COA 375925 PEOPLE OF MI V CASSAUNDRA AGLIATA Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 5/14/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
May 14, 2026
11:22 AM
v No. 375925
Delta Circuit Court
CASSAUNDRA AGLIATA, LC No. 24-011262-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and REDFORD and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this interlocutory appeal, defendant, who has been charged with operating a vehicle
while intoxicated (OWI), third offense, MCL 257.625(9)(c), appeals on leave granted the trial
court’s order denying her motion to suppress chemical test results obtained under Michigan’s
informed consent law, MCL 257.625c. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 14, 2024, after pulling defendant over on suspicion of driving while
intoxicated, a Michigan State Police trooper arrested defendant for OWI. The arresting trooper’s
body-worn camera captured footage of the entire interaction. Defendant cooperated with the
trooper’s request to submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT) after the trooper erroneously told
defendant that she would receive an additional two-year misdemeanor charge if she refused.
However, the trooper correctly advised defendant of her rights regarding the chemical test three
times. Ultimately, defendant consented to the chemical test but noted that she did so “under
duress.” At the hospital, the trooper conflated the standards for PBTs and chemical tests, and he
incorrectly told defendant that her refusal to submit to the chemical test would result in a two-year
misdemeanor. Regardless, defendant did not revoke her consent. Instead, she rolled up her sleeve,
presented her arm, and sat still for the blood draw.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 12, 2024, a felony complaint was filed alleging OWI third offense. A
preliminary exam was held on August 29, 2024 and October 2, 2024, after which defendant was

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bound over to circuit court. On May 5, 2025, defendant moved to suppress the chemical test
evidence, and she argued that the evidence was obtained in violation of her Fourth Amendment
rights because the trooper’s misstatement of the law coerced her consent. By stipulation, the trial
court reviewed the footage of the body-worn camera before the May 13, 2025 hearing on
defendant’s motion. After reviewing the arresting officer’s body-camera video, the trial court
acknowledged that the trooper “initially gave a jumbled account of acts and penalties” but
concluded that he “cured” these mistakes by reading the correct standard to defendant three times.
Because the court determined that defendant had consented to the chemical test, the trial court
denied her motion. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant argues that her consent to the chemical test was not valid because it
was coerced by the trooper’s misstatements of law regarding her right to refuse. We disagree.
III. ANALYSIS
“We review de novo the circuit court’s ultimate ruling on a motion to suppress evidence.”
People v Stricklin, 327 Mich App 592, 598; 935 NW2d 59 (2019) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Additionally, “[w]e review de novo whether the Fourth Amendment was violated and
whether the exclusionary rule applies.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the
trial court’s factual findings and decisions regarding the validity of consent are reviewed for clear
error. People v Frohriep, 247 Mich App 692, 702; 637 NW2d 562 (2001). A trial court’s “finding
is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Stricklin, 327 Mich App at 598
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “We overstep our review function if we substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court and make independent findings.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
“Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v Armstrong, 344 Mich App 286, 295; 1 NW3d 299
(2022); see US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. Searches and seizures must be reasonable
for the results to be admissible in court. Armstrong, 344 Mich App at 295. Subject to certain
exceptions, “[s]earches or seizures conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable.” People
v Moorman, 331 Mich App 481, 485; 952 NW2d 597 (2020). The only exception relevant to this
case is consent, which “permits a search and seizure without a warrant when the consent is
unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given.” Stricklin, 327 Mich App at 600. The
prosecutor has the burden of proving that the totality of the circumstances establish that
defendant’s consent was freely and voluntarily given and “cannot satisfy this burden by simply
showing the defendant’s acquiescence to lawful authority.” Id. at 599-600. “Consent is not
voluntary if it is the result of coercion or duress.” People v Bolduc, 263 Mich App 430, 440; 688
NW2d 316 (2004).
Under Michigan law, anyone who is arrested for OWI is considered to impliedly consent
to chemical tests of their blood, breath, or urine. MCL 257.625c(1)(a). As relevant to this appeal,
MCL 257.625a(6)(b) provides:
(b) A person arrested for a crime described in section 625c(1) must be advised of
all of the following:

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(i) If he or she takes a chemical test of his or her blood, urine, or breath administered
at the request of a peace officer, he or she has the right to demand that a person of
his or her own choosing administer 1 of the chemical tests.
(ii) The results of the test are admissible in a judicial proceeding as provided under
this act and will be considered with other admissible evidence in determining the
defendant’s innocence or guilt.
(iii) He or she is responsible for obtaining a chemical analysis of a test sample
obtained at his or her own request.
(iv) If he or she refuses the request of a peace officer to take a test described in
subparagraph (i), a test must not be given without a court order, but the peace officer
may seek to obtain a court order.
(v) Refusing a peace officer’s request to take a test described in subparagraph (i)
will result in the suspension of his or her operator’s or chauffeur’s license and
vehicle group designation or operating privilege and in the addition of 6 points to
his or her driver record.
Here, defendant is correct that the trooper mistakenly told her that refusing to take the PBT
would result in an additional charge. However, this appeal only concerns her consent to the
chemical test, not the PBT, and the trooper correctly explained defendant’s rights regarding the
chemical test by reading verbatim from MCL 257.625a(6)(b). The trooper did briefly conflate the
PBT and chemical test standards before the blood draw, but this mistake occurred after he correctly
explained the law three times. More importantly, the trial court determined that this mistake
occurred after defendant had already consented to the test and that she did not revoke that consent.
Although defendant claims to have agreed to the test “under duress” because she felt as though she
did not have a choice, we have previously stated that “[h]aving to make a choice between two
undesirable options does not render defendant’s express consent to the blood draw coerced and
involuntary.” Stricklin, 327 Mich App at 603. The trooper’s body-camera footage clearly showed
that defendant consented to the chemical test after the trooper explained her right to refuse three
times. Having reviewed the video, we conclude that the trial court did not err by dismissing
defendant’s motion to suppress the chemical test.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Michelle M. Rick

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