COA 373941 G&D INVESTMENT GROUP LLC V CEDAR BLUFF PRESERVE LLC Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/10/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
G&D INVESTMENT GROUP LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
December 10, 2025
10:28 AM
v No. 373941
Allegan Circuit Court
CEDAR BLUFF PRESERVE LLC, ROBERT J.
LARSON, and DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING
AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
LC No. 2022-066617-CZ
Defendants-Appellees,
and
JOANNA MARIE RAJTER, ANNA RAJTER,
MICHAEL CHISM, LINDA CHISM, WOODS
ESCAPE LLC, PAUL J. SONDGERATH and
SANDRA T. SONDGERATH, Trustees of the
SANDRA & PAUL J. SONDGERATH LIVING
TRUST, MONTY BRENNER, CHERYL
BRENNER, PATRICIA HUBBARD, MARK
HUBBARD, MARY TOBIN, RCJ INVESTMENTS
LLC, EDGAR GUIGUE, HAZEL GUIGUE,
DANIEL SHANAHAN, ROBERT GREGOR,
NANCY MCADAM, TRACY R. LESLIE, Trustee
of the TRACY R. LESLIE REVOCABLE TRUST,
ROBERT W. WEBSTER, Trustee of the ELEANOR
O. WEBSTER TRUST, JAMES FAIRBAIRN,
PATRICIA FAIRBAIRN, JUDITH FAIRBAIRN,
BERNICE LOPATA and CAROL RICE, Trustees of
the LOPATA-RICE TRUST, MARTIN L. KOCH,
Individually and as Trustee of the TRUST
AGREEMENT OF MARTIN L. KOCH,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
MARGARET SCHNEIDERMAN, ROBERT L.
SHERWOOD, Trustee of the ROBERT LISTER
SHERWOOD TRUST, BENJAMIN SYLVESTER,
DANIEL SYLVESTER, THE DEBORAH GANG

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TRUST, WILLIAM HULL, TERRI HULL, MARK
FITZGERALD HUBBARD, KATHLEEN
FRANCES HUBBARD-MCDOLE, LORRAINE W.
HUBBARD, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, JEAN R. VANIER, Individually and
as Trustee of the JEAN R. VANIER TRUST,
DAVID STEWART, Trustee of the BETTY L.
STEWART IRREVOCABLE TRUST, FREDRICK
J. FARRER and JUDITH A. FARRER, Trustees of
the FREDRICK J. FARRER AND JUDITH A.
FARRER TRUST, CHARLES BEATTY, DEBRA
BEATTY, JANE CONWAY, Trustee of the
REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT 08-11-88,
KENNETH A. SCHRODER, Trustee of the
KENNETH ALAN SCHRODER TRUST, DANIEL
KEMPTON, HELEN KEMPTON, WILLIAM
ANDERSON, ELIZABETH ANDERSON, JASON
WAYNE BERRY, ALLEGAN COUNTY DRAIN
COMMISSION, LOIS LARSON, ERIC RAUCH,
HEIDI RAUCH, ERIC JAMES NEWBOLD,
PAULA NEWBOLD, TIMOTHY MALONEY,
MARYLU MALONEY, MATTHEW WEHRMAN
and LISA WEHRMAN, Trustees of the LISA AND
MATTHEW WEHRMAN TRUST, TOWNSHIP OF
CASCO, and ALLEGAN COUNTY ROAD
COMMISSION,
Defendants.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and REDFORD and FEENEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this property action, plaintiff-appellant, G&D Investment Group LLC, appeals as of right
the trial court judgment denying plaintiff’s request to vacate all or certain portions of the platted
roads within the Cedar Bluff Park Addition plat, pursuant to the Land Division Act (LDA), MCL
560.101 et seq. Numerous defendants were named in this matter; however, all but the following
three defendants were dismissed through stipulation or otherwise: Cedar Bluff Preserve LLC
(CBP), Robert J. Larson, and the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
(LARA). And because LARA ultimately offered no objection to the relief that plaintiff sought so
long as the LDA was complied with, Larson and CBP were the only defendants for the purposes

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of the bench trial in this case. Accordingly, to the extent that this opinion refers to “defendants,”
it is referring to Larson and CBP.1 We affirm.
