Bateman, Susan v. Bateman

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule
of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule
1-104(a)(2)(B).
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 160293FL
UNREPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND*
No. 1371
September Term, 2025
SUSAN BATEMAN
v.
JEFFREY AUSTIN BATEMAN
Ripken,
Kehoe, S.,
Wright, Alexander, Jr.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Wright, J.
Filed: October 13, 2026

‒Unreported Opinion‒
Susan Bateman (“Wife”) and Jeffrey Bateman (“Husband”) were divorced by way
of judgment entered in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. As part of that judgment,
Husband was ordered to pay alimony to Wife. Sometime later, Husband filed a motion to
modify alimony, and Wife filed a petition for contempt and request for attorneys’ fees.
Following a hearing, the court granted Husband’s motion and ordered that his alimony
obligation be reduced. In addition, the court granted Wife’s petition for contempt, but the
court refused Wife’s request for attorneys’ fees. Wife appealed.
In this appeal, Wife presents two questions for our review. For clarity, we have
rephrased those questions as 1 :
1. 	Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in granting Husband’s motion
to modify alimony?
2. 	Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in denying Wife’s request for
attorneys’ fees?
Finding no error or abuse of discretion, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In April 2023, Husband and Wife were divorced by way of a judgment entered in
the circuit court. Incorporated into that judgment was a Marital Settlement Agreement
1 Wife phrased the questions as:
1. 	Did the trial court err when it granted [Husband’s] motion to modify
alimony without considering all the factors required by Md. Ann. Code,
Family L. Art. § 11-106(b), including not considering [Wife’s] expenses?
2. 	Did the trial court err when it denied [Wife’s] request for attorneys’ fees
where it found [Husband] in contempt for failing to pay $40,824.00 in
alimony despite having $100,000.00 in his bank account at all times?

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2
(“MSA”) in which Husband agreed to pay Wife $4,000.00 per month in indefinite alimony.
The parties also agreed to sell their jointly-owned beach house and split the proceeds.
Motion to Terminate and/or Reduce Alimony
In October 2023, Husband filed a motion to terminate alimony or, in the alternative,
to reduce alimony. Husband alleged that he had recently lost his job and that, at age sixty-
eight, he would have difficulty finding comparable employment. Husband also alleged that,
at the time of the divorce, Wife was unemployed and “working on recovery for her
alcoholism.” Husband alleged that, since that time, Wife’s health had improved, and she
was now working. Husband argued that, under the circumstances, his alimony obligation
should be eliminated or, in the alternative, reduced. Wife opposed Husband’s request.
Petition for Contempt
In April 2024, Wife filed a petition for contempt. Wife alleged that, in September
2023, Husband stopped paying the agreed-upon alimony amount. Wife alleged that
Husband owed $22,000.00 in unpaid alimony. Wife asked that Husband be found in
contempt and that he be ordered to pay all unpaid alimony. Wife also asked that Husband
be ordered to pay Wife’s attorneys’ fees.
Merits Hearing
In July 2024, a two-day merits hearing was held on Husband’s motion to terminate
and/or reduce alimony and Wife’s petition for contempt. At that hearing, the parties
presented copious testimonial and documentary evidence.
According to that evidence, Husband, who was sixty-eight years old at the time of
trial, had been gainfully employed earning over $300,000.00 per year when the parties were

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3
divorced in April 2023. In June 2023, Husband’s employer informed him that his
employment would be terminated effective October 1, 2023. In September 2023, Husband
ceased paying the agreed-upon $4,000.00 in alimony to Wife. In April 2024, Husband got
a new job earning a yearly salary of $175,000.00 that, with commissions, could grow to
$225,000.00 to $250,000.00 per year. Despite regaining employment, Husband did not
resume paying alimony. At the time of trial, Husband’s monthly salary was, after taxes,
approximately $11,000.00, while his monthly expenses totaled approximately $13,000.00.
Around the time that Husband lost his job in 2023, the parties sold their beach house
and split the proceeds, per the terms of the MSA. Husband received approximately
$300,000.00 from the sale, while Wife received approximately $347,000.00. Wife’s
proceeds exceeded Husband’s due in large part to the fact that Husband owed Wife
$30,000.00 in pendente lite alimony. The parties had agreed that Husband’s pendente lite
arrears would be paid in full from the proceeds of the sale of the beach house.
Just prior to losing his job in 2023, Husband purchased a home in Delaware with
his new wife. The purchase price was $662,171.00, and Husband used a portion of the
proceeds from the sale of the parties’ beach house as a down payment. The remaining
balance, approximately $525,000.00, was financed via a mortgage. Husband’s assets also
included a bank account containing approximately $100,000.00 and a vehicle that was
valued at $25,000.00.
Wife, who was sixty-six years old at the time of trial, had a long history of
alcoholism that included intermittent periods of sobriety and relapses. In 2022, the year
prior to the divorce, Wife received no income. At some point in 2023, Wife obtained

