In the Matter of Jones-Daniel, Marquiete Airen-Iman, et al. v.

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule
of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to
Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No.: C-16-CV-24-003916
UNREPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND*
No. 1435
September Term, 2025
______________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF MARQUIETE AIREN-
IMAN JONES-DANIEL AND BISHOP
KHALIL-AISHON JONES-DANIEL
______________________________________
Ripken,
Kehoe, S.,
Wright, Alexander, Jr.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wright, J.
______________________________________
Filed: October 9, 2026

‒Unreported Opinion‒
This case concerns the disposition of the remains of two siblings who died at a
tragically young age: Marquiete Airen-Iman Jones-Daniel and Bishop Khalil-Aishon
Jones-Daniel. 1 The appeal arises from a judgment entered in the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County, ordering Bishop’s cremated remains be split equally between Appellant
LaTanya Jones and Appellee Herman Daniel, and for Ms. Jones to share Marquiete’s
cremated remains with Mr. Daniel if Ms. Jones has the remains in her possession. Ms.
Jones presents two questions for our review, which we have rephrased for clarity as
follows 2 :
1. 	Did the circuit court properly order Bishop’s remains be divided equally between
Ms. Jones and Mr. Daniel, consistent with an existing, valid contract, when Ms.
Jones is Bishop’s biological mother and Mr. Daniel was decreed to be Bishop’s
father in a judicial Order of Paternity?
2. 	Did the circuit court err in issuing a conditional order regarding the disposition
of Marquiete’s already-disbursed remains, in contradiction to a valid contract
specifying otherwise?
We answer both questions in the affirmative and therefore affirm in part and vacate
in part.
1 Throughout this opinion, we will refer to the siblings by their first names to avoid
confusion and mean no disrespect to the decedents.
2 Ms. Jones phrased the issues as:
1. 	Whether the circuit court erred by ordering that the remains of Bishop
Khalil-Aishon Jones-Daniel be divided equally between Ms. Jones and
Mr. Daniel when Ms. Jones is Bishop’s mother and Mr. Daniel is not
Bishop’s biological or adoptive father.
2. 	Whether the circuit court erred by issuing a conditional order regarding
Marquiete’s remains that is unenforceable and has no legal effect.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
2
BACKGROUND
Ms. Jones and Mr. Daniel are the biological parents of Marquiete, born September
3, 1994, and Ms. Jones is the biological mother of Bishop, born July 14, 1995. Ms. Jones
and Mr. Daniel were never married, and Mr. Daniel did not legally adopt Bishop. At the
time of Bishop’s birth, Ms. Jones and Mr. Daniel were in a relationship, and at all times
following Bishop’s birth, Mr. Daniel held himself out to be Bishop’s father. During the
course of child support enforcement proceedings, in 2000, genetic testing showed
definitively that Mr. Daniel was not the biological father of Bishop. Nevertheless, Mr.
Daniel signed an Affidavit of Paternity, and on July 18, 2000, the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County entered an Order of Paternity declaring that “the Defendant, Herman
Daniel, is the father of the child(ren) Marquiete A. Jones-Daniel [and] Bishop Jones-
Daniel[.]”
Tragically, both Marquiete and Bishop died in 2022 and 2024, respectively, both
aged twenty-eight. Following Marquiete’s death, her cremated remains were released to
Ms. Jones pursuant to a document submitted to March Life Tribute Center (where services
for the decedents were held and their remains cremated) and signed by both parents
dictating as such. Following Bishop’s death, the parties likewise executed an agreement
submitted to March Life Tribute Center, this one specifying that the decedent’s cremated
remains be split between the parties, both of whom were listed as “parents.” From here, the
parties dispute the facts.
According to Ms. Jones, she scattered a portion of Marquiete’s remains in North
Carolina just prior to Bishop’s death and gifted the other portion to Bishop. Mr. Daniel

‒Unreported Opinion‒
3
asserts that Ms. Jones’s account is deliberately false, that she described having Marquiete’s
ashes in an urn in her possession following Bishop’s death, and that Bishop would have
told Mr. Daniel if Bishop had a portion of Marquiete’s ashes in his possession, which he
did not.
Ms. Jones also asserts (as does March Life Tribute Center) that Mr. Daniel claimed
he was entitled to, and attempted to receive, all of Bishop’s remains following Bishop’s
service and cremation. Mr. Jones denies that he made any such claim or demand. March
Life Tribute Center subsequently refused to release Bishop’s remains to anyone until the
dispute was resolved.
On August 22, 2024, Mr. Daniel filed a petition asking the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County to issue an order directing the disposition of both Marquiete’s and
Bishop’s remains to be split equally between the parties. The following day, Ms. Jones
similarly filed a petition asking the circuit court to issue an order directing the disposition
of the entirety of Bishop’s remains to Ms. Jones. On December 2, 2024, the court
consolidated the petitions. On March 17, 2025, Ms. Jones filed a motion for summary
judgment, which the court denied after a hearing on April 22, 2025.
On May 29, 2025, the circuit court held a one-day trial and ruled from the bench
that each party was entitled to half of Bishop’s remains. With regard to Marquiete’s
remains, the court said that it “d[id] not believe that the remains are not existent. . . . But
there is no information the [c]ourt has as to where they are[.]” The court then said that Ms.
Jones must give Mr. Daniel half of Marquiete’s remains, “if [Ms. Jones] has the cremains
or knows where the cremains are.” The court also said that Ms. Jones was “both judicially

‒Unreported Opinion‒
4
and equitably estopped from asserting that Mr. Daniel is not the father of Bishop. Number
one, through the child support case. But number two, in terms of signing contracts with the
funeral home[.]” On August 8, 2025, the circuit court memorialized its ruling in a written
order. On September 5, 2025, Ms. Jones appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case requires this Court to interpret both Maryland statute and caselaw. As
such, our review is de novo. See, e.g., Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Thornton
Mellon, LLC, 478 Md. 396, 410 (2022) (“Where an order involves an interpretation and
application of Maryland constitutional, statutory or case law, our Court must determine
whether the trial court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of
review.” (quoting Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 (2006))).
With regard to statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court of Maryland has made
clear that the primary purpose of such an endeavor is “to ascertain and effectuate the
General Assembly’s purpose and intent when it enacted the statute.” Wheeling v. Selene
Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356, 376 (2021) (citing 75-80 Props., L.L.C. v. Rale, Inc., 470 Md. 598,
623 (2020)). To that end, this Court must first look to the plain language of the statute,
ensuring that “no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous,
meaningless or nugatory.” Id. (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 25-26
(2013)). Additionally, this Court must consider the context of the language: “We . . . do
not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a
statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone. Rather, the plain language must be
viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs[.]” Id. at 377 (quoting

‒Unreported Opinion‒
5
Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275-76 (2010)). Furthermore, this Court shall “presume
that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and
harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a
statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope.” Id. (quoting
Lockshin, 412 Md. at 276). If the plain meaning makes the General Assembly’s intent clear,
the inquiry ends there. Id.
It is only where the words of the statute are ambiguous—that is, “subject to more
than one reasonable interpretation”—that we look beyond the statute’s plain language and
consider other indicia of the General Assembly’s intent, such as “the structure of the
statute, how it relates to other laws, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and
legal effect of various competing constructions.” Id. (quoting Lockshin, 412 Md. at 276).
Finally, “[i]n every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that
is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.” Id. (quoting Lockshin, 412 Md.
at 276).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Mr. Daniel was declared Bishop’s father in a final court order, which gave
him both parental rights and responsibilities, and the circuit court rightly
granted Mr. Daniel half of the decedent’s remains, consistent with the valid
contract that is in place.
Relevant Law
The starting point for the dispute at hand is found in the Health-General Article of
the Maryland Code, specifically § 5-509, which, among other things, lists and ranks
authorizing agents who may decide the disposition of a deceased person’s remains when

