Robert B. Ahearn v. Board of Assessors of the Town of Plymouth(July 15, 2003)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD





ROBERT B. AHEARN			v.	BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF 
THE TOWN OF PLYMOUTH

Docket No. F263120 (FY 2002)		Promulgated: 
July 15, 2003



	This is an appeal under the formal procedure pursuant to G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65 from the refusal of the appellee to abate taxes on certain real estate in the Town of Plymouth assessed under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38 for fiscal year 2002.  
	Commissioner Rose heard this appeal.  Chairman Burns and Commissioners Scharaffa, Gorton, and Egan all joined him in the decision for the appellee.  
	These findings of fact and report are made at the request of the appellant pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.  

	Louis J. Caccavaro, Jr., Esq., for the appellant.  

	Catherine M. Salmon, Assessor, for the appellee.  

FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
	On January 1, 2001, Robert B. Ahearn was the assessed owner of a parcel of real estate located at 259 Court Street in the Town of Plymouth.  The appellant had purchased the subject property in March 2000 for $550,000.  The parcel consists of approximately 0.99 acres of land improved with an elegant single-family Colonial home that was built in about 1900.  The two-story structure with third-level attic dormers is in very good condition and contains nine rooms, including five bedrooms.  It also has four full bathrooms plus a one-half bathroom, and a patio, both an enclosed and an open porch, and a second-story deck on top of the bow-shaped portico at the front entrance.  The subject property has approximately 3,383 square feet of finished living space along with an unfinished basement and attic space.  The finished area is centrally heated and air-conditioned.  As soon as he purchased the property, the appellant converted it from its previous use as a small bed and breakfast inn into a single-family dwelling.    
For fiscal year 2002, the Board of Assessors of Plymouth ("assessors") valued the parcel and improvements, as a single-family residence, at $526,500 and assessed taxes thereon at the rate of $14.26 per thousand in the amount of $7,507.89.  The assessors attributed $257,800 of the assessed value to the land, $264,300 to the house, and an additional $4,400 to "yard items."  The appellant timely paid the tax without incurring interest.  On January 30, 2002, the appellants timely filed their application for abatement with the assessors.  On March 5, 2002, the assessors denied the application, and on May 3, 2002, the appellant seasonably filed his appeal with the Appellate Tax Board ("Board").  On the basis of these facts, the Board found that it had jurisdiction over this appeal.  
The appellant presented his case through his own testimony and the introduction of a memorandum that contained copies of twelve property record cards, including the subject's, plus a table summarizing the properties' assessments and some of their characteristics.  The assessors defended their assessment through the testimony of one of their administrative assessors and her written report.  Based on this evidence, the Board made the following findings of fact.
The appellant asserted that his property was overvalued when compared to the assessments of what he believed were eleven other comparable properties in Plymouth and that his property was disproportionately assessed.  To support his overvaluation argument, the appellant relied on the assessments of the eleven other purportedly comparable residential properties in Plymouth.  These properties included a multi- and single-family Victorian, a two-family Colonial, a two-family New England-style building, two single-family ranches, a single-family split-level, and three single-family Gambrels.  The appellant did not suggest or make any adjustments to the assessments of these purportedly comparable properties to account for their obvious differences compared to the subject in building style and type and for the number of residential units.  The Board found that these multiple-family and/or variant-style properties were not even comparable to the single-family Colonial that is the subject of this appeal and, even if they were, the appellant had failed to offer any reasonable adjustments to account for the many obvious differences between these nine allegedly comparable properties and the subject.  
The appellant's remaining two purportedly comparable properties were Colonial-style properties located at 264 Court Street and 38 Holmes Terrace.  The Court Street property had sold in 1996 for $240,000, and the Holmes Terrace property had sold in 1999 for $330,000.  Their fiscal year 2002 assessments were $297,000 and $408,200, respectively.  The subject had sold in March 2000 for $550,000 and was assessed for $526,500 for fiscal year 2002.  The Board found that these two purportedly comparable properties were marginally comparable to the subject, as the sale prices demonstrated, and to the extent that they were comparable, the appellant had once again failed to adjust for obvious differences between them and the subject.  The Board further found that the assessments associated with all three properties were supported by sales prices, which were reasonably proximate to the assessment date.  Accordingly, the Board found that none of the assessments or sale prices of the appellant's purportedly comparable properties, nor the sale of the subject itself, even remotely suggested that the subject property was overvalued for the fiscal year at issue.  
The appellant also argued that the subject was disproportionately assessed.  However, he offered scant evidence to demonstrate this assertion.  Of the thousands of residential properties in Plymouth, the appellant only "analyzed" the eleven properties discussed above plus the subject.  His supposed analysis did not show that the assessments were disproportionate in any way.  If anything, it tended to prove that the assessments were proportionate to sale prices and to each other.  Furthermore, his analysis did not contain any evidence or implication that a widespread scheme of intentional disproportionate assessment existed in Plymouth or that the assessors were discriminating against him in any way.  Accordingly, the Board found that the assessors were not engaged in an intentional widespread scheme of disproportionate assessment, and they were not discriminating against the appellant in their assessment of his property.
Finally, the Board found that the administrative assessor's testimony and appraisal report supported the subject property's assessed value through a well-reasoned sales analysis of, and appropriate adjustments to, other single-family Colonial-style properties in Plymouth and the sale of the subject itself.  On the basis of all of the evidence, the Board therefore found that the appellant failed to prove that his property was overvalued or disproportionately assessed for fiscal year 2002.  Accordingly, the Board decided this appeal for the appellee.  

