Huddleston v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

BRIAN HUDDLESTON,

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE.
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Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-447
Judge Mazzant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Second Motion to Stay Scheduling Order
Deadlines (Dkt. #21). After reviewing the Motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds the
Motion should be granted.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Plaintiff Brian Huddleston’s FOIA requests against Defendants the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) (Dkt. #1), which
are pending before Defendants now (Dkt. #3, Exhibits 1–3). On October 22, 2020, the Court
entered a scheduling order (Dkt. #9). On February 1, 2021, the Court entered an amended
scheduling order. Huddleston v. FBI, No. 4:20-CV-447, 2021 WL 327510, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Feb.
1, 2021).
On April 8, 2021, Defendants filed their Second Motion to Stay Scheduling Order
Deadlines (Dkt. #21), currently before the Court. On April 13, 2021, Huddleston filed his response
(Dkt. #22). On April 20, 2021, Defendants filed their reply (Dkt. #23). And on April 26, 2021,
Huddleston filed his sur-reply (Dkt. #24).

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LEGAL STANDARD
The authority to stay proceedings is “incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). Because stays are
“an ‘intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review,’” Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (quoting Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C.
Cir. 1958) (per curiam)), they are “not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise
result,” Virginian R. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926). Instead, stays are “an exercise
of judicial discretion, and the ‘party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the
circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.’” Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler
LLC, 556 U.S. 960, 961 (2009) (per curiam) (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 433–34); see Exner v. FBI,
542 F.2d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 1976) (explaining that the responding agency bears the burden to
demonstrate its due diligence in fulfilling its FOIA-related obligations).
The decision to stay proceedings is “left to the sound discretion of the district court, and it
is the district court’s responsibility to weigh the competing interests of the parties relating to the
appropriateness of a stay.” Wolf Designs, Inc. v. Donald McEvoy Ltd., Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d 848,
853 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55). Since “FOIA imposes no limits on
courts’ equitable powers in enforcing its terms,” deciding whether to grant a stay is unaffected by
FOIA. Payne Enters., Inc. v. United States, 837 F.2d 486, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing
Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1974)).
ANALYSIS
In its previous order, the Court did not grant Defendants’ initial motion to stay the
Scheduling Order as requested. The Court explained that it would consider a reasonable delay of
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these proceedings if Defendants were to “(1) explain the exceptional circumstances associated with
the handling of Huddleston’s FOIA requests more precisely, and (2) present a less amorphous
processing and production schedule.” Huddleston, 2021 WL 327510, at *3. Defendants have done
exactly this here.
First, in its pleadings, Defendants make clear that the strained resources of their
departments and significant volumes of other FOIA requests should allow for production at a
standardized rate of 500 pages per month (Dkt. #21 at pp. 3–4). The circumstances Defendants
detail in their Motion and reply plausibly warrant a reasonable delay of the proceedings. See Gov’t
Accountability Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 568 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59 (D.D.C.
2008) (explaining that circumstances warranting a stay exist when there are “insufficient resources
to deal with those requests in the time frames set forth in the FOIA”). As well, “[a] number of
[c]ourts have found a production rate of 500 pages per month reasonable under specific
circumstances.” White v. Exec. Off. of U.S. Att’ys, 444 F. Supp. 3d 930, 943 (S.D. Ill. 2020), aff’d
sub nom. White v. FBI, No. 20-1798, 2021 WL 1118087 (7th Cir. Mar. 24, 2021); see id. at 943–
44 (collecting cases). Moreover, in this request for stay, Defendants have laid out a more specific
and concrete timeline for document production (see Dkt. #21 at pp. 4–5). This additional detail in
Defendants’ pleadings provides the Court further reason to view the relief requested in the Motion
as reasonable. See Democracy Forward Found. v. DOJ, 354 F. Supp. 3d 55, 60 (D.D.C. 2018)
(finding an agency’s “exercise of due diligence in responding to [FOIA] requests” to warrant a
stay of the proceedings). Given the content of Defendants’ pleadings and the Court’s
“considerable discretion to manage [its] docket” by “grant[ing a] stay and set[ting] a briefing
schedule,” the Court finds that Defendants’ request should be accommodated. Henson v. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 892 F.3d 868, 874 (7th Cir. 2018).
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In response, Huddleston offers two arguments explaining why the Motion should be
denied, neither of which is persuasive.
1
First, Huddleston asks what has changed from Defendants’
last request that would warrant a stay of the proceedings now but not then (Dkt. #22 at pp. 1–2).
The answer to this question is straightforward: Defendants have provided more particularized
detail regarding the nature of the document production and have proposed a realistic, tangible
schedule for document production. Granting a stay based on these pleadings finds significantly
more basis in established law than Defendants’ first request for stay. See, e.g., Elec. Frontier
Found. v. DOJ, 517 F. Supp. 2d 111, 118–20 (D.D.C. 2007) (granting a stay where definitive proof
of a shortage in agency resources and the exercise of due diligence to process the FOIA request
was apparent). Second, Huddleston states that he has a “hard time understanding why
[Defendants] can only produce 500 pages per month,” elaborating that individuals in the private
sector “routinely process 500 pages or more per day” (Dkt. #22 at pp. 2–3). But the FOIA and
“convention civil litigation” contexts are distinct from one another when it comes to “reviewing
and processing documents,” Middle E. Forum v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 297 F. Supp. 3d
183, 186 (D.D.C. 2018), as “[d]ifferent considerations determine the outcome of efforts to obtain
disclosure,” Stonehill v. I.R.S., 558 F.3d 534, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2009). See Millennium Mktg. Grp.
LLC v. United States, 238 F.R.D. 460, 462–63 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (detailing the differences).
Particularly with this consideration in mind, Huddleston’s non-effort to explain why Defendants’
proposed production schedule is unreasonable does not lend credibility to his position.

1
Huddleston also offers an ancillary argument, stating that the quantity and quality of the documents Defendants
produced in the initial round of production are somehow deficient and insufficient (see Dkt. #24 at pp. 1–2). Apart
from offering no legal justification supporting his claim of inadequacy, Huddleston’s dissatisfaction with the produced
documents is of no concern to the Court at this stage. If Huddleston is unsatisfied with Defendants’ production, he
may later avail himself of the FOIA statutory scheme to challenge the production. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); see
also Batton v. Evers, 598 F.3d 169, 175 (5th Cir. 2010).

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In sum, given Defendants’ explanation for the requested stay, Defendants’ proposed
production schedule, and the absence of legal justification for Huddleston’s opposition to the
Motion, the Court finds that a stay of the proceedings is warranted.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants’ Second Motion to Stay Scheduling Order
Deadlines (Dkt. #21) is hereby GRANTED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Scheduling
Order in this case is amended as follows:
April 23, 2021 First Production

May 24, 2021 Second Production

June 24, 2021 Third Production

July 24, 2021 Final Production

IT IS SO ORDERED.
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