‒Unreported Opinion‒
6
that individual dies without a valid document specifying their wishes. Md. Code Ann.,
Health-Gen. (“HG”) § 5-509. The statutory provision states, in relevant part:
(c) The following persons, in the order of priority stated, have the right to
serve as the authorizing agent for a decedent:
***
(2) Unless a person has knowledge that contrary directions have been
given by the decedent, if a decedent has not executed a document
under subsection (a) of this section:
(i) The surviving spouse or domestic partner of the decedent;
(ii) An adult child of the decedent;
(iii) A parent of the decedent . . . .
HG § 5-509(c)(2). Here, it is undisputed that Bishop: died without a document specifying
what should happen with his remains in the event of his death; was unmarried and did not
have a domestic partner; and does not have any adult children. What is in dispute is the
definition of “parent” for the purposes of deciding who may act as an authorizing agent in
the case at hand.
Neither “parent,” “mother,” nor “father” are defined in Title 5 of the Health-General
Article. However, all terms are defined in other titles of the same article.
“Parent” is defined in Title 18 (which pertains to consent to the immunization of
minors) as, “(1) A natural or adoptive parent of a minor; (2) A guardian of a minor; or (3)
Any other person who, under court order, is authorized to give consent for a minor.” HG §
18-4A-01.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
7
“Father” and “mother” are defined in Title 4 (which pertains to Statistics and
Records) as having the same meaning as the definitions found in § 5-1001 of the Family
Law (“FL”) Article. HG § 4-201(g), (p). There, “father” is defined as “an individual,
regardless of gender, whose sperm fertilizes an ovum, resulting in the birth of a child.” FL
§ 5-1001(g)(1). “Mother” is defined as “an individual, regardless of gender, who gives
birth to a child unless parentage is otherwise established.” FL § 5-1001(i). Both definitions
are found in Subtitle 10, which pertains to paternity proceedings. Later in that same subtitle,
the statute discusses paternity orders, noting that, with some exceptions that are irrelevant
to the case at hand, “a declaration of paternity in an order is final[,]” and such a declaration
“may not be modified or set aside if the individual named in the order acknowledged
paternity knowing he was not the father.” FL § 5-1038(a).
Parties’ Contentions
Ms. Jones argues that the circuit court’s order regarding Bishop’s remains is
inconsistent with Maryland law because, under HG § 5-509(c), Ms. Jones has priority to
determine the disposition of the remains as the only biological parent. Ms. Jones notes that
“parent” is not defined in Subtitle 5 of the Health-General Article, and so looks to Subtitle
4, which references FL § 5-1001, to define “father.” Because that definition is limited to a
biological father, she asserts that she “alone has priority to determine the disposition of
Bishop’s remains.” Ms. Jones additionally argues that the order designating Mr. Daniel as
Bishop’s father was for the purpose of creating parental responsibilities, not parental rights,
because it was in the context of a custody and paternity proceeding. This, she says, means
that the order has no application in the dispute at hand.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
8
Mr. Daniel argues that the circuit court correctly ordered that Bishop’s remains be
split between himself and Ms. Jones because he is the father of Bishop as a matter of law
given the Order of Paternity issued by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. He points
to FL § 5-1038 to support his argument that such an order is final and controls in this
situation.
Analysis
While we address the parties’ arguments regarding the definition of “parent” and
“father” as it pertains to the relevant statute, we must begin by emphasizing that, first and
foremost, Ms. Jones and Mr. Daniel were parties to a valid contract with March Life Tribute
Center, which specified that Bishop’s remains would be shared between the parties. It is
well settled in long-established Maryland law that such a valid contract will not be
disturbed absent some indication of fraud, duress, or other circumstance that would render
the contract unenforceable, or some mutual agreement between all parties to change the
terms. See, e.g., McKeever v. Washington Heights Realty Corp., 183 Md. 216, 219-20
(1944) (“It is elementary that where a contract has been entered into by competent parties,
it is not within the power of either party to rescind it without an option to do so or without
the consent of the other party, in the absence of fraud, duress or undue influence, or unless
the equities are such that he should not be permitted to enforce it.”). Neither party argues,
nor is there evidence to suggest, that any such circumstances are present here. As such, we
will not disturb the agreement entered into by Ms. Jones and Mr. Daniel with March Life
Tribute Center on June 24, 2024, and we hold that the trial court did not err by filing an
order enforcing the terms of the agreement.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
9
However, we also address the dispute over the correct definition of “parent” and
“father” with respect to HG § 5-509, given the importance of the question to the case at
hand and to future interpretation, and we again reach the conclusion that the trial court did
not err in issuing the order with respect to Bishop’s remains because Mr. Daniel is Bishop’s
legal father and parent.
Ms. Jones encourages this Court to take an extremely narrow approach to reading
HG § 5-509, arguing that the definition of “father” for the purposes of the statute should
be limited to that found in FL § 5-1001: That is, “an individual, regardless of gender, whose
sperm fertilizes an ovum, resulting in the birth of a child.” FL § 5-1001(g)(1). Based on
this interpretation, she argues that the circuit court erred in ordering that Bishop’s remains
be split between herself and Mr. Daniel, who is not Bishop’s biological father, because
without the allegedly required genetic connection, Ms. Jones’s wishes take precedent over
Mr. Daniel’s with regard to the disposition of Bishop’s remains, even with an Order of
Paternity from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. For the reasons detailed below,
such a narrow reading is untenable based on a plain language analysis.
We must note at the outset that Ms. Jones premises at least a portion of her argument
on the erroneous assertion that “parent” is not defined anywhere in the Health-General
Article. This is simply inaccurate. “Parent” is in fact defined in Title 18 as, “(1) A natural
or adoptive parent of a minor; (2) A guardian of a minor; or (3) Any other person who,
under court order, is authorized to give consent for a minor.” HG § 18-4A-01. That
definition is considerably more expansive than the definition of “father” in FL § 5-1001.
As noted previously, the definition of “parent” in the Health-General Article specifically

