COA 372552 SARAH JAMES V GUSTAV A JAMES Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/28/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
SARAH JAMES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
August 28, 2026
11:34 AM
V No. 372552
Eaton Circuit Court
GUSTAV A. JAMES, LC No. 1988-000624-DM
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and RIORDAN and SWARTZLE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this case concerning child support arrearages, plaintiff appeals the circuit court’s order
calculating that defendant owed plaintiff $8,774. We granted plaintiff’s delayed application for
leave to appeal. James v James, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 7, 2025
(Docket No. 372552). We now reverse and remand.
I. FACTS
The parties were married and had three children. On July 19, 1988, plaintiff obtained an
ex parte interim child-support order from Eaton County. On August 22, 1988, the Eaton County
Friend of the Court issued a Notice of Arrearage stating that defendant had arrearages of $2,100
in child support due to plaintiff. On September 16, 1988, the circuit court ordered a Friend of the
Court investigation regarding child support, and on September 26, 1988, a temporary support order
was entered.
The parties were divorced in Eaton Circuit Court on August 31, 1989. The three children
were then still minors, and primary physical custody was awarded to plaintiff until “each child
attains the age of eighteen (18) years or graduates from high school, whichever occurs later, or
until further order of this court.” The judgment provided that “all support arrearage accrued before
the Judgment of Divorce for the minor children, whether the arrearage arose under a Temporary
Child Support Order or under a separate Judgment entered under the Family Support Act, is
preserved.” The judgment further provided that, going forward, defendant would pay $420 a week
for child support to plaintiff, and that “each support payment . . . is not, on and after the date it is

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due, subject to retroactive modification.” On November 14, 1989, the Friend of the Court signed
an affidavit stating that defendant’s arrearage was $28,980.
On May 31, 1990, the Virgin Islands Department of Justice Division of Paternity and Child
Support found that the older two children were living with defendant in the Virgin Islands. The
Agency ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $350 per month in child support for the youngest child.
On December 10, 1990, the parties agreed to a modified judgment of divorce. The
judgment set a sum defendant would pay plaintiff “in full and complete settlement of all claims
for support of Plaintiff but do not include all claims for support of the children of the parties.” The
judgment further stated that the parties “agree that each of the children shall be allowed to decide
the parent with whom they want to reside and in such event the amount payable to the Plaintiff
shall be $350.00 per child times the number of children choosing to reside with the Plaintiff.”
Before 1999, defendant paid plaintiff a total of $8,011 in child support, then made no other
such payments until 2023. In 2023, an income withholding for child support arrearage was sent
to defendant and to the Social Security Administration. The Eaton County Friend of the Court
received a payment of $753.50 from the Social Security Administration, and the Michigan State
Disbursement Unit (MiSDU) mailed the check to plaintiff. A Michigan Child Support Enforce-
ment System (MCSES) report prepared in April 2023 credited this payment, and listed a remaining
“Payee Balance” of $70,935.64 and a “State Balance” of $2,642.50. Defendant called the
Enforcement Case Worker, stating that the minor children had lived with him and asking for a full
accounting.
An Eaton County Family Court Referee filed a recommended order. The referee concluded
that defendant still owed $2,642.50 to the state, and a total of $9,527.50 to plaintiff (before the
$753.50 payment). The referee found that the youngest child was the only child who lived with
plaintiff following the divorce, specifying that the youngest child lived with plaintiff from
September 1, 1989, to December 31, 1992, and then again from August 1, 1993, to June 30, 1994.
The referee found that before 1999 defendant had paid $8,011. The referee stated, “Since this is a
1988 case, I was unable to locate any orders prior to the Judgment of Divorce.”
Plaintiff filed an objection to this recommended order, and a hearing was held before
another referee. The youngest child appeared as a witness. He testified that following the divorce,
he lived with plaintiff in Michigan for his second- through sixth-grade years, and his eighth-grade
year. He further testified that he lived with defendant in the Virgin Islands for nine months for his
seventh-grade year, and from ninth grade onward. He testified that he started second grade in
1988, and completed eighth grade in 1995. The referee mistakenly described the youngest child
as having testified that he last lived with plaintiff in 1994. The referee filed a recommended order
that provided the same calculation as did the previous referee.
Plaintiff again objected. The trial court issued an order expressing agreement with the
referees’ orders. The court found that “a substantial portion of the previous arrearage occurred
during a time in which the minor children resided full time with the Defendant-father.”
This appeal followed.

