New England Carpenters Central Collection Agency v. Arch Insurance Company

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25-P-74 Appeals Court

NEW ENGLAND CARPENTERS CENTRAL COLLECTION AGENCY & others1 vs.
ARCH INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 25-P-74.

Norfolk. October 10, 2025. – June 10, 2026.

Present: Massing, Sacks, & Allen, JJ.

Bond, Public works, Construction contract bond. Public Works,
Payment bond, General contractor. Surety. Contract,
Collective bargaining contract, Construction contract,
Bond, Surety, Public works, Subcontractor, Third-party
beneficiary. Notice, Timeliness. Statute, Construction.
Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. Words, "Contractual
relationship."

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
June 13, 2018.

The case was heard by Beverly J. Cannone, J., on a motion
for summary judgment.

Luke Liacos for the plaintiffs.
Mansooruddin Ahmed for Arch Insurance Company.

1 The Trustees of the New England Carpenters Pension Fund;
New England Carpenters Guaranteed Annuity Fund; New England
Carpenters Health Benefits Fund; New England Carpenters Vacation
Savings Fund; and New England Carpenters Training Fund.
2

ALLEN, J. This case, arising under G. L. c. 149, § 29,

which governs the posting of and collection against security

bonds in public construction projects, concerns whether a

claimant for unpaid contributions toward employee benefit plans

has a "contractual relationship" with the general contractor for

the purpose of collecting against the surety.

New England Carpenters Central Collection Agency (NECCCA),

together with the trustees for the benefit plans that NECCCA

represents (collectively plaintiffs), sought payment from

defendant Arch Insurance Company (Arch), the payment bond

surety, of delinquent employee benefit plan or "fringe-benefit"

contributions that two subcontractors on public construction

projects were obligated to pay pursuant to a collective

bargaining agreement. A Superior Court judge allowed Arch's

motion for summary judgment, ruling that because the plaintiffs

did not have a "contractual relationship" with the project's

general contractor, their failure to comply with the notice

requirement of G. L. c. 149, § 29, third par., applicable to

claimants who have a contractual relationship only with

subcontractors and not with the general contractor, precluded

recovery under the bond.

We conclude that the plaintiffs were intended third-party

beneficiaries of the collective bargaining agreement and, as a

result, had a "contractual relationship" with the project's
3

general contractor within the meaning of the statute; therefore,

they were not required to comply with the notice provision.

Accordingly, we vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand

for further proceedings.

Background. The facts are largely undisputed.2 CTA

Construction Company, Inc. (CTA), a general contractor for

public construction projects in Massachusetts, began work on two

projects: the Randolph Intergenerational Community Center

(Randolph project) and the Dedham Town Hall (Dedham project).

In turn, CTA contracted with two subcontractors: Mass

Construction & Management, Inc. (Mass Construction) for

carpentry work on both projects, and Galaxy Installation Group,

Inc. (Galaxy),3 for carpentry work on the Dedham project.

1. Collective bargaining agreement. At all times relevant

to this action, CTA, Mass Construction, and Galaxy were

signatories to a collective bargaining agreement (collective

bargaining agreement or agreement) with the New England Regional

2 Although the plaintiffs submitted evidence attempting to
raise a genuine issue of fact related to the subcontractors'
last day of work on one of the projects at issue, the judge
properly concluded that such evidence was insufficient to create
a genuine dispute. On appeal, the plaintiffs do not challenge
the judge's conclusions regarding when work was completed on the
projects at issue.

3 Galaxy is not a party in this case.
4

Council of Carpenters (union).4 NECCCA itself is not a

signatory, nor are the fringe-benefit fund trustees NECCCA

represents. Pursuant to the agreement, however, Mass

Construction and Galaxy, as subcontractors (or "Employers," as

defined within the agreement), were obligated to make

contributions to NECCCA -- the agency designated in the

agreement5 to collect the benefit monies -- on behalf of the

carpenters they employed for the projects. In the event of a

subcontractor's failure to make contributions, art. 15, § 1, of

the collective bargaining agreement provided NECCCA and the

union with the following mechanism to collect delinquencies with

assistance from the general contractor:

"Within seven (7) days of learning that an Employer is
delinquent in its employee benefit contributions, the Union
or the NECCCA shall notify in writing the Employer and the
General Contractor[] for whom the Employer is working of
the delinquency amount. . . .

