COA 347854 PEOPLE OF MI V ROY DESHAN ABRAMS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/19/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
February 19, 2026
11:04 AM
v No. 347854
Wayne Circuit Court
ROY DESHAN ABRAMS, LC No. 18-002500-01-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: FEENEY, P.J., and GARRETT and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions for (1) one count of assault with
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH), MCL 750.84(1)(a); and (2) two counts
of assault with a dangerous weapon (felonious assault), MCL 750.82. The trial court sentenced
defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to serve concurrent sentences of 25
to 50 years’ imprisonment for his AWIGBH conviction and 4 to 15 years’ imprisonment for each
felonious assault conviction. We vacate defendant’s convictions and sentences, reverse the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial, and remand for further proceedings.
I. FACTS
This case arises out of a physical altercation between defendant and Joseph Kendra.
Crucially, no one alleged to have witnessed the incident testified at trial, and the stories told by the
two men about that day differ significantly.
A. DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY
On February 3, 2018, Kendra showed up at defendant’s house at approximately 8:30 a.m.
looking for work. Defendant offered to have Kendra repair a flickering light socket for $20.
Kendra worked on the repair for a short time and told defendant that the light socket was fixed and
that he would be right back. Kendra then stepped out the back door. After about ten minutes,
defendant discovered that the light was still flickering. Kendra returned about twenty minutes later
visibly high on cocaine. Defendant told Kendra that the light was still flickering. Kendra, with a

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screwdriver in his hand, responded, “I’m not leaving here until you give me my m**********n’
money.”
Kendra then “sucker punch[ed]” defendant and attacked him with the screwdriver.
Defendant fell to the floor and reached for a metal pipe that he had placed beside the refrigerator
after completing repairs in the basement the day before. Still on the floor, he began swinging
“wildly” at Kendra’s legs. Kendra managed to block some blows with his hands and eventually
wrested the pipe from defendant. Kendra then began beating defendant with the pipe. At some
point, defendant managed to grab hold of a kitchen knife. After defendant stabbed Kendra in the
leg a number of times, Kendra surrendered.
In defendant’s estimation, the struggle lasted “about 15 minutes tops.” Defendant then
asked whether Kendra wanted defendant to take him to the hospital, and Kendra said yes. The two
men then got into defendant’s vehicle and proceeded from defendant’s home to Detroit Receiving
Hospital. During the drive, the argument about the money resumed, and Kendra demanded to be
let out of the truck. Defendant dropped Kendra off close to a gas station and went home.
B. KENDRA’S TESTIMONY
The night before the altercation, Kendra was at a friend’s house, where he snorted a line of
cocaine. He then “had a beer or two, went home, [and] fell asleep . . . .” He woke the next morning
to a phone call from defendant, who asked Kendra to come over and repair a “melted outlet.”
Kendra arrived at defendant’s home at about 9:00 a.m. After about 20 minutes, Kendra fixed the
melted outlet, and before placing the cover on the wall plate and completing the job, he decided to
step outside to grab a cigarette and Mountain Dew.
When Kendra returned to the kitchen, defendant was waiting for him with a crowbar in
hand. Defendant asked Kendra where the money that was on the dining room table had gone.
Kendra adamantly denied taking the money, let alone entering the dining room. Dissatisfied with
Kendra’s answer, defendant repeated the question and began tapping Kendra’s wrists and hands
with the crowbar harder each time he denied taking the money. The tapping eventually got hard
enough for Kendra to seek refuge beneath the kitchen table.
According to Kendra, defendant beat him with the crowbar for roughly 20 minutes before
getting tired. After getting his breath back, defendant told Kendra, “[Y]ou’re gonna die in my
kitchen tonight, m**********r.” This process of defendant beating Kendra for 20 minutes and
briefly resting before continuing again went on for 1½ hours. Defendant then grabbed a large
carving knife from a kitchen drawer and began stabbing Kendra’s legs, which went on for another
30 minutes. At that point, Kendra “surrendered to God” and lost consciousness. When asked by
defense counsel how long, in total, Kendra had been beaten by defendant, Kendra testified that
“[b]ased on [emergency medical services] reports,” the ordeal lasted one hour and 40 minutes.
Kendra came to as he was being carried out of the house and into defendant’s truck by
defendant and another man. The men left Kendra, who was unconscious again, in an empty alley
behind a carwash. At some point, Kendra got the attention of a passing car, and the next thing he
remembered was waking up in Detroit Receiving Hospital five days later. There he underwent
two surgical procedures over the course of what he testified was a roughly 70 day-long stay: (1)

