State of Maine v. Steven Edwards

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2024 ME 55
Docket: Som-23-326
Argued: May 9, 2024
Decided: August 1, 2024

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

STEVEN EDWARDS

STANFILL, C.J.

[¶1] Following a jury trial, Steven Edwards was convicted of eighteen

counts of possession of sexually explicit material (Class C), 17-A M.R.S.

§ 284(1)(C) (2024).1 Edwards appeals from the judgment (Somerset County,

Mullen, C.J.). Edwards challenges the court’s denials of his motion to suppress,

1 17-A M.R.S. § 284(1)(C) (2024) provides that:

A person is guilty of possession of sexually explicit material if that person: . . .
[i]ntentionally or knowingly . . . possesses or accesses with intent to view any . . .
computer data file . . . or any other mechanically, electronically or chemically
reproduced visual image or material that the person knows or should know depicts
another person engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and:

(1) The other person has not in fact attained 12 years of age; or

(2) The person knows or has reason to know that the other person has not
attained 12 years of age.
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motion for judgment of acquittal, motions for a mistrial, and motion for a new

trial. We find no error and affirm his conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] On January 6, 2021, Edwards entered a plea of not guilty to an

indictment charging him with nine counts of possession of sexually explicit

material (Class C) under 17-A M.R.S. § 284(1)(C). The State later filed a

superseding indictment that included nine additional counts of possession of

sexually explicit material (Class C), to which he also pleaded not guilty. All

charges were based on images found, upon execution of a search warrant, on

computers in Edwards’ possession.

[¶3] Edwards moved to suppress all evidence found on the computers,

arguing that there was no probable cause for the warrant because the

information in the affidavit supporting the application for the warrant was

stale. After a hearing on August 12, 2022, the court denied the motion to

suppress. The court found that the Maine State Police Computer Crimes Unit

received referrals from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children

(NCMEC) alleging that on three separate dates, January 28, January 30, and

February 26, 2019, potential child exploitation material had been uploaded
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from an IP address2 associated with a property in Mercer, Maine, later

identified to belong to Edwards. Based on these tips from NCMEC, a Computer

Crimes Unit detective presented a request for a search warrant to the court on

August 8, 2019. The search warrant was signed by the court on the same day

and executed the next day. The affidavit presented in support of the application

included the Computer Crimes Unit detective’s opinion that consumers of child

pornography often keep images or evidence of images for significant periods of

time and that even if such images are deleted, there is often evidence on the

computer demonstrating that a consumer accessed the images. The affidavit

also outlined the investigation undertaken between receipt of the tips and the

request for a warrant, including the investigation’s findings concerning the

physical location of the IP address, that Edwards resided at the house at that

location, that Edwards has an interest in child pornography, and that he had

previous convictions while in the military for possession of child pornography

and other sexual misconduct charges.

[¶4] The court held a jury trial on March 14-16, 2023. At the trial, the court

heard testimony from the detective with the Computer Crimes Unit, a special

2 According to the affidavit, the IP address “is a unique numerical label assigned to each device . . .

participating in a computer network that uses the Internet Protocol for communication. . . . Every
machine that is on the internet has an IP number. Every location has a unique IP number.”
4

agent from Homeland Security Investigations who had examined Edwards’s

computers, and a computer forensics expert for the defense. The Computer

Crimes Unit detective testified that Edwards told her he had been searching for

adult pornography and that sexually explicit images came up that were

“embarrassing, young, and really bad.” Edwards also told her he “does not look

for child pornography but that there is a gray area where a little girl can look

older and an older girl can look younger.” The special agent testified that he

found in unallocated space on Edwards’s computers multiple internet search

terms that are used to search for sexually explicit images of minors. The special

agent explained that unallocated space on a hard drive is where a file is stored

when the “data is no longer needed. It’s been marked for deletion, but it’s not

yet overwritten, so it’s still resident in the spot it was in.” He also located

eighteen thumbnail images3 in unallocated space on Edwards’s computers. The

court admitted in evidence the images, the evidence log from the search of

Edwards’s house, and a photograph of Edwards’s house.

[¶5] After the State rested, Edwards moved for a judgment of acquittal,

arguing that the State had not presented evidence sufficient to support a finding

The agent testified that thumbnail images are “small pixelated images that as you zoom in on
3

them, they get more gradient” or the “pictures that are on [a website’s] landing page.”
5

that Edwards possessed the images, that he accessed the images on eighteen

separate occasions, or that the images depicted persons under the age of

twelve. The court denied the motion. After the defense rested, Edwards

renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal; it was again denied.