"Upon written notification from . . . [the Union] or
the NECCCA that a subcontractor is delinquent in the
payment of wages or benefits to the Funds provided for in
this Agreement, the general contractor shall assist the
Union in collecting those wages and benefit contributions
for that specific job to the extent that subcontractor
funds are available and in hand. . . .

4 The name of the union has since changed to the North
Atlantic States Regional Council of Carpenters.

5 Article 10, § 3, of the agreement provides that "[t]he
parties have established a non-profit agency, the New England
Carpenters Central Collection Agency . . . (NECCCA) whose
purpose shall be to perform the collection, auditing and related
activities for the Funds. The Agency shall be directed equally
by the Union and Employer designees."
5

"The general contractor shall pay subcontractors who
are delinquent in the benefit payments on their jobs, by
issuing a two-party check to the subcontractor and the
NECCCA for any delinquent subcontractor upon request for
this procedure from the Union or the NECCCA."

2. General Laws c. 149, § 29. Under G. L. c. 149, § 29,

general contractors for a publicly funded construction project

must obtain "security by bond . . . for payment of labor

performed or furnished" on the project. Given the

unavailability of mechanic's liens to secure payment on public

construction projects, see Lessard v. Revere, 171 Mass. 294,

294-295 (1898), § 29 affords claimants the benefit of the

security bond, see City Rentals, LLC v. BBC Co., 79 Mass. App.

Ct. 559, 564 (2011). Section 29 also sets forth the procedure

under which claimants may seek recovery of contributions owed to

them. Claimants, as described by the statute, are those

entitled to obtain "the benefit of such bond for any amount

claimed due and unpaid at any time." G. L. c. 149, § 29.

Although § 29 provides for claims by a project's laborers and

materialmen, it also expressly extends security to entities like

the plaintiffs

"for payment . . . of any sums due [to] trustees or other
persons authorized to collect such payments . . . for
health and welfare plans, . . . and other fringe benefits
which are payable in cash and provided for in collective
bargaining agreements between organized labor and the
contractor or subcontractors."
6

Here, CTA, as general contractor for both projects, obtained a

payment bond pursuant to § 29 from Arch.

Under § 29, the procedure through which a claimant collects

under the bond differs depending on whether its "contractual

relationship" is with the project's general contractor or only

with a subcontractor to the project. If the claimant has a

"contractual relationship" with the general contractor, no

written notice of the claim is required, and enforcement may be

accomplished by filing a complaint in Superior Court within one

year after the day on which the claimant last provided the

materials or services. See G. L. c. 149, § 29, second par.

Conversely, if the claimant has a "contractual relationship"

with a subcontractor, but not with the general contractor,

written notice of the claim must be provided to the general

contractor "within sixty-five days after the day on which the

claimant last performed the labor or furnished the labor,

materials, equipment, appliances or transportation" before the

claimant may proceed with an enforcement action in the Superior

Court (emphasis added). G. L. c. 149, § 29, third par.

3. Subcontractor delinquencies and NECCCA's claims for

recovery. On August 22, 2017, NECCCA provided written notice to

CTA of its claim against Mass Construction maintaining that Mass

Construction failed to make contributions required by the

collective bargaining agreement on behalf of the carpenters it
7

employed on both projects.6 Mass Construction's final day of

work on the Randolph project was August 24, 2017, and its final

day of work on the Dedham project was September 1, 2017.

On April 4, 2018, NECCCA provided written notice to CTA of

its claim against Galaxy for unpaid contributions on the Dedham

project. NECCCA maintained that Galaxy failed to make

contributions for the Dedham project from January of 2017 to

April of 2018. Galaxy's final day of work was April 30, 2018.

