Petition of Edwin R. Jonas III for Reinstatement to the Bar of the State of Maine — 2019 ME 25

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 	Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 	2019 ME 25
Docket: 	Cum-18-278
Argued: 	February 7, 2019
Decided: 	February 14, 2019
Panel: 	SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
PETITION OF EDWIN R. JONAS III FOR REINSTATEMENT
TO THE BAR OF THE STATE OF MAINE
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Edwin R. Jonas III appeals from a judgment of a single justice of the
Maine 	Supreme 	Judicial 	Court 	(Gorman, 	J.) 	denying 	his 	petition 	for
reinstatement to the Maine Bar. 	This is Jonas’s second appeal in this matter.
On his first appeal from the denial of his petition, we remanded the matter after
clarifying that the admissibility of evidence is to be determined pursuant to the
reasonable person standard rather than the Maine Rules of Evidence—the
original ruling, before clarification, may have resulted in the exclusion of
evidence that would have been admissible pursuant to the more inclusive
standard. See In re Edwin R. Jonas III, 2017 ME 115, ¶¶ 1-3, 164 A.3d 120.
[¶2] On remand, we indicated that, in addition to the evidence admitted
in the original proceeding, the single justice should “consider only (1) the
evidence that was explicitly offered and excluded based on the application of
the Rules of Evidence and that was not otherwise admitted, and (2) to the

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extent 	allowed 	by 	the 	single 	justice, 	any 	evidence 	of 	reinstatement 	or
disciplinary actions, further litigation, or other evidence deemed relevant by
the single justice that has occurred after the closing of evidence in the original
trial.” Id. ¶ 39. Jonas contends that the limited scope of our remand denied him
due process of the law and that the evidence he presented supports his
reinstatement.
[¶3] During the proceedings on remand, the single justice adhered to the
parameters that we articulated in the mandate. 	Therefore, Jonas’s argument
that he should have been entitled to present evidence outside of those
parameters constitutes a challenge to our prior decision establishing the nature
and scope of the remand proceedings.
[¶4] 	Contrary to his contention, Jonas has not demonstrated that the
process prescribed in our opinion and then implemented by the single justice
resulted 	in 	an 	erroneous 	or 	unjust 	outcome. 	See 	Greaton 	v. 	Greaton,
2012 ME 17, ¶ 7, 36 A.3d 913 (“In appealing a judgment, it is not enough to
challenge procedural errors allegedly made by the trial court without also
showing actual error in the judgment.”). 	Nor does he seem to recognize the
mitigatory opportunity of the additional process, which allowed him to present
additional evidence developed since the original trial, that has been available
to him since we remanded the matter almost two years ago.

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[¶5] 	The additional evidence he now argues he is entitled to present,
even though it is outside the scope of what we stated could be presented on
remand, would not change the outcome of the case given his own description
of what such evidence would show and the weight that the single justice gave
to the great amount of contrary evidence admitted against him.
[¶6] Balancing the factors relevant to a determination of what process is
due, including Jonas’s interest in his professional license and the burden that
remanding the matter again would place on limited judicial time and resources,
we conclude that Jonas was not deprived of due process by the limited scope of
the remand. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Fichter
v. Bd. of Environmental Protection, 604 A.2d 433, 436-37 (Me. 1992) (stating
that due process “requirements are flexible and entail no specified form or
procedure”; instead, “[w]hat process is due will vary from case to case . . . to
assure 	the 	basic 	fairness 	of 	each 	particular 	action 	according 	to 	its
circumstances” (alterations in original)).
[¶7] 	The only remaining issue we need address is whether the entire
record, including the evidence Jonas and the Board of Overseers of the Bar
introduced on remand, compelled the single justice to change her original

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conclusions, all of which are supported by the record.1 Even with the evidence
presented to the single justice on remand, we note the great deal of competent
evidence that the single justice relied on in her findings to conclude that Jonas
should not be reinstated.
[¶8] A review of the evidence Jonas introduced on remand supports the
single justice’s assessment that it added “little . . . to the issue to be decided in
this matter—that is, Jonas’s demonstration of the evidence necessary for
reinstatement.” The evidence, including the evidence introduced by the Board
of events since the closing of evidence in the original trial, demonstrates a
continuing practice of frivolous and 	vexatious actions 	and use of court
pleadings and processes for improper purposes.
[¶9] 	We discern no error in the single justice’s ultimate conclusion on
remand that Jonas did not meet his burden “to satisfy, by clear and convincing
evidence, each of the criteria for reinstatement set out in M. Bar R. 29(e).”
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
1 	The single justice’s first judgment analyzed Jonas’s petition pursuant to the reinstatement
factors enumerated in the then applicable M. Bar R. 7.3(j). The single justice’s second judgment
analyzed Jonas’s petition pursuant to current M. Bar R. 29(e), which replaced the former rule after
the first judgment was entered. The findings in the first opinion remain relevant because the rules
are—with the exception of a few inapplicable subsections—substantively the same. Compare M. Bar
R. 7.3(j)(5)(A)-(F) (Tower 2014) with M. Bar R. 29(e)(1)-(8).

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James M. Bowie, Esq. (orally), Thompson Bowie & Hatch LLC, Portland, for
appellant Edwin R. Jonas III
Aria Eee, Esq. (orally), Board of Overseers of the Bar, Augusta, for appellee Board
of Overseers of the Bar
Maine Supreme Judicial Court docket number Bar-13-16
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY