COA 373627 PEOPLE OF MI V ANNETTE PERKINS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/20/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
July 20, 2026
2:00 PM
v No. 373627
Genesee Circuit Court
ANNETTE PERKINS, LC No. 2022-050575-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and PATEL and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right her jury-trial convictions of assault with intent to commit great
bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH), MCL 750.84, malicious destruction of personal
property (MDOP), MCL 750.377a, and domestic violence, MCL 750.81(1). She was sentenced to
36 to 120 months’ imprisonment for AWIGBH, 93 days’ imprisonment for the MDOP conviction,
and 93 days’ imprisonment for the domestic violence conviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant’s convictions arise out of her driving her car into the victim following an
argument. Defendant and the victim had previously been in a dating relationship that ended
approximately 15 months before the incident. The victim claimed that defendant drove past his
house and harassed him every day, even though defendant had a personal protection order against
the victim. On the night of the assault, the victim’s son drove the victim home from work. On the
way home, the victim observed defendant talking to the victim’s sister near a parking lot behind
the victim’s house. The victim shouted out to defendant to leave his sister alone. Defendant yelled
back as the victim’s son continued to drive past. After the victim arrived home, he stood on the
sidewalk talking to his son through the passenger side of the vehicle. Defendant drove toward the
victim’s home and continued to yell at him. The victim warned that he was calling the police but
defendant did not heed to the warnings. Defendant drove over the sidewalk and accelerated
straight toward the victim. Defendant struck the victim with her vehicle, pinning him between the
two cars, and then sped away. The victim sustained serious injuries and his son’s car was damaged.

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Defendant was evaluated by the Center for Forensic Psychiatry (CFP) and found
incompetent to stand trial. She was remanded to a psychiatric hospital for treatment to restore her
competency. After months of treatment, CFP reevaluated defendant and concluded that she was
competent to stand trial. Trial counsel requested an independent evaluation, but defendant
requested a new attorney and her new attorney did not complete the independent evaluation. The
trial court found defendant competent and the case proceeded to trial.
The victim and his son both testified at trial. The victim’s medical records were admitted
into evidence. Photographs of the scene were also admitted into evidence, including pictures of
the victim’s shoe on the sidewalk, the damage to the son’s car, and lengthy tire tracks in the grass
between the roadway and son’s car.
Detective Trooper Justin Clarke testified that he administered Miranda1 warnings and
interviewed defendant while she was in custody. The parties stipulated to allow a redacted
recording of the interview to be admitted and played for the jury. During the interview, Detective
Clarke encouraged defendant to write an “apology letter” to the victim as an interrogation tactic,
which she did. In the letter, defendant blamed the victim, called him a drug addict, and stated that
their relationship was over. The letter was read into the record without objection. Defendant
mentioned in her interview that defendant might have had a brick or a stick before defendant hit
him with her car, but Detective Clarke did not find any evidence of a brick or stick at the crime
scene. Detective Clarke explained that defendant’s car was not photographed or processed for
other evidence because of a miscommunication.
The jury convicted defendant of AWIGBH, MDOP, and domestic violence. She was
sentenced as indicated. This appeal followed.
II. SENTENCING
A. OV 4
Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly assigned 10 points for offense variable
(OV) 4. We disagree.
“To preserve a sentencing issue for appeal, a defendant must raise the issue at sentencing,
in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand filed in the court of appeals.”
People v Clark, 315 Mich App 219, 223; 888 NW2d 309 (2016) (cleaned up); MCL 769.34(10).
Defendant has not preserved this issue because she did not object to the assignment of 10 points
to OV 4 at sentencing and did not move for resentencing or remand before this Court. We review
unpreserved OV points issues for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Anderson, 322
Mich App 622, 634; 912 NW2d 607 (2018). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that
an error occurred, that the error was clear or obvious, and that the error affected his or her
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). An error affects
a defendant’s substantial rights if it “affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Id.
1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

