Commonwealth v. Amrith A. Maharajh.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-425

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

AMRITH A. MAHARAJH.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury-waived trial, on an indictment charging

aggravated assault and battery, a Superior Court judge found the

defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of assault and

battery. The judge also found the defendant guilty of mayhem

and assault and battery on a household member. On appeal, the

defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence of mayhem,

and that the judge abused his discretion by admitting evidence

of the defendant's prior bad acts. We affirm.

1. Sufficiency of evidence. The defendant was convicted

under the second branch of the mayhem statute, G. L. c. 265,
§ 14,1 for using a kitchen knife to cut the victim's neck,

leaving a scar. The defendant claims that there was

insufficient evidence to support his mayhem conviction where the

Commonwealth's evidence failed to establish that he had the

specific intent to maim or disfigure the victim. Based on the

evidence presented, we disagree.

When analyzing whether the record evidence is sufficient to

support a conviction, an appellate court is not required to "ask

itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v.

Hartnett, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 467, 475 (2008), quoting

Commonwealth v. Velasquez, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 147, 152 (1999).

Nor are we obligated to "reread the record from a [defendant]'s

perspective." Palmariello v. Superintendent of M.C.I. Norfolk,

873 F.2d 491, 493 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 865 (1989).

See Commonwealth v. Duncan, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 152 (2008).

Rather, the relevant "question is whether, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

1 The second branch of the mayhem statute states "whoever,
with intent to maim or disfigure, assaults another person with a
dangerous weapon, substance or chemical, and by such assault
disfigures, cripples or inflicts serious or permanent physical
injury upon such person . . . shall be punished." G. L. c. 265,
§ 14. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 425 Mass. 718, 721-722
(1997).

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of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v.

Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

The mental state required to support a mayhem conviction

"is satisfied by direct or inferential proof that the assault

was intentional, unjustified, and made with the reasonable

appreciation on the assailant's part that a disabling or

disfiguring injury would result." Commonwealth v. Ogden O., 448

Mass. 798, 800 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 10 Mass.

App. Ct. 190, 196 (1980). "[S]pecific intent may . . . be

inferred from the severity and extent of the [victim's]

injuries" (quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Forbes, 86 Mass.

App. Ct. 197, 199 (2014). It may also be inferred from evidence

that "the injuries arose from a sustained or atrocious attack"

(quotation and citation omitted). Ogden O., supra. The

evidence here met these standards.

In the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, evidence

showed that the defendant was "controlling," "possessive," and

"violent[]" and repeatedly subjected the victim to unwanted sex.

She described the situation not as "a relationship" but as "a

deal": "Like, he would go to work, come home every day, and I

would stay home, take care of the children, cook, clean and he

would use my body whenever he desired." He took her phone, set

up a surveillance camera to monitor her when he was not home,

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and limited her contact with her mother, siblings, and friends.

When the defendant was "home and awake," the victim was not

allowed to leave the apartment. On one occasion, she tried to

leave, the defendant chased after her, and shoved her into a

parked car and onto the ground.

On the day in question, in March 2020, the victim was six

months pregnant and showing, and the defendant was aware of her

pregnancy. She was in her kitchen, cleaning; she was not

feeling well, had cramps and a backache, and she was tired. The

defendant entered the kitchen and told the victim he wanted to

have sex; she did not. She told the defendant "no" and

explained that she was "having stomach cramps [and] belly

pains," but he paid her no heed. The defendant "coaxed" her to

a bed in the living room, "pushed [her] down," and "put all of

his weight on [her]." She kicked her legs and flailed her arms

in an attempt to get him off of her. In the process, she

accidently kicked the defendant in his genitals. Angered, the

defendant went to the kitchen where he retrieved a knife.2 In

the meantime, the victim, crying for her mother, ran for the

apartment door attempting to flee to her mother's home. He

stopped her at the door, "yanked" her neck back by her braided

hair, and drew the knife across her neck. The knife "sliced" or

2 The knife was a "kitchen knife" the victim used to cut
vegetables.

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"slashed" her skin and drew blood. While the victim cried in a

state of shock, the defendant called her a "bitch" and spit on

her. She wanted to call the police, but the defendant

threatened to "[f]'n finish it off" if she did. The victim did

not go to the hospital and bandaged the wound herself. The

bleeding eventually stopped, and the wound left a lasting,

visible scar. Her mother later noticed the scar, but the victim

avoided discussing it. Three years later, the scar remained

visible and unchanged at trial. The victim "see[s] it every day

in the mirror."

This evidence belies the defense contention that the attack

occurred in the "spur of the moment," i.e., not a sustained

attack, which is generally insufficient to support a conviction

of mayhem, absent a defendant's particularly "heinous" conduct.

Commonwealth v. Cleary, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 214, 218 (1996)

(single blow to face with bladeless axe handle insufficient to

support mayhem conviction where evidence showed defendant acted

in spur of moment after victim kicked his car). See

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 243, 246-247 (2003)

(beer bottle broken over victim's head insufficient evidence of

specific intent to maim in part because injuries were product of

single blow during fight). The victim, stating that she did not

feel well, wanted to be left alone, but the defendant attempted

sex against her will and became enraged when she resisted and

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kicked him. She cried for her mother and attempted to flee the

apartment, but the defendant stopped her and carefully sliced

her neck without damaging vital structures beneath the skin.