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4
employment and earned over $9,000.00 in income that year. In 2024, at the time of trial,
Wife reported that she was employed part-time at Seniors Helping Seniors and was
“[w]orking all hours provided.” According to her financial statement, Wife earned, after
taxes, $1,368.00 per month from her employer, and she received $114.00 per month in
additional income from her pension. Wife’s monthly expenses totaled approximately
$7,000.00. Wife’s assets included the proceeds from the sale of the parties’ beach house,
which, at the time of trial, totaled approximately $250,000.00. After Husband stopped
paying alimony, Wife withdrew $36,000.00 of that money for various expenses.
Trial Court’s Order
Following the merits hearing, the trial court entered an order granting Husband’s
motion to modify alimony and ordering that Husband’s monthly obligation be reduced
from $4,000.00 to $2,240.00. In addition, the court granted Wife’s contempt petition, found
Husband in contempt, and ordered Husband to pay to Wife $40,974.00 in arrears. The court
denied Wife’s request for attorneys’ fees.
En Banc Appeal
In August 2024, Wife filed a notice of en banc review in the circuit court. Wife’s
contentions in that appeal were: 1) that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
finding a material change in circumstances to warrant reducing Husband’s alimony; 2) that
the trial court erred and abused its discretion in granting Husband’s motion without
considering the factors set forth in § 11-106(b) of the Family Law Article (“FL”) of the
Maryland Code; and 3) that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in denying Wife’s
request for attorneys’ fees.

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5
Ultimately, the en banc court disagreed with Wife’s first contention and found that
the trial court had not erred or abused its discretion in finding a material change in
circumstances. As to Wife’s second contention, the en banc court agreed that, pursuant to
FL § 11-107, the trial court was required to consider certain enumerated factors when
determining whether to modify alimony and, if so, in what amount. The en banc court
concluded, however, that it was unable to determine if the trial court had erred or abused
its discretion because the record was silent as to whether the trial court had considered the
statutory factors.
Accordingly, the en banc court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case
so that the trial court could, based on the evidence presented at the two-day merits hearing,
properly consider the statutory factors and explain on the record how those factors
contributed to the trial court’s decision. The en banc court further stated that the trial court
could, but was not required to, revisit its decision concerning attorneys’ fees.
Trial Court’s Order Following Remand
In June 2025, the trial court held a new hearing in light of the en banc court’s remand
instructions. At that hearing, the trial court heard argument from both parties regarding the
relevant statutory factors. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered a new order
on Husband’s motion to terminate and/or reduce alimony and Wife’s petition for contempt
and request for attorneys’ fees.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
6
A. Alimony
In its order, the trial court first addressed Husband’s request to terminate and/or
reduce alimony. In so doing, the court expressly identified and addressed each of the factors
set forth in FL § 11-106(b). As the court recognized, those factors are:
(1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-
supporting;
(2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient
education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment;
(3) the standard of living that the parties established during their marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-
being of the family;
(6) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(7) the age of each party;
(8) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(9) the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet that party’s
needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony;
(10) any agreement between the parties;
(11) the financial needs and financial resources of each party, including:
(i) all income and assets, including property that does not produce
income;
(ii) any award made under §§ 8-205 and 8-208 of this article;
(iii) the nature and amount of the financial obligations of each party;
and
(iv) the right of each party to receive retirement benefits; and