[¶6] During the State’s rebuttal closing argument, purportedly referring

to the defense’s comments about the adult and “barely legal” pornography

found on Edwards’s computers, the prosecutor stated, “Can you not tell the

difference between an adult and a child? That is what this case is about. It’s not

the however many he possessed that we didn’t charge him with.” Edwards

immediately objected and requested a mistrial. The court denied the motion

for a mistrial but issued a curative instruction reminding the jury that closing

arguments are not evidence and the jury should decide the case based solely on

the evidence and the charges presented. After giving the curative instruction,

the court also asked the jury if anyone would have a problem focusing only on

the eighteen counts before them; the jurors indicated they would not.

[¶7] After having indicated to the court at the beginning of the day that

he had no objections to the jury instructions, Edwards then stated, during the

recess just prior to the court instructing the jury, that he did have a concern

about the instructions. The court stated that it would give the previously
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agreed-upon instructions and that Edwards could object when they were given.

The court also indicated further concern about the State’s statement during

rebuttal. Edwards again objected to the jury instructions, but when the court

asked for clarity as to the nature of his objection, Edwards’s attorney did not

elaborate, responding, “It’s as clear as I can make it at this point, Judge.”

[¶8] The jury found Edwards guilty on all eighteen counts. After the trial,

Edwards renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal and filed motions for

a mistrial and for a new trial. After argument, the court denied all three motions

on August 9, 2023.

[¶9] The court sentenced Edwards to three years’ incarceration on

Count 1. On Count 2, Edwards was sentenced to three years, all suspended,

with six years’ probation, to be served consecutively to Count 1. On Count 3,

the court sentenced Edwards to three years, all suspended, with six years’

probation, to be served consecutively to Count 2. On Count 4, he was sentenced

to three years of incarceration, all suspended, with six years of probation, to be

served consecutively to Count 3. On Counts 5 through 18, he was sentenced to

three years’ incarceration, all suspended, with six years’ probation, to be served

concurrently with Count 4 and with each other.
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[¶10] Edwards timely appealed from the judgment of conviction and

from the denial of his motions. See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2024); M.R.

App. P. 2B(b)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Suppress

[¶11] Edwards first argues that the court erred in denying his motion to

suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant because the

information that formed the basis for probable cause was stale by the time the

warrant was issued. He argues that as a result there was insufficient cause to

believe that the images would be at Edwards’s house on the date of the

application for a search warrant.

[¶12] “We review the factual findings supporting the denial of a motion

to suppress evidence for clear error and the court’s ultimate conclusions

de novo. We will uphold the denial of a motion to suppress if any reasonable

view of the evidence supports the trial court’s decision.” State v. McNaughton,

2017 ME 173, ¶ 28, 168 A.3d 807 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[¶13] “Whether probable cause still exists at the time a warrant is

requested is determined not by the mere passage of time between observation

of the evidence and application for the warrant but by the consideration of the
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unique facts and circumstances of the case at hand.” State v. Roy, 2019 ME 16,

¶ 12, 201 A.3d 609. “In child pornography cases, if there is reasonable cause to

believe that the material will be present when and where the search is to be

conducted, staleness claims have been overcome for periods longer than the

[eighty-day period] present here.” State v. Wright, 2006 ME 13, ¶ 10,

890 A.2d 703; see also Roy, 2019 ME 16, ¶ 13 & n.2, 201 A.3d 609;

United States v. Seiver, 692 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that a central

inquiry into staleness in a child pornography investigation requires “a realistic

understanding of modern computer technology and the usual behavior of its

users”). As we explained in Roy, in cases involving sexually explicit material of

minors other courts have allowed years to pass without the information relied

on for the issuance of a warrant becoming stale. Roy, 2019 ME 16, ¶ 13 & n.2,

201 A.3d 609.

[¶14] Although the period between the last tips from NCMEC in February

and the issuance of the warrant in August was longer than the periods of time

we deemed permissible in Wright and Roy, we have never set a limit on the

maximum time allowed before information leading to probable cause becomes

stale. Instead, staleness is a fact-specific inquiry based on the circumstances of

each case. Here, there was nothing affirmatively suggesting that the
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information could have been stale, such as a change in the IP address or internet

subscriber for Edwards’s street address in the intervening months. Edwards’s

documented interest in child pornography, his previous conviction for

possession of child pornography, and the multiple CyberTips received

regarding the same IP address, together with known characteristics of people

who access electronic child pornography, all combined to provide probable

cause to believe that the material would be there when the warrant was

executed.