When viewing the totality of this evidence, a fact finder could

reasonably conclude that the knife wound (and accompanying

demeaning comment, threat, and spitting) was specifically

intended as a lasting and tangible message to the victim -- that

he controlled her and that her continued refusal to submit to

his will would result in physical injury or death. We have

examined the photographic evidence and note that the scar is

significant and spans horizontally from the front midline of the

victim's neck to the side. Unlike the line of cases cited by

the defendant where specific intent was in doubt because the

perpetrator "caused a more severe injury than anticipated,"

Commonwealth v. McPherson, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 125, 128-129

(2009), the injury here could be seen as inflicted with

precisely the surgical precision needed to send the message

intended by the defendant. "A prolonged attack is not a

necessary legal prerequisite to a finding of mayhem where a

specific intent to maim or disfigure can be inferred from the

circumstances of the attack and the severity of the inflicted

injuries." Ogden O., 448 Mass. at 801.

Apart from the sustained attack shedding light on the

defendant's specific intent, the victim's injury, while not as

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grievous as found in other cases, see McPherson, 74 Mass. App.

Ct. at 126 (damage to bridge of nose and eyes); Commonwealth v.

Hap Lay, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 27, 30 (2005) (damage to brain);

Commonwealth v. Mercado, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 391, 393-395 (1987)

(multiple lacerations and fractures to face and head), could be

viewed as a serious and even permanent disfiguration. See

Commonwealth v. Tavares, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 385, 390-391 (2004)

(serious and permanent injury may be inferred from "tiny line of

bruising extending from the front of the finger underneath the

nail bed" on each finger of child). Her mother readily noticed

the scar, the scar remained visible three years after the

attack, and the victim "see[s] it every day in the mirror."

Thus, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to submit

the case to the fact finder. See Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677.

2. Prior bad acts evidence. The defendant also claims

that the judge abused his discretion by permitting the

Commonwealth to admit numerous incidents of the defendant's

prior bad acts. We disagree.

A defendant's prior bad acts are not admissible to show a

defendant's bad character or propensity to commit the crime

charged. See Commonwealth v. Almeida, 479 Mass. 562, 568

(2018); Commonwealth v. Mullane, 445 Mass. 702, 708-709 (2006).

Such evidence may, however, be admissible to "establish motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or

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pattern of operation" (citation omitted). Almeida, supra. See

Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2) (2026). It may also be admissible to

prove a witness's state of mind or bias. See Commonwealth v.

Monico, 396 Mass. 793, 807 (1986). However, such evidence will

not be admitted if its probative value is outweighed by the risk

of unfair prejudice to the defendant. See Commonwealth v.

Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014).

Most of the complained of bad acts involved the defendant's

strained relationship with his landlord, including threats the

defendant made, nonpayment of rent, parking issues, the

defendant being "rude" and "angry," as well as the landlord

obtaining a "restraining order" against the defendant.3 The

defendant objected to some of this evidence, but not because it

was prior bad act evidence, but rather on grounds of relevance

and for a lack of a proper foundation being laid. Sua sponte,

the judge put on the record that he was admitting this evidence

"not for propensity, but just in regard[] to the
relationship that th[e] witness has had with the defendant.
So[,] it’s not going in for propensity, but I think it's
relevant as to her testimony, her bias, perhaps, and
motive. So that's why I'm allowing that in, not for
propensity as to -- or bad character, okay?"

Because the defendant failed to object or objected on

different grounds than raised on appeal, we review to determine

3 In fact, one of these bad acts was elicited on cross-
examination by defense counsel.

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if the judge abused his discretion, and if so, whether it

created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See

Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 293-296 (2002). Here,

the judge correctly stated the law and properly admitted the

evidence. See Almeida, 479 Mass. at 568; Mullane, 445 Mass. at

708-709. There was no abuse of discretion, and thus, no risk

that justice miscarried.

The defendant also claims it was improper to permit the

victim to testify that on one occasion when she tried to leave

the house, the defendant chased and pushed her, causing her to

fall and cry. To this testimony, the defendant objected on the

ground that it was improper prior bad act evidence. Later,

without objection, the victim testified that the defendant would

not let her breast feed her daughter and kicked her off the bed.

After the first question, the judge explained that because this

case involved domestic violence, the victim's testimony was

admissible to show the hostile nature of her relationship with

the defendant.

Here, the judge again properly stated the law and the

evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts was relevant to show

"the hostile nature of the relationship between [the] victim and

[the] defendant."4 Commonwealth v. Miller, 475 Mass. 212, 229

4 The defendant also takes issue with the landlord's sister
testifying, without objection, that she overheard arguments

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(2016). See Commonwealth v. Butler, 445 Mass. 568, 575 (2005);

Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 54 (2009).

Accordingly, the judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting

this evidence. There was also no risk that any prejudicial

effect of both groups of acts outweighed their probative value.

In general, this risk is low in a jury-waived trial, because the

judge is presumed to have applied correct principles of law and

not to have relied on evidence for an improper purpose.5 See

Commonwealth v. Milo M., 433 Mass. 149, 152 (2001). In this

case, we need not indulge the presumption as the judge expressly

stated on the record the correct use of the evidence.

Judgements affirmed.

By the Court (Meade,
Hodgens & Allen, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: May 15, 2026.

between the defendant and the victim, and that during one
argument, she heard the victim "screaming" and calling the
defendant a "liar." Such testimony was also admissible to show
the hostile relationship between the defendant and the victim.

5 The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448
Mass. 122, 128 (2006), is inapposite, where that case involved a
jury trial.

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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