COA 374778 AMAL ALI GOOBA V MOHAMED Z ALTAHERY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
AMAL ALI GOOBA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
August 13, 2026
11:48 AM
v No. 374778
Wayne Circuit Court
MOHAMED Z. ALTAHERY, LC No. 23-102094-DM
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this divorce action, the trial court held that defendant-husband conspired with his father
to defraud plaintiff-wife of her share of the marital home’s value. It then gave defendant two
options: pay plaintiff a portion of the house’s appraised value or sell the house and pay plaintiff a
portion of the proceeds. Because the house is titled in his father’s name, defendant challenges the
court’s authority to include the latter option. But defendant identifies no harm that he has suffered
and therefore has not shown that he is aggrieved by the court’s decision. We therefore dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction.
I. FACTS
Plaintiff Amal Gooba and defendant Mohamed Altahery married in April 2019. Sometime
thereafter, they moved into a home in Detroit. Plaintiff testified that she understood that she and
defendant had paid most or all of the house’s purchase price and that the house is not subject to a
lender’s mortgage interest. She also presented documentation showing that, in the weeks before
the purchase, defendant withdrew $15,000 from their joint checking account—with the ultimate
purchase price being $20,000. The house, however, was—and remains—titled in the name of
defendant’s father, Zein Altahery.
The parties eventually separated, and plaintiff filed for divorce. Although the proceedings
involved several disputed issues, only the dispute concerning the marital home is relevant to this
appeal. Plaintiff alleged that defendant and Zein had conspired to defraud her of her interest in
that house. The trial court found plaintiff’s allegations credible and determined that defendant and
his father had worked together to manipulate the house’s title to deprive plaintiff of her interest in

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it. The court further determined that plaintiff and defendant together held a 50% interest in the
house and that Zein owned the remaining 50%. Plaintiff was therefore entitled to 25% of the
house’s value. Invoking Wiand v Wiand, 178 Mich App 137; 443 NW2d 464 (1989), the court
gave defendant two options: he could pay plaintiff 25% of the house’s appraised value, or he could
sell the house and pay plaintiff 25% of the proceeds. Defendant now appeals from that judgment
and asks that we “strike from the Judgment of Divorce that the house of his father may be sold to
pay off the debts of the son.”
II. JURISDICTION
Although not briefed by the parties, we first turn to our jurisdiction. “The question of
jurisdiction is always within the scope of this Court’s review.” Walsh v Taylor, 263 Mich
App 618, 622; 689 NW2d 506 (2004). We conclude that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.
Under MCR 7.203(A), this Court “has jurisdiction of an appeal of right filed by an
aggrieved party from” certain trial court orders. For this Court to have jurisdiction, the appellant
must be aggrieved by the trial court’s decision.
An aggrieved party is not one who is merely disappointed over a certain result.
Rather, to have standing on appeal, a litigant must have suffered a concrete and
particularized injury . . . . [A] litigant on appeal must demonstrate an injury arising
from . . . the actions of the trial court . . . rather than an injury arising from the
underlying facts of the case. [Federated Ins Co v Oakland Co Rd Comm, 475 Mich
286, 291; 715 NW2d 846 (2006) (footnotes omitted).]
“A party who could not benefit from a change in the judgment has no appealable interest.” Ford
Motor Co v Jackson, 399 Mich 213, 226; 249 NW2d 29 (1976).
Here, the trial court gave defendant the choice of either paying plaintiff 25% of the house’s
appraised value or selling the house and paying plaintiff 25% of the proceeds. Defendant now
challenges the trial court’s authority to include the second option.1 But that only means that the
trial court’s judgment gives him more options than he desires. He does not explain how the
availability of an additional option injures him or how he would benefit from a change in the
1 The dissent construes defendant’s brief on appeal as arguing that the trial court erred in awarding
anything to plaintiff at all. We disagree. As the dissent acknowledges, “defendant’s brief is not
perfectly written.” In it, defendant poses as a question presented an argument that “the award of a
share of real estate and sale of property constituted an abuse of discretion.” But he asserts that
“[t]he actual purchaser who paid for the whole thing will lose half the value of his house and can
have it sold against his will” and that “Due Process required that [Zein] be put on legal notice that
his house was in possible jeopardy,” and asks in his prayer for relief that we “strike from the
Judgment of Divorce that the house of his father may be sold to pay off the debts of the son.”
Defendant’s argument on appeal cannot reasonably be construed as a challenge to the trial court
awarding an interest in the home to plaintiff; rather, it is solely challenges the imposed remedy.

