Frangos et al v. Flagg et al

2026 BNH 002 Note: This is an unreported opinion.
______________________________________________________________________________

UNITED
STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

In re: Case No. 24-10379-KB
Chapter 13
Thomas Anthony Frangos,
Debtors.

Thomas Anthony Frangos et al,
Plaintiffs.
v. Adv. No. 24-1010-KB

Jonathan Flagg et al,
Defendants.

Richard N. Gottlieb
Law Offices of Richard N. Gottlieb
Terrie Harman
Harman Law Offices
Kathleen McKenzie
Attorneys for Thomas Anthony Frangos, Frances Frangos, and the Frances Ann Frangos
Revocable Trust of 2002, Plaintiff

Jonathan M. Flagg
Flagg Law PLLC
Attorney for Flagg Law PLLC and Bank of New York Mellon

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
One day before a scheduled trial in state court was set to commence, the Plaintiff Thomas
Anthony Frangos (“Mr. Frangos”) filed the underlying bankruptcy case. Opposing counsel
Jonathan Flagg (“Attorney Flagg”) asked the Plaintiff’s bankruptcy counsel to assent to relief
from the automatic stay for the trial to proceed, which was declined. While the state court
received notice of the bankruptcy filing, it chose to proceed with the trial because two non-debtor
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parties remained: Frances Frangos and a trust in her name. Attorney Flagg and state court
counsel for Mr. Frangos argued whether the codebtor stay applied, both to state court staff and
with each other. Attorney Flagg may have threatened to subpoena Mr. Frangos if he did not
appear for the trial, but that is not clear. On the morning of the trial, Attorney Flagg argued that
the codebtor stay did not apply, but ultimately persuaded the presiding judge in chambers to
continue the trial to first obtain relief from stay in the bankruptcy court. The Plaintiffs began
drafting a complaint to commence this proceeding the same day. On these (abridged) facts, the
Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants violated the automatic stay and codebtor stay, and claim
damages from emotional distress, lost wages and travel expenses and $125,000 or more in
attorneys’ fees.
1
The Plaintiffs also request punitive damages.
The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the Defendants violated the automatic stay or codebtor stay. Because this Court concludes
that a violation of the automatic stay or codebtor stay did not occur, the Plaintiffs are not entitled
to damages. Nevertheless, because a significant amount of time during the trial was dedicated to
the issue of damages, the Court deems to appropriate to address them here. The Court will enter
judgment in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs.
This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1334 and 157(a) and Local Rule 77.4(a) of the United States District Court for the District of
New Hampshire. Venue and jurisdiction are properly with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1408 and 1409. This is a core proceeding in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).

