Al-Karim Dhanji v. Department of Veterans' Services.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-1067

AL-KARIM DHANJI

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS' SERVICES.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Al-Karim Dhanji, appeals under G. L. c. 30A,

§ 15, from a judgment on the pleadings that affirmed a decision

by the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA), in which

DALA concluded that the defendant, the Department of Veterans'

Services (DVS), correctly denied Dhanji's application for an

annuity benefit under G. L. c. 115, § 6B. We affirm.

Background. From 1992 to 2017, Dhanji served in the United

States Public Health Service (USPHS) as a medical officer and a

commander. At the time of his honorable discharge, the United

States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) determined that

Dhanji was one hundred percent disabled. In 2018, Dhanji

applied for a Massachusetts veterans' annuity under G. L.

c. 115, § 6B. DVS denied his application, stating that Dhanji

did not "meet the military service requirements contained in"
G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-third, inferentially, because he did not

fall within the statutory definition of "veteran." Dhanji

appealed the denial of his application, and a DVS hearing

officer upheld the decision after a hearing, stating that Dhanji

did not meet the definition of "veteran" under G. L. c. 4, § 7,

Forty-third. Dhanji then appealed to the DALA, and an

administrative magistrate granted a summary decision upholding

DVS's determination. Dhanji sought review by a judge of the

Superior Court. The judge allowed DVS's motion for judgment on

the pleadings and denied Dhanji's motion for judgment on the

pleadings, and Dhanji appealed.

Discussion. 1. Meaning of "veteran" under the statute.

On appeal from the allowance of a motion for judgment on the

pleadings, each issue is a question of law subject to de novo

review. Robinhood Fin. LLC v. Secretary of the Commonwealth,

492 Mass. 696, 707 (2023). We therefore review DALA's decision

in accordance with G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). "[W]e may set aside

or modify [the] decision . . . if it is, among other things, in

violation of constitutional provisions, [b]ased upon an error of

law, [a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law" (quotations and citation

omitted). Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc. v. Acting Director

of the Dept' of Unemployment Assistance, 493 Mass. 591, 595

(2024). "We give substantial deference to a reasonable

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interpretation of a statute by the administrative agency charged

with its administration enforcement, but the duty of statutory

interpretation rests in the courts" (citation omitted).

Commerce Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 447 Mass. 478, 481

(2006).

"In interpreting a statute, we begin with its plain

language, as the best indication of legislative intent." 135

Wells Ave., LLC v. Housing Appeals Comm., 478 Mass. 346, 354

(2017). "Beyond plain language, [c]ourts must look to the

statutory scheme as a whole, so as to produce an internal

consistency within the statute" (quotation and citation

omitted). Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement

Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 605 (2019). "Even clear statutory

language is not read in isolation." Id.

Under G. L. c. 115, § 6B, a veteran whom the VA has

determined to be one hundred percent disabled is entitled to a

$2,000 annual annuity. According to G. L. c. 115, § 6A, the

word "veteran" is defined by G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-third. A

veteran is, subject to other statutory limitations, a person who

has "served in the army, navy, marine corps, coast guard, or air

force of the United States, or on full time national guard

duty." G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-third.

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Dhanji does not claim that USPHS falls within one of the

branches expressly identified in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-third. 1

Nonetheless, Dhanji contends that his honorable discharge from

USPHS means that he is a "veteran" under the statute. 2 Because

the statute's plain language does not incorporate those who

served in USPHS into the definition of veteran, this argument

fails. 3 See Boss v. Leverett, 484 Mass. 553, 557 (2020) ("If the

language [of a statute] is clear and unambiguous, it must be

interpreted as written").

2. Federal preemption. We review de novo the DALA's

determination that the Commonwealth's definition of veteran is

not preempted by Federal law. See Robinhood Fin. LLC, 492 Mass.

at 707. "The 'ultimate touchstone' of preemption analysis is

congressional intent, which is discerned primarily from the

language of the preemption statute and its framework." Marsh v.

Massachusetts Coastal R.R. LLC, 492 Mass. 641, 648 (2023),

1 Dhanji correctly points out that service in USPHS creates
entitlement to certain Federal veterans' benefits. See 37
U.S.C. § 101(3) (defining "uniformed services"). The
Massachusetts statute, however, contains different definitions.

2 Dhanji also argues that his detail to the army from 1997
to 2000 means that he "served in the army." G. L. c. 4, § 7,
Forty-third. He has not provided us with persuasive authority
to support that conclusion and we are not aware of any.

3 Because the statute's plain language is clear, we need not
reach Dhanji's arguments regarding the statute's legislative
history. See Six Bros., Inc. v. Brookline, 493 Mass. 616, 628
n.20 (2024).

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quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485-486 (1996).

Besides express and field preemption, State law may be preempted

by Federal law when "the State law actually conflicts with the

Federal law (conflict preemption)." Marsh, supra. Dhanji

asserts that State law is conflict preempted by Federal law such

that DVS must conclude that he is a veteran under G. L. c. 4,

§ 7, Forty-third. 4

"Conflict preemption occurs when it is impossible for a

private party to comply with both [S]tate and [F]ederal

requirements, . . . or where [S]tate law stands as an obstacle

to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and

objectives of Congress" (quotation and citation omitted).

Marsh, 492 Mass. at 648 n.18. Dhanji does not point to any

Federal requirement or law that is in conflict with the statute.

Instead, he argues that his ineligibility for the annuity under

G. L. c. 115, § 6B, conflicts generally with the Federal policy

area of "veterans' benefits" that provides veterans' benefits to

members of USPHS. Because preemption is "not favored," and the

"burden is on the party seeking to displace the State action to

show preemption with hard evidence of conflict based on the

record," Dhanji's preemption argument fails. Commonwealth Elec.

4 Dhanji raises the issue of field preemption for the first
time on appeal. Thus, the argument is waived. See Central
Transp., Inc. v. Package Printing Co., 429 Mass. 189, 193
(1999).

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Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 397 Mass. 361, 375-376 (1986).

Regardless, the annuity does not conflict with any Federal

veterans' benefits policy, as the Commonwealth offers the

annuity in addition to any Federal benefits.

3. Equal protection. Dhanji contends that the statute, as

applied to him, violates the equal protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because

it creates an invidious distinction between people who served in

the armed forces and people who served in USPHS. We apply

strict scrutiny "[w]here a statute either burdens the exercise

of a fundamental right . . . or discriminates on the basis of a

suspect classification." Commonwealth v. Roman, 489 Mass. 81,

86 (2022), quoting Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector

Auth., 459 Mass. 655, 668-669 (2011), S.C., 461 Mass. 232

(2012). Dhanji does not have a fundamental right to receive the

annuity in addition to Federal VA benefits, and the class of

people who served in USPHS is not suspect. "Accordingly, we

apply a rational basis level of judicial scrutiny to the

[plaintiff's] equal protection claims." Roman, supra at 88-89.

"[T]he rational basis test requires that 'an impartial

lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would

serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to

the members of the disadvantaged class.'" Roman, 489 Mass. at

89, quoting Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass.

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309, 330 (2003). Because "the Legislature may afford some

classes of veterans a greater preference than others," Greeley

v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 746, 754 (1974), we

conclude that this requirement is met, and hold that G. L.

c. 115, § 6B, is constitutional as applied to Dhanji.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Englander,
Hand & Brennan, JJ. 5),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: May 6, 2024.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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