Reynaldo Castellanos v. Board of Assessors of the City of Everett (September 11, 2015)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPELLATE TAX BOARD

 
 
REYNALDO CASTELLANOS            v.		 BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF  
   		 THE CITY OF EVERETT

Docket No. F315042			   		 Promulgated:
   					 September 11, 2015

 
 
This is an appeal filed under the formal procedure pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, from the refusal of the Board of Assessors of the City of Everett ("appellee" or "assessors") to abate a tax on certain real estate in Everett owned by and assessed to Reynaldo Castellanos ("appellant") under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal year 2012 ("fiscal year at issue").  
Commissioner Mulhern ("Presiding Commissioner") heard this appeal under G.L. c. 58A, § 1A and 831 CMR 1.20 and issued a single-member decision for the appellant.      
These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a request by the appellant under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.
  
 
Reynaldo Castellanos, pro se, for the appellant.
 
Carl Surabian, Chief Assessor, for the appellee.
 
 

FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
Based on the testimony and exhibits offered into evidence at the hearing of this appeal, the Presiding Commissioner made the following findings of fact.
On January 1, 2011, the relevant assessment date for the fiscal year at issue, the appellant was the assessed owner of a condominium unit located at 13 Woodland Street, Unit C, in the City of Everett ("subject property"). For assessment purposes, the subject property was identified as "Parcel ID B0-05-16000C". 
For the fiscal year at issue, the assessors valued the subject property at $297,100 and assessed a tax thereon, at the rate of $15.52 per thousand, in the total amount of $4,610.99.  In accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 57C, the appellant timely paid the tax due without incurring interest. On January 3, 2012, in accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 59, the appellant timely filed an Application for Abatement with the assessors, which the assessors denied on February 27, 2012. On April 2, 2012, in accordance with G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, the appellant seasonably filed a Petition Under Formal Procedure with the Appellate Tax Board ("Board").  On the basis of these facts, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the Board had jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal.  
The subject property is a duplex-style condominium, with a total of seven rooms, including four bedrooms and also one full and one half bathroom, with a total living area of 1,836 square feet.  Additional features include a finished basement, a deck, and a fireplace.  The assessors considered the subject property to be in overall average condition.  
In support of his claim that the subject property was overvalued for the fiscal year at issue, the appellant submitted an appraisal report prepared by a licensed appraiser John J. Lyons, III.  The assessors did not object to its submission or the factual information contained within it.  However, because the appraiser was not present to testify, the Presiding Commissioner excluded his adjustments to his comparable condominium properties and his opinions of the subject property's fair cash value.  See Papernik v. Assessors of Sharon, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2011-600, 615 (ruling that hearsay opinion evidence, which, although not objected to by the assessors, was entitled to no weight because it was offered without proper foundation, qualification, or underlying factual support and without providing the assessors with an opportunity for cross-examination). 
The appellant purchased the subject property from a bank on February 26, 2010 for $189,900.  The appellant argued that the subject property's fair cash value as of the relevant assessment date was even less than the amount that he had paid for it because the market had declined since his 2010 purchase.  Other than his bare assertion, the appellant offered no credible evidence to show that this bank sale was without compulsion or duress or that the market had been in decline.  Consequently, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the appellant failed to establish that the sale of the subject property to the appellant was a market transaction.  Therefore, the Board gave the sale no weight because the sale price offered no probative evidence of the subject property's fair cash value for the fiscal year at issue.  See Haynes v. Assessors of Middleton, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2011-143, 185 (ruling that bank sales are inherently suspect, because by their nature, there is a suggestion that they do not represent an agreement between a willing buyer and a willing seller in a free and open market without compulsion).    
It was undisputed that the subject property is located at the end of a small court with no common amenities, which gives it an urban feel.  It was also undisputed that the model used by the assessors to develop the subject property's assessed value for fiscal year 2012, while based on similarly sized condominiums, was also based on newer, higher-end properties that were superior to the subject property and therefore commanded a higher per-square-foot value.  It was further undisputed that the condominium adjacent to the subject property located at 13 Woodland Street, Unit A, which was an 1,100 square-foot condominium, sold for $156,500, or $142.27 per square foot, within a reasonable time from the valuation and assessment date for the fiscal year at issue.     
The assessors presented their case-in-chief through the testimony of Carl Surabian, the Chief Assessor for the City of Everett. The assessors also offered into evidence several exhibits, including:  the requisite jurisdictional documents; the subject property's property record cards for fiscal years 2012 and 2013, which showed a decrease of over $85,000 in its assessed value; and the fiscal year 2012 property record cards for three duplex-style condominiums, including the condominium adjacent to the subject property, Unit A.  
Based on all the evidence, the Presiding Commissioner found that the subject property was overvalued for the fiscal year at issue.  The Presiding Commissioner found that the sale of 13 Woodland Street, Unit A, with a slight downward adjustment in its per-square-foot unit of value to account for the subject property's larger square footage, was the best evidence of the subject property's fair cash value for the fiscal year at issue because of its similarity to the subject property in all other respects.  The Presiding Commissioner further found that this evidence, together with the assessors' over $85,000 decrease in the subject property's assessed value from fiscal year 2012 to 2013 supported a fair cash value of $240,000 for the fiscal year at issue.  On this basis, the Presiding Commissioner determined that the subject property's fair cash value for the fiscal year at issue was $240,000, and he, therefore, decided this appeal for the appellant and granted abatement in the amount of $886.19.   
 