1
The total amount of attorneys’ fees incurred by the Plaintiffs was to be determined after the trial in this case upon
request of this Court, but evidence reflected that certain attorneys’ fees totaled at least $125,000.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Relevant Parties and the Bankruptcy Case
1. The Plaintiffs Thomas A. Frangos and Frances A. Frangos (“Mrs. Frangos”) are
individuals who reside at 33 Gosport Road, Portsmouth, NH 03801. ECF No. 15 ¶¶ 11–12. The
Plaintiff Frances Ann Frangos 2002 Revocable Trust (the “Tru s t” and with Mr. and Mrs.
Frangos, the “Plaintiffs”) is a trust established by Mrs. Frangos on March 12, 2002. Id. ¶ 17.
2. The Defendant Jonathan Flagg is a New Hampshire attorney with a business
address of 93 Middle Street, Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801. Id. ¶ 13. The Defendant Flagg
Law is a professional limited liability company operated by Attorney Flagg and located at 93
Middle Street, Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Id. ¶ 14. The Defendant Bank of New York Mellon
(“BONY”), trustee for Certificate Holders of CWABS, Inc., Asset Backed Certificate, Series
2005-AB2, is a New York corporation with a mailing address of 101 Barclay Street 4W, New
York, New York 10286. Id. ¶ 15.
3. Mr. Frangos filed the underlying bankruptcy case on May 30, 2024 (Case No. 24-
10379-KB) (the “Bankruptcy Case”). BONY moved on June 4, 2024 for relief from the
automatic stay to proceed with a state court trial that was previously scheduled for May 31, 2024.
Bankruptcy Case ECF Nos. 12, 13. The Court granted relief from the automatic stay t o BONY
on July 3, 2024. Id. ECF No. 28. The post-petition events of May 30 and 31, 2024 are the entire
basis for this proceeding.
B. The Adversary Proceeding
4. On August 7, 2024, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Defendants
commencing this adversary proceeding. ECF No. 1. The Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
on October 1, 2024 (the “Complaint”). ECF No. 15.
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5. According to the Complaint, Mr. Frangos purchased real property at 33 Gosport
Road, Portsmouth, New Hampshire (the “Property”) on March 14, 2002. Compl. ¶ 23. Mr. and
Mrs. Frangos later transferred the Property to the Trust on April 1, 2003, where it allegedly
remains. Id. ¶¶ 24–27. Mr. Frangos executed a $599,000 promissory note in favor of BONY on
April 25, 2005, and executed a mortgage against the Property. Id. ¶¶ 28–29, 71.
6. BONY filed an action in Rockingham County Superior Court, New Hampshire
(the “Superior Court”) on May 16, 2022 asserting claims against the Plaintiffs for unjust
enrichment, quantum meruit, equitable subrogation, reformation of mortgage and deed and to
quiet title (the “State Court Action”). Id.¶ 32. The State Court Action was set for trial on May
31, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. Id. ¶ 34. Mr. Frangos was represented by Attorney Terrie Harman, and Mrs.
Frangos and the Trust were represented by Attorney Vincent Marconi. Id. ¶¶ 35–36.
7. Mr. Frangos filed the Bankruptcy Case on May 30, 2024, the day before trial in
the State Court Action. Id. ¶ 38. Attorney Kathleen McKenzie, bankruptcy counsel for Mr.
Frangos, sent Attorney Flagg a text message screenshot of Mr. Frangos’s bankruptcy filing
approximately ten minutes after the filing. Id. ¶ 39. Five minutes later, Attorney McKenzie
emailed the screenshot of Mr. Frangos’s bankruptcy filing to Attorneys Flagg, Harman, and
Marconi, as well as Patrice Touma, Clerk of the Court for the Superior Court (“Ms. To u m a”),
and other Superior Court staff. Id. ¶ 40. A suggestion of bankruptcy was filed with the Superior
Court later that day. Id. ¶ 42. Attorney Flagg acknowledged the bankruptcy filing that day and
asked whether Attorney McKenzie would consent to relief from the automatic stay. Id. ¶ 41.
8. Ms. Touma responded to Attorney McKenzie’s e-mail by stating that because only
Mr. Frangos filed bankruptcy, the automatic stay did not apply to Ms. Frangos or the Trust, and
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the State Court Action trial would go forward. Id. ¶ 43. Attorneys Harman and McKenzie
responded by e-mail that the 11 U.S.C. § 1301 co-debtor stay applied. Id. ¶ 44.
9. Attorney Flagg replied to Attorneys Harman and McKenzie that the State Court
Action was unrelated to Mr. Frangos’s bankruptcy estate, that he would be at trial the next day
with his witnesses and that the State Court Action judge would have to decide whether the stay
applied. Id. ¶ 45. Attorney Flagg further stated: “Mrs. Frangos is not a co-debtor. She did not
sign the note.” Id. ¶ 46. On May 30, 2024, Attorneys Harman and McKenzie held a conference
call with Attorney Flagg in which they stated: (1) proceeding with trial in the State Court Action
would violate the automatic stay; (2) bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine
whether the automatic stay applies; (3) Attorney Flagg proceeding with trial in the State Court
Action would be a willful stay violation; (4) Attorney Flagg’s actual knowledge of the
