Hunley, Johnny v. Parr, Nicole et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

JOHNNY RAY HUNLEY, JR.,

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER
v.
24-cv-22-wmc
NICOLE PARR,
GUNNER LEE,
JUSTIN RIBAULT,
ERIN WEHRLE, and
SARAH MARTIN,

Defendants,

Plaintiff Johnny Ray Hunley, Jr., a state prisoner representing himself, has been
granted leave to proceed on claims of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment
as well as a claim of medical negligence under Wisconsin law. Specifically, plaintiff
contends that: (1) all defendants were deliberately indifferent and negligent by failing to
schedule timely a CT scan ordered by an outside provider; and (2) two defendants, Dr.
Justin Ribault and Nurse Erin Wehrle, persisted in treatment they knew to be ineffective.
(Dkt. #15.) Pending before the court are: defendants’ opposed motion for summary
judgment (dkt. #30); plaintiff’s motion for the court to take judicial notice of adjudicative
facts (dkt. #43); and defendants’ unopposed motion to strike plaintiff’s reply in support
of his additional proposed findings of fact (dkt. #59). For the following reasons, the court
will grant defendants’ motions and deny plaintiff’s motion.
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BACKGROUND
1

A. The Parties
At all relevant times, plaintiff Johnny Hunley was in custody of the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections (“DOC”). In January 2023, Hunley was assigned to the
Wisconsin Secure Program Facility (“WSPF”), where all defendants were then employed.
More specifically, defendant Dr. Justin Ribault was employed as a physician. In
this role, Dr. Ribault attended to inmate medical needs, such as diagnosing and treating
illnesses and injuries, as well as arranging off-site consultations. When inmates are sent to
an off-site provider, they return with an “off-site service request and report” allowing those
providers to fill out a “recommended plan of care.” (Dkt. #35, at ¶ 11-16.) Health
Services Unit (“HSU”) staff review those recommendations with inmates and advise them
that their Advanced Care Provider (“ACP”) will place any orders for such recommended
care as is deemed appropriate. (Id.)
In WSPF’s HSU, defendant Erin Wehrle was also employed as a Nurse Clinician 2;
defendant Nicole Parr was employed as a Health Services Manager (“HSM”); and
defendant Gunner Lee was employed as an Assistant Health Services Manager (“AHSM”).

1
Plaintiff asks this court to take “judicial notice of adjudicative facts of documentary evidence”
submitted as exhibits to his proposed findings of fact and in his response to defendants’ proposed
findings of fact. (Dkt. #43, at 1.) However, because these exhibits are part of the record already,
the court need not take judicial notice. Accordingly, his motion will be denied as moot.
Additionally, plaintiff conceded that his reply to defendants’ response to his proposed finding of
fact was not authorized by this court’s standard procedures and that the court may strike it from
the record. (Dkt. #61.) The court will do so by granting defendants’ motion to strike. Accordingly,
unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are material and undisputed as drawn from
defendants’ reply to plaintiff’s response to their proposed findings of fact (dkt. #50) and
defendants’ response to plaintiff’s proposed finding of fact (dkt. #51).
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In those roles, defendants Wehrle, Parr, and Lee were Hunley’s first point of contact for
medical issues and would work to resolve symptoms that did not require urgent evaluation
from an ACP. Generally speaking, all HSU staff work to find solutions through education
and over-the-counter medications, which they may distribute by following nursing
protocols established by DOC’s Bureau of Health Services. However, nursing staff may
not prescribe medications, refer patients to off-site specialists, order imaging studies, or
override an ACP’s treatment decisions.
Finally, defendant Sarah Martin was employed as a Medical Program Assistant
Associate (“MPAA”). In this role, Martin only scheduled appointments and could not
determine a course of treatment.
B. Plaintiff’s Care
On October 26, 2022, Hunley was seen for a physical by an Advanced Practice
Nurse Prescriber (“APNP”), Jodi Fields, who is not a defendant. Hunley reported to Fields
that he had been drinking minimal water during the day and previously had been on a
medication for urinary hesitancy and a weak stream, although he denied pain or burning.
