Maria C. Letasz v. Board of Assessors of the City of Westfield (June 21, 2011)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD




MARIA C. LETASZ		   v.	BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF 
THE CITY OF WESTFIELD

Docket No. F306014				Promulgated:
							June 21, 2011


	This is an appeal under the formal procedure, pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, from the refusal of the appellee to abate taxes on certain real estate in the City of Westfield owned by and assessed to the appellant under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal year 2010.  
	Commissioner Rose heard this appeal under G.L. c. 58A, § 1A and 831 CMR 1.20, and issued a single-member decision for the appellee.  
	These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a request by the appellant under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.  

	Maria C. Letasz, pro se, for the appellant.
	James M. Pettingill, assessor, for the appellee.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
	Based on the testimony and exhibits offered into evidence at the hearing of this appeal, the Presiding Commissioner made the following findings of fact. 
	On January 1, 2009, Maria C. Letasz (the "appellant") was the assessed owner of a parcel of real estate located at 4 College Park Lane in the City of Westfield (the "subject property").  The parcel contains approximately 0.50 acres of land and is improved with a single-family, 2,226-square-foot, Cape Cod style house.  The dwelling was built in 1991 and contains six above-grade rooms, including three bedrooms, as well as two full bathrooms.  On the first floor, there is a fully applianced kitchen with a dining area, pantry, and cherry cabinets; a carpeted living room with a fireplace; a family room with hard wood floors; a carpeted master bedroom; and one full bathroom with granite countertops.  On the second floor, there are two additional carpeted bedrooms and a second full bathroom also with granite countertops.  There is a recreation room in the below-grade finished basement, along with a utility area with a washer and dryer.  The home is heated by a forced hot air, natural-gas heating system and cooled by central air conditioning.  The exterior of the dwelling has vinyl siding and an asphalt roof.  The grounds are accented with some picket fencing and attractive landscaping.  There is also an attached two-car garage.  The subject property is serviced by town water but has a private septic system.  
The Board of Assessors of Westfield (the "assessors") valued the subject property at $354,000 and assessed a tax thereon, at the rate of $14.68 per thousand, in the amount of $5,234.01.  On December 31, 2009, Westfield's Collector of Taxes sent out the city's actual real estate tax notices.  In accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 57C, the appellant timely paid the taxes without incurring interest.  On January 28, 2010, in accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 59, the appellant timely filed her application for abatement with the assessors.  On March 10, 2010, the assessors denied the appellant's application, and on May 14, 2010, in accordance with G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, the appellant seasonably filed her appeal with the Appellate Tax Board (the "Board").  On the basis of these facts, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the Board had jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal.  
In her abatement application and petition to this Board, the appellant claimed that her property was overvalued.  In her abatement application, she sought to have her assessment reduced by $74,000 to $280,000.  She explained in her application that the subject property had been listed for sale in calendar years 2008 and 2009, and despite reducing the asking price twice, had not sold.  She became discouraged and took the subject property off the market.  
At the hearing, both the appellant and her real estate agent, Carolyn Coughlen, testified.  They related that they had first listed the subject property for $324,900 in August, 2008, and, after receiving no offers, had reduced the listing price in May, 2009 to $319,500.  By the end of October, 2009, the appellant temporarily removed the subject property from the market, again after receiving no offers.  In January 2010, the appellant and her real estate agent placed the subject property back on the market with a listing price of $298,000.  The listing expired by the end of August, 2010 with only one offer - in July, 2010 for $285,000 - which, according to Ms. Coughlen, the buyer withdrew because the subject property's real estate taxes were too high.  
	Ms. Coughlen also introduced six sales of single-family homes in Westfield into the record.  The sales took place in 2008 and 2009 and ranged in price from $250,000 to $296,000.  The sales, however, were not in a comparable area or setting to the subject property's, and Ms. Coughlen offered no adjustments for these differences and the many other disparities that the Presiding Commissioner observed from the property record cards between these six properties and the subject property.  Ms. Coughlen acknowledged that there were no sales of truly comparable properties during the relevant time period.
	In defense of the assessment, the assessors offered several of their own sale properties into the record.  These sales occurred in 2008 and ranged in sale price from $240,000 to $405,000.  The properties that the assessors deemed most comparable to the subject property were the two with the highest sale prices of $335,000 and $405,000.  Like the appellant's real estate agent, however, the assessors did little to establish the sales' comparability to the subject property and did not offer any adjustments to account for their obvious differences with the subject property.
	Based on all of the evidence, the Presiding Commissioner found that the appellant did not adequately demonstrate that the subject property was overvalued for the fiscal year at issue.  The sale properties that her real estate agent introduced into the record did little to help establish the fair cash value of the subject property.  Ms. Coughlen acknowledged that their locations and settings were not comparable to the subject property's, and she did not even attempt to apply any adjustments to their sale prices to account for these and the other many disparities between her sale properties and the subject property.  In addition, the Presiding Commissioner found that the listing prices for the subject property did not constitute persuasive evidence of value either.  
The Presiding Commissioner further found that the sale properties introduced into the record by the assessors did little to illuminate the fair cash value of the subject property.  The assessors never established the comparability of their chosen properties to the subject property and did not adjust for obvious differences between them and the subject property.  Accordingly, the Presiding Commissioner found that he was unable to determine from the evidence a value for the subject property lower than the assessment.             