Arch declined to make any payments to NECCCA. Thereafter,

on June 13, 2018, NECCCA and the other plaintiffs filed the

present action asserting that, pursuant to § 29, NECCCA was

entitled to recover from Arch the unpaid employee benefit fund

contributions owed for work performed on both projects. Arch

moved for summary judgment, contending that NECCCA's written

notices were sent to CTA prematurely -- that is, prior to Mass

Construction and Galaxy's final days of work on the projects --

and that without strict compliance with § 29, no payment was

due. At the motion hearing, NECCCA's counsel emphasized the

distinction between the benefit funds -- which, having no direct

access to jobsite information, rely on reports and other

6 Specifically, the plaintiffs assert in their brief that
Mass Construction was delinquent on contributions for work
performed from September 2016 to July of 2017 on the Dedham
project, and for work performed from April 2017 to July 2017 on
the Randolph project.
8

documentation from the contractor for notification of the last

day of work and contributions due -- and other, more typical

claimants (such as subcontractors or laborers), who have direct

access to the ongoing operations of a project, and thus, are

better positioned to recognize when work on a project has been

completed so as to permit compliance with § 29's notice

requirement.

After the hearing, a judge allowed Arch's motion for

summary judgment. The judge ruled that the plaintiffs, despite

being third-party beneficiaries of the collective bargaining

agreement between CTA and the union, were not "parties" to the

agreements and had no "contractual relationship" with CTA;

therefore, they were required under § 29 to provide written

notice to CTA within sixty-five days after Mass Construction's

and Galaxy's final days of work. The judge concluded that,

because NECCCA provided written notice prior to the completion

of work on the construction projects, the notice was defective,7

7 As noted by the judge, the Supreme Judicial Court has
strictly enforced the notice requirements of § 29 and analogous
statutes where claimants have provided notice prematurely. See,
e.g., International Heating & Air Conditioning Corp. v. Rich
Constr. Co., 372 Mass. 134, 137 (1977); C. C. Smith Co. v.
Frankini Constr. Co., 334 Mass. 379, 383 (1956); International
Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Quinn Bros. Elec. Co., 321 Mass. 16, 17-19
(1947); Mario Pandolf Co. v. Commonwealth, 303 Mass. 251, 256-
257 (1939).

Additionally, in N-Tek Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 186, 193 (2016), we noted that
9

and NECCCA was not entitled to payments from Arch as a matter of

law.8 This appeal followed.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "We review the grant

of summary judgment de novo." Masonic Temple Ass'n of Quincy,

Inc. v. Patel, 489 Mass. 549, 553 (2022). We employ the

familiar standard of review, "whether, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving

§ 29's "notice requirement bolsters the legislative policy to
protect the general contractor, by requiring the claimant's
writing to serve as a presentation of a claim against the
general contractor." See Barboza v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 18
Mass. App. Ct. 323, 328 (1984) (finding it "ill serves the
statutory scheme . . . and would stimulate litigation, if we
obscured the relatively simple statutory prerequisites upon
which all parties in public contracting, including the sureties,
presumably rely").

In closing her decision, the judge thoughtfully expressed
8

dismay at the apparent unfairness of the result:

"[A]lthough the evidence and case law compel this
conclusion, [the court] is troubled by the result. . . .
[R]equiring employee benefit funds trustees or other
persons authorized to collect such payments to comply with
the same notice provisions as contractors, who have
unfettered access to relevant jobsite information, does not
appear to effectuate the purpose of the statute and may
incentivize contractors to keep such person in the dark
about the status of a job in order to insulate the surety
from claims on the bond under G. L. c. 149, § 29. Indeed,
it is apparent from the summary judgment record here that
the plaintiffs were relatively in the dark about the status
of the work on the various projects and received job
information from the contractors themselves. However, in
the absence of guidance from the Legislature or a direct
holding on this point, the Court is compelled to allow
summary judgment in favor of Arch."
10

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Meyer v.

Veolia Energy N. Am., 482 Mass. 208, 211 (2019). "The proper

construction of a statute is a question of law." Lanctot v.

Brewster, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 739, 741 (2023). Because here, the

judge's decision was based on undisputed facts and her

interpretation of § 29, this case is "especially suited for

summary disposition and de novo review" (citation omitted). Id.