Fields noted that a urinalysis test taken on October 3 revealed microscopic hematuria (i.e.,
trace amounts of blood in his urine). In response, Fields encouraged Hunley to increase
his water intake and ordered a pelvic ultrasound, as well as another urinalysis.
On December 8, 2022, APNP Fields saw Hunley for a follow up. While Hunley’s
most recent urinalysis had come back “normal” (meaning without microscopic hematuria),
his ultrasound showed a mildly enlarged prostate. As a result, Fields prescribed Hunley
tamsulosin, a long-term medication prescribed to relax the prostate, which improves urine
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flow and reduces urgency, frequency, and the feeling of incomplete emptying associated
with an enlarged prostate. Fields also noted that Hunley may need a urology consultation
if his symptoms continued.
However, on January 23, 2023, Hunley was transferred to WSPF. The very next
day, Nurse Wehrle saw Hunley in that institution’s HSU to address his complaint that his
symptoms worsened after he began taking tamsulosin. After a urinalysis was completed
and shown to be within normal limits, Nurse Wehrle encouraged Hunley to drink fluids
and continue his medications. Wehrle also informed him that an ACP would be updated
on his condition. After that appointment, Nurse Wehrle promptly updated Dr. Ribault,
who noted that neither Hunley’s previous pelvic ultrasound nor his most recent urinalysis
explained his symptoms. Dr. Ribault also told Nurse Wehrle that if Hunley was not seeing
obvious changes with tamsulosin he could stop taking it. Still, because Hunley’s urinalysis
came back normal, and because his symptoms were not accompanied by fever, chills, flank
pain, nausea or vomiting, Dr. Ribault was unconcerned that Hunley was experiencing an
urgent or emergent issue.
On February 10, two nurses, Wehrle and non-defendant Kaitlin Kinyon, saw
Hunley in WSPF’s HSU where he now reported that tamsulosin was helping with urinary
retention, but he was still experiencing pain in his testicles and had a red, swollen urethra.
After Nurses Wehrle and Kinyon obtained a urine sample, which was normal, they advised
Hunley that his ACP would again be updated. In addition, Nurse Wehrle ordered
acetaminophen and Motrin for Hunley’s pain.
On February 20, Dr. Ribault saw Hunley for the first time. Hunley advised that
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tamsulosin was helping with some of his urinary symptoms, and Dr. Ribault advised him
to continue taking it. Dr. Ribault further noted that Hunley’s lab tests were normal, but
because Hunley’s issues were not resolving on their own, he ordered a urology consultation.
On February 23, a non-defendant nurse, Anna Fernberg, also saw Hunley in the HSU
following his request for antibiotics to address his urinary complaints. However, Nurse
Fernberg advised that an ACP would not prescribe antibiotics without knowing or
suspecting that Hunley had a bacterial infection.
A month later, on March 27, Hunley was seen by Dr. Hoxie, a non-defendant ACP,
at an off-site urology clinic. At that appointment, Hunley reported having issues with
dysuria (pain, burning, or discomfort with urination) for the last three years. He also
reported a history of microscopic hematuria and an enlarged prostate, which tamsulosin
had not helped, but denied having blood in his urine, nor significant urgency or frequency
in urination. In his notes, Dr. Hoxie wrote, “At this point I going to obtain a CT scan with
and without IV contrast due to the microscopic hematuria” and that he “Will have
[Hunley] follow up for a cystoscopy to make sure that intravesical abnormalities are present
which could be causing his symptoms.” (Dkt. #33-1, at 96.) In Dr. Hoxie’s
“recommended plan of care” section of Hunley’s off-site service request and report, Dr.
Hoxie also wrote “follow up for cystoscopy” noting further that “imaging will call to have
CT set-up.” (Id., at 95-96.)