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When assigning OV points, “a court may consider all record evidence, including the
contents of a [presentence investigation report (PSIR)], plea admissions, and testimony presented
at a preliminary examination.” People v McChester, 310 Mich App 354, 358; 873 NW2d 646
(2015). “The trial court may also consider victim-impact statements, and may make reasonable
inferences from evidence in the record.” People v Montague, 338 Mich App 29, 55, 979 NW2d
406 (2021).
Defendant argues the trial court erred by assessing 10 points for OV 4. Defendant contends
that the trial court should have assessed 0 points because there was no evidence that the victim
suffered serious psychological injury. OV 4 is scored when there is “psychological injury to a
victim.” MCL 777.34(1). OV 4 is assessed 10 points when a “[s]erious psychological injury
requiring professional treatment occurred to the victim[.]” MCL 777.34(1)(a). OV 4 is assessed
0 points when “[n]o serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment occurred to the
victim[.]” MCL 777.34(1)(c). However, “the fact that treatment has not been sought is not
conclusive.” MCL 777.34(2). “The trial court may assess 10 points for OV 4 if the victim suffers,
among other possible psychological effects, personality changes, anger, fright, or feelings of being
hurt, unsafe, or violated.” People v Armstrong, 305 Mich App 230, 247; 851 NW2d 856 (2014).
But a trial court may not score OV 4 on the basis of the assumption that a victim of the crime at
issue would generally suffer psychological injury. People v White, 501 Mich 160, 163; 905 NW2d
228 (2017).
The trial court’s assessment of 10 points for OV 4 was supported by a preponderance of
the evidence. At the preliminary examination, the victim became emotional during the questioning
and stated that the situation was bothering him. At trial, the victim agreed that he was suffering
“some lasting affects [sic] due to [the] assault.” The PSIR reported that the victim stated that he
was “mentally and physically exhausted from what he endured as a result of being struck by
[defendant’s] vehicle,” and the victim’s son stated that he was “emotionally and mentally
devastated” after witnessing defendant’s assault on his father. And at sentencing, the victim
testified that he wished he had never met defendant, that she harassed and bugged him for two
years, that she put the victim in a “bad situation,” that he could no longer “do the things that [he]
was doing with [his] grandkids,” and that defendant “took away a lot from [him].” While neither
the victim nor his son sought psychological treatment or directly addressed the psychological
effects of the assault, the preponderance of the evidence supports an inference that the victim and
his son both suffered psychological injury requiring treatment as a result of defendant’s crime. On
this record, we are not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake by
assessing 10 points for OV 4.
B. PROPORTIONALITY
Defendant next argues that her within-guidelines sentence for AWIGBH was unreasonable
and disproportionate. We disagree.
“Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” People v Boykin, 510 Mich
171, 182; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). “An abuse-of-discretion standard recognizes that there may be
more than one principled outcome and the trial court may not deviate from that principled range
of outcomes.” Id., citing People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
“[W]ithin-guidelines sentences are to be reviewed for reasonableness” on appeal. People v Posey,

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512 Mich 317, 359; 1 NW3d 101 (2023) (Opinion by BOLDEN, J.).2 “[T]he key to reasonableness
review is whether the sentence is proportionate.” Id. A trial court abuses its discretion if the
sentence imposed is not “proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the
offense and the offender.” People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 459-460; 902 NW2d 327 (2017)
(cleaned up). A proportionate sentence considers “the reformation of the offender, the protection
of society, the discipline of the offender, and the deterrence of others from committing the same
offense.” Boykin, 510 Mich at 183. But “these are not the only relevant sentencing criteria and
trial courts are not required to consider each of these factors when imposing a sentence.” Id.
at 183-184.
“When a trial court sentences a defendant within the guidelines’ recommended range, it
creates a presumption that the sentence is proportionate.” Posey, 512 Mich at 360. To overcome
that presumption, “the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that their within-guidelines
sentence is unreasonable or disproportionate.” Id. at 359. In order to overcome the presumptive
proportionality of a within-guidelines sentence, a defendant must “present unusual circumstances
that would render the presumptively proportionate sentence disproportionate.” People v Bowling,
299 Mich App 552, 558; 830 NW2d 800 (2013) (cleaned up); see also Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636
(“Conceivably, even a sentence within the sentencing guidelines could be an abuse of discretion
in unusual circumstances.”). “Unusual” means “uncommon, not usual, rare.” People v Sharp, 192
Mich App 501, 505; 481 NW2d 773 (1992) (cleaned up).
In this case, it is undisputed that the applicable guidelines range was 19 to 38 months, and
the trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum term of 36 months, which is within the guidelines
range. Therefore, defendant’s sentence is presumptively proportionate. Posey, 512 Mich at 360.
At sentencing, the trial court noted that defendant had no felony convictions but several other
misdemeanor convictions for assaultive crimes. The trial court concluded that defendant continued
to pose a danger to the victim because she continued to write the victim letters despite a court order
that ordered her to stop. The court stated that it hoped defendant would obtain further mental
health treatment and anger management while in prison. And it noted that defendant expressed no
remorse for her actions. The PSIR also stated that defendant had nine instances of misconduct in
custody, including for encouraging or threatening other inmates to send the victim letters even
after being ordered by the trial court to stop. Defendant also addressed the court and expressed no
remorse. She argued that she was wrongfully convicted, accused the victim of putting drugs into
her food, claimed that she had never harmed the victim, and claimed that the victim was
exaggerating his injuries.
Although defendant’s sentence was on the high-end of her minimum guidelines range, she
has not demonstrated that his within-guidelines sentence was unreasonable or disproportionate
under the circumstances in this case. See Posey, 512 Mich at 357. Defendant is not entitled to
resentencing.
2 While Posey was a plurality opinion that is not technically binding, this Court concluded that
following the essential holdings upon which the Posey majority agreed was prudent “in the interest
of judicial economy and jurisprudential stability.” People v Purdle (On Remand), 350 Mich App
446, 453-454; 32 NW3d 479 (2024).

