In the Matter of the Estate of Julia Elisabeth Rice.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-4

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JULIA ELISABETH RICE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

A single justice of this court granted Catherine J. Cahners

leave to file an interlocutory appeal of a Probate and Family

Court judge's order. That order allowed Susan H. Rice, sister

of the decedent, Julia E. Rice, and special personal

representative (SPR) of her estate, to waive the decedent's

attorney-client privilege for purposes of the SPR's wrongful

death action against Cahners and others on behalf of the estate.1

We conclude that Cahners does not have standing to pursue this

appeal, which must therefore be dismissed. We note that if

Cahners did have standing, we would affirm the order.

1Cahners also appealed from the order disqualifying a
particular law firm from representing her. See Tran v. Liberty
Mut. Group, Inc., 490 Mass. 1001, 1001 n.2 (2022). Cahners has
made no arguments on that issue, so we affirm that order.
Background. The underlying facts and claims need not be

described in detail. It suffices to say that the decedent had

named Cahners, her decluttering contractor and later, friend, as

cotrustee of the decedent's revocable trust. The decedent also

nominated Cahners to serve as personal representative to

administer her estate. Cahners is alleged to have assisted the

decedent in taking her own life.

After the probate judge appointed the decedent's sister as

SPR, the SPR filed a wrongful death action in Superior Court

against Cahners and others. Having reason to believe that the

decedent's law firm might have information regarding the

circumstances of her death, the SPR served a subpoena on the

firm for documents relating to its representation of the

decedent. Cahners and the firm moved to quash the subpoena.

Before the Superior Court judge ruled on the motion to quash,

the probate judge issued an extension of the SPR order but

specified that "the [SPR] does not have the court's authority to

waive the [d]ecedent's attorney client privilege." The Superior

Court judge then issued an order quashing the subpoena on the

ground that, although an SPR may generally have authority to

waive the privilege, in this case the probate judge had

"specifically and unequivocally curtail[ed] [the SPR's]

authority."

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All defendants in the wrongful death action then moved for

judgment on the pleadings; as relevant here, the Superior Court

judge denied the motion as to Cahners individually. The SPR

then moved to vacate the restriction barring her from waiving

the decedent's attorney-client privilege. The probate judge

allowed the motion, and this appeal by Cahners followed.

Discussion. The SPR asserts that Cahners lacks standing to

pursue this appeal. We agree. "We treat standing as an issue

of subject matter jurisdiction." Ginther v. Commissioner of

Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 322 (1998). "The issue of standing may be

raised at any time." Matter of the Receivership of Harvard

Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 434 Mass. 51, 56 (2001). Only "[a]

person aggrieved by an order . . . of a probate court" may

appeal. G. L. c. 215, § 9. "Under that statute a person is

aggrieved if some pecuniary interest or personal right of

[theirs] has been adversely affected, or if some public or

official duty has been restricted or impaired by [the probate

court's] order, decree or denial." Altshuler v. Minkus-Whalen,

31 Mass. App. Ct. 937, 938 (1991), quoting McKay v. Audubon

Soc'y, Inc., 318 Mass. 482, 484 (1945).

Cahners argues that as a trustee of the decedent's trust,

she is an "interested person" pursuant to G. L. c. 190B,

§ 1-201 (24), and, as such, has standing to pursue this appeal.

Section 1-201 (24) states that an interested person includes

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those "having a property right in or claims against a trust

estate or the estate of a decedent . . . . It also includes

persons having priority for appointment as personal

representative, and other fiduciaries representing interested

persons." G. L. c. 190B, § 1-201 (24). Cahners, however, does

not address this court's decision in Estate of Birkenfeld, where

we held that being an "interested person" under G. L. c. 190B,

§ 1-201 (24), entitles one to notice but does not displace the

common-law requirements of standing. Estate of Birkenfeld, 103

Mass. App. Ct. 628, 628 (2023). In light of that decision, even

if Cahners is an interested person under the statute, that is

insufficient to confer standing to appeal. Cahners must instead

qualify as a "person aggrieved" under G. L. c. 215, § 9.

Cahners claims that as a trustee of the decedent's trust,

she is a person aggrieved. She contends that it is her

appointed function as a trustee to execute the intent of the

decedent by restricting the SPR's involvement in the decedent's

estate. Cahners claims she held the authority to waive the

decedent's attorney-client privilege until the probate judge

granted the SPR that authority.

General Laws c. 203E, § 816, describes the powers of

trustees, most of which are directly related to the

administration of trust assets. We see nothing in § 816

granting a trustee broad power to execute the intent of a

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decedent generally.2 Although generally a trustee may "prosecute

or defend an action, claim or judicial proceeding . . . to

protect trust property and the trustee in the performance of the

trustee's duties," G. L. c. 203E, § 816 (24), Cahners is not

doing so here. Nor has she shown how the decedent's trust could

be negatively affected by the SPR's wrongful death action. If

anything, the SPR's successful prosecution of that action could

add assets to the estate, and thus potentially to the trust,

from a beneficial settlement or an award of damages.

Additionally, the SPR has not depleted estate or trust assets by

prosecuting that action, because she has funded it personally.

In short, Cahners has not shown how the SPR's prosecution of the

wrongful death action confers standing on Cahners in her

capacity as a trustee of the decedent's trust.

Nor does Cahners have standing as the personal

representative of the estate. Although the decedent nominated

her as such, she was never appointed by the judge, see G. L.

c. 190B, § 3-103, and so she has no powers or duties in that

capacity. Finally, Cahners's status as a defendant in the

2 We recognize that "[a] trustee, without authorization by
the court, may exercise . . . powers conferred by the terms of
the trust," and certain additional powers "except as limited by
the terms of the trust." G. L. c. 203E, § 815. But Cahners has
not provided us with the decedent's trust documents and she
makes no argument that the terms of the trust strengthen her
claim to standing.

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wrongful death action does not give her standing to contest the

SPR's authority to waive the decedent's attorney-client

privilege. The waiver would have at most an indirect and

speculative effect on Cahners's interest in that action, and

such effects do not confer standing to appeal the order. See

Ginther, 427 Mass. at 323; Altshuler, 31 Mass. App. Ct. at 938.

We note, nonetheless, that were the appeal properly before

us, we would affirm the order. Generally, a decedent's

attorney-client privilege may be waived by the personal

representative of the decedent's estate. See Matter of John Doe

Grand Jury Investigation, 408 Mass. 480, 483 (1990). Cahners

does not contend that an SPR lacks such authority or cannot

obtain it from the appointing court. See generally G. L. c.

190B, §§ 3-617 (a), 3-715 (a) (22), 3-715 (b). Nor was the

probate judge barred from revisiting her previous ruling denying

the SPR such authority. "Though there is no duty to reconsider

a case, an issue, or a question of fact or law, once decided,

the power to do so remains in the court until final judgment or

decree." Salter v. Scott, 363 Mass. 396, 401-402 (1973),

quoting Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597, 601 (1940). Finally,

despite Cahners's unsupported assertion to the contrary, the

probate judge, in deciding whether to allow waiver of the

privilege, could reasonably consider the Superior Court judge's

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ruling that the wrongful death action had at least sufficient

merit to survive Cahners's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Conclusion. We dismiss the appeal from the order dated

July 11, 2023, allowing the SPR to waive the decedent's

attorney-client privilege. We affirm the order dated July 11,

2023, disqualifying Cahners's then-counsel from representing her

in the Probate and Family Court proceedings. See note 1, supra.

So ordered.

By the Court (Sacks, Shin &
Hershfang, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: December 3, 2024.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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