When Hunley returned to WSPF, he reviewed this off-site service request and report
with HSU staff, who forwarded it to Dr. Ribault. On March 28, Dr. Ribault ordered the
cystoscopy though not a CT scan, believing the latter was unnecessary since Hunley’s lab
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tests had been negative for microscopic hematuria since October 2022. Later that same
day, MPAA Martin scheduled the cystoscopy for May 15.
On April 18, Hunley sent two HSRs inquiring about scheduling of his urology tests.
Nurse Wehrle reviewed both and responded that he had a scheduled appointment with
urology for a cystoscopy. On May 9, Hunley submitted another HSR and was told the
appointment was soon. Then on May 11, MPAA Martin received a call from the provider,
stating that Hunley needed a CT before they could perform a cystoscopy. Although Martin
inquired about the possibility for Hunley to add a trip for a CT before the still scheduled
cystoscopy on May 15, security was unable to do so because of staffing issues, and without
the CT scan, the off-site medical facility decided that it was necessary to reschedule the
cystoscopy. At that point, Martin informed Dr. Ribault that Hunley needed to have a CT
scan before his cystoscopy. The next day, Dr. Ribault ordered the CT scan, and Martin
scheduled both appointments.
On June 9, Hunley was seen off-site for his CT scan, which disclosed simple cysts
in his kidneys. These cysts are common, asymptomatic, and harmless fluid-filled sacs that
rarely require intervention and would not have caused Hunley’s symptoms. Ten days later,
on June 19, Hunley was again seen off-site for his cystoscopy. Upon arriving at the off-site
facility, however, Hunley was informed that his appointment would need to be rescheduled
once again, this time due to equipment issues. MPAA Martin rescheduled Hunley’s
cystoscopy appointment for the next available date and time, which unfortunately was not
until August 21. On June 23, Hunley was again seen in the HSU for urinary complaints.
He was offered acetaminophen and ibuprofen for the pain but declined, stating that these
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medications made his symptoms worse.
A month later, on July 25, another non-defendant WSPF physician, Dr.
Degiovanni, saw Hunley for a follow up on his pelvic CT results. At this visit, Hunley
reported that his pain had become “unbearable” and that taking acetaminophen or
ibuprofen caused a greater burning sensation. In response, Dr. Degiovanni ordered a
comprehensive metabolic panel and a prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test. On July 31,
Hunley was also seen by AHSM Lee for his urological concerns. During that appointment,
Lee emphasized that multiple recent urinalysis dips showed no signs of infection or blood,
reviewed Hunley’s chart and his recent and upcoming labs, and ordered a urinalysis, which
returned normal results. On August 14, Dr. Degiovanni further sent Hunley a letter
explaining that his recent PSA test had returned normal results, meaning he had tested
negative for prostate cancer, prostatitis, gonorrhea, and chlamydia. Then, on August 21,
Hunley was seen by an off-site urology provider for his delayed cystoscopy. However, that
provider found neither structural abnormalities in Hunley’s bladder or urethra nor evidence
of trabeculation, erythema, or inflammation.
On November 20, Hunley was again seen by an off-site urology provider for his
complaints of urinary pain. At this appointment, the provider took an ultrasound of
Hunley’s scrotum, which found small cysts and an enlarged right varicocele vein. Again,
however, neither finding required follow-up care, as these cysts were benign and often come
and go throughout a patient’s lifetime. In particular, because his cystoscopy was negative,
neither finding prompted the provider to believe Hunley required further evaluation or
treatment.
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Finally, on December 7, almost eleven months since Hunley’s transfer to WSPF,
Dr. Degiovanni reviewed Hunley’s urology report. Because other issues had been ruled
out, Dr. Degiovanni noted that Hunley may have a non-infectious inflammatory syndrome
or chronic pelvic pain syndrome, then started him on a trial of amitriptyline. However,
these syndromes are ordinarily diagnosed through exclusion, requiring other potential
conditions to be tested for and ruled out.