I. FACTS
The original plat in this case, containing 132 lots, was recorded in 1925. According to the
plat, the platted roads were “dedicated to the use of the lot owners.” But the roads were never
constructed or maintained. Since then, there have been two amendments to the plat—both
amendments combined certain lots and vacated their respective abutting platted roads, but neither
amendment concerned the lots at issue in this case. The only lots pertinent to this appeal are the
following: (1) plaintiff’s vacant lots, purchased in 2021; (2) Larson’s vacant lots, purchased in
2012; and (3) CBP’s vacant lots, purchased in 2022. Notably, Larson owns CBP.
In December 2022, plaintiff filed a complaint, requesting that the trial court vacate all the
platted roads—or at least the platted roads bordering plaintiff’s property—within the Cedar Bluff
Association plat, pursuant to the LDA. Plaintiff explained that the vacation of the roads would
allow plaintiff to connect its separated lots into one continuous plot of land, thereby increasing the
land’s value and utility. Defendants requested that the trial court dismiss plaintiff’s claims with
prejudice. Defendant’s objections included that: (1) defendants had a right to use the roads, (2)
defendants would not consent to the vacation of the roads, (3) the roads represented valuable
property rights of the defendants, and (4) vacation of the roads would limit defendants’
development opportunities and deprive defendants of valuable access rights.
At the very beginning of the bench trial, the trial court indicated that it had met with the
attorneys in chambers, and everyone agreed that it would be appropriate to submit written briefs
concerning the impact of Beach v Lima Twp, 283 Mich App 504; 770 NW2d 386 (2009), aff’d 489
Mich 99 (2011), on plaintiff’s request for relief. Accordingly, both parties submitted posttrial
briefs in this matter. Plaintiff argued that Beach did not require a finding of adverse possession
over platted roads before they could be vacated under the LDA; instead, it merely explained that
the LDA was not the proper avenue to seek relief when trying to establish ownership by adverse
possession, but it was the proper avenue to seek relief when trying to establish an interest in land
traceable to the plat or platting process. Conversely, defendants asserted that under Beach, plaintiff
was required to show that it had substantive property rights in the roads before they could be
vacated under the LDA.
Thereafter, the trial court issued a written order denying plaintiff’s request to vacate all or
certain portions of the platted roads. The trial court analyzed three distinct arguments. First, citing
Beach v Lima Twp, 489 Mich 99, 109-111, 115; 802 NW2d 1 (2011), the trial court noted that
because the LDA was not intended to establish nonexistent property rights, plaintiff was required
to show an existing substantive property right in the streets sought to be vacated before such relief
could be granted. Second, the trial court found that defendants established reasonable objections—
1 As an initial matter, we reject defendants’ jurisdictional challenge because the trial court’s
judgment clearly meets the definition of final under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i), ensuring that we have
jurisdiction over this appeal as of right, pursuant to MCR 7.203(A).

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related to access and development—to the vacation of the platted roads. And third, the trial court
found that plaintiff’s request for a nonuniform amendment, without the unanimous consent of the
affected property owners, was “not consistent with [Maatta v Dead River Campers, Inc, 263 Mich
App 604, 617; 689 NW2d 491 (2004)] and impermissible as a matter of law.” Plaintiff now
appeals.
II. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Issues that are not properly addressed by the trial court are not preserved for review.”
Koster v June’s Trucking, Inc, 244 Mich App 162, 168; 625 NW2d 82 (2000). In this case, the
trial court plainly addressed: (1) existing substantive property rights under Beach, (2) defendants’
objections under the LDA, and (3) nonuniform amendments to covenants. Therefore, those issues
are all preserved for appellate review. See id. But because plaintiff did not object—and in fact,
affirmatively agreed—to the submission of posttrial briefs on the Beach issue, plaintiff failed to
preserve its argument that the trial court sua sponte introduced the issue of existing substantive
property rights under Beach. See id. Although we may overlook preservation requirements under
certain circumstances, we decline to do so here. See Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs
& Mfg, LLC, 347 Mich App 280, 289-290; 14 NW3d 472 (2023); see e.g., Joseph v Nat’l Gen Ins
Co, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 364798); slip op at 9.