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II. ANALYSIS
“Generally, this Court reviews child support orders and orders modifying support for an
abuse of discretion.” Fisher v Fisher, 276 Mich App 424, 427; 741 NW2d 68 (2007). “An abuse
of discretion occurs when a court selects an outcome that is not within the range of reasonable and
principled outcomes.” Borowsky v Borowsky, 273 Mich App 666, 672; 733 NW2d 71 (2007).
This Court reviews “the trial court’s factual findings for clear error.” Diez v Davey, 307 Mich App
366, 375-376; 861 NW2d 323 (2014). We review “de novo the proper interpretation of
the . . . applicable statutes.” Borowsky, 273 Mich App at 672.
Plaintiff argues that the circuit court erroneously calculated defendant’s arrearage. We
agree.
MCL 552.603 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) A support order issued by a court of this state shall be enforced as
provided in this act.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a support order that is part
of a judgment or is an order in a domestic relations matter is a judgment on and
after the date the support amount is due as prescribed in section 5c, with the full
force, effect, and attributes of a judgment of this state, and is not, on and after the
date it is due, subject to retroactive modification. No additional action is necessary
to reduce support to a final judgment. Retroactive modification of a support
payment due under a support order is permissible with respect to a period during
which there is pending a petition for modification, but only from the date that notice
of the petition was given to the payer or recipient of support.
(3) This section does not apply to an ex parte interim support order or a
temporary support order entered under supreme court rule.
“MCL 552.603(2) prohibits both retroactive increases and decreases in child support
payments.” Clarke v Clarke, 297 Mich App 172, 187; 823 NW2d 318 (2012). “[E]quitable
circumstances are not appropriate considerations when applying MCL 552.603(2) and a flexible
interpretation of the statute is precluded.” Clarke, 297 Mich App at 187. “MCL 552.603(2) was
drafted to reflect the public policy of ensuring the enforceability of support orders for the
protection of children.” Malone v Malone, 279 Mich App 280, 288-289; 761 NW2d 102 (2008).
In Malone, 279 Mich App at 282, the child had lived with the defendant for two years while
the defendant still paid child support before finally filing a motion to modify it. The defendant
sought a retroactive adjustment that would credit him for the payments made during those two
years. Id. The trial court did retroactively modify support, citing MCR 2.612(C) (grounds for
relief from judgment). Malone, 279 Mich App at 287. We reversed. Id. at 290. We held that the
court rule and statute were in conflict, and that MCL 552.603(2) controlled. Malone, 279 Mich
App at 288-289. We further held that there was “no basis for allowing equity to intervene in this
case,” because “[the defendant] should have promptly filed a motion in the . . . Circuit Court to
change custody and abate child support as soon as the child was placed with him.” Id. at 289.