OPINION
In this suit, plaintiff claims that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, plaintiff
contends that: (1) all defendants failed to schedule a CT scan timely; (2) Dr. Ribault
encouraged him to take medicine that he knew would be ineffective; and (3) Dr. Ribault
and Nurse Wehrle instructed him to take medicine that would actually worsen his
condition. Defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing that all of plaintiff’s
claims fail because he cannot meet the exacting, deliberate-indifference standard or
demonstrate that he suffered actual harm. In the alternative, defendants assert entitlement
to qualified immunity.
Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of
showing that there is no genuine dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, 605 F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010). If that initial
burden is met, then the non-moving party must show that material, disputed issues of fact
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exist, preventing the entry of summary judgment. Id.
Moreover, “[t]he nonmoving party must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932,
937 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586-87 (1986)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving
party’s position will be insufficient to survive a summary judgment motion; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id.
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). Summary judgment is
properly entered against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial.” Austin v. Walgreen Co., 885 F.3d 1085, 1087-88 (7th Cir. 2018)
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
While pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings, that
“status doesn’t alleviate his burden on summary judgment,” meaning plaintiff has the
burden to come forward with evidence that demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact.
Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 760 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Further, while the
court must view the record “in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and constru[e]
all reasonable inferences from the evidence in his favor,” Moore v. Western Ill. Corr. Ctr., 89
F.4th 582, 590 (7th Cir. 2023), a nonmovant is only entitled to favorable inferences that
are supported by admissible evidence, not those based upon mere “speculation or
conjecture.” Grant v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted).
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Here, plaintiff’s primary claim is that defendants failed to adequately treat his
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits “cruel and unusual
punishments” caused by deliberate indifference to conditions resulting in the “unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Although the
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, officials have a duty under the Eighth
Amendment to provide “humane conditions of confinement” by ensuring that inmates
receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 832 (1994).
To succeed on a claim of constitutionally inadequate medical care in particular, an
inmate “must show ‘(1) an objectively serious medical condition to which (2) a state official
was deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.’” Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th 818, 824
(7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th
Cir. 2016)). A medical need is objectively serious if it “has been diagnosed by a physician
as mandating treatment” or “is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d
451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotations omitted). For purposes of
summary judgment, defendants have conceded that plaintiff’s ongoing urological
complaints presented an objectively serious medical condition. (Dkt. #31, at 13.)
As for proof of the requisite deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must prove a prison
official “actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm.” Petties v. Carter, 836
F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); see
also Brown v. Osmundson, 38 F.4th 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2022) (same). Indeed, the Seventh
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Circuit recognizes that proof of deliberate indifference is “a high bar ‘because it requires a
showing [of] something approaching a total unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the face
of serious risks.’” Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 710 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Rosario v.
Brawn, 670 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2012)). Thus, when a prisoner has received medical
treatment for his medical condition, courts will generally defer to a medical professional’s
professional judgment as to the adequacy of that care unless a plaintiff introduces evidence
of a departure from ordinary care by: “refus[ing] to take instructions from a specialist”;
“fail[ing] to follow existing protocol”; “persist[ing] in a course of treatment known to be
ineffective”; “choos[ing] easier and less efficacious treatment without exercising
professional judgment”; or “inexplicably delay[ing] [] treatment which serves no
penological interest.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 729-31 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
I. Plaintiff’s CT Scan
To begin, plaintiff claims that all defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by ignoring Dr. Hoxie’s initial instruction to schedule a CT scan in March 2023 in addition
to the cystoscopy. This claim fails for two reasons: first, plaintiff has produced no evidence
from which a reasonable jury could infer that (1) Dr. Ribault or any other defendant
deliberately ignored or delayed or were indifferent to plaintiff’s need for a CT scan; and (2)
even if Dr. Ribault or another defendant unreasonably delayed ordering a CT scan, plaintiff
has produced no evidence from which a reasoanble jury could infer that this delay
exacerbated his condition or unnecessarily prolonged his pain.