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III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant next argues through appellate counsel that she was denied effective assistance
of counsel. Defendant also makes several claims in her Standard 4 brief that are best construed as
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim presents a “mixed question of fact and
constitutional law.” People v Yeager, 511 Mich 478, 487; 999 NW2d 490 (2023). We review de
novo constitutional questions, while we review the trial court’s findings of fact, if any, for clear
error. Id. When, as in this case, defendant has not moved for a new trial or a Ginther3 evidentiary
hearing in the trial court, People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 80; 829 NW2d 266 (2012), or moved
in this Court to remand for a Ginther hearing, People v Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App 210, 227;
966 NW2d 437 (2020), our review is limited to errors apparent on the record, Abcumby-Blair, 335
Mich App at 227.
The United States and Michigan Constitutions afford criminal defendants the right to
effective assistance of counsel. Yeager, 511 Mich at 488, citing Const 1963, art 1, § 20; US Const
Am VI; Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). To prevail
on a claim of ineffective assistance, “a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s deficient performance,
there is a reasonable probability that [the] outcome would have been different.” Yeager, 511 Mich
at 488 (cleaned up). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” Id. (cleaned up). “Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant
bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” People v Head, 323 Mich App 526, 539; 917 NW2d
752 (2018) (cleaned up).
We first address defendant’s claim raised through appellate counsel. Defendant argues that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s assignment of 10 points to OV
4. We disagree. Even presuming that failing to object to the points for OV 4 was deficient
performance, the result of the proceedings would not have been different because, as discussed
above, the trial court properly assigned 10 points to OV 4. Thus, trial counsel was not ineffective
in this instance.
We now turn to the allegations in defendant’s Standard 4 brief that can be best construed
as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, defendant claims that information in her PSIR
was incorrect because she did not have five prior misdemeanors as stated in the PSIR. However,
defendant makes no offer of proof as to her claim beyond a bare allegation in her brief. Defendant
has the burden of establishing the factual predicate of her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). And we will not “scour the record” on
behalf of an appellant in search of support for a claim. People v Butsinas, ___ Mich App ___,
___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 364778); slip op at 20. Defendant has not met her burden
of establishing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the information in
defendant’s PSIR.
3 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).

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Defendant also argues that trial counsel should have requested a drug test of the victim.
However, even presuming that trial counsel’s decision not to request a drug screening for the
victim constituted deficient performance, there is no reasonable probability that obtaining a drug
test of the victim would have led to a different result at trial because the jury was made aware that
the victim was on cocaine the night of the assault by the victim’s own admission. Thus, trial
counsel was not ineffective in this instance.
Defendant further argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate her
claim that the victim or some other unknown party put drugs in her food. Defendant claims that,
at some point prior to the assault, she tested positive for cocaine because her food was drugged.
The record is unclear whether these claims were investigated by trial counsel. There is no evidence
in the record or provided by defendant of a positive drug screen or when this alleged drug screen
may have occurred. Defendant has the burden of establishing the factual predicate of her
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Hoag, 460 Mich at 6, and we will not search for support
for a claim, Butsinas, ___ Mich App at __; slip op at 20. Counsel is presumed competent, and the
defendant “must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 US at 689 (cleaned up). Defendant’s
claim is implausible, vague, unsupported, difficult to prove, and may have hurt the defense’s
credibility at trial. Defendant has not overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s decision
was a matter of trial strategy, and defense counsel was not ineffective on this ground.
Defendant makes several additional claims that are flatly contradicted by the record, and
defendant makes no offer of proof that the record is incorrect. Defendant contends she was not
“allowed” to testify at trial, but the record is clear that defense counsel and the trial court discussed
defendant’s right to testify at length and defendant ultimately chose not to testify. Defendant also
claims that she was never given a discovery packet. However, defense counsel stated on the record
that he had “provided all the discovery that I have to [defendant] at the jail,” and defendant
provides no evidence otherwise. Thus, defendant has failed to demonstrate a factual predicate for
these claims. Hoag, 460 Mich at 6.
Defendant additionally asserts that she was never given a competency evaluation. But the
record is clear that defendant received a competency evaluation from CFP. While defendant never
received the independent competency evaluation that was requested by her previous trial counsel,
defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that an independent evaluation would have led
to a different result at trial. Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App at 228. Even if the independent
evaluation was completed and the independent evaluator had concluded that defendant was
incompetent to stand trial, that may not have altered the trial court’s ultimate finding as to
defendant’s competency. Mere speculation is insufficient to support an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim. People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 190; 774 NW2d 714 (2009).
IV. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Defendant claims innocence, the prosecution’s witnesses lacked credibility, and there was
insufficient evidence to convict her. We interpret these claims as an argument that there was
insufficient evidence to convict defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and we disagree.