‒Unreported Opinion‒
10
identifies those individuals who may consent to the immunization of a minor. HG § 18-
4A-01. Given that narrow and clearly defined context, for the purposes of the case at hand,
we agree that the Family Law Article is the appropriate starting point for our analysis of
the definitions of “father” and “parent.” However, we disagree that the reading of the
definition of either term is as narrow as Ms. Jones asserts, or that the General Assembly so
narrowly and exclusively defined either term in the Health-General Article.
Family Law Article Section 5-1001 is located in Title 10, which deals with paternity
proceedings. It is cited in another title of that same article, as well as the Health-General
and Estates and Trusts (“ET”) Articles, in order to define “mother” and “father” in various
contexts where such definitions are essential to effectuating the purposes of the statutes.
See ET § 1-201 (defining roles and relationships in the context of decedents’ estates); FL
§ 5-3B-01 (defining roles and relationships in the context of independent adoption); HG
§ 4-201 (defining roles and relationships in the context of vital statistics and records).
The stated purpose of Family Law Article, Title 10, is multifold:
(1) to promote the general welfare and best interests of children born out of
wedlock by securing for them, as nearly as practicable, the same rights to
support, care, and education as children born in wedlock;
(2) to impose on the mothers and fathers of children born out of wedlock the
basic obligations and responsibilities of parenthood; and
(3) to 	simplify 	the 	procedures 	for 	determining 	paternity, 	custody,
guardianship, and responsibility for the support of children born out of
wedlock.
FL § 5-1002(b). To those ends, Title 10 describes the procedure for establishing paternity,
including but not limited to legitimation proceedings, genetic testing, affidavits of