bankruptcy and acknowledgment of the stay by asking for assent to relief from stay potentially
exposed him to punitive damages; and (5) neither Mr. Frangos or Attorneys Harman and
McKenzie would appear at trial the next day. Id. ¶ 47. Attorney Flagg allegedly demanded that
Mr. Frangos appear at trial and indicated that “his deposition transcript would simply be read into
the evidence in lieu of live testimony” if he did not appear. Id. ¶¶ 48–49.
10. On May 31, 2024 at 9:00 a.m., Judge David Ruoff held a hearing regarding the
automatics stay’s application to the State Court Action. Id. ¶ 50. Mrs. Frangos was present in the
courtroom with Attorney Marconi, while Mr. Frangos was in the Superior Court parking lot “in
the event that Judge Ruoff made an order requiring his immediate presence”. Id. ¶¶ 51–52. The
Complaint alleges that Judge Ruoff “acknowledged that proceeding with the hearing would
subject” Attorney Flagg and BONY “to sanctions for violation of the automatic stay if in fact the
Stay applied”. Id. ¶ 53. Attorney Flagg “repeatedly argued in favor of moving forward with the
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trial” and “repeatedly argued that neither the automatic stay nor the co-debtor stay applied”. Id.
¶¶ 54–55. Judge Ruoff stated that the trial would commence at 10:00 a.m. that day. Id. ¶ 59.
11. At 9:56 a.m., Attorney Flagg asked Attorney McKenzie for her assent to an
expedited hearing on a motion for relief from stay in the bankruptcy court, which Attorney
McKenzie declined to give. Id. ¶ 60. Attorneys Flagg and Marconi later “agreed that a short
continuance would be in order.” Id. ¶ 61. Judge Ruoff then issued a two page order concluding
that: (1) the automatic stay did not apply to the State Court Action; (2) if the bankruptcy court
disagreed, any trial would be void; and (3) the trial would be continued to July 19, 2024 for
Defendant BONY to seek relief from stay in the bankruptcy court. Id. ¶ 62.
12. Based on these allegations, the Complaint includes two counts against the
Defendants for willful violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1) and (k), and
willful violation of the co-debtor stay under 11 U.S.C. § 1301. Compl. ¶¶ 63–110. The Plaintiffs
allege that they lost wages and incurred travel expenses, attorneys’ fees, and emotional distress
as a result of the Defendants’ alleged stay violations, and request damages, punitive damages,
and attorneys’ fees. Id.
13. The Defendants answered the Complaint on January 30, 2025. ECF No. 37. The
Defendants largely admit the Complaint’s allegations, with the following exceptions: they deny
that Attorney Flagg demanded Mr. Frangos appear at trial during the May 30, 2024 conference
call between Attorneys Flagg, Harman and McKenzie; deny allegations regarding the mortgage’s
validity; deny that Attorney Flagg “personally acknowledged” the automatic stay; and deny that
Mr. and Mrs. Frangos lost wages or incurred travel expenses, attorneys’ fees, or emotional
distress from the Defendants’ alleged conduct. Id. ¶ 2; see Compl. ¶¶ 29–31, 48, 72–74, 80, 86–
96, 103–110.
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14. The Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on June 30, 2025 requesting
that the Court find the Defendants liable for violations of the automatic stay and co-debtor stay.
ECF No. 74. The Defendants objected on July 28, 2025. ECF No. 80. The Court denied the
motion for summary judgment, primarily relying on a transcript of the May 31, 2024 hearing in
the State Court Action. See ECF No. 33. At that hearing, Attorney Flagg stated: “I’m prepared to
go forward. I have no intention of violating the automatic stay. That’s a very serious thing. I
don’t want to violate the automatic stay . . . .” Id. at 10:2–10. Later, after a recess where
Attorneys Flagg and Marconi met with Judge Ruoff in chambers, Judge Ruoff stated: “Out of an
abundance of caution, [Attorney Flagg] has requested a short continuance so that it may seek
relief/review from the bankruptcy court about whether the automatic stay applies to the case.
This Court was willing to proceed with the trial on the merits on today’s date, but agrees that a
more prudent approach would be to allow the bankruptcy court to review the issue.” Id. at 22:20–
23:2. The Court concluded that it could not find that the Defendants willfully violated the
automatic stay through their actions at the May 31, 2024 hearing because: (1) the Superior Court
set the hearing, not the Defendants; and (2) while Attorney Flagg stated he was prepared to go
forward, he convinced Judge Ruoff to continue the matter, and did not request testimony from
the Frangos or ask that their deposition transcripts be read into evidence. The Court left open
whether statements made by Attorney Flagg in chambers with Judge Ruoff could support
liability.
15. This Court held a bench trial regarding the Complaint on November 17, 2025.
The Plaintiffs and Defendants submitted post-trial briefs which this Court has reviewed and
considered. See ECF Nos. 108-109.