“A trial court’s findings of fact in a bench trial are reviewed for clear error while its
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” Midwest Valve & Fitting Co v Detroit, 347 Mich App
237, 250; 14 NW3d 826 (2023), aff’d 14 NW3d 393 (Mich, 2024). “A finding is clearly erroneous
when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “This Court is especially deferential to the trial court’s superior ability to judge
of the relative credibility of witnesses.” Fraser Twp v Haney, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___NW3d
___ (2025) (Docket No. 368834); slip op at 2 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
III. NONUNIFORM AMENDMENTS TO COVENANTS
As an initial matter, defendants argue that plaintiff’s failure to address the trial court’s third
finding—regarding nonuniform amendments to covenants—requires dismissal of this case
because “irrespective of how this Court rules on the other two holdings of the trial court, the appeal
must necessarily fail because the outcome of this case will not change due to the third holding
surviving . . . .” We disagree because denial of relief under this issue does not preclude relief
under the other issues plaintiff raised.
The trial court found that “plaintiff’s request for a nonuniform amendment,” without the
unanimous consent of the affected property owners, was “not consistent with Maatta and
impermissible as a matter of law.” In Maatta, 263 Mich App at 616, this Court held that “[n]on-
uniform covenant amendments require the unanimous consent of the affected property owners.”
According to the plat in this case, the roads were “dedicated to the use of the lot owners.” Although
some of the lot owners did not object to the vacation of the roads, defendants clearly did. Because
plaintiff did not obtain unanimous consent to vacate the platted roads, plaintiff needed to establish
a reason for vacation by other means, which as will be discussed next, plaintiff failed to do.

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IV. EXISTING SUBSTANTIVE PROPERTY RIGHT
On appeal, plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by finding that plaintiff was
required to show an existing substantive property right in the streets sought to be vacated before
such relief could be granted under the LDA. We disagree.
Under the LDA, a trial court may “vacate, correct, or revise all or a part of a recorded plat.”
MCL 560.221; See Tomecek v Bavas, 482 Mich 484, 495-496; 759 NW2d 178 (2008). The LDA
defines “plat” as “a map or chart of a subdivision of land.” MCL 560.102(a). To vacate, correct,
or revise a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat, a complaint must be filed in the trial court
“by the owner of a lot in the subdivision, a person of record claiming under the owner, or the
governing body of the municipality in which the subdivision covered by the plat is located.” MCL
560.222. The complaint must set forth the following: (1) “[t]he part or parts, if any, sought to be
vacated and any other correction or revision of the plat sought by the plaintiff;” and (2) “[t]he
plaintiff’s reasons for seeking the vacation, correction, or revision.” MCL 560.223. Once the
plaintiff has asserted a reason for the vacation, correction, or revision, those opposing the action
have the burden of showing a reasonable objection to the request. Petition of Gondek, 69 Mich
App 73, 74-77; 244 NW2d 361 (1976).
“When construing the LDA, we are mindful that our primary goal is to ascertain and give
effect to the Legislature’s intent. When determining intent, we consider first the language of a
statute.” Tomecek, 482 Mich at 496 (citation omitted). “The LDA was never intended to enable
a court to establish an otherwise nonexistent property right. Rather, the act allows a court to alter
a plat to reflect property rights already in existence.” Id. As our Supreme Court has explained,
“[a] map, by itself, is not a determination of substantive property interests. If one ‘revises’ a map
of the United States to show Michigan encompassing half of the country, it does not make it so.”
Id.
In this case, the trial court relied on Beach, 489 Mich 99, for the proposition that plaintiff
needed to show an existing substantive property right in the streets sought to be vacated before
such relief could be granted under the LDA. In the trial court and in its appellate brief, plaintiff
argued that the LDA was the proper avenue for relief because plaintiff was “looking for relief from
the establishment of a plat or the platting process . . . .” But according to the plat, the roads were
“dedicated to the use of the lot owners,” and plaintiff never explained what the alleged error was
in the establishment of the plat or the platting process. Instead, plaintiff merely argued that it
preferred to have the roads vacated. It was not until plaintiff’s reply brief on appeal that plaintiff
claimed “a reversionary interest in the land subject to the roads which it abuts . . . .” “Reply briefs
must be limited to rebuttal of the arguments in the appellee’s or cross-appellee’s brief . . . .”