‒Unreported Opinion‒
7
(12) whether the award would cause a spouse who is a resident of a related
institution as defined in § 19-301 of the Health-General Article and from
whom alimony is sought to become eligible for medical assistance earlier
than would otherwise occur.
FL § 11-106(b).
Regarding Wife’s ability to be wholly or partially self-supporting, the court found
that Wife “ha[d] been working at a home health care for elderly patients” and that she
“stated that she could work more hours if needed.” The court concluded that Wife
“appear[ed] to be partially self-supporting.”
Regarding the time Wife needed to gain sufficient education and training to find
suitable employment, the court found that Wife was already employed and had “no
intention of changing jobs or getting additional training.” The court concluded that “[n]o
further time is needed.”
Regarding the factors related to the parties’ marriage, the court noted that the parties,
who were married from 1981 to 2023, did not present any evidence of their standard of
living during the marriage. The court also noted that there were “no facts to determine the
contributions of each party to the well-being of the family or the circumstances that led to
the estrangement of the parties.”
Regarding each party’s age and physical and mental condition, the court noted that
Wife and Husband were sixty-six years old and sixty-eight years old, respectively. The
court found that, although Wife had “a long history of alcoholism and emotional
dysregulation[,]” she “seem[ed] to be in better physical and emotional condition.” The

‒Unreported Opinion‒
8
court found that there was “no evidence to show [that Husband] has any impairment in his
physical and mental condition.”
Regarding any agreements between the parties, the court noted that the parties had
executed the MSA at the time of the divorce. The court noted that, per the MSA, Husband
had agreed to pay Wife $4,000.00 per month in indefinite alimony.
Regarding each party’s financial needs and resources, the court noted that, one of
the ways to assess that factor is to look at “all the income and assets, including property
that does not produce income.” The court found that both parties received significant funds
following the sale of the beach house. The court noted that Husband owned a car valued at
$25,000.00 and that Wife had $78,000.00 in cash prior to the execution of the MSA. The
court also noted that Husband’s monthly expenses exceeded his monthly income by
approximately $2,000.00, while Wife received supplemental income from her pension.
Based on those findings, the court granted Husband’s motion and ordered that
Husband’s monthly alimony obligation be reduced from $4,000.00 to $2,240.00. The court
found that, as of July 2024, Husband’s alimony arrears totaled $40,974.00.
B. Contempt and Attorneys’ Fees
As to Wife’s petition for contempt, the court granted the petition and found Husband
in contempt for failing to pay his alimony obligation, as set forth in the MSA. The court
ordered Husband to pay Wife $10,000.00 immediately and an additional $500.00 per
month until the alimony arrearage was paid off.
The court declined, however, Wife’s request for attorneys’ fees. In so doing, the
court took note of each party’s financial needs and resources, which the court had

‒Unreported Opinion‒
9
previously outlined in its analysis of the alimony factors. The court also noted that there
were “no facts to demonstrate that the litigation before the [c]ourt was brought upon an
unjustifiable reason” or “that either party proceeded in bad faith.” The court determined,
therefore, that “both parties shall pay each of their attorney’s fees individually without the
help of the other party.”
This timely appeal followed. Additional facts will be supplied as needed below.
DISCUSSION
I.
Parties’ Contentions
Wife first contends that the trial court erred in granting Husband’s motion to modify
alimony. Wife contends that the court failed to engage in a thorough examination of the
requisite statutory factors. Specifically, Wife argues that the court never discussed her
expenses or needs; that the court failed to acknowledge her dwindling assets; that the court
ignored Husband’s various assets and “affluent lifestyle”; and that the court did not explain
how the reduced alimony amount was sufficient to meet her needs. Wife contends that “a
careful analysis of the alimony factors, which the trial court failed to do for the second
time, graphically demonstrates that [Wife] needs the agreed upon $4,000.00 per month in
indefinite alimony and [Husband] had and has the ability to pay said amount.”
Husband argues that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in granting his
motion to modify alimony. Husband contends that the record demonstrates that the court
carefully considered the requisite factors and made a reasonable decision based on those
factors.