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C. The Plaintiffs’ Case in Chief
1. Attorney Harman
16. The Plaintiffs’ first witness at trial was Attorney Harman, Mr. Frangos’s counsel
in the State Court Action. Trial Tr. 23:10–16. According to Attorney Harman, she informed
Attorney Flagg by e-mail in the spring of 2024 that Mr. Frangos would be filing a bankruptcy
case. Id. 23:22–24:12. When Mr. Frangos filed the Bankruptcy Case on May 30, 2024, Attorney
McKenzie informed Attorney Flagg of the filing. Id. 25:16–20. Attorney Harman also discussed
the Bankruptcy Case with Attorney Flagg that day, by both e-mail and conference call with
Attorney McKenzie. Id. 25:25–26:23.
17. On the conference call, Attorney Harman informed Attorney Flagg that the May
31, 2024 trial in the State Court Action would be stayed by the automatic stay in the Bankruptcy
Case. Id. 26:24–27:3. Attorney Flagg “pushed back”, disagreeing that the trial was stayed
because the Trust was not a co-debtor of Mr. Frangos, and requesting that Attorney Harman
stipulate that the Trust was a co-debtor. Id. 27:3–11. Attorney Harman refused and stated that
Attorney Flagg had two options: “take a voluntary non-suit without prejudice or [] simply
continue the trial and get a comfort order from the Bankruptcy Court to be able to go forward
. . . with your trial”. Id. 27:14–20.
18. Attorney Harman then stated that the trial is “not going forward. We’re not
attending. The bankruptcy stay applies. Don’t go forward.” Id. 28:6–8. Attorney Flagg then “got
pushy”, stating that he would “subpoena your client. I’ll subpoena Tom Frangos and I have his
deposition transcript. I’ll read his deposition transcript into the record.” Id. 28:8–11. Attorney
Harman informed Attorney Flagg that proceeding with the trial with knowledge of the
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Bankruptcy Case was “lining [him] up for punitive damages.” Id. 28:13–21. Attorney Flagg’s
response was “not collaborative”. Id. 28:22–29:1.
19. The Plaintiffs decided to have Mr. Frangos take Mrs. Frangos to the Superior
Court on May 31, 2024, where Mr. Frangos would wait in the parking lot, as he “didn’t need to
go because of the automatic stay” but would “be available in case something else came up that
[Attorney Harman] couldn’t predict.” Id. 29:7–14, 21–24. Attorney Harman spoke to Attorney
Marconi, who stated that he and Attorney Flagg “talked and the trial is off for tomorrow.” Id.
29:14–18. According to Attorney Harman, Attorney Marconi “wasn’t prepared” for trial because
“he knew there was going to be a bankruptcy”, but stated he “better go anyway and take [Mrs.
Frangos].” Id. 29:25–30:13.
2. Attorney McKenzie
20. The Plaintiffs’ second witness was Attorney McKenzie. Attorney McKenzie
testified that initial discussions regarding preparing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition for Mr.
Frangos began in “early May of 2024.” Id. 67:4–8. Attorney McKenzie filed the Bankruptcy
Case before 9:00 a.m. on May 30, 2024, after which she texted Attorney Flagg “with a
screenshot of the notice of bankruptcy case filing”. Id. 68:17–25. Attorney McKenzie later
prepared a suggestion of bankruptcy for the Superior Court. Id. 69:1–4.
21. Attorney McKenzie participated in the afternoon conference call with Attorneys
Harman and Flagg. Id. 69:15–19. Attorney Flagg “changed course” regarding “what he thought
the bankruptcy filing meant” during the afternoon call. Id. 69:20–70:4. While Attorney Flagg
responded to the morning text message with a request to assent to relief from the automatic stay,
during the call later that day he “seemed pretty exasperated” at the Bankruptcy Case “stopping
the trial.” Id. 70:5–20. Attorney Flagg “thought that Mr. Frangos would not appear” and
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“indicated that [] he’ll just read Mr. Frangos’s deposition into the record”, meaning that he
“won’t have a chance to testify live if he doesn’t appear.” Id. 70:15–25. At the “very tail end of
the call” Attorney Flagg “made some remark about, well, now he has to go subpoena a
defendant” which Attorney McKenzie believed meant Mr. Frangos. Id. 71:1–6. Attorney
McKenzie recalled that Attorney Harman “plead[ed] with [Attorney Flagg] not to proceed”,
stating that, “You’re playing with fire. Don’t do this.” Id. 71:7–17. Attorney Harman suggested
that Attorney Flagg should instead “take a voluntary non-suit” to which he “kind of chuckled and
said, ‘Oh, [Attorney Harman], you’d love that, wouldn’t you?’” Id. 74:9–17.
22. Attorney McKenzie recalled receiving e-mail communications from Superior
Court staff indicating that they were reviewing the suggestion of bankruptcy, which only
appeared to apply to Mr. Frangos. Id. 72:12–73:1. Attorney McKenzie responded to that e-mail
to state “that the co-debtor stay did apply” to Mrs. Frangos. Id. 73:2–10. The e-mail chain
included her, Attorneys Harman, Flagg, and Marconi, and three Superior Court staff members.
Id. 73:13–20; Pl. Exs. 2–3. Ms. Touma later replied that: “As of right now, the bench trial will
remain on the docket as scheduled. The parties should be prepared to argue whether the Notice of
Bankruptcy stays the case given Attorney Flagg’s position outlined in his previous email. After
the hearing, the Judge will determine if the case will be stayed. If not, the case will proceed to
bench trial.” ECF No. 29 at 3.
2