‒Unreported Opinion‒
11
parentage, and court orders. See FL §§ 5-1001–5-1048. Importantly for the case at hand,
FL § 5-1038 specifies that “a declaration of paternity in an order is final” and “may not be
modified or set aside if the individual named in the order acknowledged paternity knowing
he was not the father.” FL § 5-1038(a).
Ms. Jones asserts that she does not dispute the legitimacy of the Order of Paternity
filed by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Instead, she argues that it is irrelevant
to the case at hand because it was filed in the context of a proceeding that established
parental responsibilities, not rights, and the only applicable definition of “father” for HG
§ 5-509 can be found in FL § 5-1001, which defines the term on a purely biological basis.
This overly narrow interpretation fails for two, interrelated reasons: (1) it ignores the
broader context of the provision, and (2) it requires a tortured reading of statute that
produces impermissibly absurd results.
To the first point, we cannot simply consider FL § 5-1001 in a vacuum, ignoring
other, interrelated provisions that provide additional context for who is also considered a
parent under the law. Section 5-1038 of the Family Law Article demonstrates that the
General Assembly clearly envisioned scenarios such as the one at hand, in which an
individual knows that he is not the biological father, but nevertheless puts himself forward
as the father of a child and is so adjudicated by a court. In such a case, the law is clear that
the declaration of paternity is final, and a court may not set it aside. FL § 5-1038. The
General Assembly has not provided any exceptions to this rule. The circuit court
acknowledged this during the motions hearing, saying, “[T]he bottom line is that in 2000

‒Unreported Opinion‒
12
Judge Weinstein said that [Mr. Daniel] is the father of the children. He made an order of
paternity. That means that’s it. [Mr. Daniel] is the father.” We agree.
This is unchanged by the fact that Ms. Jones, for the first time in the context of this
conflict, alleges that an individual named Douglas Scott Fisher is Bishop’s biological
father, and Mr. Fisher’s parental rights were never terminated. Mr. Fisher submitted an
affidavit alleging that he is the biological father of Bishop and asserting that Ms. Jones
should receive all of Bishop’s remains, but as of the proceedings in the circuit court, Mr.
Fisher was incarcerated and did not appear or otherwise participate in the proceedings.
There was never a DNA test establishing that Mr. Fisher was Bishop’s biological father.
Mr. Fisher never paid child support. A court declared that Mr. Daniel is Bishop’s father via
the Order of Paternity after Mr. Daniel clearly understood that he was not the biological
father and signed an Affidavit of Paternity nevertheless. Neither Ms. Jones nor Mr. Fisher
appealed the Order of Paternity. Such an order, as clearly set forth in FL § 5-1038, is final
and may not be set aside.
Nor has the General Assembly limited the effects of an order of paternity to apply
solely to parental responsibilities, without any accompanying parental rights. Such a claim
is unsupported by either statute, caselaw, or logic. As the circuit court said,
You can’t say that he was only adjudicated—there is no way that I would say
somebody is a father and then say you’ve got to pay child support, but you
don’t get to have any of the child’s benefits, including taking him to a
baseball game, having custody, having access. . . . That is not even logical.
Again, we agree.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
13
Ms. Jones supports her claim by pointing to Mohan v. State, wherein this Court said
that “it is more rational to construct the statute and the meaning of the term ‘parent’ in a
way that is more exclusive rather than inclusive” in scenarios in which we are “weighing
the relative rationality of competing constructions,” and that there are a “multitude of cases
that stand for the widely understood legal meaning of the term ‘parent’ to be limited to
biological or adoptive parent only.” 257 Md. App. 65, 82 (2023) (cleaned up).
Mohan addressed whether a minor’s stepfather had properly been convicted under
a sex abuse statute as a “parent” of the child. Id. at 71. The trial court reasoned that the man
was a de facto parent and stood in loco parentis to the child due to the parental nature of
his relationship to her, and therefore convicted him as a parent. Id. at 82-83. Importantly,
he was neither the biological nor adoptive parent of the child, nor had he been adjudicated
to be the father of the child. Id. at 73. We held that the “contemplated meaning of ‘parent’”
under the applicable criminal statute “is limited to biological or adoptive parents only” and
therefore reversed the conviction under the statute. Id. at 83.
Mohan is inapposite to the case at hand for multiple reasons. First, we were
analyzing the term “parent” as used in a criminal statutory provision, and concluded that
interpreting the term broadly to include an individual in loco parentis would create
unnecessary 	redundancies 	due 	to 	the 	construction 	of 	that 	particular 	statute, 	which
prohibited sexual abuse by both a “parent” and “other persons who have permanent or
temporary care or custody of a minor[.]” Id. at 77. Given that an individual in loco parentis
could fall into either category, we concluded that “parent” in that context must be more
narrowly construed. Id. No such redundancies exist here. Second, as noted above, the