The dispute in this case turns on whether a "contractual

relationship" existed between general contractor CTA and the

fringe benefit funds represented by NECCCA. As noted above, the

judge found that the plaintiffs occupied "the position of third-

party beneficiaries" of the collective bargaining agreement

between CTA and the union.9 The plaintiffs argue that such a

position constitutes a "contractual relationship" to CTA under

9 As referenced by the judge, several Federal courts have
concluded that employee benefit funds are third-party
beneficiaries of collective bargaining agreements between a
union and employers. See e.g., Benson v. Brower's Moving &
Storage, Inc., 907 F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 982 ("The Funds occupy the position of a third party
beneficiary of the collective bargaining agreement"); Malden
Mills Indus., Inc. v. ILGWU Nat'l Retirement Fund, 766 F. Supp.
1202, 1210 (D. Mass. 1991) (Fund is "third-party beneficiary of
the collective bargaining agreement" where "the fund receives
contributions and makes payments based upon the terms negotiated
by others, namely, the union and the employer").
11

§ 29, and thus, § 29's notice requirement was inapplicable to

them.10 We agree.

2. Third-party beneficiary. We agree with the judge's

conclusion that the plaintiffs are third-party beneficiaries of

the collective bargaining agreement. Significantly, we further

conclude, based on the plain language of the collective

bargaining agreement, bolstered by § 29, that the plaintiffs are

intended third-party beneficiaries to the agreement.11 As we

explain, because the plaintiffs are intended third-party

beneficiaries of the collective bargaining agreement, they have

a "contractual relationship" with CTA, and thus, § 29's notice

requirement does not apply to them.

Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1981),

adopted by our appellate cases, see, e.g., Miller v. Mooney, 431

Mass. 57, 62 (2000), "a beneficiary of a promise is an intended

10The plaintiffs argue alternatively that, regardless of
the relationship that existed between themselves and CTA, they
were not required to comply with § 29's notice requirement
because the statute does not require multiemployer benefit funds
to provide written notice as a prerequisite to filing suit.
Given our decision, we need not address this argument.

11Section 29 reflects the Legislature's expectation that
trustees like the plaintiffs will benefit from the payment bond;
it states that "security by bond . . . [shall be] for payment by
such contractor and subcontractors of any sums due trustees or
other persons authorized to collect such payments . . . for
[furnishing benefits] provided for in collective bargaining
agreements between organized labor and the contractor or
subcontractors."
12

beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the

beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the

parties and . . . the circumstances indicate that the promisee

intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised

performance."12 The intent of the parties to the contract

"determines whether a third party is an incidental or intended

beneficiary." Markel Serv. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Tifco, Inc.,

403 Mass. 401, 405 (1988). "We look at the language and

circumstances of the contract for indicia of intention."

Anderson v. Fox Hill Village Homeowners Corp., 424 Mass. 365,

366 (1997).

As noted above, art. 15, § 1, of the collective bargaining

agreement specified CTA's obligations to NECCCA in the event of

a subcontractor's delinquency. Upon notice from the union, or

NECCCA itself, given within seven days of a subcontractor's

delinquency, CTA was required to assist the union in collecting

12Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302, set forth in
full, provides:

"(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee,
a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if
recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is
appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and
either (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary;
or (b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends
to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance. (2) An incidental beneficiary is a
beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary."
13

the delinquent contributions from the subcontractors.

Additionally, if requested by the union or NECCCA, CTA was

obligated to pay any delinquent subcontractor with a two-party

check made payable to the delinquent subcontractor and NECCCA.

Viewing the plain language of art. 15, § 1, we are

persuaded that the plaintiffs were intended third-party

beneficiaries of the collective bargaining agreement, and not

just incidental beneficiaries, as CTA contends. See James

Family Charitable Found. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 80 Mass.

App. Ct. 720, 725 (2011) ("One need not be a beneficiary of

every provision of the contract in order to be an intended

beneficiary with enforceable rights; it is enough to be the

intended beneficiary of the promise one is seeking to enforce").

Contained in art. 15, § 1, is a promise that CTA will utilize

procedures that directly benefit NECCCA and the trustees it

represents, to wit, possibly agreeing to be responsible for

delinquent funds, affirmatively assisting in collecting the

delinquency, and using two-party checks to pay future benefits.

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302(1)(b) (1981) ("the

circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the

beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance"). Cf.

FloorPro, Inc. v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 144, 148-149

(2011), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 680 F.3d 1377

(Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding subcontractor was intended third-party
14

beneficiary to modified contract wherein government agreed to

issue two-party check to prime contractor and subcontractor).