23. Following the hearing on May 31, 2024, Attorney Flagg texted Attorney
McKenzie asking for consent to expedited relief from the automatic stay. Trial Tr. 74:18–22.
Attorney McKenzie believed this text was sent while Attorneys Flagg and Marconi were having

2
This e-mail was filed as a screenshot, which the parties agreed at trial would be submitted as Joint Exhibit 1. Trial
Tr. 104:12–106:20.
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an in-chambers discussion with Judge Ruoff while the hearing was in recess. Id. 74:23–75:8.
Attorney McKenzie declined to assent. Id. 75:9–12.
24. During cross-examination, Attorney Flagg directed Attorney McKenzie to page 73
of Defendants’ Exhibit 2. Trial Tr. 92:1–2. Attorney McKenzie described the exhibit as “an
interoffice memorandum” between Attorney Harman and Tim Chevalier, a former coworker of
hers. The exhibit is titled “Evaluation of Potential Stay Violations by the Superior Court” and
dated May 31, 2024, the day of the trial in the State Court Action. Def. Ex. 2 at 73. The Plaintiffs
stipulated that Mr. Chevalier “did a memorandum, which is a draft – an outline of a draft of the
complaint for violation of the automatic stay.” Trial Tr. 93:5–8. Attorney McKenzie testified that,
to her knowledge, no attorney for the Plaintiffs had “discussed damages with Mr. Frangos” as of
May 31, 2024. Id. 93:11–14.
3. Mr. Frangos
25. The Plaintiffs called Mr. Frangos as their third witness. Mr. Frangos testified that
he manages “construction sites for his own business.” Trial Tr. 108:4–7. Mr. Frangos does not
receive regular paychecks, but rather is “compensated at the very end of the job” “based upon the
profitability of the job itself.” Id. 109:6–12. He receives 60% of the proceeds from his jobs,
while his investors receive 40%.
3
Id. 110:11–16. The Court noted on the record that Mr. Frangos
indicated in his Schedule I, under penalty of perjury, that he receives $1,000 per month. Id.
111:11–14; see Bankruptcy Case ECF No. 21 at 26.
26. As of May 2024, Mr. Frangos had started “a four-unit townhouse in Portsmouth”
and finished “a restaurant in Exeter” and “a luxury house in Maine.” Trial Tr. 109:1–5. Two of

