COA 370296 PEOPLE OF MI V MALCOLM COLBERT Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
January 12, 2026
1:13 PM
v No. 370296
Wayne Circuit Court
MALCOLM COLBERT, LC No. 22-006051-01-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and O’BRIEN and YOUNG, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury-trial convictions of receiving and concealing stolen
property (RCSP), MCL 750.535(4)(a) (value of more than $200 but less than $1,000); felon in
possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f; and carrying a firearm during the
commission of a felony (felony-firearm), second offense, MCL 750.227b(1).1 The trial court
sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to a prison term of 46 to
60 months for his felon-in-possession conviction, to be served concurrently with a term of one
year in jail for his RCSP conviction. The trial court also sentenced defendant to a prison term of
five years for his felony-firearm conviction, to be served consecutively to his other sentences, “and
any parole if applicable.” We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences, but remand to the
trial court for the ministerial task of correcting defendant’s judgment of sentence.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 3, 2022 Eliran Zohrar was the victim of a carjacking, armed robbery, and
nonfatal shooting in Detroit. Zohrar, a locksmith, received a call that evening from a woman,
1 The jury acquitted defendant of carjacking, MCL 750.529a; assault with intent to do great bodily
harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; armed robbery, MCL 750.529; and three counts of felony-
firearm.

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Alexis Ruckes,2 seeking assistance because she had lost the key to her car, a silver Dodge Charger.
Zohrar accepted the job and drove to meet her, arriving at about 9:30 p.m. Zohrar parked his
vehicle, leaving his wallet (containing two to three thousand dollars in cash from other
locksmithing jobs) inside. Zohrar accompanied Ruckes to the driveway where the Charger was
parked, at which point a man wearing a ski mask confronted him, pointed a gun at him, and
threatened to kill him. Zohrar agreed to give the man the money in his wallet, but he was shot in
the back when he turned to go back to his vehicle. Zohrar attempted to run, hearing several more
gunshots, but soon had to stop running because of his gunshot wound. The man then shot Zohrar
a second time. Zohrar gave the man his keys and phone. The man drove off in Zohrar’s vehicle,
and Ruckes followed shortly thereafter in the Charger. Zohrar received help from a bystander who
lived in the area and who had heard the gunshots and dialed 911.
Detroit police officers checked the surveillance footage of a nearby camera and observed
a silver Charger leaving the scene. After running the Charger’s license plate through the Law
Enforcement Information Network (LEIN), they discovered that the Charger was registered to
defendant’s mother, Edna Houston, with defendant identified as a secondary owner. Police issued
a be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) for the Charger, and obtained a search warrant for Houston’s house
on Riverpark in Redford, Michigan (the Riverpark house).
The next day, David Jakeway, a civilian working with the Detroit Police Department’s
Commercial Automobile Theft Section (CATS), located the Charger parked in front of the
Riverpark house. Jakeway initially observed that the driver’s seat was empty and that Ruckes was
sitting in the passenger seat. Shortly thereafter, defendant exited the Riverpark house, entered the
driver’s seat of the Charger, and drove away. Detroit Police Officers Carson Hopman and Austin
Morris performed a felony traffic stop, arresting defendant and Ruckes. Officer Hopman observed
Officer Morris recover a forty-caliber “black Glock 23” from the front passenger seat of the
Charger, along with a standard magazine and a “large magazine, drum magazine.”
After the arrest, members of CATS, including Detroit Police Sergeant Robert Wellman and
Detroit Police Detective Quentin Glover, assisted by Jakeway, executed the Riverpark house
search warrant. Sergeant Wellman spoke with defendant’s father, who indicated that defendant
primarily stayed in the basement. Officers searched “a walled off room in the basement,” which
contained “like a bed platform” (minus a mattress or sheets), and “kind of like an armoire that had
stuff that could hang up as well as drawers.” Sergeant Wellman searched the armoire, locating a
letter addressed to defendant from the Secretary of State dated April 7, 2022. When Detective
Glover lifted a board sitting atop the bed platform, he located two magazines and a box containing
“a brown and black Draco [a brand of firearm].” The box reflected “the brand or the manufacturer
of that gun.” Inside a drawer, Jakeway also located a “Smith & Wesson handgun” (the SW
handgun), whose serial number was defaced. Jakeway photographed the SW handgun, along with
2 Ruckes was a codefendant in these proceedings and agreed to testify against defendant in
exchange for reduced charges. After pleading nolo contendere to accessory after the fact to a
felony, MCL 750.505b, Ruckes was sentenced on October 2, 2023, to a prison term of two years.