‒Unreported Opinion‒
14
individual convicted in that case had not been adjudicated to be the father of the child by a
court, and we did not contemplate or address a situation in which that was the case and
how that might apply. Instead, we only compared a biological or adoptive parent with a de
facto parent who stood in loco parentis to a child. Id. at 82-83. Again, such is not the case
here. Finally, the “multitude of cases” we considered to support the conclusion that the
term “parent” is limited only to biological and adoptive parents similarly did not involve
any parties who had been decreed by a court to be the parent of a child—only individuals
who were caretakers or de facto parents to the children in question. Id. at 82. Like statutes,
we cannot view language from caselaw in a vacuum, ignoring the context of the case and
dispute in question. Here, for all of the reasons stated above, Mohan simply does not apply.
Finally, reading “parent” in HG § 5-509 as narrowly as Ms. Jones suggests leads to
illogical and absurd results. If the General Assembly truly intended to limit fathers’
parental rights in HG § 5-509 to biological fathers, as defined in FL § 5-1001, this would
inherently 	preclude 	adoptive 	fathers, 	who 	are 	fully 	vested 	with 	the 	rights 	and
responsibilities of biological fathers. See FL § 5-341. While Ms. Jones seems to impliedly
carve out an exception for adoptive parents, noting that Mr. Daniel is neither Bishop’s
biological nor adoptive parent, she does not explain how the extremely narrow definition
of “father” she puts forth makes room for adoptive parents in HG § 5-509. Instead, she
continues to put forth FL § 5-1001 as the sole provision that defines “father” for the
purposes of HG § 5-509: a definition that only recognizes biological fathers. FL § 5-
1001(g)(1).

‒Unreported Opinion‒
15
Family Law Article Section 5-341 says that “after a juvenile court enters an order
for adoption . . . the adoptee . . . is the child of the adoptive parent for all intents and
purposes[.]” FL § 5-341(a)(2)(i)(1). If we accept Ms. Jones’s definition of “father” for HG
§ 5-509, this means that if an individual was adopted by a single father, or a couple
including a father or two fathers, the father(s) in such a scenario would be excluded as
authorizing agents in HG § 5-509. It would also mean that the General Assembly intended
to carve out an exception to the adoption provision such that the adoptee is the child of the
adopter “for all intents and purposes,” except in the event that the child dies without valid
documentation expressing what to do with their remains, and they have no spouse or
surviving children, in which case an adoptive father has no say in the disposition of the
remains. These are absurd results that the canons of statutory interpretation will not allow.
We therefore hold that: (1) Ms. Jones and Mr. Daniel had a valid contract with
March Life Tribute Center; (2) under HG § 5-509(c)(2)(iii), “parent” includes fathers who
have been so declared by a court in an order of paternity; (3) Mr. Daniel is Bishop’s father
under the law and was entitled to a say in the disposition of Bishop’s remains; and (4) the
circuit court did not err in ordering that Bishop’s remains be split between Ms. Jones and
Mr. Daniel.
II. 	The 	circuit 	court’s 	order 	regarding 	Marquiete’s 	remains 	was
impermissibly conditional and erroneously modified the terms of a valid
contract and is therefore void.
Relevant Law
The second dispute in this case concerns whether the circuit court’s order to split
Marquiete’s remains, if Ms. Jones has them, is impermissibly conditional and therefore