	On this basis, the Presiding Commissioner found that the appellant failed to meet her burden of proving that the subject property was overvalued for the fiscal year at issue and thereby failed to overcome the presumed validity of the assessment.  The Presiding Commissioner, therefore, decided this appeal for the appellee.
  					OPINION
The assessors are required to assess real estate at its fair cash value.  G.L. c. 59, § 38.  Fair cash value is defined as the price on which a willing seller and a willing buyer in a free and open market will agree if both of them are fully informed and under no compulsion.  Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).
	The appellant has the burden of proving that the property has a lower value than that assessed. "'The burden of proof is upon the petitioner to make out its right as [a] matter of law to [an] abatement of the tax.'" Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974) (quoting Judson Freight Forwarding Co. v. Commonwealth, 242 Mass. 47, 55 (1922)). "[T]he board is entitled to 'presume that the valuation made by the assessors [is] valid unless the taxpayer[] . . . proves the contrary.'" General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 598 (1984) (quoting Schlaiker, 365 Mass. at 245)).
In appeals before this Board, a taxpayer "may present persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or errors in the assessors' method of valuation, or by introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines the assessors' valuation."  General Electric Co., 393 Mass. at 600 (quoting Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 848, 855 (1983)).  In the present appeal, the appellant attempted to introduce affirmative evidence of value demonstrating that the subject property's fair cash value was less than the assessment.
The fair cash value of property may often best be determined by recent sales of comparable properties in the market.  See Correia v. Assessors of New Bedford Redevel. Auth., 375 Mass. 360, 362 (1978); McCabe v. Chelsea, 265 Mass. 494, 496 (1929).  Actual sales generally "furnish strong evidence of market value, provided they are arm's-length transactions and thus fairly represent what a buyer has been willing to pay for the property to a willing seller."  Foxboro Associates v. Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. 679, 682 (1982); New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 469 (1981); First National Stores, Inc. v. Assessors of Somerville, 358 Mass. 554, 560 (1971).  Sales of comparable realty in the same geographic area and within a reasonable time of the assessment date contain credible data and information for determining the value of the property at issue.  See McCabe, 265 Mass. at 496.  "In the sales comparison approach, an opinion of market value is developed by comparing properties similar to the subject property that have recently sold."  Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real estate 297 (13th ed., 2008).  "A major premise of the sales comparison approach is that an opinion of the market value of a property can be supported by studying the market's reaction to comparable and competitive properties."  Id. When comparable sales are used, however, allowance must be made for various factors which would otherwise cause disparities in the comparable prices.  See Pembroke Industrial Park Co., Inc. v. Assessors of Pembroke, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1998-1072, 1082.  "After researching and verifying the transactional data and selecting the appropriate unit of comparison, the appraiser adjusts for any differences."  The Appraisal of real estate at 307.
In the present appeal, the appellant, through her real estate agent, introduced six sales of properties in Westfield.  The appellant's real estate agent acknowledged that her sale properties' locations and settings were not comparable to the subject property's, and she did not even attempt to apply any adjustments to her properties' sale prices to account for the many differences between her sale properties and the subject property.  The Presiding Commissioner found that those sales were not truly comparable to the subject property and no adjustments had been applied to their sale prices to account for obvious differences with the subject property.  Accordingly, the Presiding Commissioner found that the sales that the appellant's real estate agent introduced into the record did little to help establish the fair cash value of the subject property.  In addition, the Presiding Commissioner found that the listing prices for the subject property did not constitute persuasive evidence of value.  See Sands v. Assessors of Bourne, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2007-1098, 1103 ("[L]isting prices of unsold properties . . . are not reliable indicators of the fair cash value of a property.").  
The Presiding Commissioner further found that the sale properties introduced into the record by the assessors also did not assist in illuminating the fair cash value of the subject property.  The assessors never established the comparability of these properties to the subject property and did not adjust for obvious differences between them and the subject property.  Consequently, the Presiding Commissioner found that he was unable to determine from the evidence a value for the subject property lower than the assessment.
In reaching his decision in this appeal, the Presiding Commissioner was not required to believe the testimony of any particular witness or to adopt any particular method of valuation that a witness suggested.  Rather, the Presiding Commissioner could accept those portions of the evidence that the Presiding Commissioner determined had more convincing weight. Foxboro Associates, 385 Mass. at 682; New Boston Garden Corp., 383 Mass. at 469.  "The credibility of witnesses, the weight of evidence, the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are matters for the Board."  Cummington School of the Arts, Inc. v. Assessors of Cummington, 373 Mass. 597, 605 (1977).        
On this basis, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the evidence presented by both the appellant and the assessors did little to assist him in finding a fair cash value for the subject property lower than the assessed value.  The Presiding Commissioner further found and ruled that the appellant failed to meet her burden of proving that the subject property was overvalued and thereby failed to overcome the presumed validity of the assessment.  See The May Department Store Co. v. Assessors of Newton, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2009-153, 195 ("'[T]he taxpayer loses when the taxpayer and the assessors present the board with equally footless cases.'")(quoting Hampton Assoc. v. Assessors of Northhampton, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 110, 119 (2001). 


The Presiding Commissioner, therefore, decided this appeal for the appellee.

  					  APPELLATE TAX BOARD


				  By:			          	
					 James D. Rose, Commissioner


A true copy,
Attest:		______			
      Clerk of the Board

 The tax bill includes a Community Preservation Act ("CPA") tax in the amount of $37.29.  

ATB 2011-579