COA 372611 PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLIE JOHN MCKAY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 11/21/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
November 21, 2025
8:38 AM
v No. 372611
Kent Circuit Court
CHARLIE JOHN MCKAY, LC No. 24-002381-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: RICK, P.J., and MALDONADO and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this interlocutory appeal, defendant appeals by delayed leave granted1 the circuit court’s
order denying his motion to quash his bindover on a charge of operating a vehicle while intoxicated
causing death, MCL 257.625(4)(a). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The testimony and evidence obtained from defendant’s preliminary examination are as
follows. In September 2023, defendant was working at a restaurant. After his shift, he and a
coworker went to the restaurant’s bar where his coworker observed defendant drink at least three
14-ounce beers. The restaurant’s manager authenticated a receipt indicating that defendant had
purchased a total of four beers that evening between approximately 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. The
coworker did not observe defendant smoke any marijuana at that time or during the day, although
the coworker was not working in defendant’s vicinity all day.
At approximately 8:00 p.m., law enforcement was dispatched to a curved section of a road
5 to 10 minutes away from the restaurant. It was dark, and that portion of the road was not lit.
When law enforcement arrived, they observed the aftermath of a two-car collision: defendant was
1 People v McKay, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 27, 2025 (Docket
No. 372611).

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in his vehicle appearing uninjured, and the victim was in a heavily damaged vehicle. The victim
later died from injuries sustained in the collision. The victim’s blood alcohol level was 0.20%.
Deputy Caitlin Carey of the Kent County Sheriff’s Department (KCSD) made brief initial
contact with defendant while he was in his vehicle to ask if he was all right. She did not notice
any signs of intoxication at that time. However, when she made a second contact with defendant
that was face-to-face, she “could smell a strong odor of intoxicants coming from his person.”
Deputy Michael Stahl of the KCSD also interacted with defendant; Deputy Stahl noted that
defendant smelled of onions, not alcohol. Neither deputy observed any other symptoms of
intoxication, such as slurred speech, limited dexterity, or poor motor skills. However, defendant
refused to complete a field sobriety test, and he exhibited some alleged confusion in response to
one of Deputy Carey’s instructions about a breath test. Defendant later agreed to go to the hospital
to have his blood tested. At approximately 11:30 p.m., defendant’s blood was drawn, processed,
and secured. His blood alcohol level was 0.051%. He also was tested for THC,2 the results of
which yielded 2.3 nanograms per milliliter.
Two crash-reconstruction experts went to the scene several days later where they observed
gouge marks that indicated the location and nature of the initial impact between the vehicles. In
both of their expert opinions, the collision occurred because defendant crossed the double-yellow
center line. When one expert was asked at the preliminary examination whether the victim’s blood
alcohol level had any impact on the expert’s assessment of how the collision occurred, the expert
testified that the victim’s blood alcohol level had no impact whatsoever. However, the experts
acknowledged that defendant could have crossed the center line in efforts to avoid the victim
driving into the wrong lane.
In February 2024, the prosecution brought a charge of operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated causing a death, MCL 257.625(4)(a), against defendant. After hearing the testimony
and observing the evidence, the district court made the following findings, in pertinent part:
The next [consideration] is whether or not the state of intoxication
significantly and materially affected the Defendant’s ability to control the motor
vehicle either by consumption of alcohol or consumption of a controlled substance
or a combination of both. In this instance, we have a combination of both.
The next test that the Court must look at is was there a significant
superseding independent cause for this accident. Specifically, I’m referring to the
blood alcohol content of [the victim]. He was, clearly, almost three times the legal
limit as he was proceeding down the highway. Therefore, does the degree of
intoxication of the Victim, [], enter into this calculation. I don’t remember, but I
do recall the testimony, and I can’t tell you who authored that testimony said that
in fact in his opinion that there was absolutely no way anyone, including [the
2 “Tetrahydrocannabinol, or THC, is the physiologically active component of marijuana. See
Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (26th ed), p 1791.” People v Koon, 494 Mich 1, 3 n 3; 832 NW2d
724 (2013).

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victim], could have avoided this collision. So whether or not the Defendant[’s]
state of intoxication caused this accident, or was the proximate cause of the
accident, and whether or not the Victim’s .20 percent by weight of alcohol in his
blood significantly affected or wasn’t introducing cause of the accident is left to a
trier of fact, not this Court.
Therefore, this Court will bind him over on the one count of operating while
intoxicated causing death.
In March 2024, defendant moved to quash the bindover, arguing that the prosecution failed
to provide sufficient evidence that defendant was under the influence of intoxicating substances
during the collision. After a brief hearing on the motion, the circuit court denied defendant’s
motion because there was evidence that both supported and negated defendant’s intoxication such
that the district court properly bound over defendant for a jury to make the determination. This
appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence of probable cause that he was
intoxicated to bind him over for trial. We disagree.
“In the context of reviewing a district court’s bindover decision, the order on appeal is the
circuit court’s decision denying the motion to quash, which we review de novo (i.e., with no
deference) because the dispositive question is whether the district court abused its discretion in
binding over defendants.” People v Crumbley, 346 Mich App 144, 166; 11 NW3d 576 (2023)
(emphasis added). Accordingly, we review the district court’s bindover decision for an abuse of
discretion, which “occurs when a decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes, and a trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Id.
at 167 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
In general terms, “the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether a crime
was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it.”
Id. (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). “In order to bind a defendant over for trial
in the circuit court, the district court must find probable cause that the defendant committed a
felony based on there being evidence of each element of the crime charged or evidence from which
the elements may be inferred.” People v Simon, 339 Mich App 568, 580; 984 NW2d 800 (2021)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). To establish probable cause, the prosecution must present
sufficient evidence for each element of the charged offense such that “a person of ordinary caution
and prudence [would] conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of defendant’s guilt.”
Crumbley, 346 Mich App at 167-168 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Although a district
court may . . . rely on inferences to establish probable cause for a bindover, a person or ordinary
prudence and caution may not infer a fact absent any actual evidence to support the inference of
that fact because mere suspicion is not the same as probable cause . . . .” Simon, 339 Mich App
at 585 (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted; ellipses in original). That said, “[i]f the
evidence conflicts or raises a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be bound over for resolution
of the issue by the trier of fact.” People v Selwa, 214 Mich App 451, 457; 543 NW2d 321 (1995).