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10
Standard of Review
When reviewing an alimony award, we assess whether “‘the trial court abused its
discretion or rendered a judgment that is clearly wrong.’” Goicochea v. Goicochea, 256
Md. App. 329, 357 (2022) (cleaned up) (quoting Brewer v. Brewer, 156 Md. App. 77, 98
(2004)). In so doing, “[w]e ‘accord great deference to the findings and judgments of [the
trial court.]’” Id. (quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 385 (1992)). “We will disturb a
trial court’s ruling only when ‘no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the
trial court,’ or when ‘the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences
before the court[.]’” Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Reynolds, 216 Md. App. 205, 219 (2014)).
Analysis
Under FL § 11-107(b), a court may, upon petition of either party, “modify the
amount of alimony awarded as circumstances and justice require.” 2 “‘A party requesting
modification of an alimony award must demonstrate through evidence presented to the trial
court that the facts and circumstances of the case justify the court exercising its discretion
to grant the requested modification.’” Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 171 Md. App. 373, 384
(2006) (quoting Langston v. Langston, 366 Md. 490, 516 (2001)). “In considering a petition
for modification, a trial court has discretion to determine the extent and amount of
alimony[.]” Baer v. Baer, 128 Md. App. 469, 484 (1999). Before ordering a modification,
2 A court’s power to modify alimony is subject to FL § 8-103, which prohibits
modification of any provision of a deed, agreement, or settlement regarding alimony if the
deed, 	agreement, 	or 	settlement 	includes 	a 	provision 	that 	specifically 	prohibits 	a
modification of alimony. FL § 11-107(b); see also FL § 8-103(c). No such provision was
included in the agreement in the instant case.

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11
however, the court must consider the factors set forth in FL § 11-106(b). Id. “Although no
formal checklist is required, the trial court must demonstrate that it has considered all
necessary factors.” Goicochea, 256 Md. App. at 358.
We hold that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in modifying
Husband’s alimony obligation. First, the record clearly demonstrates that the court
considered all of the factors set forth in FL § 11-106(b) prior to making its decision. In its
written order modifying Husband’s alimony obligation, the court expressly recognized
each factor and discussed the relevance of each factor in light of the evidence presented.
Thus, Wife’s claim that the court failed to consider the requisite factors is belied by the
record.
To be sure, the court, in addressing the various factors, did not discuss all of the
evidence presented at trial regarding each factor. Nevertheless, the court’s failure to
expressly acknowledge certain evidence does not mean that the court did not consider that
evidence. See Smith-Myers Corp. v. Sherill, 209 Md. App. 494, 504 (2013) (“The trial
judge need not articulate each item or piece of evidence she or he has considered in
reaching a decision.” (cleaned up)). Furthermore, a court, in considering the FL § 11-106(b)
factors, “‘need not use formulaic language or articulate every reason for its decision with
respect to each factor. Rather, the court must clearly indicate that it has considered all the
factors.’” Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 416 (2003) (cleaned up) (quoting Digges
v. Digges, 126 Md. App. 361, 387 (1999)). Here, the record shows that the court did
consider all of the factors.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
12
As to the court’s ultimate decision to reduce Husband’s monthly alimony obligation
from $4,000.00 to $2,240.00, we are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion or
rendered a judgment that was clearly wrong. The evidence established that, when the MSA
was 	incorporated 	into 	the 	divorce 	judgment 	in 	April 	2023, 	Husband 	was 	earning
approximately $25,000.00 per month. Shortly thereafter, Husband’s employment was
terminated, and, in April 2024, Husband started a new job earning approximately
$15,000.00 per month. Although Husband testified that his salary at his new job could
increase in the future, there was no evidence that Husband’s current salary would be
commensurate with the salary he was earning at his previous job. Either way, the fact
remains that Husband, who was nearly seventy years old at the time of trial, was earning
significantly less money than he was earning when the MSA was entered. See Campitelli
v. Johnston, 134 Md. App. 689, 699 (2000) (“A substantial change in one party’s financial
circumstances can, under appropriate circumstances, be legally sufficient to justify a
change in spousal support.”).
The evidence also showed that Wife’s circumstances had improved by the time of
trial. In 2022, just prior to the MSA being entered, Wife earned no income and had been
dealing with a long history of alcoholism. By trial, Wife’s physical and emotional condition
had improved, and she had obtained a job working with seniors, where she netted nearly
$1,400.00 per month. On top of that, Wife received an additional $114.00 per month from
her pension plan. Wife had, therefore, become at least partially self-supporting following
entry of the MSA, and her new-found income of over $1,500.00 per month was almost
enough to offset the reduction in Husband’s alimony obligation.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
13
In addition, Wife had received over $300,000.00 from the sale of the parties’ beach
house following entry of the MSA, and the evidence established that those funds had
remained largely intact by the time of trial. Although Wife claimed that those funds had
been partially depleted leading up to trial, she also claimed that the primary reason for that
depletion was that she had to use $36,000.00 of those funds to pay for her expenses after
Husband stopped paying alimony in September 2023. Given that the court ordered
Husband to pay over $40,000.00 in arrearages to Wife, Wife should be able to recoup most,
if not all, of those depleted funds. Under the circumstances, the court’s decision to reduce
Husband’s alimony obligation was not unreasonable or otherwise against the logic and
effect of facts and inferences before the court.
Finally, we are not persuaded by Wife’s insistence that “a careful analysis of the
alimony factors … graphically demonstrates that [she] needs the agreed upon $4,000.00
per month in indefinite alimony and [Husband] had and has the ability to pay said amount.”
In making that claim, Wife is essentially asking us to reweigh the evidence, which is not
our role. Qun Lin v. Cruz, 247 Md. App. 606, 628-29 (2020). Rather, our role is to
determine whether the court abused its discretion or rendered a judgment that was clearly
wrong. Based on the record before us, we find no error or abuse of discretion that would
warrant reversal.
II.
Parties’ Contentions
Wife next contends that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in refusing her
request for attorneys’ fees. Wife argues that, while the court correctly found Husband in