OPINION
The assessors are required to assess real estate at its fair cash value.  G.L. c. 59, § 38.  Fair cash value is defined as the price on which a willing seller and a willing buyer in a free and open market will agree if both of them are fully informed and under no compulsion.  Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).
The appellant has the burden of proving that the property has a lower value than that assessed. "'The burden of proof is upon the petitioner[s] to make out [their] right as [a] matter of law to [an] abatement of the tax.'" Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974) (quoting Judson Freight Forwarding Co. v. Commonwealth, 242 Mass. 47, 55 (1922)). "[T]he board is entitled to 'presume that the valuation made by the assessors [is] valid unless the taxpayers . . . prov[e] the contrary.'" General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 598 (1984) (quoting Schlaiker, 365 Mass. at 245).  
In appeals before this Board, taxpayers "'may present persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or errors in the assessors' method of valuation, or by introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines the assessors' valuation.'"  General Electric Co., 393 Mass. at 600 (quoting Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 848, 855 (1983)).  
The Presiding Commissioner need not specify the exact manner in which he arrived at his valuation.  Jordan Marsh v. Assessors of Malden, 359 Mass. 106, 110 (1971).  The fair cash value of property cannot be proven with "mathematical certainty and must ultimately rest in the realm of opinion, estimate and judgment."  Assessors of Quincy v. Boston Consolidated Gas, 309 Mass. 60, 72 (1941).  In evaluating the evidence before it, the Presiding Commissioner selected among the various elements of value and formed its own independent judgment of fair cash value.  General Electric Co., 393 Mass. at 605.  "The credibility of witnesses, the weight of evidence, the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are matters for the [Presiding Commissioner]."  Cummington School of the Arts, Inc. v. Assessors of Cummington, 373 Mass. 597, 605 (1977).
Based on all of the evidence, the Presiding Commissioner found that the sale of 13 Woodland Street, Unit A, with a slight adjustment downward to its per-square-foot unit of value to account for the subject property's larger living area, was the best evidence of the subject property's fair cash value for the fiscal year at issue.  Moreover, the Presiding Commissioner found that the significant decrease in the subject property's assessed value from fiscal year 2012 to 2013 further supported the Presiding Commissioner's finding that the subject property was overvalued for the fiscal year at issue.  The Presiding Commissioner further found that the assessors' model for valuing the subject property for the fiscal year at issue relied on properties which were not comparable to the subject property in age or condition.  

For these reasons, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the fair cash value of the subject property for the fiscal year at issue was $240,000.  Accordingly, the Presiding Commissioner issued a decision for the appellant and granted abatement of $886.19.
 
                                THE APPELLATE TAX BOARD   
 
 
 
   By: ________________________________
  Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman
                  


A true copy,

Attest: ___________________________
   Clerk of the Board
 

ATB 2015-490