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To establish that a defendant violated MCL 257.625, the prosecution must provide
evidence for each of the following elements: “First, that the defendant operated a motor
vehicle. . . . Second, that the defendant operated the vehicle on a highway or other place open to
the public or generally accessible to motor vehicles . . . . Third, that defendant was intoxicated.”
M Crim JI 15.2(2)-(4). “Under the influence” means that the consumption of intoxicating
substances impacted the defendant such that “the defendant’s ability to operate a motor vehicle in
a normal manner was substantially lessened.” M Crim JI 15.2.
In the present case, defendant challenges only that he was under the influence of
intoxicating substances. “To prove a person was ‘under the influence’ of alcoholic liquor, a
controlled substance, or other intoxicating substance, the prosecution must prove that defendant’s
ability to drive was substantially and materially affected by consumption of the relevant
substance.” People v Bowden, 344 Mich App 171, 188; 999 NW2d 80 (2022) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Merely having a measurable amount of marijuana in one’s system does not
automatically constitute being “under the influence” of marijuana while operating a motor vehicle.
People v Koon, 494 Mich 1, 6; 832 NW2d 724 (2013). A person may be considered under the
influence of marijuana “if it can be shown that consumption of marijuana had some effect on the
person, such that it weakened or reduced the [person’s] ability to drive such that the [person] drove
with less ability than would an ordinary, careful, and prudent driver.” People v Dupre, 335 Mich
App 126, 140; 966 NW2d 200 (2020) (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in
original). Similarly, to be “ ‘[u]nder the influence’ effectively means that the defendant was
substantially deprived of normal control or clarity of mind.” Bloomfield Twp v Kane, 302 Mich
App 170, 185 n 10; 839 NW2d 505 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“[A] driver’s [blood alcohol level] is presumed to be the same at the time of testing as it
was at the time the driver operated the vehicle.” People v Urbanski, 348 Mich App 90, 94; 17
NW3d 430 (2023), citing MCL 257.625a. Evidence of intoxication that impaired a driver’s ability
to operate a vehicle includes evidence of “visible impairment,” such as swerving, driving
erratically, “failing a sobriety test,” stumbling, speaking with a slur, or confusion. People v
Mikulen, 324 Mich App 14, 24-25; 919 NW2d 454 (2018). Additionally, evidence that a defendant
lied can support a jury’s inference of a consciousness of guilt. People v Unger, 278 Mich App
210, 227; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
In the present case, the record evidence in support of finding that defendant was intoxicated
was as follows: the coworker’s testimony; the bar tab receipts; the manager’s authentication of the
receipts establishing that defendant consumed at least three 14-ounce beers between 5:00 p.m. and
8:00 p.m. before the collision; law enforcement being dispatched to respond to a collision at
approximately 8:00 p.m., which was an estimated 5 to 10 minutes away from the restaurant;
Deputy Carey smelling alcohol on defendant when she interacted with him more closely after he
exited his vehicle; defendant lying about consuming alcohol that evening; defendant’s blood
alcohol level and THC content results indicating that he had alcohol and THC in his system at the
time of the collision; the crash-reconstruction experts opining that the collision occurred by
defendant’s vehicle crossing the center line; and a deputy’s expert testimony opining that the
victim’s blood alcohol level had no impact on how the collision unfolded. See, e.g., Unger, 278
Mich App at 227. This evidence appears greater than “mere speculation” such that “a person of
ordinary prudence and caution” could infer probable cause that defendant was intoxicated, which
caused him to cross the center line. See Simon, 339 Mich App at 585.

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In contrast, the following evidence challenges the assertion that defendant was intoxicated:
the deputies who interacted with defendant observed no signs of intoxication; defendant’s
coworker testified that defendant did not appear intoxicated when the coworker left the restaurant
bar; defendant’s coworker did not observe defendant smoke marijuana that evening, and marijuana
can remain in one’s system for a long duration after initial ingestion; defendant’s blood alcohol
level was below the 0.08% legal threshold for per se driving while intoxicated; and the crash-
reconstruction experts acknowledged that the collision could have occurred by the victim crossing
the center line and defendant swerving to avoid the victim. See, e.g., Koon, 494 Mich at 6;
Mikulen, 324 Mich App 14, 24-25.
This competing evidence establishes a conflict that “raises a reasonable doubt” such that
the district court properly bound over defendant “for resolution of the issue by the trier of fact.”
Selwa, 214 Mich App at 457. See also People v Hudson, 241 Mich App 268, 278; 615 NW2d 784
(2000). Given that the threshold for a district court abusing its discretion is limited to errors of
law or a decision that falls “outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes,” the district
court’s decision to bind over defendant for trial on this substantial, though conflicting, evidence
about whether defendant was under the influence during the collision was not an abuse of
discretion. Crumbley, 346 Mich App at 167 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin

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