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a shelf containing ammunition, “three extended magazines for a handgun,” and an identification
wristband with defendant’s name on it.
At trial, in response to questioning regarding whether anything else was recovered from
the basement bedroom, Detective Glover stated: “Yes, I recovered two I believe prison photos of
the Defendant.” Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that the statement
was prejudicial and improperly attacked defendant’s character. The trial court denied the motion,
noting that the jury knew and would be reminded that defendant had previously been convicted
of a specified felony, and finding that any prejudice would be mitigated by a curative instruction.
When the jury returned, the trial court stated: “I am instructing you to disregard the last testimony
of this witness.”
Houston testified that she had never seen any guns or ammunition in the Riverpark house,
nor had she ever seen defendant or Ruckes with a gun. Houston confirmed that defendant stayed
in the basement, but added that he was not there every day and that, when he was, he slept on the
sofa outside of the basement bedroom. According to Houston, defendant and Ruckes came to the
Riverpark house on August 3, 2022 and went to the basement. Between “approximately” 7:30
p.m. and 8:30 p.m., defendant came upstairs to shower and Ruckes told Houston that “she’d be
right back.” Ruckes then left, alone, in the Charger. Houston estimated that she went to bed at
“approximately 10 or 11” p.m., at which point Ruckes had not returned. According to Houston,
defendant was still at the Riverpark house when she went to bed, and in response to whether he
could have left without Houston knowing, she stated: “Anything’s possible, but I can’t say that he
left the house. I never saw him left [sic] the house. I normally hear the door when it opens.”
Houston testified that defendant was home on August 4, 2022, and that she believed he was in the
basement at some point. Houston stated that Ruckes did not enter the Riverpark house on August
4, but at one point was sitting outside in the Charger.
Ruckes testified that she and defendant had left the Riverpark house at about 5:00 a.m. on
August 4, 2022, for their shared 6:00 a.m. work shift. Ruckes explained that she carried a weapon
every day for safety, and that she had a concealed pistol license (CPL). Ruckes stated that she had
purchased the Glock about “two weeks” before her arrest, because her other handgun had been
stolen, and that she was carrying the Glock on the night of the shooting.3 According to Ruckes,
defendant had previously seen her carrying the Glock. When police stopped the Charger, Ruckes
had “the drum to the gun,” which had just arrived in the mail that day, and the Glock was in a
holster on her hip. As police approached, she detached the clip and placed it on the floor, on the
front passenger side of the Charger. Ruckes stated that she informed police about the Glock and
advised them of her CPL, but that they never asked to see it.
According to Ruckes, she had purchased the Draco on the day of her arrest and had placed
it in the basement of the Riverpark house. Ruckes stated that she set the Draco on “a wooden
3 Ruckes’ version of the facts surrounding the shooting incident differed markedly from Zohrar’s
including that defendant was not the man who had shot Zohrar.

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platform,”4 and that it was on top of that platform when she and defendant left. The prosecutor
showed Ruckes a photograph of the Draco, which Ruckes identified as hers. When shown a
photograph of the SW handgun, Ruckes asserted that it was “similar” to her Smith & Wesson, but
that the SW handgun in the picture had an extra compartment on the bottom, which her Smith &
Wesson did not have. According to Ruckes, she had not seen her Smith & Wesson since it was
stolen, explaining that she had filed a police report and that all of her weapons were registered.
The prosecution reminded Ruckes that when she pleaded no contest to accessory after the
fact, facts were read into the record establishing that she was in the Charger with defendant, that
defendant knew the gun was there, and that she knew he wasn’t supposed to have a gun. Ruckes
agreed, but stated: “[H]e didn’t possess a gun. I did.” Ruckes asserted that she was told that “the
only thing” she “would have to truthfully testify to was [defendant] being a felon,” and her “still
having him around my firearm and nothing more.”
At the close of proofs, the parties stipulated that as of August 3, 2022, defendant was
ineligible to use or possess a firearm, having been previously convicted of a specified felony. The
jury convicted defendant of RCSP, felon-in-possession, and one count of felony-firearm, and
acquitted him of carjacking, armed robbery, assault with intent to commit great bodily harm, and
three counts of felony-firearm. This appeal followed.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
On appeal, defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to support
his convictions of felon-in-possession and felony-firearm. We disagree.
“This Court reviews de novo [a] defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.”
People v Meissner, 294 Mich App 438, 452; 812 NW2d 37 (2011). On appeal, this Court views
“the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime to have been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. “The standard of review is deferential; a reviewing court is required to
draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” People
v Bailey, 310 Mich App 703, 713; 873 NW2d 855 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“The sufficient evidence requirement is a part of every criminal defendant’s due process
rights.” People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), mod 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
“[D]ue process requires the prosecution to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt.”
People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 240 n 3; 917 NW2d 559 (2018). We resolve all conflicts in the
evidence in favor of the prosecution. People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 619; 751 NW2d 57
(2008). “A jury is free to believe, or disbelieve, in whole or in part, any of the evidence presented.”
People v Perry, 460 Mich 55, 63; 594 NW2d 477 (1999).
4 The prosecutor asked whether Ruckes was referring to “a bed with a wooden platform on top,”
but Ruckes stated “there was no bed down there. It was just a wooden platform. It was on the
floor.”