OPINION
	
	The assessors have a statutory and constitutional obligation to assess all real property at its full and fair cash value.  Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth; art. 10 of the Declaration of Rights; G.L. c. 59, §§ 38, 52.  See Coomey v. Assessors of Sandwich, 367 Mass. 836, 837 (1975)(citations omitted). Fair cash value is defined as the price on which a willing seller and a willing buyer will agree if both of them are fully informed and under no compulsion.  Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).  Generally, real estate valuation experts, the Massachusetts courts, and this Board rely upon three approaches to determine the fair cash value of property:  income capitalization, sales comparison, and cost reproduction.  Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment Authority, 375 Mass. 360, 362 (1978).
	"[S]ales of property usually furnish strong evidence of market value, provided they are arm's-length transactions and thus fairly represent what a buyer has been willing to pay for the property to a willing seller." Foxboro Associates v. Board of Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. 679, 682 (1982).  Actual sales of the subject "are very strong evidence of fair market value, for they represent what a buyer has been willing to pay to a seller for [the] particular property [under appeal]."  New Boston Garden Corp. v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 469 (1981) (quoting First Nat'l Stores, Inc. v. Assessors of Somerville, 358 Mass. 554, 560 (1971)).    	
In this appeal, the Board found and ruled that the sale of the subject property was reasonably proximate to the assessment date and supported the assessment.  The Board further found and ruled that the assessors' comparable-sales analysis that compared the adjusted sale prices of three single-family Colonial properties in Plymouth to the subject property's assessed value supported the assessment for fiscal year 2002.
The Board also recognized that an owner of property is entitled to express his opinion of its value during the relevant time period if he is experienced in dealing with the property, is familiar with its characteristics, and recognizes its proper uses or potential uses.  Menici v. Orton Crane & Shovel Co., 285 Mass. 499, 503-504 (1934), and the cases cited therein. Accord  Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment Authority, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 289, 295 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 375 Mass. 360 (1978).  In this appeal, the Board considered the appellant's opinion regarding the value of his property on January 1, 2001, but did not rely on it.  The Board found and ruled that the appellant's dependence on the unadjusted assessments of properties that, at best, were marginally comparable to his own was misplaced, particularly where the recent arm's-length sale of the subject itself supported the assessment.   
 The Board is entitled to presume that the assessment is valid until the taxpayer sustains his burden of proving otherwise.  Schlaiker v. Board of Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974).  Accordingly, the burden of proof is upon the taxpayer to make out his right as a matter of law to an abatement of the tax.  Id. The taxpayer must demonstrate that the assessed valuation of his property was improper.  See Foxboro Associates, 385 Mass. at 691. In the present appeal, the Board found and ruled that the appellant failed to prove overvaluation using his comparable assessment approach.  
The appellant also raised a claim of disproportionate assessment to demonstrate that his property was over-assessed for fiscal year 2002.    

