COA 374097 IN RE C C M BASKIN MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 3/18/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
March 18, 2026
10:01 AM
In re C. C. M. BASKIN, Minor.
No. 374097
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2024-000868-NA
Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MURRAY and MALDONADO, JJ.
MALDONADO, J. (dissenting).
Respondent Shaniqua Baskin contends on appeal that the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) failed to make reasonable efforts toward family reunification prior to the trial
court terminating her parental rights, including failing to provide her with a case service plan. The
majority concludes that respondent waived this issue by entering a no-contest plea to jurisdiction
and statutory grounds for termination. I disagree that respondent’s plea in this case constituted a
waiver of her right to challenge the sufficiency of the DHHS’s reunification efforts. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent.
I. WAIVER
“A waiver consists of the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”
Patel v Patel, 324 Mich App 631, 634; 922 NW2d 647 (2018). “Magic words are unnecessary to
effectuate a valid waiver, but a waiver must be explicit, voluntary, and made in good faith.” In re
MJC, 349 Mich App 42, 49; 27 NW3d 122 (2023), quoting Patel, 324 Mich App at 634. A valid
waiver may be shown by “express declarations or by declarations that manifest the parties’ intent
and purpose, or may be an implied waiver, evidenced by a party’s decisive, unequivocal conduct
reasonably implying the intent to waive.” In re MJC, 349 Mich App at 49 (quotation marks,
citation, and brackets omitted). “A party who waives a right is precluded from seeking appellate
review based on a denial of that right because waiver eliminates any error.” Id., quoting Cadle Co
v Kentwood, 285 Mich App 240, 255; 776 NW2d 145 (2009).
In In re MJC, this Court determined that the statutory requirement for the DHHS to provide
reasonable efforts to reunify a family is distinct from the statutory requirement that at least one

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statutory ground for termination of parental rights be established by clear and convincing evidence.
In re MJC, 349 Mich App at 54. So in that case, the respondent-father’s waiver of his right to
contest the statutory grounds for termination did not also waive his right to contest the adequacy
of the DHHS’s reunification efforts. Id. Unlike the majority, I do not find In re MJC to be
distinguishable from the instant case on this point because just as in In re MJC the trial court did
not inform respondent that she has the statutory right to reunification services and that she was
waiving those services through her no-contest plea. See id. at 54.
Because of the importance of the relevant language during the plea colloquy at the July 22,
2024 hearing, I include a lengthy excerpt of the hearing transcript:
The Court: Your attorney has indicated to the Court that you wish to
enter a no-contest plea. That means that you are giving up
your right to trial . . . I’m just gonna [sic] have a conversation
with you; ask you some questions because I need to make
sure that you understand what it is you’re giving up before I
can accept the no-contest plea, and I need to make sure that
you are doing this voluntarily.
So first and foremost, you have the right to have a trial before
a judge, sitting with or without a jury. And the trial means
that Ms. Barash, who’s the assistant attorney general, she
represents DHHS; she would call witnesses, and then your
attorney, Mr. Alex, would have a chance to cross examine
any witnesses that she calls. And you would ask questions
of those witnesses through your attorney.
Additionally, you have the right to have witnesses come to
court to testify on your own behalf, and you have the right to
testify on your own behalf.
Ms. Baskin, do you understand that Ms. Barash, the assistant
attorney general, has the burden of proving the allegations,
by a preponderance of the evidence, for statutory grounds
and jurisdiction; and by clear and convincing evidence to
terminate parental rights? And that if you enter a no-contest
plea today that can later on in the future be used at a hearing
to terminate your parental rights. You understand this, Ms.
Baskin?
[Respondent]: Yes.
The Court: Are you making a no-contest plea today, of your own free
will, Ms. Baskin?
[Respondent]: Yes.

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The Court: Has anyone promised you anything to make a no-contest
plea today?
[Respondent]: No.
The Court: Has anyone threatened you to make a no-contest plea today?
[Respondent]: No.
The Court: Okay. And you understand that if the Court takes
jurisdiction, after accepting this no-contest plea, and the
Court does not terminate your parental rights after a best
interest hearing; that the children will be adjudicated. The
Court will take jurisdiction over your children and order you
to do certain things before your children can be returned to
your care. Do you understand that?
[Respondent]: Yes.
The Court: Okay. Are all parties here satisfied with the Advice of
Rights?
[DHHS Attorney]: Yes.
[Respondent’s Attorney]: Satisfied.
[L-GAL]: Yes, your Honor.
The Court: The Court is, then, going to find that the no-contest plea will
be made knowingly and voluntarily. The Court is going to
find that there is a—there is a basis for jurisdiction and a
statutory basis to terminate parental rights.
But the Court, today, as I said Ms. Baskin, we’re not
terminating parental rights because the Court doesn’t do that
until a best interest finding is made. The Court has to hear
evidence and testimony about what is in the best interest of
these children.
I cannot conclude from this colloquy that the trial court clearly indicated to respondent that
she was entitled to reasonable efforts toward reunification—including a case service plan—and
that she was relinquishing that statutory right through her plea to jurisdiction and statutory grounds.
The only potential reference to reasonable efforts, DHHS services, or a case service plan was the
trial court’s statement that it may “order [respondent] to do certain things before [her] children can
be returned to [her] care.” But that statement did not make clear the DHHS’s responsibilities to
facilitate reunification. Therefore, I would conclude that, just as in In re MJC, respondent’s no-
contest plea in the present case did not amount to an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right.” Patel, 324 Mich App at 634. As a result, this issue has not been waived, and