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We review sufficiency claims de novo. People v Xun Wang, 505 Mich 239, 251; 952
NW2d 334 (2020). We “view the evidence—whether direct or circumstantial—in a light most
favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Kenny, 332
Mich App 394, 402-403; 956 NW2d 562 (2020). We are “required to draw all reasonable
inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” People v Oros, 502 Mich
229, 240; 917 NW2d 559 (2018) (cleaned up). “It is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court,
to determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight
to be accorded those inferences.” Id. (cleaned up). Any and all conflicts that arise in the evidence
must be resolved “in favor of the prosecution.” People v Mikulen, 324 Mich App 14, 20; 919
NW2d 454 (2018).
There is sufficient evidence for a guilty verdict when “a rational trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Tennyson, 487 Mich 730, 735; 790 NW2d
354 (2010). “The prosecution need not negate every reasonable theory of innocence; instead, it
need only prove the elements of the crime in the face of whatever contradictory evidence is
provided by the defendant.” Mikulen, 324 Mich App at 20. “Circumstantial evidence and the
reasonable inferences that arise from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements
of the crime.” People v Blevins, 314 Mich App 339, 357; 886 NW2d 456 (2016).
Defendant was convicted of AWIGBH, domestic violence, and MDOP. “The elements of
AWIGBH are (1) an assault, i.e., an attempt to offer with force and violence to do corporal hurt to
another coupled with (2) a specific intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.” People v
McKewen, 516 Mich 23, 30; 33 NW3d 307 (2024) (cleaned up). “The intent to do great bodily
harm less than murder is ‘an intent to do serious injury of an aggravated nature.’ ” People v
Stevens, 306 Mich App 620, 628; 858 NW2d 98 (2014), quoting People v Brown, 267 Mich App
141, 147; 703 NW2d 230 (2005). “Because of the difficulty in proving an actor’s intent, only
minimal circumstantial evidence is necessary to show that a defendant had the requisite intent.”
Stevens, 306 Mich App at 629. “Intent to cause serious harm can be inferred from the defendant’s
actions, including the use of a dangerous weapon or the making of threats.” Id. “Although actual
injury to the victim is not an element of the crime, injuries suffered by the victim may also be
indicative of a defendant’s intent.” Id. (citations omitted).
The elements of domestic violence are, in relevant part, “(1) the commission of an assault
or an assault and battery and (2) a dating relationship between the parties.” People v Cameron,
291 Mich App 599, 614; 806 NW2d 371 (2011). The dating-relationship element of domestic
violence may be satisfied if the parties currently or previously had a dating relationship.
MCL 750.81(2). Finally, “[a] person who willfully and maliciously destroys or injures the
personal property of another person is guilty of” misdemeanor MDOP if, in relevant part, “the
amount of the destruction or injury is less than $200.00.” MCL 750.377a(1)(a) and (e). “[T]he
focus of the statute is on the nature of the damage that defendant’s actions caused, not the actual
monetary cost to the victim for repairing the resulting damage. Indeed, there is no requirement in
the statute that repairs must actually take place.” People v Hamblin, 224 Mich App 87, 97; 568
NW2d 339 (1997).
At trial, the victim and the son both testified that defendant hit the victim with her car. The
prosecution submitted photographs of tire tracks in the grass, the son’s damaged car, the shoe in

