Commonwealth v. Breon L. Stroup.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-168

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

BREON L. STROUP.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Breon L. Stroup, appeals from a District

Court order revoking his probation based in part on evidence

that he committed five new offenses, including unarmed burglary

and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. His

principal claim is that the hearing judge erred by considering

unreliable hearsay evidence during the revocation hearing,

including statements from the burglary victim and the State

trooper who arrested Stroup for possessing cocaine. Because

Stroup later pleaded guilty to the possession charge, see Fall

River Dist. Ct. Dock. # 1932CR001561 (MassCourts), we need not

address his claim that the judge erred in considering the State

trooper's arrest report. See Commonwealth v. Milot, 462 Mass.

197, 201–202 (2012) ("subsequent pleas of guilty to the offenses

that formed the basis of the judge's factual finding of a
violation of probation render[] moot the claim that the hearsay

was unreliable"). Accordingly, we examine only whether the

consideration of the burglary victim's hearsay statements and

other evidence related to the burglary violated Stroup's due

process rights. Seeing no violation, we affirm the order

revoking probation.

Background. In April 2019, while Stroup was on probation

based on previous drug and assault charges, Dartmouth police

obtained a warrant for his arrest in connection with a break-in

at a local motel. Separately, the following week, State police

arrested Stroup on drug charges. Two complaints issued -- one

for burglary and other charges stemming from the break-in,1 and

another for possession of a class B substance with intent to

distribute and a related conspiracy charge. Based on these new

charges, Stroup was issued a notice of probation violation and

of a hearing. The notice also alleged two technical violations:

failure to pay probation supervision fees and failure to attend

a visit with his probation officer.

During the hearing, the probation department called

Dartmouth police Officer Mark Vachon to testify about the motel

1 The charges arising from the burglary were later dismissed for
lack of prosecution. See New Bedford Dist. Ct. # 1933CR001722
(MassCourts). Nevertheless, "the fact that the charges against
the defendant . . . were later dismissed for failure to
prosecute is immaterial to the validity of the revocation."
Commonwealth v. Mejias, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 948, 949 (1998).

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break-in. We summarize that testimony. Vachon and a colleague

were dispatched to the motel early in the morning of April 3,

2019, and learned from the motel owner of a reported break-in in

room 145. The room was rented to one Angelica Estrela, who was

not present when the officers arrived. Vachon inspected the

room and found the front window broken and the door ajar. The

officers recovered a cellphone from the ground in front of the

broken window.

Vachon watched a surveillance video recording of that

night, provided to him by the motel owner but no longer

available by the time of the hearing. The video showed three

men in a dark sedan enter the motel parking lot at approximately

3:30 A.M. and approach the door to Estrela's room three times

over the course of about an hour. On the third occasion, the

men ran from the room carrying several objects, including what

appeared to be some clothing and a box, and then drove away.

Though Vachon could not identify the men, he could discern from

the black-and-white video that one of them was wearing light-

colored clothing.

Vachon further testified that, when Estrela arrived back at

the motel, she reported to the officers that her belongings,

including her clothes and $10,000 in cash, were missing from her

room. The officers showed her the video, and she positively

identified two of the men as Stroup and his friend, Isaiah

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Toure. She told the officers that she had met Stroup that day

and had allowed him into her room earlier that night while she

was packing her belongings. She recognized Stroup's and Toure's

clothing in the video as matching what they had worn earlier

that day. In the video, she could see Stroup carrying her

clothes away from her room. She also showed Vachon a recent

video from Stroup's Snapchat social media account in which

Stroup wore clothing that, in Vachon's opinion, appeared similar

to the light-colored clothes worn by one of the men in the

surveillance video. Estrela confirmed the identities of the two

men based on registry of motor vehicles (RMV) photos the

officers showed her, and she identified the cellphone as

Stroup's, based on a picture of his child appearing on the

phone's lock screen.

In addition to Vachon's live testimony, the probation

department introduced, over Stroup's hearsay objections,

Vachon's police report, Estrela's written statement, and the

State police arrest report detailing the events that led to

Stroup's drug charges. The judge found that Stroup violated the

terms of his probation by committing the crimes alleged in the

complaints as well as the technical violations. The judge

revoked Stroup's probation and sentenced him to serve the

balance of his two-and-one-half year house of correction

sentence for the assault charge.

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Discussion. On appeal, Stroup primarily challenges the

judge's consideration of Estrela's statements, both to Vachon

and in writing, identifying Stroup as the burglary suspect. He

argues that the statements were unreliable hearsay and,

accordingly, that the judge's consideration of them to find that

Stroup committed the burglary violated his due process rights,

including his right to confront adverse witnesses. We are not

persuaded.