If the taxpayer can demonstrate in an appeal to the Board that he has been the victim of a scheme of discriminatory, disproportionate assessment, he "may be granted an abatement . . . which will make . . . his assessment proportional to other assessments, on a basis which reaches results as close as is practicable to those which would have followed application by the assessors of the proper statutory principles."


Coomey, 367 Mass. at 836 (quoting Shoppers' World, Inc. v. Assessors of Framingham, 348 Mass. 366, 377-78 (1965)).  See also Brook Road Corporation v. Board of Assessors of Needham, 27 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 30, 34 (2001); Gargano v. Assessors of Barnstable, 25 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 461, 465-66 (1999).  The burden of proof as to existence of a "scheme of discriminatory, disproportionate assessment" is on the taxpayer.   First National Stores, 358 Mass. at 559; see also Schlaiker, 365 Mass. at 245.  
 "In order to obtain relief on the basis of disproportionate assessment, a taxpayer must show that there is an 'intentional policy or scheme of valuing properties or classes of properties at a lower percentage of fair cash value than the taxpayer's property.'"  Brown v. Assessors of Brookline, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 327, 332 (1997) (quoting Shoppers' World, 348 Mass. at 562).  If taxpayers successfully demonstrate improper assessment of such a number of properties to establish an inference that such a scheme exists, the burden of going forward to disprove such a scheme shifts to the assessors.  Shoppers' World, 348 Mass. at 377.  "The ultimate burden of persuasion, of course, will remain upon the taxpayer."  First National Stores, 358 Mass. at 562.
	In the present appeal, the appellant failed to introduce any evidence showing that a policy or scheme of discriminatory, disproportionate assessment was employed by the assessors against any class of properties in Plymouth.  Moreover, the evidence of sales and assessments submitted by both parties supported the assessments of the properties analyzed, including the subject property.  Accordingly, the Board found and ruled that the appellant failed to meet his burden of proving and persuading the Board that a deliberate scheme of disproportionate assessment existed in Plymouth for the fiscal year at issue.
Furthermore, the Board found and ruled that the assessors adequately supported the assessments of the relevant properties and the subject property for the fiscal year at issue and, therefore, successfully rebutted any potential inference of discriminatory, disproportionate assessment in this context.  The Board found and ruled that the evidence was simply nonexistent to demonstrate, or even suggest, that the assessors engaged in an "intentional widespread scheme of discrimination."  Stilson v. Assessors of Gloucester, 385 Mass. 724, 727-28 (1982).  At any rate, where assessments, even if wrong, are "consistent with honest mistake or oversight on the part of the assessors," as opposed to a "deliberate scheme of disproportionate assessment," no relief for disproportionate assessment is appropriate.  Brown v. Assessors of Brookline, 18 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 83, 92 (1996), aff'd, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 327 (1997) (quoting Stilson, 385 Mass. at 728).  
	In appeals before this Board, a taxpayer "may present persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or errors in the assessors' method of valuation, or by introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines the assessors' valuation."  General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 600 (1984) (quoting Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 848, 855 (1983)).  In the present appeal, the Board found and ruled that the appellant failed to show that the assessors' methodology was faulty or that the assessment over-valued his property in fiscal year 2002.
 

On this basis of these findings and rulings, the Board decided this appeal for the appellee.  

						APPELLATE TAX BOARD
  					


By:  __________________________
						Abigail A. Burns, Chairman


A true copy,


Attest: ___________________
	   Clerk of the Board



			   
	
                  

 Because the actual tax bill was mailed on December 31, 2001, the application for abatement was due on or before February 1, 2002.        G.L. c. 59, § 59.   
 "Adjustments can be made either to the total purchase price or to appropriate units of comparison.  Often adjustments for property rights conveyed, financing, conditions of sale (motivation), date of sale (market conditions), and expenditures made immediately after purchase are made to the total sale price.  The adjusted price is then converted into a unit price and adjusted for other elements of comparison such as location and physical characteristics." Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate 425-26 (12th ed. 2001).  "Physical differences include differences in building size, quality of construction, architectural style, building materials, age, condition, functional utility, site size, attractiveness, and amenities."  Id. at 436.

ATB 2003-357