‒Unreported Opinion‒
16
void. Ms. Jones cites to Southern Four, Inc. v. Peter Parker, P.A., 81 Md. App. 85 (1989),
a case in which an attorney sued his client to recover legal fees. In that case, the trial court
ruled in favor of the attorney but conditioned the attorney’s right to enforce the judgment
on the client having a positive cash flow from a particular mining operation. Id. at 88-89.
The trial court found that there was no evidence of mining on the property, no income, and
therefore no payment due. Id. at 89. This Court held that “the cause of action had not yet
accrued and the court was in error in rendering judgment based upon a debt and action that
did not yet exist.” Id. at 89-90. Further, and importantly for our analysis of the case at hand,
the Court said that “even if the cause of action had accrued the judgment rendered was
improper in that it was an impermissible conditional civil judgment.” Id. at 91. The Court
described a conditional judgment as: “[O]ne whose enforcement is dependent on the
performance of future acts by a litigant and is to be annulled if default occurs. . . .
Conditional . . . judgments and decrees are wholly void as they do not perform in praesenti
and leave to speculation and conjecture what their final effect may be.” Id. at 94 (quoting
with approval Wallace v. Hankins, 541 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)). The Court
therefore held that “generally, in law, conditional judgments are not favored . . . .” Id. at
95.
Parties’ Contentions
Ms. Jones asserts that the circuit court impermissibly conditioned its order that Ms.
Jones split Marquiete’s remains with Mr. Daniel on Ms. Jones having or knowing where
the remains are. Such a conditional judgment, she says, is void as it “resolves no uncertainty

‒Unreported Opinion‒
17
as to whether [she] actually possesses the remains . . . and creates an unenforceable
judgment that serves no legitimate legal purpose.”
Mr. Daniel disagrees with Ms. Jones’s assertion that the order regarding Marquiete’s
remains is impermissibly conditional. However, Mr. Daniel offers no reasoning or law in
support of his claim that the circuit court correctly ordered Marquiete’s remains be split if
Ms. Jones has them, and therefore leaves it to this Court to imagine what such an opinion
might be based upon.
Analysis
We must begin again by noting that, with regard to Marquiete’s remains, Ms. Jones
and Mr. Daniel were once again parties to a valid contract with March Life Tribute Center
and had agreed via the contract that Marquiete’s remains would go to Ms. Jones. Again,
there is no allegation or evidence of fraud, undue influence, or any other circumstance that
might justify changing the terms of the contract at this point.
Additionally, 	unlike 	Bishop’s 	remains, 	Marquiete’s 	remains 	were 	already
distributed according to the terms of the agreement. Our state’s caselaw establishes that
there is “no property in a dead body in a . . . material sense[,]” that “[r]ights in a dead body
exist ordinarily only for purposes of [final disposition,]” and that once remains are subject
to their final disposition, there would need to be a “reason of substance” for a change.
Dougherty v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Tr. Co., 282 Md. 617, 620 & n.2 (1978). Unless
the authorizing agent(s) can demonstrate that their consent to the final disposition “was
obtained through coercion or was otherwise involuntary[,]” the final disposition is legally
regarded as just that—final. Id. at 621. We reiterate that the parties in this case consented

‒Unreported Opinion‒
18
to the cremation and disposition of Marquiete’s remains to Ms. Jones, without any
indication of coercion or an otherwise invalidating circumstance. Mr. Daniel does not
present a compelling argument as to why the final disposition should at this time be
disturbed, regardless of the location of Marquiete’s remains. We therefore hold that the
circuit court erred in ordering that Marquiete’s remains should be shared with Mr. Daniel
if Ms. Jones has the remains in her possession.
In addition, we hold that the circuit court erred due to the nature of the order. As
noted above, Ms. Jones argues that the circuit court’s order requiring her to give Mr. Daniel
half of Marquiete’s remains “if they are within [Ms. Jones’s] possession, custody, or
control” is impermissibly conditional and therefore void. In this regard, we agree with Ms.
Jones.
To begin, such an order was not based on a factual finding that Ms. Jones actually
has the remains in her possession. Ms. Jones has asserted throughout the proceedings that
she scattered a portion of Marquiete’s remains in North Carolina and gave the remaining
portion to Bishop. Mr. Daniel argued at trial that he believes Ms. Jones is not telling the
truth based on a conversation the two had after Bishop died in which he alleges Ms. Jones
indicated that she still had the ashes. Both in the motions hearing and at trial, the circuit
court expressed doubts regarding the veracity of Ms. Jones’s claim that she no longer had
the remains in her possession. However, importantly to the issue at hand, the circuit court
never made a factual finding regarding the actual location of Marquiete’s remains. Instead,
the court simply said that it “d[id] not believe that the remains are not existent[,]” and
“there is no information the [c]ourt has as to where they are[.]” Based on this lack of