"Even though standard evidentiary rules do not apply to

probation revocation hearings," due process still requires that

a finding of a probation violation be based on reliable

evidence. Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 117-118

(1990). To determine whether proffered evidence is sufficiently

reliable, a hearing judge may consider:

"(1) whether the evidence is based on personal knowledge or
direct observation; (2) whether the evidence, if based on
direct observation, was recorded close in time to the
events in question; (3) the level of factual detail; (4)
whether the statements are internally consistent; (5)
whether the evidence is corroborated by information from
other sources; (6) whether the declarant was disinterested
when the statements were made; and (7) whether the
statements were made under circumstances that support their
veracity."

Commonwealth v. Hartfield, 474 Mass. 474, 484 (2016). A hearsay

statement need not satisfy all of these criteria to be

considered "trustworthy and reliable" evidence sufficient to

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support a finding of a probation violation. Commonwealth v.

Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 133 (2010).

Due process also guarantees a probationer "the right to

confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing

officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing

confrontation)" (quotation omitted). Durling, 407 Mass. at 113.

But "a showing that the proffered [hearsay] evidence bears

substantial indicia of reliability and is substantially

trustworthy is a showing of good cause obviating the need for

confrontation." Id. at 118.

Here, Estrela's statements were based on her personal

knowledge and direct observation of Stroup's appearance and the

clothes he wore that day. Her oral and written statements were

made close in time to the events in question, were factually

detailed, and were consistent with each other. They were in

part corroborated by Vachon's testimony that a burglary had

occurred in Estrela's room and that he witnessed Estrela

identifying Stroup and Toure in the surveillance video and the

RMV photos.2 Although Stroup complains that he had no

2 The statements were also confirmed in Vachon's police report.
Because that report stated essentially the same facts as
Vachon's testimony, the judge had no need to rely on the report
for any of his findings. Nevertheless, the report bore many
indicia of reliability: it was based on Vachon's direct
observations, was written on the same day as the events it
reported, was factually detailed and consistent with his live
testimony, and was submitted to support an application for an

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opportunity to see the surveillance video, he cites no authority

suggesting that the video itself had to be offered in evidence

in order to corroborate Estrela's statements. Nor does Stroup

challenge either the authenticity of the video or the

reliability of Vachon's testimony about his direct observation

of its contents.3

Finally, Estrela made her statements under circumstances

indicating their veracity, in that it is a crime to make a false

report of a crime to a police officer. See Commonwealth v.

Nunez, 446 Mass. 54, 59 (2006); Commonwealth v. Negron, 441

Mass. 685, 691 (2004). In addition, Estrela sought to

corroborate her identification of Stroup by showing Vachon the

Snapchat video of the man she said was Stroup. Vachon then

confirmed that the man in that video wore light-colored clothing

similar to that worn by the suspect in the surveillance video.

Based upon the foregoing, the judge did not err in

determining that Estrela's statements as a whole were

arrest warrant. The report was thus substantially reliable.
See Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 484. Moreover, Vachon was available
to be cross-examined about it.

3 We do not understand Stroup to be arguing that anything
depicted in that video was itself hearsay, so as to require that
it be evaluated for reliability. Nothing in the video, at least
as Vachon described its contents, made any "statement," as that
word is defined for hearsay purposes. See Mass. G. Evid.
§ 801 (a) (2022) ("'Statement' means a person’s oral assertion,
written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended
it as an assertion").

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substantially reliable. Her ability to accurately perceive and

truthfully report what she perceived was sufficiently

established. The judge could thus treat her identification of

Stroup in the surveillance video, and of Stroup's phone,4 as

substantially reliable. As numerous cases demonstrate, there is

no requirement that each one of a declarant's statements be

individually corroborated before it may be treated as reliable.

See, e.g., Patton, 458 Mass. at 133; Nunez, 446 Mass. at 59;

Commonwealth v. Henderson, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 674, 679 (2012);

Commonwealth v. Cates, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 759, 763 (2003).

Corroboration is merely one of the criteria for reliability, and

not all of those criteria need be satisfied. See Patton, 458

Mass. at 133.

In sum, the judge's finding of a probation violation based

largely on Estrela's statements did not violate Stroup's due

process rights. Also, as noted at the outset, whether the

hearsay report of the drug offenses was substantially reliable

is moot, under Milot, 462 Mass. at 201–202; the finding of a

probation violation based on the possession charge was proper.

We therefore need not consider Stroup's claim that the judge

4 Although the record included no affirmative explanation of how
Estrela, having met Stroup for the first time that day, was able
to identify Stroup's child from the phone's lock screen, we do
not view this gap as fatal, given the other circumstances
showing the reliability of her statements.

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would not have been warranted in revoking probation based only

on Stroup's technical violations.

Order revoking probation and
imposing sentence affirmed.

By the Court (Massing,
Sacks & Walsh, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: February 21, 2023.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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