As to Dr. Ribault’s decision not to order a CT scan for plaintiff in March 2023,
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nothing from Dr. Hoxie’s notes indicated that a CT scan was necessary before scheduling
plaintiff’s cystoscopy. Rather, Hoxie specifically wrote, “I am going to obtain a CT scan
with and without IV contrast due to microscopic hematuria,” dkt. #33-1, at 96 (emphasis
added), which Dr. Ribault understood to mean a CT scan was being ordered because
plaintiff reported microscopic hematuria. In contrast, Dr. Ribault knew that the only
urinalysis to show microscopic hematuria was in October 2022, almost six months before
Dr. Hoxie noted the need for a CT scan before plaintiff’s cystoscopy. Plus, the three
urinalysis tests taken by plaintiff since then had come back normal. Because the stated
reason for Dr. Hoxie’s proposed plan of care was contradicted by plaintiff’s medical records,
therefore, a reasoanble jury could find at most that Dr. Ribault reasonably, although
mistakenly, believed that a CT scan was unnecessary and did not order one until later,
after the off-site provider explained the need for one. Such a mistake, without more, might
have been negligent but is not evidence of deliberate indifference. Whiting, 839 F.3d at
662; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06 (“an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical
care cannot be said to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ or to be
‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’”).
In opposition, plaintiff nevertheless argues that the evidence shows Dr. Hoxie
needed the CT scan as a prerequisite to the cystoscopy because it was less surgically
intrusive and risky. However, plaintiff identifies no language in Dr. Hoxie’s March 2023
notes showing that the CT scan served any purpose beyond his reported microscopic
hematuria. If anything, the record indicates that had Dr. Ribault known the CT scan was
a prerequisite for plaintiff’s cystoscopy, Ribault would have ordered it, just as he did when
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the need for one was explicitly communicated by an off-site provider in May 2023.
Additionally, plaintiff has provided no evidence that ordering a cystoscopy without a prior
CT scan falls outside the parameters of the exercise of professional discretion. Accordingly,
no reasonable jury could infer that Dr. Ribault was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s
medical needs when he did not schedule the CT scan in March 2023.
Likewise, even if Dr. Hoxie’s March 2023 notes could be interpreted as requiring a
CT scan as a prerequisite to plaintiff’s cystoscopy, no reasonable jury could find that Dr.
Ribault’s delay in ordering a CT scan rose to a constitutional violation. To succeed on a
constitutional claim for a delay in medical treatment, an inmate must place “verifying medical
evidence in the record to establish [its] detrimental effect.” Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235,
1240 (7th Cir. 1996). Again, plaintiff has produced no evidence that the delay had any
detrimental effect or that benign cysts discovered on imaging were caused by any treatment
plaintiff failed to receive. To the contrary, despite plaintiff’s continued pain, the record
shows that (1) after October 2022, his labs and images were consistently normal, and (2)
any potential diagnosis required exclusion, which only more time could resolve.
Accordingly, no jury could conclude that delay caused by Dr. Ribault rose to the level of a
constitutional violation and for this additional reason he is entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law.
As for defendants Parr, Lee, Wehrle, and Martin, plaintiff contends that they each
knew through various means that Dr. Hoxie requested a CT scan in March 2023, and that
it needed to be done before the cystoscopy but did not schedule it or adequately explain
this need to Dr. Ribault. However, none of these defendants are ACPs, authorized to
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determine a course of treatment or override the treatment decisions of an ACP, to whom
they must defer. Thus, each of these defendants were entitled to rely on Dr. Ribault’s
treatment decisions. See McCann v. Ogle Cnty., Ill., 909 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 2018)
(affirming summary judgment for nurse who deferred to doctor’s prescription despite
leading to overdose). Accordingly, defendants Parr, Lee, Wehrle, and Martin are entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law on this claim as well.
II. Plaintiff’s Use Of Tamsulosin
Plaintiff separately claims that Dr. Ribault violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by encouraging him to take tamsulosin despite knowing that it would provide no relief.