3
The transcript reflects that Mr. Frangos testified his investors receive “50 percent” of the proceeds, for a total of
110%. Trial Tr. 110:15–16. The Court assumes either that Mr. Frangos stated this figure in error, or that his answer
was transcribed incorrectly. See id. 115:19–23.
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the townhouse units have sold for $1,650,000 and $1,750,000; if the remaining units sold for
similar amounts, Mr. Frangos estimated total gross sales of $6,800,000 for that project. After
paying off a $4,150,000 note, he estimated earning $1,200,000 from the project. Id. 109:13–
110:6–10, 115:11–18.
27. However, if a job is delayed “for any reason,” his investors can demand a 50/50
split instead. Id. 115:19–23. According to Mr. Frangos, the townhouse job was delayed by him
waiting in the Superior Court parking lot during the morning on May 31, 2024. Id. 116:1–9. If he
is “not there and [] can’t supervise somebody, they may decide they can’t do the work in a day.
So they leave and go off on another job because these people are subcontractors, not employees.
So even though they miss one day I might not see them again for a week.” Id. 116:24–117:12.
Mr. Frangos estimated that his lost wages for May 31, 2024 were $6,000, calculated by dividing
the $1,200,000 expected return from the project by 200 days, which he estimated was the normal
time that the townhouse job would take. Id. 118:7–23.
28. According to Mr. Frangos, on the day of the scheduled trial, Mrs. Frangos “was
very nervous” and “doesn’t drive when she’s nervous” so Mr. Frangos had to drive her to the
May 31, 2024 hearing. Id. 118:24–119:8. As for Mr. Frangos, he testified that on the drive to the
Superior Court: “I was angry. I was livid.” Id. 119:9–11. He did not express that anger to Mrs.
Frangos because “I don’t even have to say a word. She knows.” Id. 119:12–14. After the May 31,
2024 hearing concluded, the Frangos’s may have stopped “at Market Basket to get something”
and then went home. Id. 122:6–10. They continue to be angry about the hearing. Id. 122:16–
123:15.
29. When Mr. Frangos was asked whether he had any emotional distress on May 30,
2024, he stated: “I was angry, so if you consider anger emotional distress, then I did.” Id.
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140:11–14. In his March 5, 2025 deposition in this proceeding, Attorney Flagg asked Mr.
Frangos whether he was worried on May 30, 2024; Mr. Frangos replied: “I don’t worry about
anything. It doesn’t matter because I was, I’ve been on the edge of death so many times I don’t
worry about anything.” Id. 140:15–141:7; Def. Ex. 2 at 44:23–45:3. Mr. Frangos admitted he did
not recall this proceeding being filed and did not see the original complaint before it was filed.
Trial Tr. 141:8–16. Mr. Frangos was asked whether he could have kept working after the May 31,
2024 hearing and he stated: “Possibly I did. I just don’t recall.” Id. 153:8–19.
4. Attorney Marconi
30. The Plaintiffs fourth witness was Attorney Marconi, State Court Action counsel
for Mrs. Frangos and the Trust. Attorney Marconi testified that, while the State Court Action was
set for trial in May, he did not prepare for trial “in the ordinary course” because he understood
that Mr. Frangos was going to file the Bankruptcy Case. Id. 126:17–127:8. Attorney Marconi
spoke with Attorney Flagg by phone the afternoon of May 30, 2024, after receiving the
suggestion of bankruptcy. Id. 127:24–128:10. Attorney Flagg “said something to the extent of,
‘Well, I guess our weekend is starting up,’” which Attorney Marconi believed to mean the State
Court Action trial would be continued. Id. 128:14–22.
31. After that call, Attorney Marconi received an e-mail from the Superior Court
Clerk’s office indicating that the trial would proceed on May 31, 2024 with the non-debtor
defendants. Id. 129:6–11. Attorney Marconi called Attorney Harman’s office, which explained
their position that the automatic stay and co-debtor stay applied to Mrs. Frangos and the Trust.
Id. 129:12–18. Attorney Marconi then called Mrs. Frangos in the evening, indicating that they
would need to be present for the trial. Id. 129:19–130:4.
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32. Attorney Marconi testified that Mrs. Frangos was “[a]nxious” and “[f]airly
nervous” at the May 31, 2024 hearing. Id. 131:15–20. He did not observe or recall Mrs. Frangos
crying. Id. 131:21–24.
33. At the hearing, Attorney Marconi argued that the automatic stay and co-debtor
stay applied to Mrs. Frangos and the Trust. Id. 132:14–20. Judge Ruoff “did not agree”. Id.
132:20–21. Judge Ruoff then recessed the hearing until 10:00 a.m. Id. 132:22–133:2. During the
recess, Attorney Flagg met with Attorney Marconi and “suggested that we continue the case.
Abundance of caution, something to that effect. And of course, I said, we’d assent.” Id. 133:3–
21; see 138:11–14. Attorneys Flagg and Marconi then met with Judge Ruoff in his chambers to
discuss a motion to continue the hearing drafted and filed by Attorney Flagg. Id. 133:22–134:15.
5. Mrs. Frangos
34. The Plaintiffs’ fifth witness was Mrs. Frangos. Mrs. Frangos stated that she had
three jobs in the period around May 2024: cleaning homes, working in a lingerie store and
working in a hotel during the summer. Id. 156:18–24. Mrs. Frangos could not recall what job she
would have worked on May 31, 2024, or how many jobs she would have worked that day. Id.
156:25–157:3, 20–24. She estimated her lost wages at $300. Id. 158:4–11.
35. Mrs. Frangos testified that, in her thirty-seven years of marriage to Mr. Frangos,
she had never struck her husband, except for “one night” after the trial. Id. 158:17–25, 163:20–
25. When Attorney Marconi informed Mrs. Frangos that she would have to go to the Superior
Court on May 31, 2024, she “was very upset. I was very angry. I was not happy with my husband
that I had to go to court. I didn’t sleep well that night. “Id. 161:11–22. According to her, “I was
angry that I had to go and I was told I didn’t have to go. I was angry that I was told I had to go
and my husband didn’t have to go that day.” Id. 161:23–162:2. Specifically, she was “upset” at
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being “forced to actually go and sit in court while” Mr. Frangos “would just be sitting in the
parking lot.” Id. 162:3–6. Mrs. Frangos was “very angry” and “very anxious” at the hearing, and
since the hearing hasn’t “been sleeping at night” and cries “for no reason.” Id. 163:6–10, 20–25.
36. At her March 5, 2025 deposition, Mrs. Frangos testified that she did not recall
either May 30 or May 31, 2024. Id. 172:11–173:5; Def. Ex. B at 7:2–18. On cross-examination,
Mrs. Frangos admitted she does not have a therapist or psychologist and she did not call her
doctor on May 30 or 31, 2024. Trial Tr. 182:21–183:3.
D. The Defendants’ Case in Chief
37. The Defendants’ first witness was Attorney McKenzie. In a January 29, 2025 e-
mail, she said to Mr. Frangos and Attorneys Harman and Gottlieb that, “Atty Flagg was arguing
that he doesn’t understand what emotional distress there could be, so we are going to need to nail
that down with both Mr. & Mrs. Frangos.” Trial Tr. 190:17–191:8; Def. Ex. 2 at 56. When asked
whether the time to nail down emotional distress damages is months after filing the Complaint,
Attorney McKenzie testified that she meant “to nail down the specifics of the emotional distress
beyond the general allegation”. Trial Tr. 191:9–24.
38. The Defendants’ second witness was Attorney Harman. When asked whether any
document provided in discovery showed the Frangos’s “talking about emotional distress” or their
attorneys billing for discussions with them about their emotional distress, Attorney Harman
testified that she could not remember. Id. 193:14–194:16. To Attorney Harman’s knowledge,
Attorney Gottlieb never spoke with Mrs. Frangos about this adversary proceeding prior to filing.
Id. 196:21–197:5.
39. The Defendants’ third witness was Attorney Flagg. He testified that he did not
recall demanding Mr. Frangos to appear for trial, and that didn’t make sense for him to make that
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demand because he would always prefer his opponents to not show up. Id. 221:24–222:8.
Attorney Flagg’s statement that he would read Mr. Frangos’s deposition into the record if he did
not appear was because, until the Superior Court informed the parties that the May 31, 2024 trial
would go forward, he “assumed we weren’t going to go forward with the trial” meaning Attorney
Flagg was scrambling to prepare. Id. 222:9–223:8.
40. Attorney Flagg then corrected Attorney Marconi, testifying that he did not file a
motion to continue the trial on May 31, 2024; rather, he asked Attorney Marconi to go with him
to “talk to the Judge” because he wanted “to get this thing continued because if the Judge is
wrong about whether the stay applies, nobody cares” while the consequences for Attorney Flagg
being wrong could be significant. Id. 223:9–224:6. Attorney Flagg did not believe he would be
able to get a motion to continue on file, even if he filed it the previous day, because such a
motion would not immediately get to Judge Ruoff. Id. 223:20–224:5.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Defendants Did Not Commit a Violation of the Automatic Stay

41. The Plaintiffs’ first claim is that the Defendants violated the automatic stay by
appearing at the May 31, 2024 hearing in the State Court Action and arguing that the trial should
move forward, despite having knowledge of the Bankruptcy Case. The automatic stay prohibits,
among other things, continuing judicial proceedings against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). To
prevail on a stay violation claim, the Plaintiffs must show by a preponderance of the evidence:
“(1) that a violation of the automatic stay occurred; (2) that the violation was willfully
committed; and (3) that the debtor suffered damages as a result of the violation.” In re Slabicki,
466 B.R. 572, 577–78 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). The Court concludes that the
Plaintiffs failed to show that the Defendants violated the automatic stay.
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42. The “automatic stay is extremely broad in scope and should apply to almost any
type of formal or informal action against the debtor or the property of the estate”. Id. (citation
modified). That said, it “does not prohibit all communication or actions by a creditor to a debtor.”
In re Knowles, 442 B.R. 150, 160 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “Mere requests” do
not violate the stay if they are not “coercive or harassing” and actions only violate the stay if they
“immediately or potentially threaten the debtor’s possession of its property,” requiring the debtor
“to take affirmative acts to protect its interest.” Id. (citation modified).
43. From the filing of the Bankruptcy Case on the morning of May 30, 2024 to Judge
Ruoff continuing the trial on the morning of May 31, 2024, there are at most three instances
where the Defendants’ actions could implicate the automatic stay: (1) when Attorney Flagg gave
a position regarding the notice of bankruptcy to Superior Court staff by e-mail the afternoon of
March 30, 2024; (2) during a conference call when Attorney Flagg indicated that he would have
to subpoena Mr. Frangos or read Mr. Frangos’s deposition into the record if the March 31, 2024
State Court Action trial went forward and Mr. Frangos did not appear; and (3) when Attorney
Flagg indicated to Judge Ruoff at the May 31, 2024 hearing that he was ready to go forward with
trial.
44. Regarding the first action, Attorney Flagg did not violate the automatic stay
because there is no evidence to suggest that he took any action against Mr. Frangos. When
Attorney McKenzie sent Attorney Flagg a text message of the notice of the Bankruptcy Case on
the morning of May 30, 2024, Attorney Flagg asked if she would assent to relief from stay,
indicating he understood the stay at least protected Mr. Frangos. Pl. Ex. 1. Later, at 1:43 p.m.,
Ms. Touma stated that because the notice of bankruptcy “only pertains to one Defendant” the
May 31, 2024 trial remained on the docket as to Mrs. Frangos and the Trust. Pl. Ex. 2 at 1. At
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3:02 and 3:12 p.m., Attorneys McKenzie and Harman each replied that the co-debtor stay applied
to the non-debtor defendants. Pl. Exs. 2 & 3. Attorney Flagg responded, but the substance of his
response is not in the record.
4
But given Ms. Touma already confirmed the notice of bankruptcy
was solely for Mr. Frangos, the Court can at least infer that, whatever Attorney Flagg’s position
was, it only concerned whether the automatic stay applied to Mrs. Frangos and the Trust, the
non-debtor Defendants. See Ex. 2; ECF No. 29 at 2–3.
45. Regarding the second action, Attorney Flagg did not violate the automatic stay.
While Mr. Flagg was described as “exasperated” or “pushy,” this is not enough to violate the
automatic stay. Trial Tr. 28:8–11, 70:5–20. In order to violate the automatic stay, his statements
needed to advance the proceeding somehow, and specifically for Mr. Frangos. See In re
Witkowski, 523 B.R. 291, 299 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2014) (collecting cases interpreting the term
“continuation” in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), abrogated on other grounds by In re Smith, 910 F.3d
576 (1st Cir. 2018). Nothing in the record suggests that Attorney Flagg drafted a trial subpoena
for Mr. Frangos, let alone served it.
5
Attorney Flagg did not read Mr. Frangos’s deposition into
the record either. See ECF No.33. Attorney Flagg did not cause the May 31, 2024 hearing to go
forward because Ms. Touma had already informed the parties that the Superior Court intended to
proceed with the matter. Pl. Ex. 2.; ECF No. 29 at 3. Attorney Flagg took no actions against Mr.
Frangos that advanced the Superior Court Action.
46. Even if the Court read 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) expansively to include “coercive or
harassing” statements that fail to advance a proceeding but “potentially threaten the debtor’s