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judgment. Defendant may avoid the challenged portion of the judgment altogether by choosing
the option that he does not contest: paying plaintiff 25% of the house’s appraised value.
Moreover, defendant does not frame his appellate arguments in terms of any injury he has
suffered.2 His brief instead makes clear that he is seeking to protect his father’s interests.
Defendant argues that the trial court’s decision “abrogates [Zein’s] rights,” and his requested relief
asks this Court “to strike from the Judgment of Divorce that the house of his father may be sold to
pay off the debts of the son.” That is consistent with the trial court’s observation in response to
defendant’s motion for reconsideration that the motion was “in essence, an argument advanced on
behalf of Defendant’s father.”
A litigant “generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim
to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 499; 95 S Ct
2197; 45 L Ed 2d 343 (1975). Defendant cannot litigate his father’s interests in this appeal by
proxy; he can litigate only his own interests. This Court has held that a nonparty adversely affected
by a decision in a divorce action lacks standing to appeal unless the nonparty properly intervened.
Zalewski v Zalewski, 342 Mich App 429, 438; 995 NW2d 553 (2022). That principle applies here.
If Zein wanted these arguments raised on appeal, he needed to intervene. He did not do so. And
because defendant has identified no injury to his own interests, he is not an aggrieved party. We
therefore lack jurisdiction over his appeal.3
2 The dissent argues that defendant is aggrieved because “if he succeeds on appeal, he would
benefit: he would not be required to sell his 25% interest in the home if he cannot afford to pay
plaintiff her share.” But at no point in these proceedings has defendant argued that he cannot
afford to pay plaintiff for her interest in the house. We decline to conclude that defendant is
aggrieved based on this hypothesized injury.
3 We also note that in his claim of appeal, defendant asserted that he was appealing from the trial
court’s February 20, 2025 order denying his motion for reconsideration. But “[a]n order denying
a motion for reconsideration is not a final order from which one may appeal as of right”; instead,
“it may serve as a triggering event for calculating the time for filing a claim of appeal” from an
order that is a final order appealable of right. Adams v Perry Furniture Co, 198 Mich App 1, 5;
497 NW2d 514 (1993), overruled on other grounds by Allied Electric Supply Co v Tenaglia, 461
Mich 285, 289; 602 NW2d 572 (1999). The appeal is properly taken from the October 25, 2024
judgment of divorce, not the order denying reconsideration. Given that this Court advised
defendant that he needed to file a copy of the judgment of divorce, and he subsequently complied,
we do not dismiss the appeal on that basis. See Nye v Gable, Nelson & Murphy, 169 Mich App
411, 415-416; 425 NW2d 797 (1988) (“[A]lthough plaintiff stated the wrong order in his claim of
appeal, this Court accepted the appeal as if it had been claimed from the order of summary
disposition . . . .”).

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This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Costs are awarded to plaintiff under
MCR 7.219(A).4
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
/s/ Mariam Saad Bazzi
4 Plaintiff also requests attorney fees under MCL 552.13 and MCR 3.206(D). But MCL 552.13
applies to “every action brought . . . for a divorce,” and MCR 3.206(D) applies to “actions for
divorce,” see MCR 3.201(A)(1). “Because a ‘civil action’ relates to the filing of a complaint, see
MCR 2.101, an appeal from the circuit court to this Court is not a ‘civil action.’ ” Fette v Peters
Constr Co, 310 Mich App 535, 552; 871 NW2d 877 (2015). As a result, neither authority applies
here.

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