‒Unreported Opinion‒
19
information, the court instructed Ms. Jones to share Marquiete’s remains with Mr. Daniel
if Ms. Jones has them or knows of their location. The court then memorialized its ruling in
an order instructing Ms. Jones to give Mr. Daniel “one-half of the cremated remains of
Marquiete . . . if they are within her possession, custody, or control[.]” As Ms. Jones points
out, this order does not “resolve[ an] uncertainty as to whether Ms. Jones actually possesses
the remains . . . and creates an unenforceable judgment . . . .”
As noted above, Ms. Jones relies exclusively on Southern Four, Inc. to support her
argument. To briefly reiterate, that case held that a judgment awarding money damages for
a breach of contract conditioned on a speculative future event is void, and generally,
conditional judgments are not favored in the law. S. Four, Inc., 81 Md. App. at 95.
We should note that the holding in Southern Four, Inc. pertained specifically to a
breach of contract case and only held that conditional judgments broadly are generally not
favored. Id. The case at hand of course does not concern money damages awarded as a
result of a breach of contract and as such does not provide a perfect analog. Nor are there
more recent cases that deal with this specific issue. Nevertheless, the general disfavor
applies in this case because the order in this scenario was not based on a finding of fact, is
conditioned upon a circumstance which may or may not exist and therefore does not
present a clear course of legal action or recourse for noncompliance.
Indeed, on September 22, 2025, Mr. Daniel filed a Petition for Contempt alleging,
among other things, that Ms. Jones was in violation of the court’s order because Mr. Daniel
“believe[s] and therefore contends” that Ms. Jones is in “possession, custody, or control”
of Marquiete’s remains and “is therefore in . . . contempt of this [c]ourt.” This assertion

‒Unreported Opinion‒
20
was unsupported by any evidence. On September 29, 2025, Ms. Jones filed a reply in which
she reasserts that she is not in “possession, custody, or control” of Marquiete’s remains,
and therefore cannot be held in contempt. Mr. Daniel’s petition was denied on October 15,
2025. The back-and-forth of the parties demonstrates the unenforceable nature of the order,
which, without a finding of fact, leaves the parties no clear recourse except to reiterate their
same arguments without result. This is the type of judgment that “do[es] not perform in
praesenti and leave[s] to speculation and conjecture what [its] final effect may be.” Id. at
94 (quoting with approval Wallace, 541 S.W.2d at 84). We therefore hold that the order is
impermissibly conditional and therefore void.
CONCLUSION
We hold that: (1) Ms. Jones and Mr. Daniel are parties to valid contracts that dictate
the disposition of Bishop’s and Marquiete’s remains and the contract’s terms are not to be
disturbed; (2) a father who is so decreed by a court through an order of paternity is a
“parent” within the meaning of the term as used in HG § 5-509 and the circuit court
correctly instructed Bishop’s remains to be split between Ms. Jones and Mr. Daniel; and
(3) the circuit court’s order which instructed Ms. Jones to share Marquiete’s remains with
Mr. Daniel if Ms. Jones has the remains within her possession impermissibly disturbs the
final disposition of Marquiete’s remains, is a conditional order that was not based on a
finding of fact, is unenforceable, and as such is void.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR 	PRINCE 	GEORGE’S 	COUNTY
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN
PART; 	COSTS 	TO 	BE 	SPLIT 	BY
APPELLANT AND APPELLEE.