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To prove felon-in-possession, the prosecution must establish (1) that defendant possessed
a firearm, (2) when he was ineligible to do so under MCL 750.224f, as a result of a prior felony
conviction. See People v Perkins, 262 Mich App 267, 269-270; 686 NW2d 237 (2004), abrogated
in part on other grounds by People v Smith-Anthony, 494 Mich 669, 682-683; 837 NW2d 415
(2013). “The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the
commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597
NW2d 864 (1999). Defendant stipulated that he was ineligible to possess a firearm because of a
prior felony conviction, and on appeal he challenges only whether the prosecution presented
sufficient evidence to show that he had possessed a firearm.
Possession “can be actual or constructive, joint or exclusive,” and a defendant “has
constructive possession if there is proximity to the article together with indicia of control.” People
v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Put another way, a defendant has constructive possession of a firearm if the location of the
weapon is known and it is reasonably accessible to the defendant.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Possession is a question of fact for the jury and “can be proved by circumstantial
evidence and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence.” People v Strickland, 293 Mich
App 393, 400; 810 NW2d 660 (2011). However, “the circumstantial proof must facilitate
reasonable inferences of causation, not mere speculation.” People v Xun Wang, 505 Mich 239,
251; 952 NW2d 334 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendant argues that the evidence that he possessed a firearm was insufficient because
the Glock was recovered from Ruckes (who possessed a CPL), and because the two other
recovered firearms were accessible to numerous others in the home. Defendant cites to Parker v
Renico, 450 F Supp 2d 727 (ED Mich, 2006), aff’d 506 F3d 444 (CA 6, 2007),5 in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a writ of
habeas corpus, finding that the evidence presented at trial was too speculative to support the
defendant’s felon-in-possession and felony-firearm convictions. Parker, 506 F3d at 445, 452. In
Parker, the defendant was traveling with three other men, sitting in the backseat on the driver’s
side of the vehicle. After the vehicle crashed while fleeing police, two firearms were located
inside, one on the front passenger-side floor, and the other on the passenger-side backseat. This
Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions, finding that the evidence showed that the defendant
first attempted to escape out the driver’s side door, the other backseat passenger had a different
weapon, and “a driver’s side door repeatedly opened during the chase,” suggesting that the
defendant had attempted to use or dispose of a gun. Id. at 445-447. See also People v Tillman,
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 29, 2004 (Docket Nos.
245442, 245443, and 245894), p 6.
The Sixth Circuit disagreed, stating that “[p]resence near a firearm, without more, does not
suffice to prove possession,” and explaining that “each fact the state advances as ‘indicia of
control’ fails to link Parker to the gun, and viewed cumulatively the evidence gains no greater
traction.” Parker, 506 F3d at 451-452. Without that “indicia of control,” the “evidence may have
5 “[F]ederal caselaw is not binding precedent and is only persuasive authority in resolving a
question of state law[.]” People v Rogers, 338 Mich App 312, 327; 979 NW2d 747 (2021).