[¶15] Given the facts of this case, we conclude that the suppression court

did not err in concluding that the information in the affidavit was not stale, in

determining that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant, or in

denying Edwards’s motion for suppression.

B. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

[¶16] Edwards next argues that the court erred in denying his motion for

judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence that he possessed

or accessed child sexual exploitative material with intent to view it.4

4Before the trial court, Edwards argued that there was insufficient evidence that the images
depicted persons under the age of twelve. Although he has abandoned that argument on appeal, we
note there is sufficient evidence that the persons depicted were under the age of twelve.
10

[¶17] “When reviewing a judgment for sufficiency of the evidence, we

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether

the fact-finder could rationally have found each element of the offense beyond

a reasonable doubt. We defer to all credibility determinations and reasonable

inferences drawn by the fact-finder, even if those inferences are contradicted

by parts of the direct evidence.” State v. Hansley, 2019 ME 35, ¶ 19,

203 A.3d 827 (quotation marks omitted). “[O]ur review does not intrude on

the jury’s role to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and

to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. ¶ 22

(quotation marks omitted).

[¶18] Edwards argues that because the images found on his computers

were thumbnails, rather than full-size images, and because they were found in

unallocated space, there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for

possessing or accessing sexually explicit material with the intent to view it.5

Edwards specifically claims that unallocated space is not accessible to the

computer user without software and that there was no evidence of that type of

In an argument related to his sufficiency argument, Edwards argues that the court erred in its
5

instructions to the jury. This argument is unpersuasive, and we do not discuss it further.
11

software on Edwards’s computers. He argues that as a result, the evidence is

insufficient to find that he “possessed” the images.

[¶19] To be found guilty of possession of digital images, an individual

must have “held, owned, or controlled the digital images in question.” State v.

Wilson, 2015 ME 148, ¶ 17, 127 A.3d 1234. In Wilson, we held that the presence

of thumbnail images found in unallocated space was sufficient to support a

conviction for possession of sexually explicit materials. Id. ¶¶ 13-19. Although

the original “videos that generated the thumbnail images may have been

deleted, . . . the thumbnail images remained.” Id. ¶ 5. In Wilson, we noted that

there was evidence, similar to the evidence here, that “when programs that

scrub or delete images after viewing are used to remove illegal videos or images

from a computer, the programs often leave thumbnail images of the videos or

images that had existed on the computer. Such thumbnail images, like those

discovered in this case, appear in the unallocated space on the computer.”

Id. ¶ 5 n.4. In short, “circumstantial evidence [was] no less conclusive than

direct evidence” that Wilson had “owned and viewed those images.” Id. ¶ 18

(quoting State v. Reed, 2013 ME 5, ¶ 13, 58 A.3d 1130).

[¶20] Here, like in Wilson, the State offered both direct and

circumstantial evidence that Edwards had held, owned, or controlled sexually
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explicit images. Edwards admitted to law enforcement that he had searched

for adult pornography, that “there is a gray area where a little girl can look older

and an older girl can look younger” in pornography, and that sexually explicit

images that were “embarrassing, young, and really bad” appeared. There were

multiple search terms found on Edwards’s computers that are frequently used

to search for sexually explicit images of minors. There were eighteen separate

sexually explicit thumbnail images of children under the age of twelve found on

his computers. The jury rationally could have found all elements of the offense

beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Beckwith, 2015 ME 72, ¶ 10,

117 A.3d 1049.

C. Motions for a Mistrial and New Trial

[¶21] Finally, Edwards argues that the court erred in denying his

motions for a mistrial and his motion for a new trial because the prosecutor’s

reference to uncharged conduct affected his substantial rights. The State

concedes that the prosecutor’s comment was improper but argues that there

was no prosecutorial bad faith or exceptionally prejudicial circumstances and

that the curative instruction was sufficient.

[¶22] “Our review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial is

highly deferential.” State v. Carillo, 2021 ME 18, ¶ 19, 248 A.3d 193. “We review
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the court’s denial of a motion for mistrial only for an abuse of the court’s

substantial discretion.” Id. When reviewing a prosecutor’s comments at issue

in a motion for a mistrial, we “must consider the totality of the circumstances,

including the severity of the misconduct, the prosecutor’s purpose in making

the statement (i.e., whether the statement was willful or inadvertent), the

weight of the evidence supporting the verdict, jury instructions, and curative

instructions.” Id. ¶ 18 (quotation marks omitted). “Because of its significant

effect on the proceedings, [a] motion for a mistrial should be denied except in .

