COA 371851 GEORGE BADEEN V PAR INC Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/10/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
GEORGE BADEEN and MIDWEST RECOVERY
AND ADJUSTMENT, INC., on Behalf of
Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
UNPUBLISHED
September 10, 2026
2:01 PM
v No. 371851
Wayne Circuit Court
PAR NORTH AMERICA, doing business as PAR,
INC., REMARKETING SOLUTIONS,
CENTERONE FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC,
MILLENIUM CAPITAL AND RECOVERY
CORP., RENOVO SERVICES, LLC,
RENAISSANCE RECOVERY SOLUTIONS, INC.,
ASR NATIONWIDE, LLC, THE M. DAVIS CO.,
INC., doing business as USA RECOVERY
SOLUTIONS, REPOSSESSORS, INC.,
NATIONAL ASSET RECOVERY CORP.,
TD AUTO FINANCE, LLC, TOYOTA MOTOR
CREDIT CORP., NISSAN MOTOR ACCEPTANCE
CORP., SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.,
PNC BANK, NA, BANK OF AMERICA, NA,
FIFTH THIRD BANK, and THE HUNTINGTON
NATIONAL BANK,
LC No. 10-004053-CZ
Defendants-Appellees,
and
FIRST NATIONAL REPOSSESSORS, INC., MV
CONNECT, LLC, doing business as IIA, LLC,
AMERICAN RECOVERY SERVICE, INC.,
DIVERSIFIED VEHICLE SERVICES, INC.,
CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, GE
MONEY BANK, EVAN BURKHOLDER,
CENTERONE DEBT MANAGEMENT SERVICES
LLC, CHRYSLER CREDIT CORP., and
NATIONAL CITY CORP.,

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Defendants.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and O’BRIEN and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this putative class action, plaintiffs, George Badeen and Midwest Recovery and
Adjustment, Inc., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, appeal as of right the
trial court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’ claims against the nearly three dozen defendants. Plaintiffs
assert eight separate counts and are seeking damages from defendants, at least in part, for
defendants’ supposed violations of the Occupational Code, MCL 339.101 et seq., and the
Regulation of Collection Practices Act (RCPA), MCL 445.251 et seq. Each of those statutes
provide for recovery of actual damages or a minimum amount of recovery regardless of actual
damages incurred. In Rodriguez v Hirshberg Acceptance Corp, 341 Mich App 349; 991 NW2d
217 (2022) (Rodriguez I), vacated 514 Mich 906 (2024), this Court held that MCR 3.501(A) barred
class actions premised on statutes that provide for minimum amounts of recovery regardless of
actual damages unless the statutes expressly permit recovery through class actions. Because
neither the Occupational Code nor the RCPA expressly permit recovery through class action, the
trial court reasoned that it was required to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims on the basis of Rodriguez I.
On appeal, plaintiffs rightly note that Rodriguez I is no longer binding because it was
vacated, and they ask this Court to reject Rodriguez I’s interpretation of MCR 3.501(A)(5) and to
instead read that court rule as permitting this class action because it seeks actual damages. That
is, plaintiffs argue that MCR 3.501(A)(5) only bars class actions that seek a minimum amount of
recovery regardless of actual damages, so class actions under the Occupational Code and the
RCPA seeking actual damages are permissible. Plaintiffs further contend that regardless of how
MCR 3.501(A)(5) is interpreted, their individual claims and other potential class-action claims
should be allowed to proceed.
Consistent with Rodriguez I, we hold that MCR 3.501(A)(5) precludes class actions
seeking to recover damages under statutes that mandate a minimum amount of recovery regardless
of actual damages incurred and do not expressly permit recovery through class actions, like the
Occupational Code and the RCPA. The trial court thus properly dismissed plaintiffs’ class action
to the extent that plaintiffs sought to recover damages for violations of the Occupational Code and
the RCPA. We decline to address whether MCR 3.501(A)(5) precludes plaintiffs’ other class-
action claims (if any) because we conclude that this issue is not properly before us, but we conclude
that MCR 3.501(A)(5) does not preclude plaintiffs’ individual claims, so the trial court erred by
dismissing plaintiffs’ other claims against defendants on grounds that it was required by MCR
3.501(A)(5) to do so. We therefore affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand for
further proceedings.

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I. BACKGROUND
This is not the first time that this case has been through this state’s appellate courts. This
case centers around practices in the debt-collection business, and in a prior appeal, our Supreme
Court set forth the basic facts concerning the parties’ roles in that business:
For many years, the collection industry involved two players: the creditors
and the collection agents that they hired to collect debts. But in the late 1990s, as
the collection industry evolved, a middleman emerged. These middlemen—known
as forwarders or forwarding companies—operate as intermediaries between
creditors and local collection agents. The forwarding companies’ business model
involves obtaining assignments of unpaid accounts from creditors and then
allocating the collection of those accounts to local collection agents. The
forwarding companies do not, however, contact debtors themselves.
* * *
Plaintiff George Badeen, a licensed collection agency manager, owns and
operates Midwest Recovery and Adjustment, Inc., a licensed collection agency
doing business in Michigan. The primary business of Midwest Recovery is
repossessing automobiles when it is assigned a delinquent account by a financing
company.
This dispute’s origins lie in the shifting landscape of collection practices.
In the past, when a creditor needed a debt collected or something repossessed, it
would contact and retain a collection agent wherever the debtor was located. But
the business model has changed with the introduction of forwarding companies.
Now forwarding companies act as middlemen between the lenders and the local
collection agents. The forwarding companies operate nationwide, and when a
creditor needs a collection, it contracts with a forwarding company, which, in turn,
allocates the collection to a collection agent in the appropriate location. The
forwarding companies maintain networks of collection agents and negotiate
favorable rates that save creditors money and allow the forwarding companies to
make a profit. Plaintiffs allege that this business model negatively affects licensed
local collection agents. [Badeen v PAR, Inc, 496 Mich 75, 78-81; 853 NW2d 303
(2014).]
Plaintiffs also believed that certain aspects of this business model violated the Occupational
Code and the RCPA. As a result, in 2010, plaintiffs filed suit seeking certification of a class
comprised of automobile repossession entities that held Michigan debt-collection licenses, and, on
behalf of themselves and the proposed class, plaintiffs sought to recover damages from defendants
for defendants’ alleged violations of the Occupational Code and the RCPA, among other bases for
relief.
What followed was a lengthy procedural history that took this case up to our Supreme
Court, back to the trial court, then to federal court, where it went up to the United States Supreme
Court, until the case eventually landed back in state trial court. During that time, this Court decided

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Rodriguez I, which interpreted MCR 3.501(A)(5) to mean that “when a statute provides for a
minimum penalty irrespective of actual damages, no class action may be maintained on the basis
of that statute.” Rodriguez I, 341 Mich App at 358. So, back in the trial court, defendants moved
for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), citing Rodriguez I and arguing that, because the
Occupational Code and the RCPA provide for a minimum penalty irrespective of actual damages,
MCR 3.501(A)(5) barred plaintiffs’ class action based on those statutes. At the hearing on this
motion, plaintiffs’ counsel admitted that Rodriguez I was controlling, and the trial court
subsequently entered an order dismissing plaintiffs’ case in its entirety.
While plaintiffs’ appeal was pending, our Supreme Court vacated this Court’s opinion in
Rodriguez I, concluding that a notice of settlement “rendered the issues before [the] Court moot.”
Rodriguez v Hirshberg Acceptance Corp, 514 Mich 906, 906 (2024) (Rodriguez II).
The trial court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint on the basis of Rodriguez I is now
before this Court for review.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Yellow
Tail Ventures, Inc v City of Berkley, 344 Mich App 689, 699; 1 NW3d 860 (2022). Defendants
moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), which is appropriately granted “when
the opposing party has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Bodnar v St John
Providence, Inc, 327 Mich App 203, 212; 933 NW2d 363 (2019). A (C)(8) motion considers “the
pleadings alone.” Id. “All well-pleaded factual allegations are to be accepted as true and are to
be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.
The proper interpretation and application of a court rule is reviewed de novo. Green v
Pontiac Public Library, 350 Mich App 478, 486; 32 NW3d 487 (2024).
III. CLASS ACTIONS
The trial court relied exclusively on Rodriguez I to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint. As
plaintiffs rightly observe on appeal, that case is no longer binding because our Supreme Court
vacated it. See Estate of Wanda Jesse v Lakeland Specialty Hosp at Berrien Ctr, 328 Mich App
142, 149 n 2; 936 NW2d 705 (2019) (explaining that opinions of this Court that are vacated are
not precedentially binding). But that does not mean that Rodriguez I was wrongly decided; it
simply means that we are not bound by Rodriquez I’s reading of MCR 3.501(A)(5). We must
decide for ourselves whether MCR 3.501(A)(5) bars class actions like plaintiffs’ that seek to
recover damages under statutes that provide for minimum amounts of recovery regardless of actual
damages but do not expressly permit recovery through class actions.1
1 Plaintiffs contend that because the trial court relied entirely on Rodriquez I to dismiss plaintiffs’
complaint, and because Rodriquez I is no longer binding, this Court should simply vacate the trial
court’s order and remand for further proceedings. Plaintiffs contend that this route is preferrable
because it promotes “efficiency” and “finality.” We do not see how. Deciding this issue now is

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Answering this question requires this Court to interpret MCR 3.501(A)(5). Court rules are
interpreted in the same manner as statutes. Estate of Maki v Coen, 318 Mich App 532, 540; 899
NW2d 111 (2017). The goal when interpreting a statute is to give effect to the intent of the
Legislature. Farris v McKaig, 324 Mich App 349, 353; 920 NW2d 377 (2018). The most reliable
evidence of the Legislature’s intent is the words of the statute, id., so properly interpreting a statute
begins by examining the statute’s language. Foster v Van Buren Co, 332 Mich App 273, 280-281;
956 NW2d 554 (2020). If the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, then no further
interpretation is required, and the statute must simply be enforced as written. Bronson Health
Care Group, Inc v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co, 348 Mich App 428, 439; 19 NW3d 151 (2023).
MCR 3.501(A)(5) provides:
An action for a penalty or minimum amount of recovery without regard to
actual damages imposed or authorized by statute may not be maintained as a class
action unless the statute specifically authorizes its recovery in a class action.
By its plain language, this rule applies in limited circumstances. The preliminary question we
must answer, then, is whether MCR 3.501(A)(5) applies here—that is, whether the statutes under
which plaintiffs seek to recover via class action are covered by MCR 3.501(A)(5).
As relevant to this case, MCR 3.501(A)(5) applies if a statute under which recovery is
sought in a class action “impose[s]” or “authorize[s]” a “minimum amount of recovery without
regard to actual damages.” Plaintiffs seek to recover damages from defendants for their alleged
violations of the Occupational Code and the RCPA. MCL 339.916(1) of the Occupational Code
provides a cause of action for violation of the code, and Subsection (2) provides that recovery in
such an action “shall be in the amount of actual damages or $50.00, whichever is greater.”2 MCL
445.257(1) of the RCPA likewise provides a cause of action for violation of the act, and Subsection
(2) provides that recovery in such an action “shall be in the amount of actual damages or $50.00,
whichever is greater.” MCL 445.257(2).3
The Occupational Code and the RCPA thus both impose or authorize a minimum amount
of recovery without regard to actual damages, so class actions seeking to recover under these
obviously the most efficient way to address it. And having this Court decide the issue promotes
finality because our decision is final unless it is disturbed by our Supreme Court. We also observe
that this case has been lingering in the court system for 16 years, and the parties are entitled to a
resolution of their dispute as quickly as possible.
2 MCL 339.916(2) further provides that, if the court finds that a defendant’s violation of the
Occupational Code was willful, then the court “may award a civil penalty of not less than 3 times
the actual damages, or $150.00, whichever is greater and shall award reasonable attorney’s fees
and court costs incurred in connection with the action.”
3 MCL 445.257(2) further provides that, if the court finds that a defendant’s violation of the RCPA
was willful, then “the court may assess a civil fine of not less than 3 times the actual damages, or
$150.00, whichever is greater, and shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs incurred
in connection with the action.”

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statutes are subject to MCR 3.501(A)(5). Returning to the plain language of that court rule, it
permits class actions under statutes like the Occupational Code and the RCPA only if those statutes
“specifically authorize[]” recovery in a class action. See MCR 3.501(A)(5). Neither the
Occupational Code nor the RCPA authorize class actions as a means of recovery, so plaintiffs’
class action seeking recovery on the basis of those statutes is precluded by MCR 3.501(A)(5).
Arguing against this result, plaintiffs insist that application of MCR 3.501(A)(5) to a class
action depends on the type of damages that the class seeks. According to plaintiffs, if the class is
seeking to recover the statutory minimum in damages, then MCR 3.501(A)(5) precludes the class
action, but if the class is seeking “actual damages,” then MCR 3.501(A)(5) does not preclude the
class action. Plaintiffs claim that their class action under the Occupational Code and the RCPA
“seek[s] actual, not statutory damages,” so they conclude that “MCR 3.501(A)(5) does not
preclude plaintiffs from bringing their claims under the Occupational Code and the RCPA as class
claims.”
The problem with this argument is that neither the Occupational Code nor the RCPA allow
a plaintiff to select what type of damages they are seeking. Each statute states that “recovery shall
be in the amount of actual damages or $50.00, whichever is greater.” MCL 445.257(2); MCL
339.916(2). So, if the factfinder determines that a class member’s “actual damages” for a violation
of the Occupational Code or the RCPA was less than $50, then that class member must recover
$50 in damages, because that is what the plain language of the statutes says. The statutes do not
give the claimant the option to recover actual damages less than $50—the statutes state that
“recovery shall be in the amount of actual damages or $50.00, whichever is greater.” MCL
445.257(2) (emphasis added); MCL 339.916(2) (emphasis added). See Smitter v Thornapple Twp,
494 Mich 121, 136; 833 NW2d 875 (2013) (explaining that use of the word “shall” “indicates a
mandatory directive”).
It therefore does not matter whether plaintiffs claim to be seeking only “actual damages”
under the Occupational Code and the RCPA. The statutes mandate a minimum amount of recovery
for any action brought under the statutes, which means that any class action seeking to recover
damages under those statutes will necessarily be “[a]n action for a . . . minimum amount of
recovery without regard to actual damages imposed or authorized by statute” subject to MCR
3.501(A)(5). That court rule precludes plaintiffs’ class action seeking to recover damages under
the Occupational Code or the RCPA because neither statute “specifically authorizes” recovery in
a class action. MCR 3.501(A)(5).
To summarize, recovery for violations of the Occupational Code and the RCPA is governed
by MCL 445.257 and MCL 339.916, and MCR 3.501(A)(5), by its plain terms, precludes class
actions seeking to recover damages under those statutes. The trial court therefore properly
dismissed plaintiffs’ class action to the extent that it sought recovery on the basis of violations of
the Occupational Code and the RCPA.
Finally, it is not apparent that plaintiffs’ complaint alleges other class-action claims that do
not seek recovery on the basis of violations of the Occupational Code and the RCPA, but if such
claims exist, we vacate the trial court’s order dismissing them. We believe that the only issue
related to plaintiffs’ class action that is properly presented on appeal—and thus the only issue that
we decide—is whether plaintiffs’ class action must be dismissed to the extent that it seeks to

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recover damages on the basis of defendants’ alleged violations of the Occupational Code and the
RCPA. We offer no opinion as to whether all class-action claims alleged in a class-action
complaint are precluded by MCR 3.501(A)(5) if one of the complaint’s class-action claims is
precluded by MCR 3.501(A)(5). If plaintiffs alleged other class-action claims not premised on
violations of either the Occupational Code or the RCPA, then the parties can litigate those claims
below, including whether they must be dismissed by application of MCR 3.501(A)(5). If plaintiff
did not allege any such claims, then all of plaintiff’s class-action claims are precluded by MCR
3.501(A)(5).
IV. INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS
Plaintiffs also contend the trial court erred by dismissing their individual claims. We agree.
As this Court explained in Rodriguez I, “MCR 3.501(A)(5) appears within a rule expressly
addressing class actions,” so “an action” as used in the rule clearly refers to “a class action.”
Rodriguez I, 341 Mich App at 358. Even if this was not clear from the court rule’s context, it is
“quite impossible that our Supreme Court intended MCR 3.501(A)(5) to forbid any lawsuit
whatsoever based on” a statute that provides a minimum amount of recovery without regard to
actual damages. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accord McDougall v Schanz, 461
Mich 15, 27; 597 NW2d 148 (1999) (explaining that our Supreme Court “is not authorized to enact
court rules that establish, abrogate, or modify the substantive law”). Stated differently, MCR
3.501(A)(5) cannot be plausibly interpreted as preventing a plaintiff from bringing individual
claims under statutes that authorize minimum amounts of recovery without regard to actual
damages that are not recoverable through a class action. So, as applied here, MCR 3.501(A)(5)
does not preclude plaintiffs’ individual claims against defendants under the Occupational Code
and the RCPA. The trial court thus erred by dismissing plaintiffs’ individual claims on that ground.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ class action to the extent that the
dismissal was consistent with this opinion; we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ class
action to the extent that the dismissal was inconsistent with this opinion; we reverse the trial court’s
dismissal of plaintiffs’ individual claims; and we remand this case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense

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