PEOPLE OF MI V STEPHEN MICHEAL FLEMING

Court of Appeals, State of Michigan
ORDER
PEOPLE OF MI V STEPHEN MICHAEL FLEMING
Docket No. 377706
LC No. 99-002656-FC
Stephen L. Borrello
Presiding Judge
Michael J. Riordan
Daniel S. Korobkin
Judges
The motion to waive fees is GRANTED for this case only.
The application for leave to appeal is DENIED because defendant has failed to establish
that the trial court erred in denying the motion for relief from judgment.
_______________________________
Presiding Judge
Korobkin, J., concurring.
I concur in the order denying defendant’s application for leave to appeal because this Court’s
recent decision in People v Sykes, ___ Mich App ___ (2026) (Docket No. 367133), is binding on this
panel, establishing a rule of law that we must follow. MCR 7.215(J)(1). But I write separately because I
believe Sykes misapplied our Supreme Court’s precedent on an issue of major significance and warrants
that Court’s further review. See MCR 7.305(B).
At issue in this case is whether defendant’s life sentence for second-degree murder is cruel or
unusual punishment in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 16, in light of People v Taylor, ___ Mich ___
(2025) (Docket Nos. 166428 and 166654), and People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301 (2022). A fair reading of
those two decisions compels the conclusion that it is.
In Stovall, the Court held that a life sentence with the possibility of parole for second-degree
murder violates Const 1963, art 1, § 16 when imposed on an individual who was a juvenile at the time of
the offense. Stovall, 510 Mich at 313-322. The Court explained that a parolable life sentence is
“particularly severe when imposed on a juvenile, given the important mitigating ways that children are
different from adults.” Id. at 314-315. The Court further observed that under MCL 769.25 and MCL
769.25a, most juveniles convicted of first-degree murder, a more serious offense, receive a less severe
term-of-years sentence. Id. at 316. Unlike in first-degree cases, juveniles in the second-degree cases do

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not have the “significant procedural safeguard” of a Miller1 hearing, so they are at risk of serving a life
sentence with less process despite being convicted of a less serious offense. Id. at 316. And although
they have a possibility of parole, the parole board’s discretionary decision whether to release them within
their lifetime would be forever “subject to the fluctuation of executive branch policies.” Id. at 321. For
these reasons, the Court concluded, subjecting juveniles convicted of second-degree murder to a harsher
punishment with fewer procedural protections than those convicted of first-degree murder is
“disproportionate and therefore cruel or unusual.” Id. at 317.
In People v Parks, 510 Mich 225 (2022), the Court held that Const 1963, art 1, § 16 requires
affording the protections of Miller to 18-year-olds convicted of first-degree murder, and then in Taylor
the Court extended that holding to adolescents under the age of 21. The Court explained in Parks, 510
Mich at 252, “that, in terms of neurological development, there is no meaningful distinction between those
who are 17 years old and those who are 18 years old,” and then in Taylor, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 2,
that “late adolescents who are 19 or 20 years old, as a class, share with 18-year-olds the same mitigating
characteristics of late-adolescent brain development.” Consequently, the Court held, adolescents under
the age of 21 were entitled to all the procedures and protections afforded by MCL 769.25, MCL 769.25a,
and related caselaw, including a default or presumptive term-of-years sentence. Parks, 510 Mich at 267
& n 19; Taylor, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 13-14.
Considering Stovall and Taylor together, Stovall’s holding applies to defendant, who was 20 years
old at the time of his offense. Not only was the Court clear in Taylor that 20-year-olds as “a class . . . are
presumptively neurologically indistinguishable from . . . a teenage juvenile offender,” Taylor, ___ Mich
at ___; slip op at 37, it also held that they are entitled to the same rebuttable presumption of a term-of-
years sentence under Michigan’s post-Miller statutes and related caselaw, id. at ___; slip op at 12-13.
Consequently, in this case defendant finds himself in precisely the same position as his counterpart in
Stovall: the default or presumptive sentence for someone who committed a more serious, first-degree
murder at the same age is a less severe term-of-years sentence. As in Stovall, defendant had no Miller
hearing, yet whether he is released from prison within his lifetime will be subject to the complete discretion
of the parole board. Defendant is presumptively less culpable twice over: he is less culpable than older
adults, and he is less culpable than 20-year-olds with first-degree convictions. Yet, as in Stovall, he is
subject to a harsher sentence for a less severe crime. It is for this reason that Stovall, viewed through the
lens of Taylor, leads to the inescapable conclusion that defendant’s sentence is “disproportionate and
therefore cruel or unusual.” Stovall, 510 Mich at 317.
The Sykes Court took the position that it did not have authority to “extend” the Supreme Court’s
caselaw because, in part, we are only an “error-correcting” court. Sykes, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op
at 3, 4. Respectfully, I must disagree. To grant relief in this and similar cases would not “extend” the
Supreme Court’s caselaw; it would synthesize, apply, and implement it—a classic role and responsibility
of any tribunal, including ours. And because defendant’s sentence is unconstitutional (and the other
requirements of MCR 6.508(D) are satisfied), the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is the “error” that this Court should “correct.” See People v Poole, 349 Mich App 594, 611
(2024), aff’d ___ Mich ___ (2025) (Docket No. 166813).
1 Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012).

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Because we are presently bound by Sykes, however, I concur in this Court’s order denying
defendant’s application for leave to appeal. Defendant will need to apply to our Supreme Court for the
relief to which I believe he and those similarly situated are entitled.
Borrello, P.J., joins the statement by Korobkin, J.

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