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the sidewalk, and the victim’s injuries. Defendant’s intent to cause great bodily harm can be
inferred because striking someone with a moving vehicle is likely to cause serious and aggravated
injury. It can also be inferred that defendant did not hit the victim by accident because the tire
tracks in the grass and the shoe in the sidewalk both indicate that defendant left the roadway and
drove onto the grass before hitting the victim. The victim testified that he and defendant were
previously in a dating relationship for three or four months before the assault and defendant’s
“apology letter” to the victim stated that things were “definitely over” between defendant and the
victim, which supports an inference that they had previously been dating. Photographs of the
damaged vehicle were also admitted into evidence. The son testified that the damage was at least
$2000.00 according to several estimates he received but the damage was not repaired.
While there was some contradictory testimony from the victim and issues of his credibility
were raised, reasonable inferences and questions of credibility must be drawn in favor of the
verdict. Oros, 502 Mich at 239. A witness’s testimony is not necessarily deprived of all possible
believability merely because it is inconsistent or questionable in some respects. See People v
Knepper, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 363191); slip op at 4, 6-7
(a victim’s testimony may be believed in part by the jury despite suffering some credibility issues).
The jury was free to accept or reject the theory of either party in light of the evidence presented at
trial, and we will not interfere with the jury’s role of determining issues of weight and credibility.
People v Baskerville, 333 Mich App 276, 283; 963 NW2d 620 (2020). Applying these standards,
there was sufficient evidence to enable the jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of AWIGBH, domestic violence, and MDOP. We will not disturb that determination.
V. OTHER CLAIMS OF ERROR
Finally, defendant raises numerous unsubstantiated claims of error and misconduct by the
prosecutors, police, and the trial court. These claims of error fail for lack of factual and legal
support.
Because defendant’s allegations were not raised before the trial court, these issues are
unpreserved, People v Swenor, 336 Mich App 550, 562; 971 NW2d 33 (2021), and our review is
for plain error, Carines, 460 Mich at 763.
Prisoners proceeding in propria persona are entitled to lenity in construing their pleadings,
but they are not excused from supporting their claims. Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 106-108; 97
S Ct 285; 50 L Ed 2d 251 (1976). If an appellant proceeding in propria persona provides a brief
that lacks clarity or fully supported arguments, we will address any issues that can be discerned,
but we will not craft arguments for the appellant. In re JCR II/JCR/JCR/JCR, ___ Mich App ___,
___ n 6; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367472); slip op at 7 n 6. Merely presenting a “list
of alleged errors, without any factual or legal development, is not sufficient to raise arguments for
appellate review.” People v Rohm, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket
No. 369338); slip op at 8.
Defendant raises several arguments for which she has provided no factual or legal support.
First, she asserts that the police and prosecution tampered with her apology letter, the transcripts,
the recordings of her interview, and the 911 calls. But she does not articulate what was changed
or what was inaccurate about any of these documents, other than vague assertions that they were

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tampered with and “twisted around.” Defendant also claims that the prosecution tampered with
witnesses by bribing the victim and the victim’s son with a promise of restitution for the son’s
damaged car. Once again, defendant provides no factual support or binding authority in support
of this claim. Defendant further argues that she was convicted on the basis of evidence obtained
using a “faulty warrant.” But defendant does not explain what specific piece of evidence or search
warrant she is referring to. Defendant additionally maintains that she was not given Miranda
warnings before the police interviewed her. But Detective Clarke testified that he administered
Miranda warnings to defendant before interviewing her, and defendant has not provided any
evidence indicating otherwise. Defendant is not excused from supporting her claims, Estelle, 429
US at 106-108, and because of the lack of support for these claims, she has not met her burden of
demonstrating plain error.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor failed to preserve exculpatory evidence by
failing to photograph or examine defendant’s car. “A criminal defendant can demonstrate that the
state violated his or her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment if the state, in bad
faith, failed to preserve material evidence that might have exonerated the defendant.” Heft, 299
Mich App at 79. However, “[i]f the defendant cannot show bad faith or that the evidence was
potentially exculpatory, the state’s failure to preserve evidence does not deny the defendant due
process.” Id. Detective Clarke testified that the Jeep was not photographed because of a
miscommunication arising out of the Jeep being located at a different scene, and there is no
evidence indicating that he acted in bad faith. Defendant has failed to demonstrate how
photographs of her car would have exonerated her given that she never disputed that she was at
the scene in her car. There was no plain error in this instance.
Defendant also takes issue with the victim’s sister not being called to testify despite being
on the prosecution’s witness list, and with the fact that a probation officer was not present at her
sentencing hearing. While these claims are factually true, defendant has made no showing that
either of these facts affected her substantial rights or would otherwise lead to a different result in
her case. Carines, 460 Mich at 763.
Defendant further contends that there was no preliminary examination in this matter and
she was subject to double jeopardy for her MDOP conviction because she had previously been
convicted of the same offense. But the record is clear that a preliminary examination was held for
defendant’s charges, and there is no evidence that defendant was convicted of the same offense
twice. Defendant has not established plain error.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin

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