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this Court can consider whether the DHHS failed to make reasonable reunification efforts, such
that the trial court erred by terminating respondent’s parental rights.1
II. REASONABLE EFFORTS
It is well established that the DHHS “has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to
reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79,
85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017), citing MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) and (c); MCL 712A.19a(2). Reasonable
efforts must be appropriate to address the specific barriers facing the family, so efforts will vary
according to circumstance. See In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85-86. However, reasonable
efforts must include creating a case service plan “ ‘outlining the steps that both [the DHHS] and
the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve
reunification.’ ” In re MJC, 349 Mich App at 55, quoting In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85-86.
Generally, to preserve an argument regarding the sufficiency of reasonable reunification
efforts, a respondent must object to the services at the time that the efforts are offered. In re Frey,
297 Mich App 242, 247; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). However, when the DHHS never creates a case
service plan, a respondent never has the opportunity to object, so such a challenge is timely even
when made at the termination hearing. See In re Matamoros, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2025) (Docket No. 371544); slip op at 3-4.
In this case, respondent’s trial counsel never challenged the DHHS’s reunification efforts.
Accordingly, this issue is not preserved and is subject to plain error review. In re Pederson, 331
Mich App 445, 463; 951 NW2d 704 (2020). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three
requirements must be met: 1) the error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or
obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120,
135; 809 NW2d 412 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). “Generally, an error affects substantial
rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings.” In re Utrera, 281
Mich App 1, 9; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). “If those three requirements are met, reversal is warranted
when the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” In re Boshell/Shelton, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No.
371973); slip op at 6 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the present case, a careful review of the record compels the conclusion that the trial
court plainly erred in terminating respondent’s parental rights without the DHHS engaging in
reasonable reunification efforts.2 Indeed, the order terminating respondent’s parental rights
1 Additionally, although respondent did not include this issue in her statement of the questions
presented on appeal, she did address this issue in her supplemental briefing, which she submitted
in response to this Court’s order inviting the parties to address the lack of reunification efforts. In
re CCM Baskin Minor, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 6, 2026 (Docket
No. 34097). For this reason, I would not conclude that this issue is abandoned.
2 The DHHS is excused from its reunification requirements in cases involving aggravated
circumstances. MCL 712A.19a(2); In re Simonetta, 340 Mich App 700, 707; 987 NW2d 919

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indicates: “Reasonable efforts were made to preserve and unify the family to make it possible for
the child(ren) to safely return to the child(ren)’s home. Those efforts were unsuccessful.” But
when the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights at the best-interest hearing, the court
stated:
[Respondent’s] reaction, denying accountability for her role in the crash suggest[s]
she may not increase her safety practice if this Court were to allow her to work
towards reunification. Her failure to recognize responsibility suggest[s] she does
not understand her duty to keep her children safe, or what it takes to keep them safe.
[Emphasis added.]
This statement contradicts the trial court’s finding that “reasonable efforts were made.” To the
contrary, this statement indicates that no reunification efforts were offered or even permitted.
For its part, the DHHS argues that it made the following efforts prior to seeking
termination: face-to-face interviews and follow-up with Children’s Hospital of Michigan,
coordination with law enforcement, interviews with family members, review of prior case files,
and seeking relatives for placement. Assuming arguendo that these efforts are appropriate to the
specific barriers facing the family, see In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85-86, the DHHS’s
reunification efforts were still incomplete because there is no case service plan in the record. See
In re MJC, 349 Mich App at 55.
Consequently, I would conclude that the trial court plainly erred by determining that
reasonable efforts were made and terminating respondent’s parental rights at initial disposition. In
light of the accelerated proceedings, I would further conclude that this error affected the outcome
of the proceedings, causing prejudice to respondent. See In re Boshell/Shelton, ___ Mich App at
___; slip op at 8 (reiterating that the erroneous deprivation of reasonable efforts toward
reunification can seriously affect the fairness and integrity of child-protective proceedings).
For these reasons, I would reverse the order terminating respondent’s parental rights and
remand for further proceedings.
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
(2022). In its original petition, the DHHS included an allegation of murder or attempted murder
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k), which constitutes an aggravated circumstance. See MCL
722.638(1)(a)(vi). But this allegation was removed from the amended petition, prior to the initial
disposition, after respondent pleaded nolo contendere to involuntary manslaughter.

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