COA 356493 PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT STEWART ALDERTON Opinion - On Remand SCt - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/26/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
December 26, 2025
3:00 PM
v No. 356493
Wayne Circuit Court
ROBERT STEWART ALDERTON, LC No. 19-004601-01-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and MARIANI and WALLACE, JJ.
MARIANI, J. (concurring).
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but based on more limited reasoning. Our
Supreme Court remanded this matter to us for reconsideration of two specific points: (1) “whether
the verified statements in support of the petition for a personal protection order [PPO] were
testimonial in light of People v Washington, 514 Mich [583, 594-595; 22 NW3d 507 (2024)],” and
(2) “whether the victim’s statements to his girlfriend and other children were admissible under
MRE 803(3) in light of th[e] Court’s January 22, 2025 order in People v Propp, ___ Mich ___
(2025) (Docket No. 164313).” People v Alderton, ___ Mich ___ (2025) (Docket No. 166825). I
do not see, in these particular points of reconsideration, grounds to reach a different result than the
original panel of this Court1 did.
As to the first point, the original panel concluded that the verified statements in support of
the PPO petition were not testimonial under the “ongoing emergency” doctrine. People v Alderton,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 18, 2024 (Docket No.
356493), p 7 (Alderton I). There is, in my view, ample reason to question that conclusion, and I
would likely reach a different one if I were presented with the issue in the first instance. But
Washington, as I read it, did not purport to alter or disrupt the analysis applicable to the “ongoing
1 As the majority notes, two of the three judges reconsidering this case on remand (myself
included) were not on the panel of this Court that originally considered and disposed of this appeal.

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emergency” doctrine or the scope of circumstances that may fall within it. See Washington, 514
Mich at 594-595. Thus, while I may disagree with the original panel’s substantive treatment of
this issue, that disagreement does not have anything in particular to do with Washington or any
reconsideration of the issue in light of it—and so I do not view my reasons for potentially rejecting
the original panel’s disposition of this issue as within the scope of the instant remand.
Similarly, as to the second point of reconsideration, our Supreme Court’s order in Propp
makes clear that the victim’s statements to his girlfriend and children must not be viewed as
“categorically admissible under MRE 803(3).” Propp, ___ Mich at ___. Beyond that, however,
the Propp order does not provide meaningful guidance regarding what portions of those
statements, if any, may be admissible under that rule. Were I addressing the issue in the first
instance, I would likely find error in the admission of at least some of those statements. But again,
that disagreement with the original panel is not particularly based on anything set forth in the
Propp order. And more fundamentally, nothing in the Propp order provides reason to revisit or
depart from the original panel’s alternative conclusion that any error in the admission of those
statements was harmless. See Alderton I, unpub op at 6. That harmlessness conclusion is itself
dispositive of the issue and, given that the conclusion is not impacted by reconsideration of the
issue in light of Propp, its reevaluation by the instant panel does not strike me as warranted.
/s/ Philip P. Mariani

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