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We expressed “no opinion on whether [the defendant] can pursue a civil remedy from [the
plaintiff] for her wrongful acceptance of support when she did not have physical custody of her
minor child,” and added that “there may be very rare circumstances in which constitutional due-
process protections require a retroactive modification of child support,” such as “where a support
order was entered against a person not legally obligated to pay support and that party was denied
notice of the issuance of the support order.” Id. at 290.
However, “retroactive modification of temporary child support orders . . . is permissible.”
Proudfit v O’Neal, 193 Mich App 608, 611; 484 NW2d 746 (1992) (emphasis added).
MCL 552.605c provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) All support orders shall be stated in monthly amounts payable on the
first of each month in advance. A support obligation not paid by the last day of the
month in which it accrues is past due. If a support order does not state the amount
of support as a monthly amount, the support amount stated in the order shall be
converted to a monthly amount using the formula established by the state court
administrative office.
* * *
(3) If a support order takes effect on other than the first day of a month, the
monthly amount is prorated based on the daily amount for that month. A monthly
support order amount shall not be prorated for the last month in which the order is
in effect.
The Michigan Child Support Formula Manual provides that weekly amounts are multiplied by
4.35 to convert to the monthly amounts, 2025 MCSF 4.06(A), and that daily amounts are found
by dividing the monthly amount by 0.033, 2025 MCSF 4.06(B).
MCL 400.236(1) provides as follows: “The state disbursement unit is established as the
direct responsibility of the office. The SDU shall use automated procedures, electronic processes,
and computer-driven technology to the maximum extent feasible, efficient, and economical to
receive and disburse support and fees.” Under MCL 400.236(2), “The SDU is the single location
to which a payer or source of income subject to this section shall send a support or fee payment.”
The trial court adopted the calculations of the first referee, which purported to follow a
timeline covering when the youngest child lived with plaintiff, awarding support for only those
periods. The actual support orders were only referenced for their support amounts, without
examination of the other pertinent provisions. The referee recommendations and trial court order
did not mention the ex parte support order, the notices of arrears, the divorce judgment’s
preservation of arrears or provisions for custody and support for all three children, or the amounts
of total arrears calculated by MCSES or MiSDU.
As noted, MCL 552.603(3) does allow for retroactive changes of support for those periods
where support was assessed under “an ex parte interim support order or a temporary support order
entered under supreme court rule.” However, in this case the first divorce judgment explicitly

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preserved “all support arrearage accrued before the Judgment of Divorce for the minor children,
whether the arrearage arose under a Temporary Child Support Order or under a separate Judgment
entered under the Family Support Act.” Having agreed to that judgment in the first instance, which
the trial court formally entered, defendant agreed to preserve such support obligations. Therefore,
the arrearage amount due before the first divorce judgment was fixed by the judgment, and
subsequently could not properly be retroactively modified.
As noted, MCL 552.603(2) provides that once “a support order that is part of a judgment
or is an order in a domestic relations matter” is formally agreed to, it may not be retroactively
changed. The only event that can establish the date from which a new amount will apply is when
a party files “a petition for modification.” MCL 552.603(2). Here, defendant did not petition for
modification while the support payments were being assessed. Therefore, the provisions of the
support agreements control. MCL 552.603(2) requires a party to promptly move the court for a
change in the support order if the child moves, instead of asserting such a defense after the fact, as
defendant did here.
From July 19, 1988, to August 30, 1989, the ex parte and temporary support orders
controlled. The notices of arrearage show that on August 22, 1988, $2,100 in support had
accumulated, and on November 14, 1989, $28,980 had accumulated. These amounts reveal that
the rate before the judgment of divorce was the same as the one later set forth in the judgment:
$420 a week. From August 31, 1989, to May 31, 1990, the original divorce judgment controlled.
For that period, defendant owed $420 per week to plaintiff.
From June 1, 1990, to December 9, 1990, the order from the agency in the Virgin Islands
was in effect. That order assessed $350 per month. On December 10, 1990, the modified divorce
judgment took effect. Going forward, the payments were still $350 per month per child residing
with plaintiff. In her addendum to her objection to the second referee order, plaintiff agreed with
the trial court that only the youngest child lived with her from December 1990 onward.
Apart from its incorrect method of calculating the arrearage, the trial court made other
errors. The youngest child testified that he lived with plaintiff from the divorce through the end
of eighth grade, minus nine months. The trial court calculated the end of the youngest child’s time
with plaintiff as June 30, 1994. But this was a year off, as the youngest child finished eighth grade
in 1995, not 1994.
The trial court also subtracted $2,642.50 due to the state from the amount due to plaintiff.
The trial court did not explain why an amount due to the state would be subtracted from the amount
defendant owed plaintiff instead of being assessed separately. It does not appear that this was
correct given that the base sum was the amount specifically owed to plaintiff, not an amount
charged to defendant overall. The MCSES report indicated that the “State Balance” was an amount
separate from the “Payee Balance,” not an amount included in it.
The trial court further erred to the extent that it adjusted defendant’s obligation to account
for where the children were living at the time. Defendant was required to intervene while the
payments were being assessed if he wished to change the support order on the basis of where the
children were living.

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We therefore reverse and remand for a calculation focused on what the support orders
provided. The trial court must also correct the end-date for when the youngest child moved from
Michigan, and not subtract any amount due to the state from the amount due to plaintiff.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle

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