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14
contempt for failing to pay his alimony obligation, “the [c]ourt gave [Husband] a ‘pass’ on
his contemptuous behavior by denying [Wife] an award of attorneys’ fees.” Wife contends
that Husband had “a history of ignoring [c]ourt [o]rders and grossly underpaying support”
and that “[i]t was graphically evident that [Wife] was forced to incur attorneys’ fees of
$11,531.25 . . . solely because [Husband] violated the [j]udgment of [a]bsolute [d]ivorce.”
Wife also argues that the court “failed to consider [her] financial needs and resources when
it considered [her request for] attorneys’ fees and ignored the fact that [Husband] had over
$100,000.00 in the bank at the time of trial.”
Husband contends that the court did not err in denying Wife’s request. Husband
argues that the court correctly ordered the parties to pay their own attorneys’ fees.
Standard of Review
“The standard of review for the award of counsel fees and costs in a domestic case
is that of whether the trial judge abused his discretion in making or denying the award.”
Steinhoff v. Sommerfelt, 144 Md. App. 463, 487 (2002). A trial court “is vested with wide
discretion in deciding whether to award counsel fees and, if so, in what amount.” Malin,
153 Md. App. at 435-36 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[W]e will not disturb an
award unless the exercise of discretion was arbitrary or the judgment was clearly wrong.”
Id. at 436.
Analysis
In a proceeding involving the modification or enforcement of an award of alimony,
“the court may order either party to pay to the other party an amount for the reasonable and
necessary expense of prosecuting or defending the proceeding.” FL § 11-110(b). “Before

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15
ordering payment, the court shall consider: (1) the financial resources and financial needs
of both parties; and (2) whether there was substantial justification for prosecuting or
defending the proceeding.” FL § 11-110(c).
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wife’s request
for attorneys’ fees. First, the court did not have to consider each party’s resources and needs
before denying Wife’s request. As the plain language of FL § 11-110(c) makes clear, a
court must consider the financial resources and financial needs of both parties before
ordering the payment of expenses. The statute does not require a court to consider that
factor when denying an award of expenses. Nevertheless, the record does not support
Wife’s claim that the court failed to consider the parties’ needs and resources. In its written
order, the court expressly referenced its prior discussion of the various alimony factors,
which included a discussion of the parties’ needs and resources, prior to denying Wife’s
request for attorneys’ fees.
As to the merits of the decision itself, the record provides ample evidence to support
the court’s denial of Wife’s request. At the time of the request, Wife earned approximately
$1,500.00 per month in income, and she was set to receive, based on the court’s order,
$2,240.00 per month in regular alimony and an additional $500.00 per month toward
Husband’s arrears. Wife also had approximately $250,000.00 in additional funds at her
disposal. It was not unreasonable, therefore, for the court to make Wife pay her own
attorneys’ fees. Those fees, though not insignificant, were not excessive in light of Wife’s
resources.

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16
Furthermore, although Wife claims that her attorneys’ fees were incurred solely as
a result of Husband’s failure to pay alimony, the record shows that a portion of those fees
were for other matters, including defending against Husband’s motion to modify alimony,
which the court ultimately granted. And, even though the court did find Husband in
contempt for failing to pay his alimony obligation, the court also found that there was no
evidence that Husband was litigating in bad faith or for an unjustifiable reason. Under the
circumstances, the court acted within its discretion in ordering each party to pay his or her
own attorneys’ fees.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR 	MONTGOMERY 	COUNTY
AFFIRMED; 	COSTS 	TO 	BE 	PAID 	BY
APPELLANT.