. . rare circumstance[s], that is, only in the event of exceptionally prejudicial

circumstances or prosecutorial bad faith.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[¶23] “We review the trial court’s decision on a motion for a new trial for

an abuse of discretion and any findings underlying its decision for clear error.”

State v. Abdullahi, 2023 ME 41, ¶ 41, 298 A.3d 815 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶24] “On appeal, even if a claim is preserved and error was committed,

that error does not warrant relief unless it affect[s] substantial rights.” State v.

White, 2022 ME 54, ¶ 30, 285 A.3d 262 (quotation marks omitted). “A remedial

measure less drastic than ordering a mistrial, such as a curative instruction,

may be sufficient to preserve a fair trial for the defendant.” State v. Hinds,

485 A.2d 231, 237 (Me. 1984).
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[¶25] As discussed above, the Computer Crimes Unit detective testified

that when discussing the search warrant, Edwards admitted to searching for

pornography and that “embarrassing, young, and really bad” stuff came up.

Edwards additionally told her that “he does not look for child pornography but

that here is a gray area where a little girl can look older and an older girl can

look younger.” In his closing argument, Edwards’s counsel discussed the adult

pornography and the searches for “barely legal pornography” and emphasized

that those were legal and that the sexually explicit material may have gotten

onto the computers through those searches. In response, during rebuttal, the

prosecutor stated, “Can you not tell the difference between an adult and a child?

That is what this case is about. It’s not the however many he possessed that we

didn’t charge him with.”

[¶26] The State has conceded error. Although purportedly referring to

the “barely legal” and adult pornography that Edwards’s attorney discussed in

his closing, the prosecutor’s statements could have been understood to be

referring to other images depicting sexually explicit material of minors that the

State did not charge Edwards with, of which no evidence had been presented.

A discussion of uncharged conduct not admitted into evidence constitutes

error.
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[¶27] Nonetheless, we must determine “whether the trial court’s

response remedied any prejudice resulting from the [error].” State v. Tripp,

2024 ME 12, ¶ 27, 314 A.3d 101 (quotation marks omitted).

We will generally defer to the determination of a presiding Justice,
who has the immediate feel of what is transpiring, that a curative
instruction will adequately protect against the jury giving
consideration to matters which have been heard but have been
stricken as evidence. Any concern created by improper statements
made by a prosecutor is likely to be cured by a prompt and
appropriate curative instruction, especially when such an
instruction is specifically addressed to the prosecutor’s [error].
Therefore, a curative instruction will only be deemed inadequate
to eliminate prejudice where there are exceptionally prejudicial
circumstances or prosecutorial bad faith.

Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also State v. Daluz,

2016 ME 102, ¶ 45, 143 A.3d 800 (“[T]rial courts possess a greater ability to

perceive the fairness of trial proceedings than can a reviewing court on

appeal.”). “[T]rials are inherently imperfect and unintended errors inevitably

occur.” State v. Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 28, 28 A.3d 1147. We “must presume

that the jury heeds the [trial] court’s instruction[s].” State v. Scott,

2019 ME 105, ¶ 23, 211 A.3d 205 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶28] Here, although the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument was concededly

inappropriate, there was no exceptionally prejudicial circumstance or

prosecutorial bad faith. The prosecutor was apparently responding to the
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defense argument, albeit imprecisely. The court immediately issued a specific

curative instruction that stated that closing arguments are not evidence and

that the jury was to consider solely the evidence that was presented. This

instruction was specific to the error and was sufficient to correct the error and

eliminate any resulting prejudice. To ensure the curative instruction was

sufficient, the court additionally asked the jurors if anyone would be unable to

follow the curative instruction, and the jurors all answered that they could. The

trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Edwards’s motions for

a mistrial and for a new trial based on prosecutorial error.

[¶29] Because the court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying any

of Edwards’s motions, we affirm the conviction.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Peter J. Cyr, Esq. (orally), The Law Offices of Peter J. Cyr, Esq., Portland, for
appellant Steven Edwards

Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Paul Cavanaugh, Asst. Dist. Atty.
(orally), Office of the District Attorney, Skowhegan, for appellee State of Maine

Somerset County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2020-648
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY