COA 378344 IN RE R M WENDZEL MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 5/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
May 12, 2026
1:32 PM
In re R. M. WENDZEL, Minor.
No. 378344
St. Joseph Circuit Court
Juvenile Division
LC No. 2024-000621-NA
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and REDFORD and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to her minor child, RW, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (3)(j). Because the record is unclear
whether the trial court complied with the notification requirements under the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA), 25 USC 1901 et seq., and the Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA),
MCL 712B.1 et seq., we conditionally reverse and remand this matter to the trial court only to
resolve the ICWA notice issue.1
I. ICWA/MIFPA
Respondent argues that the trial court failed to determine, on the record, whether notice
was sent, or whether RW possessed the necessary heritage to trigger the statutory protections of
ICWA and MIFPA, after it was put on notice of RW’s potential Indian heritage. We review issues
involving the application and interpretation of ICWA and MIFPA de novo. In re L A Ledee Minor,
___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. 371631); slip op at 4.
In determining whether ICWA or MIFPA applies, the trial court must first determine
whether the minor child falls within the definition of “Indian child.” In re Morris, 491 Mich 81,
99-100; 815 NW2d 62 (2012). ICWA defines an “Indian child” as “any unmarried person who is
under the age of eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for
1 Petitioner did not file a brief on appeal.

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membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”2 Id.
at 100 (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also 25 USC 1903(4). Indian tribes determine
membership, so “when there are sufficient indications that the child may be an Indian child, the
ultimate determination requires that the tribe receive notice of the child custody proceedings, so
that the tribe may advise the court of the child’s membership status.” Morris, 491 Mich at 100.
See also 25 USC 1912(a). In relevant part, the notice requirements under ICWA provide as
follows:
[W]here the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the
party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an
Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe,
by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of
their right of intervention. If the identity or location of the parent or Indian
custodian and the tribe cannot be determined, such notice shall be given to the
Secretary in like manner . . . . [25 USC 1912(a) (emphasis added).]
However, the ICWA notice requirements under 25 USC 1912(a) are only “triggered by indicia of
Indian heritage sufficient to give the court actual knowledge or a ‘reason to know’ that the child
at issue is an Indian child.” Morris, 491 Mich at 104. In general, this “reason to know” standard
is a “rather low bar” for triggering the notice requirement, id. at 105, because “sufficiently reliable
information of virtually any criteria on which membership might be based is adequate to trigger
the notice requirement,” id. at 108 (emphasis added).
Further, under MIFPA, our Legislature provided “a nonexclusive list of circumstances that
trigger the notification mandate . . . .” In re Jones, 316 Mich App 110, 114; 894 NW2d 54 (2016).
In relevant part this list includes when “[a]n officer of the court involved in the proceeding has
knowledge that the child may be an Indian child.” MCL 712B.9(4)(e) (emphasis added). Further,
our Supreme Court has clarified under ICWA that
indicia sufficient to trigger tribal notice includes situations in which (1) the trial
court has information suggesting that the child, a parent of the child, or members
of a parent’s family are tribal members, [or] (2) the trial court has information
indicating that the child has Indian heritage, even though no particular Indian tribe
can be identified . . . . [Morris, 491 Mich at 108 n 18.]
ICWA notice provisions are triggered even when respondents merely inform the court that they
have Indian heritage. See, e.g., id. at 109; In re Johnson, 305 Mich App 328, 329; 852 NW2d 224
(2014).
At the preliminary hearing, respondent’s counsel informed the trial court that respondent
said that she had “some” Indian heritage “down the line” and that she thought that RW’s father
also may have some Indian heritage. The primary issue is whether this brief statement by
2 “The definition of ‘Indian child’ in MIFPA is similar to that in ICWA, but does not require the
child who is eligible for membership to also be the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”
In re KMN, 309 Mich App 274, 287; 870 NW2d 75 (2015).