However, plaintiff concedes, as he must, that defendant Ribault communicated to Nurse
Wehrle that plaintiff could stop taking tamsulosin if he was not seeing obvious changes.
(Dkt. #38, at 15.) Further, plaintiff’s own medical records reveal that he told Dr. Ribault
that tamsulosin was improving some of his urinary symptoms. (Dkt. #33-1, at 76.)
Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find on that record that Dr. Ribault’s encouraging
plaintiff to continue taking tamsulosin even amounted to negligence, much less deliberate
indifference. As a result, Dr. Ribault is also entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law on this claim.
III. Plaintiff’s Other Prescribed Medications.
Plaintiff claims that defendants Wehrle and Ribault further violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by prescribing and signing off on the use of other medications that they
knew or should have known would worsen his symptoms. In support of this contention,
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however, plaintiff merely offers patient education instructions that he received from the
HSU about dysuria, which advised against use of ibuprofen or other drugs that may act as
blood thinners if a patient has blood in their urine because those medications may increase
bleeding. (Dkt. #49-2, at 3-4.) However, when plaintiff was first prescribed
acetaminophen and Motrin for pain in February 2023, the medical record shows he did
not have blood in his urine. In fact, plaintiff’s only uranalysis containing blood was in
October 2022, more than four months prior, and in all subsequent urinalysis blood was not
present. Given that plaintiff was not experiencing hematuria when advised to take
acetaminophen and Motrin, nor any time after, no jury could conclude that defendants
Wehrle or Dr. Ribault were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs when prescribing
these medications. Accordingly, these defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law on this claim.
IV. Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, defendants have asserted the defense of qualified immunity, which
protects government officials from liability for damages unless they “violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982). Once the defense is raised, plaintiff bears the burden of defeating it by showing
that: (1) the defendants violated a constitutional right; and (2) the constitutional right was
clearly established at the time of the violation. Garcia v. Posewitz, 79 F.4th 874, 778 (7th
Cir. 2023). “If either inquiry is answered in the negative, the defendant official is entitled
to summary judgment.” Pierner-Lytge v. Hobbs, 60 F.4th 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 2023)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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At minimum, plaintiff has not shown that any of the named defendants in this case
clearly violated his constitutional rights by failing to schedule a CT scan in response to Dr.
Hoxie’s initial communications nor by affirmatively prescribing tamsulosin,
acetaminophen, and Motrin while continuing to search for a longer term remedy. Because
plaintiff has failed to offer any clearly established right being violated in this case, the court
will grant defendants motion for summary judgment for this additional reason as well.
V. State Law Claims
2

Finally, Plaintiff has pleaded medical negligence claims against defendants under
Wisconsin law, which are only before this court through an exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Because the court has now dismissed all of
plaintiff’s federal claims, and plaintiff has not alleged any other basis for the exercise of
federal jurisdiction over these state-law claims, district courts are encouraged to relinquish
supplemental jurisdiction absent unusual circumstances. See Coleman v. City of Peoria,
Illinois, 925 F.3d 336, 352 (7th Cir. 2019). Since there are no unusual circumstances that
would justify retaining jurisdiction, therefore, the court declines to exercise any further
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s common law medical negligence claims and will dismiss those
claims without prejudice so that plaintiff may pursue them in state court to the extent not
time barred.

2
Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed on state law medical negligence claims in a text only order
that was separate from this court’s screening order (dkt. #23), although, these claims were not
addressed in defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
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ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (dkt. #30) is GRANTED as to all
of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims..
2) Plaintiff’s state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
3) Defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s reply in support of his additional
proposed findings of fact (dkt. #59) is GRANTED.
4) Plaintiff’s motion for the court to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts (dkt.
#43) is DENIED AS MOOT.
5) The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment consistent with this opinion
and close this case.
Entered this 21st day of July 2026.

BY THE COURT:

/s/
__________________________________
WILLIAM M. CONLEY
District Judge
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