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led the jury . . . to ‘reasonably speculate’ that Parker possessed a weapon,” but was insufficient to
support constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 452. Defendant argues that,
under Parker, the prosecution failed to establish that he was able to and intended to exercise control
over any of the recovered firearms.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could find that defendant
had constructive possession of, at a minimum, the Draco found in the basement bedroom. The
Draco was found in the room where defendant frequently stayed, under a board atop the bed
platform. Ruckes testified that she purchased the Draco on August 4, 2022 and brought it into the
house that same day, and that she placed it on top of what she termed the “wooden platform” in
the basement bedroom. But Houston testified that Ruckes waited outside the Riverpark house that
afternoon, but did not go inside. And while Ruckes stated that she placed the Draco on top of the
“wooden platform” in the basement bedroom, the Draco was recovered underneath it. From this
record, a jury could credit Houston’s testimony and conclude that it was defendant who brought
the Draco into the house and placed it underneath the bed frame. Or it could credit Ruckes’
testimony (that she had placed the Draco on top of the “wooden platform”) and conclude that
defendant had moved the Draco and placed it under the board. On these facts, sufficient evidence
was presented by the prosecution to enable a rational jury to conclude defendant had at least some
indicia of control over the Draco. Johnson, 293 Mich App at 83.
The SW handgun was also found in the basement bedroom where defendant spent a
majority of his time when at the Riverpark house. Defendant’s wristband identification and a letter
addressed to him were found nearby. Despite other people having access to the basement bedroom,
testimony indicated that defendant was in the basement on the night of August 3, 2022, the
following morning, and later in the afternoon before his arrest. Viewed in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, this circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that defendant
knew of the SW handgun’s location and had reasonable access to it. Id.
To sustain defendant’s felon-in-possession conviction, the prosecution only needed to
present sufficient evidence that defendant possessed a gun, not every gun. See MCL 750.224f.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence, and reasonable inferences arising
from it, were sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was in
possession of a firearm. It further follows that sufficient evidence was presented to support
defendant’s felony-firearm conviction.
III. ERROR IN THE FELONY INFORMATION
Defendant also argues that an error in his felony information resulted in his convictions for
crimes with which he was never charged, requiring this Court to vacate his convictions. We
disagree. Because defendant “neither objected to the information nor moved for its amendment
before the trial court,” his argument is unpreserved and reviewed for plain error affecting
substantial rights, People v Sabin, 223 Mich App 530, 531-532; 566 NW2d 677 (1997), remanded
in part on other grounds 459 Mich 924 (1998); see also MCL 767.76.
Both the United States and Michigan constitutions provide a criminal defendant with the
right to notice of the charges against him. US Const, Am VI, XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 20.
“Grounded in a defendant’s constitutional right of due process of law is the principle that an

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accused shall not be called upon to defend himself against a charge of which he was not sufficiently
apprised.” People v Higuera, 244 Mich App 429, 442; 625 NW2d 444 (2001) (quotation marks,
citation, and alterations omitted).
The felony information notifies a defendant of the charges against him. People v
Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 706; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). The felony information “shall
contain” the “time of the offense as near as may be,” and “[n]o variance as to time shall be fatal
unless time is of the essence of the offense.” MCL 767.45(1)(b) (emphasis added). See also
MCR 6.112(D) (“To the extent possible, the information should specify the time and place of the
alleged offense.”).
In this case, defendant argues that errors in the felony information violated his
constitutional right to have every element of the offense charged in the felony information and
found by a jury. Specifically, defendant’s felony information states that the charged offenses
occurred on August 3, 2022, and defendant asserts on appeal that because the only offenses he was
convicted of occurred on August 4, 2022, this Court must reverse his convictions. However, the
jury made no finding as to when defendant committed the offenses, nor was the exact time an
element of any of the offenses charge. Defendant makes no argument that the date of offenses was
essential, nor does he cite any authority to establish that a defect in the information exists, let alone
one amounting to a constitutional violation.
Even assuming that an error in the information did exist, MCL 767.76 states, in relevant
part:
[No] conviction [shall] be set aside or reversed on account of any defect in form or
substance of the indictment, unless the objection to such indictment, specifically
stating the defect claimed, be made prior to the commencement of the trial or at
such time thereafter as the court shall in its discretion permit.
Relatedly, MCR 6.112(G) provides for harmless-error review with regard to errors relating to the
felony information, stating:
Absent a timely objection and a showing of prejudice, a court may not dismiss an
information or reverse a conviction because of an untimely filing or because of an
incorrectly cited statute or a variance between the information and proof regarding
time, place, the manner in which the offense was committed, or other factual detail
relating to the alleged offense.
Defendant failed to object to the date in the felony information until this appeal, and even
now has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any discrepancy. “MCR 6.112(G) places
the burden on defendant to demonstrate prejudice and thus establish that the error was not
harmless.” Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 707. “The dispositive question in determining whether
a defendant was prejudiced by a defect in the information is whether the defendant knew the acts
for which he or she was being tried so that he or she could adequately put forth a defense.” Id. at
706. Defendant’s felony information clearly listed the charges of which he was eventually
convicted, and considering that the bulk of his initial charges stemmed from conduct that occurred
on the evening of August 3, 2022, lists the date of the offenses “as near as may be.” See