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respondent’s counsel constitutes sufficient indicia of Indian heritage as to trigger the notification
requirements under ICWA and MIFPA. We conclude that it did, as did the trial court.
First, the information came directly from an officer of the court, i.e., respondent’s counsel,
and ultimately from respondent. Under MCL 712B.9(4)(e), this is sufficient to trigger the
notification mandate. See also Jones, 316 Mich App at 116-117 (holding that information that the
child might have Native American heritage obtained from the respondent was sufficient to trigger
the notification requirements). Second, the fact that respondent, or her counsel, did not provide a
specific tribe is not determinative because “indicia sufficient to trigger tribal notice” also exists
when “no particular Indian tribe can be identified.” Morris, 491 Mich at 108 n 18. Further, both
ICWA and MIFPA specifically provide guidance for notification when a particular Indian tribe
cannot be determined, i.e., provide notice to the Secretary of the Interior. See 25 USC 1912(a);
MCL 712B.9(1). In other words, there is no requirement that a specific tribe be named in order to
trigger the notice requirements of ICWA and MIFPA.
As discussed earlier, the trigger for the notification mandate is a “low bar,” Morris, 491
Mich at 105, and we must “err on the side of caution, protecting the interests of Indian children,
families, and tribes to avoid later potential disruptions in the child’s life,” Jones, 316 Mich App
at 117. Here, there is no indication on the record that the DHHS ever notified potential tribes or
the Secretary of the Interior. At most, the court reports indicate that the DHHS made a “Native
American Inquiry,” with the ultimate determination that there was not any “Native American
affiliation.” However, there is no indication or explanation in the record as to how the DHHS
came to this conclusion, and the trial court never made any specific findings regarding whether
notice was sent or whether RW was considered an “Indian child” under ICWA and MIFPA. See
Johnson, 305 Mich App at 332-333.
We encountered a very similar scenario in Johnson, 305 Mich App at 330, and concluded
that remand was necessary because the statement at the preliminary examination was sufficient to
trigger the notification requirements, and there was insufficient evidence in the record that any
proper inquiry was made. Although here it is likely that the DHHS ultimately determined that
ICWA or MIFPA were not triggered, as evidenced by the conclusion noted in the initial court
report and subsequent reports, this is not certain from the record. Accordingly, we must
conditionally reverse the order and remand for resolution of the ICWA notice issue. Morris, 491
Mich at 89. On remand, the trial court shall first ensure that notice was properly made to the
appropriate entities. Id. at 123. If the trial court determines that the child is not an Indian child,
then the trial court’s order terminating parental rights should be reinstated. Id. But, if the trial
court determines that the child at issue is an Indian child, then the protections of ICWA apply, and
the trial court’s order terminating parental rights “must be vacated and all proceedings must begin
anew in accord with the procedural and substantive requirements of ICWA.” Id.
II. ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY AT ADJUDICATION TRIAL
Respondent’s only other argument is that her due-process rights were violated by the
admission of a process server’s testimony at the adjudication trial.
This argument was not advanced in the trial court; therefore, it is not preserved. See In re
Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). We review unpreserved arguments of

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constitutional error for plain error. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 29; 934 NW2d 610 (2019); In re
VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 135; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain
error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) the error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain,
i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” VanDalen, 293 Mich App
at 135 (quotation marks and citations omitted). “An error has affected a party’s substantial rights
when there is a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court
proceedings.” In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 463; 951 NW2d 704 (2020) (quotation marks
and citations omitted). The outcome of the proceeding will not be reversed unless the plain error
“seriously affect[ed] the integrity, fairness, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” In re
MOTA, 334 Mich App 300, 311; 964 NW2d 881 (2020). The interpretation and application of
statutes and court rules are reviewed de novo. In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 404; 852 NW2d 524
(2014).
Child protective proceedings may be initiated by filing a petition that “contain[s] facts that
constitute an offense against the child under the juvenile code.” In re Collier, 314 Mich App 558,
567-568; 887 NW2d 431 (2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted). After the petition is
authorized, the proceeding moves onto the adjudicative phase. MOTA, 334 Mich App at 312. The
adjudicative phase in child protective proceedings “is of critical importance because the
procedures used in adjudicative hearings protect the parents from the risk of erroneous deprivation
of their parental rights.” Collier, 314 Mich App at 568 (quotation marks, citation, and alteration
omitted). In this phase, the trial court determines whether the child “comes within the jurisdiction
of the court.” Pederson, 331 Mich App at 464 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The fact-
finding adjudication of an authorized petition to determine if the minor comes within the
jurisdiction of the court is called a trial.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also
MCR 3.903(A)(27).
If the respondent demands a trial, then the respondent “is entitled to a determination of the
facts by the jury or judge, the rules of evidence apply, and jurisdiction must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence.” MOTA, 334 Mich App at 312-313. Once the petitioner proves
by a preponderance of the evidence one or more of the statutory grounds for jurisdiction alleged
in the petition, the case enters the dispositional phase. Ferranti, 504 Mich at 16.
At trial petitioner presented John Mazur-Baker, a process server, as a witness.
Respondent’s counsel challenged whether Mazur-Baker’s testimony was relevant and necessary
to the proceeding, but the trial court determined that the testimony was relevant. Mazur-Baker
testified regarding the following: (1) that he was a process server; (2) that he was tasked with
serving respondent; (3) when he went to respondent’s residence he saw her “bent over” on a table
outside “doing something like sniffing something with her hands”; (4) when he talked to
respondent she told him that RW’s father was out selling meth and that meth was her “drug of
choice that she did when she moved up from cocaine to methamphetamine”; and (5) that he saw a
“crystal-like substance around her nostril and she was holding a straw in her hand” which, on the
basis of his experience, was consistent with someone using meth.
Respondent advances one clear argument against the admission of this testimony: because
the testimony was regarding an event that took place after the petition was filed, her due-process
rights were violated. As to this argument, this Court has clearly stated that “[n]either the juvenile
code nor the court rules mandates the exclusion of evidence concerning events that occur after a

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jurisdictional petition has been filed.” In re Dearmon, 303 Mich App 684, 696; 847 NW2d 514
(2014). Therefore, “[i]f evidence of postpetition facts qualifies as relevant to an issue presented
in an adjudication trial and is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, it may be
admitted.” Id. Accordingly, the fact that Mazur-Baker testified regarding an interaction that took
place after the petition was filed did not violate respondent’s due-process rights.3
We conditionally reverse the order terminating respondent’s parental rights, and remand
for the trial court to make applicable findings under ICWA. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
3 Additionally, the testimony was admissible under the rules of evidence. It was relevant to the
issues raised in the petition and was not more prejudicial than probative.

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