Bronson Methodist Hosp v Mich Assigned Claims Facility, 298 Mich App 192, 199; 826 NW2d
197 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Raising an issue for the first time in a reply
brief is not sufficient to present the issue for appeal.” Id. (quotation marks, citation, and alteration
omitted). Therefore, we decline to address plaintiff’s reversionary-interest argument. See id.
Because plaintiff has failed to timely explain what the alleged error was in the
establishment of the plat or the platting process, the crux of this issue is whether the trial court was
correct in finding that plaintiff needed to show an existing substantive property right in the streets

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sought to be vacated before such relief could be granted under the LDA. We conclude that the
trial court did not err in this regard.
A. BEACH
The dispute in Beach, 489 Mich at 103, arose from a disagreement over property rights to
areas of land that were designated as platted streets but that had never been developed or used as
roads. The plat at issue was made and recorded in 1835, and it had remained unaltered since its
execution. Id. In 2004, the defendant purchased land within the plat, intending to use and develop
part of the platted roads for ingress and egress to their parcel. Id. The plaintiffs, disputing the
defendant’s right to use and develop the platted streets, filed an action to quiet title on the basis of
adverse possession. Id. at 104. The trial court ultimately granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary
disposition, finding that: (1) large trees, at least 100 years old, were growing in the middle of the
platted streets; and (2) the plaintiffs had adversely possessed the disputed area by farming and
maintaining private trials and fences on the land. Id.
The question posed in Beach, was “whether a nonrecord property holder seeking to
establish marketable title by proof of adverse possession must bring such an action under the LDA,
rather than solely as an action to quiet title.” Id. at 107. Our Supreme Court explained that the
LDA’s language, coupled with its historical application, “highlights the crucial limitation of LDA
actions to vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat.” Id. at 116-117. For example, “[i]f a party’s
interest in land is traceable to the plat or the platting process, the LDA is the appropriate avenue
for relief.” Id. at 117. But “[i]f, as here, a party seeks to establish a substantive interest in land
that is not traceable to the plat nor the platting process, the LDA cannot provide the necessary
relief.” Id. “It is only after such a property right has been recognized that the need arises under
the LDA to revise a plat that does not reflect the newly recognized property right. Until that
property right is legally recognized, the LDA is inapplicable.” Id. at 102. The Court reiterated
that “[t]he LDA was never intended to enable a court to establish an otherwise nonexistent property
right. Rather, the act allows a court to alter a plat to reflect property rights already in existence.”
Id. at 109-110 (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added).
B. APPLICATION OF BEACH
In this case, plaintiff—similar to the plaintiffs in Beach—sought to vacate previously
platted, but never developed, roads. See id. at 103. But unlike the plaintiffs in Beach, plaintiff
never argued a substantive property right through adverse possession or otherwise.2 Rather,
plaintiff merely argued that it preferred to have the roads vacated. Because plaintiff failed to
explain how its alleged interest in the roads was “traceable to the plat or the platting process,” the
LDA was not the proper avenue for relief in this case. Id. at 117. The proper avenue would have
instead been for plaintiff to: (1) first, legally establish a substantive property interest in the roads,
that was not traceable to the plat nor the platting process; (2) then, move, under the LDA, to have
2 As previously stated, because plaintiff failed to raise its reversionary-interest argument until its
brief on appeal, it was not sufficiently raised for appeal. See Bronson Methodist, 298 Mich App
at 199.

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the plat revised to reflect that newly recognized property right. Id. at 102. Accordingly, the trial
court did not err by finding that plaintiff was required to show an existing substantive property
right in the streets sought to be vacated before such relief could be granted under the LDA. See
id. As the trial court explained, “[t]o conclude otherwise, would create a new property right, a
record title, through the LDA on behalf of plaintiff[], which is impermissible.” See id. at 109-110.
Because plaintiff has not demonstrated a current substantive property right in the streets
sought to be vacated, the trial court did not err by denying plaintiff’s requested relief in this case.
V. REASONABLE OBJECTION
Plaintiff further argues that the trial court erred by finding that defendants had a reasonable
objection to the vacation of the platted roads. But because plaintiff has failed to establish a reason
for vacation of the platted roads under the LDA, we do not need to reach the question of whether
defendants had a reasonable objection to plaintiff’s requested relief. See Petition of Gondek, 69
Mich App at 74-77.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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