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an “intestinal discectomy” to remove 2½ feet of his small intestines and 4 inches of his large
intestines, and (2) a fasciotomy to restore circulation to his leg and prevent amputation at the hip.
According to Kendra, treating physicians “recorded and stitched up 17 stab wounds” in total.
Kendra also testified that he had broken his leg during the altercation, but the doctors at Detroit
Receiving Hospital “missed it.”
C. DEFENSE COUNSEL’S PERFORMANCE AT TRIAL
Defense counsel pursued the theory of self-defense, highlighting several inconsistencies in
Kendra’s trial testimony. For example, during his closing argument, defense counsel sought to
undermine Kendra’s credibility by emphasizing his past and present drug use and pointing to the
inconsistencies between his testimony and his medical records.1 Defense counsel emphasized
three pages in particular:
[T]here are 1,737 pages of medical records. I submit that you you [sic] only need
to go to Page 27. Remember when I had asked Joseph Kendra was there any reason
for you to be combative? He said no. Hospital says he was a combative patient.
That’s page 27. Page 29, [admits] to having done cocaine 12 hours ago. He told
the hospital he did cocaine 12 hours ago. Under oath he told you what the prior
night?
* * *
Page 30, comment five, smokes in the last three months. He had five
smokes in the last—he can’t even be honest about how many cigarettes he smokes.
So when [defendant] tells you he was confronted in his kitchen by a crackhead who
had a screwdriver, should he not be believed?
Nevertheless, defendant was convicted and sentenced, as stated earlier.
D. THE GINTHER2 HEARING
Thereafter, defendant moved this Court to remand his case to allow him to move for a new
trial or evidentiary hearing with respect to several issues, including ineffective assistance of
counsel. That motion was granted, People v Abrams, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered December 13, 2019 (Docket No. 347854), and defendant moved for new trial in the trial
court.
At the Ginther hearing, defense counsel testified that when preparing for trial, his usual
practice was to review discovery documents carefully and entirely. But when asked whether he
reviewed the approximately 1,700 pages of Kendra’s medical records, defense counsel responded:
“I recall reviewing his medical records. I cannot say that I reviewed every single page of those
1 Defense counsel made no objection to the admission of over 1,700 pages of Kendra’s medical
records from his stay at Detroit Receiving Hospital.
2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).

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records.” He then added, “The ones that I looked at I know that I reviewed carefully,” though “I
cannot say under oath that I reviewed every single page but it would be my practice to do so.”
Defense counsel acknowledged that, in cases involving a credibility contest between
witnesses, his practice was to direct the jury to as many inconsistencies in the testimony of the
adverse witness as possible. Defense counsel further agreed that in his closing argument, he
attempted to show that Kendra was a lying drug-addict who should not be believed. Considering
the content of Kendra’s medical records, defense counsel was also asked about the following
apparent inconsistencies and exaggerations in Kendra’s testimony:
 During Kendra’s February hospital stay, doctors never diagnosed or treated him for a
broken leg; in fact, x-ray readings affirmatively noted the absence of leg fractures.
 Although Kendra claimed that doctors were considering amputation of his left leg, the
medical records did not discuss that course of treatment as a possibility.
 The medical records generally undermined Kendra’s claim that before the altercation,
he was “in great health.” In fact, doctors speculated that Kendra’s abdominal issues
were likely caused by his prolonged cocaine use.
 The surgical procedure that Kendra called a “discectomy” does not seem to exist.
 In addition to cocaine, Kendra had cannabinoids and benzodiazepine in his blood on
the day of the altercation.
 Kendra was hospitalized for 18 days, not 45 days as he testified during the preliminary
examination, nor 70 days as he testified at trial.
 The 911 call was placed at 9:24 a.m., and Kendra was admitted to Detroit Receiving
Hospital at 9:59 a.m. He therefore could not have arrived at defendant’s home at 9:00
a.m. and been tortured for roughly two hours before 911 was called.
When asked whether he would have wanted the jury to know about these discrepancies and
exaggerations, defense counsel answered that, at least with respect to the mixture of drugs in
Kendra’s system on the day of the altercation and the “discectomy” he was alleged to have
undergone, expert testimony would have been required, which defense counsel “did not have . . . .”
As for the fact that the 911 call was inconsistent with Kendra’s narrative of events, defense counsel
was skeptical that such evidence would be persuasive because jurors are “more concerned about
what is on the 911 call,” and they “understand that people get times mixed up.” But defense
counsel nonetheless concluded that “[t]he bottom line is, I would love for those jurors to have
known everything and anything that would have acquitted my client. That’s the best answer I can
give.”
The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, finding that defendant failed to
satisfy either prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