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MCL 767.45(1)(b). Defendant fails to explain how a minor discrepancy in the date listed on the
felony information prejudiced him in preparing a defense, and he has not established he was
unaware of the charges against him or that he was unable to defend against them.
Alternatively, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the verdict and for failing to object when defendant was sentenced for crimes he was not charged
with committing. However, as discussed, defendant has failed to establish any error, and any
objection by trial counsel would therefore have been futile. See People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App
192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010) (“Failing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile
objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
IV. DENIAL OF MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion
for a mistrial. We disagree. This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision
on a motion for a mistrial. People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 228; 530 NW2d 497 (1995).
“An abuse of discretion occurs when the court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 259; 749 NW2d 272
(2008). “A mistrial should be granted only for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights of the
defendant, and impairs his ability to get a fair trial.” Haywood, 209 Mich App at 228 (citations
omitted). Generally, “an unresponsive, volunteered answer to a proper question is not grounds for
the granting of a mistrial.” Id. However, police officers have a “special obligation” to refrain
from making prejudicial and irrelevant remarks during their testimony. People v Holly, 129 Mich
App 405, 415-416; 341 NW2d 823 (1983).
In response to questioning about what was found while executing the search warrant in the
basement bedroom, Detective Glover testified: “I recovered two I believe prison photos of the
Defendant.” Defense counsel immediately objected and, outside of the presence of the jury, argued
for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion, finding the jury was aware and would be reminded
that defendant had stipulated to having been convicted of a felony, and that a curative instruction
would mitigate any prejudice. “Jurors are presumed to follow instructions, and instructions are
presumed to cure most errors.” People v Petri, 279 Mich App 407, 414; 760 NW2d 882 (2008).
Contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, the trial court immediately instructed the jury to
disregard the testimony, and later reminded the jury not to consider stricken testimony when
deliberating.
Defendant argues that Detective Glover’s statement was too prejudicial to be addressed
with a curative instruction because it painted him as a criminal, giving the jury a reason to convict
him. Defendant asserts that the jury was unaware, until Detective Glover’s statement, that his
prior conviction was “serious enough that it resulted in imprisonment,” and that it “effectively
communicated to the jury that [defendant] was guilty of something.” We disagree. Detective
Glover’s statement was brief and undetailed, and gave no indication as to why defendant had
previously been incarcerated. Nor was it responsive to the prosecutor’s permissible question
regarding what else was found in the basement bedroom. Further, the danger in revealing that a
defendant has been previously incarcerated is “that a jury will recognize that the defendant had
previously been convicted of a crime . . . .” People v McDonald, 303 Mich App 424, 436; 844
NW2d 168 (2013) (discussing revealing parole status). However, when the jury is aware of a

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defendant’s prior felony conviction underlying a felon-in-possession charge, “the requisite
prejudice . . . has not been shown.” Id. In this case, any prejudice was mitigated because defendant
stipulated to having previously been convicted of a felony. Because defendant did not suffer
prejudice from the challenged testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
defendant’s motion for a mistrial. Haywood, 209 Mich App at 228.
V. CORRECTION OF JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE
Finally, defendant argues—and the prosecution agrees—that his judgment of sentence
should be amended because his felony-firearm sentence was erroneously imposed to run
consecutively to his misdemeanor RCSP sentence. We agree.
Under MCL 750.227b, the sentence for a felony-firearm conviction “shall be served
consecutively with and preceding any term of imprisonment imposed for the conviction of the
felony or attempt to commit the felony.” MCL 750.227b(3). “From the plain language of the
felony-firearm statute, it is evident that the Legislature intended that a felony-firearm sentence be
consecutive only to the sentence for a specific underlying felony.” People v Clark, 463 Mich 459,
463; 619 NW2d 538 (2000). “No language in the statute permits consecutive sentencing with
convictions other than the predicate offense.” Id. at 464.
The underlying felony for defendant’s felony-firearm conviction was felon-in-possession.
Defendant was also convicted of RCSP, and his judgment of sentence states that his felony-firearm
sentence is consecutive to both his RCSP and felon-in-possession sentences “and any parole if
applicable.” Because RCSP was not the underlying felony for defendant’s felony-firearm
conviction (nor could it be, because it is a misdemeanor conviction), it was error for the trial court
to impose the felony-firearm sentence consecutively to the RCSP sentence. We remand for the
ministerial correction of this error. See MCR 6.435(A); MRC 7.216(A)(7).
We affirm defendant’s convictions. We remand to the trial court for the ministerial task of
correcting defendant’s judgment of sentence. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Adrienne N. Young

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