3. Contractual relationship. Having concluded that the

plaintiffs are intended third-party beneficiaries of the

collective bargaining agreement, we next determine whether that

position creates a "contractual relationship" between NECCCA and

CTA under § 29. Because the term "contractual relationship" is

not defined within G. L. c. 149, § 29, "we give [the words]

their usual and accepted meanings, as long as these meanings are

consistent with the statutory purpose." Commonwealth v. Zone

Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977). Moreover, "[w]e

interpret a statute according to the intent of the Legislature,

which we ascertain from all the statute's words, construed by

the ordinary and approved usage of the language and considered

in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or

imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be

accomplished" (quotation and citation omitted). Meyer v. Veolia

Energy N. Am., 482 Mass. 208, 211 (2019).

Where the language of a statute is "clear and unambiguous,"

the plain meaning of the language must be given effect, as the

principal insight into legislative intent (citation omitted).

See Cohen v. Commissioner of the Div. of Med. Assistance, 423

Mass. 399, 409 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Kokoska v. Bullen,

519 U.S. 1057 (1997). See also Commonwealth v. Meta Platforms,
15

Inc., 497 Mass. 384, 397 (2026). The plain meaning of words is

to be derived from "their use in other legal contexts and

dictionary definitions." Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. at 369.

"A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the

breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of

which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." I & R

Mechanical, Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 452,

454 (2004), quoting from Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1

(1981). See also Black's Law Dictionary 404 (12th ed. 2024)

(defining "contract" as "[a]n agreement between two or more

parties creating obligations that are enforceable or otherwise

recognizable at law"). As defined by Black's Law Dictionary,

"relationship" describes "[t]he nature of the association

between two or more people; [especially], a legally recognized

association that makes a difference in the participants' legal

rights and duties of care." Id. at 1544.

Applying these definitions, we conclude that the plaintiffs

had a "contractual relationship" with CTA. As discussed above,

art. 15, § 1, conferred certain rights on NECCCA -- the standing

and right to notify CTA directly upon a subcontractor's

delinquency, the right to demand performance by CTA, and the

right to demand future payment through the issuance of a two-

party check -- which, in turn, obligated CTA to, at the very

least, steward payment of delinquent contributions to the
16

plaintiffs under the agreement. Put differently, upon the

plaintiffs' invocation of their rights by notifying CTA of a

subcontractor's delinquency, CTA was required to (1) assist the

union in collecting payments, or (2) issue a two-party check to

the plaintiffs and subcontractor. It is readily apparent that

the intended goal of these provisions was to require CTA to play

a role in ensuring that the plaintiffs received the payments due

to them under the collective bargaining agreement.

Additionally, it is relevant that the Legislature used the

phrase "contractual relationship" and did not use the words

"contract" or "privity," or the term "direct contract," or make

specific reference to a construction contract to describe the

relationship between a claimant and general contractor under

§ 29. See G. L. c. 149, § 29 ("any claimant having a

contractual relationship with the contractor principal

furnishing the bond" [emphasis added]). Rather, by using "any

claimant" and "contractual relationship" the Legislature

seemingly contemplated a broader group of claimants, like the

plaintiffs here, who, despite not being parties to the contract

with either the general contractor or subcontractor, are

intended beneficiaries of promises contained in contracts

between such parties and a labor union.

Further, our conclusion is consistent with our courts' oft-

repeated determination that G. L. c. 149, § 29, "be given a
17

broad or liberal construction to accomplish its intended

purpose." American Air Filter Co. v. Innamorati Bros., 358 Mass.

146, 150 (1970). Cf. M. Lasden, Inc. v. Decker Elec. Corp., 372

Mass. 179, 183 (1977). It is well-settled that "Section 29

. . . is a remedial law intended to protect laborers and

material suppliers from nonpayment by contractors and

subcontractors involved in the construction or repair of public

buildings and public works." N-Tek Constr. Servs., Inc. v.

Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 186, 190 (2016). See

Massachusetts Gas & Elec. Light Supply Co. v. Rugo Constr. Co.,

321 Mass. 20, 23 (1947), quoting Burr v. Massachusetts Sch. for

the Feeble–Minded, 197 Mass. 357, 360 (1908) ("The object of

[§ 29] is to give those furnishing labor and materials 'security

equivalent to the lien which the law creates upon the property

of other owners in like cases'"). Thus, it follows that a

liberal interpretation of § 29's remedial purpose would

recognize the plaintiffs, as representatives of funds designed

to secure benefits for a project's workers, as having a

contractual relationship to the general contractor who was

contractually obligated to assist in collecting the payment of

such benefits. Cf. Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459 Mass. 697, 708

(2011) (concluding that, in light of G. L. c. 151B's remedial

purpose, it would be error to impose "current employee" as

modifier where statute addresses action taken by "any person"
18

against "another person" and statutory language does not require

limitation). To conclude otherwise, that is, to construe

§ 29's notice requirement in a manner that limits trustees of

benefit funds in collecting important kinds of compensation

under the statute when these trustees often have limited access

to relevant jobsite information, would be inconsistent with the

statute's remedial nature and intent to "improv[e] the flow of

funds in the construction industry." Manganaro Drywall, Inc. v.

White Constr. Co., 372 Mass. 661, 664 (1977), quoting St. 1972,

c. 774, § 5.

Because the plaintiffs had a "contractual relationship"

with the general contractor (here, CTA) within the meaning of

§ 29, we conclude that the plaintiffs were not required to

follow the § 29 notice procedure for claimants that have

contractual relationships only with subcontractors. Therefore,

that the plaintiffs nevertheless chose to provide written notice

to CTA, yet did so earlier than § 29 envisions, does not affect

the validity of their claims.13 It was sufficient, for § 29

purposes, that the plaintiffs filed this Superior Court action

within § 29's one-year period for doing so.

13We distinguish here between the notice to the contractor
required by § 29, which we conclude was not required in this
instance, and the notice to the contractor (as employers)
required by art. 15, § 1, of the collective bargaining
agreement, the giving of which is not disputed.
19

Lastly, we note that the decision in Peters v. Hartford

Acc. & Indem. Co., 377 Mass. 863 (1979), on which Arch relies,

is not contrary to our conclusion. In Peters, supra at 865-866,

the Supreme Judicial Court was asked to determine whether

trustees of an employee benefit fund could maintain an action

against a surety pursuant to § 29, where a "sub-subcontractor"

was delinquent in making contributions to the trustees. The

surety argued that, because the liable party was a sub-

subcontractor, and thus not in direct privity with the general

contractor, the statute foreclosed the plaintiffs from bringing

a claim, as the express language of the statute mentions only

claimants that have a contractual relationship to either a

subcontractor or general contractor. Id. at 865-866. The court

disagreed, reasoning that such a limitation was incompatible

with § 29's intent, legislative history, and pragmatic

considerations.14 See id. at 869-872.

Arch's argument that the court in Peters provided the

plaintiffs with an "exact road map . . . to correctly make a

14We note that the Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation
of § 29 in Peters departed from the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270a (the
predecessor to 40 U.S.C. § 3131, the current Federal analog to
G. L. c. 149, § 29) in applying § 29's protections to those
having a contractual relationship to sub-subcontractors. See
J. W. Bateson Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 586, 589-594 (1978)
(interpreting Miller Act to be inapplicable to "sub-
subcontractors" based on legislative history). See also Peters,
377 Mass. at 868 n.12 (discussing J. W. Bateson Co., supra).
20

claim and pursue recovery under [§ 29]" misses the mark.

Although the plaintiff trustees in Peters provided the general

contractor and subcontractor with written notice of the sub-

subcontractor's delinquency "which met all the requirements of"

§ 29, the court addressed not how those requirements applied to

the trustees, but only whether the plaintiffs could bring the

claim at all where sub-subcontractors were delinquent. See id.

at 865, 869-872. Thus, we do not read Peters to require

claimants to comply with § 29's notice requirement, where, as

here, the claimants maintained a "contractual relationship"

recognized in § 29 with the general contractor via a collective

bargaining agreement.

In sum, where the plaintiffs and CTA had a contractual

relationship arising out of the collective bargaining agreement

of which the plaintiffs were intended third-party beneficiaries,

no written notice of their claims was required under § 29.

Accordingly, we vacate the entry of summary judgment and remand

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.