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On appeal, defendant first argues that defense counsel’s failure to review all the
documentary evidence, and adequately impeach Kendra with that evidence, constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. We agree.
A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because defendant moved this Court to remand his case to allow him to move for a new
trial or evidentiary hearing with respect to several issues, including ineffective assistance of
counsel, this issue is preserved for appellate review. See People v Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App
210, 227; 966 NW2d 437 (2020). “The question whether defense counsel performed ineffectively
is a mixed question of law and fact; this Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s findings of
fact and reviews de novo questions of constitutional law.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38,
47; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). “A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court, on the whole record, is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” People v Dendel, 481 Mich 114, 130; 748 NW2d 859 (2008)
(quotation marks and citation omitted), amended 481 Mich 1201 (2008).
B. ANALYSIS
In Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), the
United States Supreme Court established a two-prong test that a defendant must meet to prove that
his or her counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require a new trial:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. [Id.]
Stated more simply, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.
at 694. To show that a counsel’s performance was deficient, a defendant “must identify the acts
or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional
judgment.” Id. at 690. “The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances,
the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.” Id
Because there are countless ways to provide effective assistance in a given case, courts
“must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id.
at 689 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Reviewing courts are not only required to give
counsel the benefit of the doubt with this presumption, they are required to affirmatively entertain
the range of possible reasons that counsel may have had for proceeding as he or she did.” People
v Gioglio (On Remand), 296 Mich App 12, 22; 815 NW2d 589 (2012) (quotation marks and
citation omitted), vacated in part on other grounds 493 Mich 864 (2012).

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Generally, “[t]he questioning of witnesses is presumed to be a matter of trial strategy.”
People v Petri, 279 Mich App 407, 413; 760 NW2d 882 (2008). But, “[c]ounsel may provide
ineffective assistance if counsel unreasonably fails to develop the defendant’s defenses by
adequately impeaching the witnesses against the defendant.” People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38,
68; 862 NW2d 446 (2014). Further, “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law
and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made
after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Strickland, 466 US at 690-691.
“In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Id. at 691. “In any ineffectiveness
case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the
circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Id. When
claiming ineffective assistance because of defense counsel’s unpreparedness, a defendant must
show prejudice resulting from the lack of preparation. People v Caballero, 184 Mich App 636,
640; 459 NW2d 80 (1990).
At the Ginther hearing, defense counsel acknowledged that this case involved a credibility
contest between defendant and Kendra. Therefore, defense counsel’s principal aim was to
convince the jury that defendant should be believed and Kendra should not. Although defense
counsel emphasized Kendra’s past and present drug use and pointed to a few inconsistencies
between Kendra’s testimony and medical records, defense counsel missed a plethora of significant
inconsistencies found in Kendra’s medical records. For example Kendra testified that: (1) his leg
was broken during the incident, but x-rays affirmatively noted the absence of any leg fractures; (2)
he had a procedure done to prevent the amputation of his leg, but there was no mention of the
possibility of amputation in his medical records; (3) he was “in great health” before the altercation,
but doctors speculated that Kendra’s abdominal issues were likely caused by his prolonged cocaine
use; (4) he had an “intestinal discectomy,” but that terminology was not used in his medical records
nor does it seem to relate to his alleged injuries; and (5) he was hospitalized for 70 days, but he
was only hospitalized for 18 days. Defense counsel’s failure to pursue these contradictions is
perplexing. Additionally, defense counsel failed to highlight the fact that the 911 call was placed
9:24 a.m., and Kendra was admitted to Detroit Receiving Hospital at 9:59 a.m.; that timeline
clearly refuted Kendra’s testimony that he arrived at defendant’s house at 9:00 a.m., and the
altercation lasted, at a minimum, one hour and 40 minutes.
Notably, when asked whether he reviewed the approximately 1,700 pages of Kendra’s
medical records, defense counsel responded: “I recall reviewing his medical records. I cannot say
that I reviewed every single page of those records.” He then added, “The ones that I looked at I
know that I reviewed carefully,” although “I cannot say under oath that I reviewed every single
page but it would be my practice to do so.” Importantly, defense counsel acknowledged that “[t]he
bottom line is, I would love for those jurors to have known everything and anything that would
have acquitted my client.”
We therefore conclude that although defense counsel pursued a sound trial strategy of self-
defense, the choices that defense counsel made when executing that strategy were not reasonable,
insofar as he appears to have failed to reasonably investigate the available documentary evidence,
thereby overlooking strong evidence that should have been used to impeach Kendra. Defense
counsel’s failure to adequately review Kendra’s medical records—and discover the plethora of

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inconsistencies therein—constituted a “less than complete investigation” that was not supported
by reasonable professional judgments. See Strickland, 466 US at 690-691. In fact, not only did
defense counsel fail to adequately impeach Kendra with the documentary evidence, but defense
counsel also told the jury that it only needed to look at three of the medical-document pages,
effectively instructing the jury to also overlook any of the contradictory evidence. Accordingly,
we conclude that defense counsel’s performance fell outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance. See id.
Moreover, considering that: (1) this case came down to a credibility contest between
defendant and Kendra, and (2) the overlooked medical-record evidence supported defendant’s
version of events and undermined Kendra’s credibility, we conclude that defendant was prejudiced
by defense counsel’s errors. See Strickland, 466 US at 690; Caballero, 184 Mich App at 640. In
other words, “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 US at 694.3
Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s convictions and sentences, reverse the trial court’s
denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial, and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
3 In light of this resolution, we decline to address the remaining instance of ineffective assistance
of counsel raised in defendant’s Standard 4 brief. See Administrative Order No. 2004-6, 471 Mich
ci, cii, Standard 4 (2004).

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