providing her own affidavit, she failed to establish when the treasurer died and that only
the treasurer had access to the information necessary to file campaign finance reports. Further, the
record demonstrates that plaintiff has since formed other committees for her subsequent
campaigns; therefore, the treasurer’s death does not give her good cause for not filing other
campaign reports.
Plaintiff also seems to allege that Flowers, and other staff working for the County,
prevented plaintiff and her campaign staff from filing the necessary paperwork, primarily because
they were given inaccurate passwords, presumably so they could electronically file the necessary
reports. Plaintiff produced an affidavit from another campaign staffer, who described his problems
with filing a single report in 2017, which he eventually was able to file in person. Again, given
the amount of time that has passed and plaintiff’s other campaign committees, the problems

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plaintiff’s staff experienced in 2017, filing a single report, do not prove good cause for waiving
fees due in other campaigns.
Lastly, plaintiff raises arguments regarding waiver, laches, and statute of limitations to
support her claims. These arguments are primarily based on the fact that the County allowed
plaintiff to appear on ballots in the past, when she already owed late fees, and the county officials
are only now taking action against delinquent candidates.
Specifically, plaintiff relies on laches to argue that the county officials should be barred
from enforcing Rule 168.2 against plaintiff, when the grounds for keeping her off the ballots
include late fees that were assessed well before 2022. “Estoppel by laches is the failure to do
something which should be done under the circumstances or the failure to claim or enforce a right
at a proper time.” Nykoriak v Napoleon, 334 Mich App 370, 382; 964 NW2d 895 (2020) (quotation
marks, brackets, and citations omitted). In practical terms, “laches is an equitable tool used to
provide a remedy for the inconvenience resulting from the plaintiff’s delay in asserting a legal
right that was practicable to assert. A party guilty of laches is estopped from asserting a right it
could have and should have asserted earlier.” Id.
Here, plaintiff has not properly demonstrated that laches should have applied to the county
official’s decision to disqualify plaintiff. Plaintiff essentially blames the county officials for
waiting to punish her for not paying her late fees for many years. But it does not make sense to
apply laches to the county officials and allow plaintiff to appear on future ballots, because it is
undisputed that she had not paid past-due filing fees for years. Courts will not apply the equitable
doctrine of laches to a party who has “unclean hands.” Davis v Secretary of State, 346 Mich App
445, 463; 12 NW3d 653 (2023). Further, before applying laches, courts consider any possible
injury to the public. Id. Allowing plaintiff to refuse to pay late fees for many years and still be
treated the same as other candidates who have paid outstanding fees, would not be in the public
interest.
Plaintiff also argues that the county officials waived enforcement of any late fees. Waiver
consists of the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The Cadle Co v City of Kentwood,
285 Mich App 240, 254; 776 NW2d 145 (2009). The party asserting waiver has the burden of
proof. Id. at 255. Before Rule 168.2 was adopted in 2022, county clerks were not required to look
beyond an affidavit of identity to certify a candidate. Accordingly, before 2022, clerks may have
only refused to certify a candidate if statements in the affidavit were clearly false. There is no
merit to plaintiff’s argument that the county officials should not be permitted to enforce Rule 168.2
against her because plaintiff was allowed to appear on past ballots when she owed past-due late
fees. Clerks were not instructed by the secretary of state to review records related to past-due
campaign finance fines before certifying a candidate before 2022. The County imposed late fees
against plaintiff, but the county officials did not take action against her candidacy until 2024, after
Rule 168.2 went into effect in 2022. These facts do not support a finding that the county officials
intentionally waived any of its rights with regard to penalizing plaintiff for failing to pay late fees.
To the extent that plaintiff also raises a statute of limitations argument, she has not
demonstrated that she is entitled to relief. Even assuming, without deciding, that a six-year
limitations period applies to the collection of outstanding campaign fees and fines, MCL 600.5813,
plaintiff has not demonstrated that all the fees and fines imposed would fall outside of the six-year

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window predating 2024. Plaintiff has also not established that fees or fines no longer collectable
are not subject to the reporting requirements of MCL 168.558(4), i.e., that those outstanding fees
must be acknowledged in the affidavit. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it determined
that plaintiff was not entitled to have her unpaid filing fees waived.
B. CLAIM AGAINST WINFREY
Plaintiff’s only claim against Winfrey arises from how plaintiff’s name appeared on the
ballot for the Detroit mayoral election in 2021. Plaintiff preferred to use only her first initial and
her middle name, rather than have her full first name appear on the ballot. Plaintiff alleged that
Winfrey released plaintiff’s name to the media as “Dallias Wilcoxon,” rather than plaintiff’s
preferred iteration of “D. Etta Wilcoxon.” To support her claim, plaintiff provided her own
affidavit, dated May 13, 2024, in which she stated that her name appeared in the press differently
than what she had requested through Winfrey’s office; two news articles from 2021 stating that
“Dallias Wilcoxon” was a candidate; and a copy of the proof ballot from the City, in which
plaintiff’s name was to appear as “D. Etta Wilcoxon,” in the August 2021 primary for mayor.
MCL 168.558(1) states that when filing a nominating petition, qualifying petition, filing
fee, or affidavit of candidacy for office in any election (other than a presidential election), a
candidate must file with the local filing officer, or the secretary of state when nominated at a
convention, two copies of an affidavit of identity. Among the personal information that should be
included in the affidavit of identity is “the manner in which the candidate wishes to have his or her
name appear on the ballot.” MCL 168.558(2). See also MCL 168.560b.
Plaintiff argues that Winfrey violated MCL 168.560b because she released plaintiff’s full
legal name to the media in the spring of 2021, when candidates were just starting to campaign for
the August 2021 primary. Although plaintiff is correct that she had a right to request how her
name should appear on the ballot, per MCL 168.560b, there is nothing in that statute that regulates
how election officials should release the names of individuals who were not yet candidates and
were in the process of taking steps to appear on a ballot months later. Notably, plaintiff does not
dispute that her name was correctly included on the 2021 ballot.
Further, plaintiff’s factual allegations against Winfrey involve how plaintiff’s name
appeared in press releases or election records in 2021. Therefore, this claim appears to be limited
to only the 2021 election, and the trial court properly ruled that there was no actual controversy
with regard to plaintiff’s allegations against Winfrey because the election had already occurred.
See Garrett, 314 Mich App at 449-450. Further, plaintiff did not propose amending her complaint
to add any new allegations involving Winfrey’s preparation of ballots but simply reiterated her
allegations that Winfrey had previously released information about plaintiff without using her
preferred iteration of her name. As plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint merely reiterates her
claims against Winfrey, any amendment of the complaint was futile. See PT Today, 270 Mich
App at 143.

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Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed this part of plaintiff’s complaint, even if the
trial court erred by not first reviewing plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint.
Affirmed.
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Adrienne N. Young

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