4
Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that they wanted to introduce Attorney Flagg’s response into evidence, but never did
so. Trial Tr. 104:12–106:16.
5
A trial subpoena issued against Mr. Frangos solely for testimony regarding Mrs. Frangos and the Trust would also
not have violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). See In re Kenoyer, 489 B.R. 103, 113–117 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.) (citing In re
Miller, 262 B.R. 499 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001)) (finding no continuation of an action against a debtor the debtor
received a trial subpoena “for purposes other than to continue the prosecution of [] claims against Debtor”).
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possession of its property,” there is still no violation. Knowles, 442 B.R. at 160 (citation
modified). The “coerciveness of a statement” is measured by “the immediateness of any
threatened action and the context in which a statement is made.” In re Diamond, 346 F.3d 224,
227 (1st Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The record does not indicate that anyone ever relayed
Attorney Flagg’s comments to Mr. Frangos, meaning that he was not coerced or harassed by
them personally. While a threatened subpoena could coerce or harass a debtor by requiring them
to possibly incur attorneys’ fees in drafting a preemptive response such as a motion to quash,
there is no evidence that the Plaintiffs started or even considered such a motion. Mr. Frangos’s
appearance in the Superior Court parking lot—not even the courtroom—was not caused by
Attorney Flagg’s statements either; Mr. Frangos had to drive Mrs. Frangos, whose appearance
was required based on the message from the Superior Court indicating that the hearing would go
forward and not by Attorney Flagg’s actions. Trial Tr. 118:24–119:8; Pl. Ex. 2; ECF No. 29 at 3.
The Plaintiffs’ lack of reaction to Attorney Flagg’s statements, coupled with the Superior Court
already requiring the parties’ appearance the next day, convinces the Court that Attorney Flagg
did not violate the automatic stay by raising the possibility of subpoenaing Mr. Frangos’
appearance at the next day’s trial.
47. The Court also notes that there is conflicting testimony regarding whether
Attorney Flagg in fact demanded that Mr. Frangos appear on May 31, 2024, or that Attorney
Flagg would subpoena him. In Attorney Flagg’s words: “I did not demand that he appear. I don’t
recall now . . . . I don’t recall saying that and Attorney Harman doesn’t recall some of the things
in her notes about that conversation either. But it doesn’t make sense to me that I would demand
that he appear for trial because I don’t want him there.” Trial Tr. 221:24–222:8. That is, Attorney
Flagg would not have wanted Mr. Frangos to appear because that would benefit his case. The
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Court does not doubt that Attorneys Harman and McKenzie believe Attorney Flagg made these
statements, but it is unable to conclude by the preponderance of evidence that he did.
48. The third action similarly fails to show a violation of the automatic stay. While
Attorney Flagg stated on the record that he was “prepared to go forward,” Pl. Ex. 16 10:2, he
continued to say that he had “no intention of violating the automatic stay” and did not want
either himself or his client BONY to violate the automatic stay. Id. 10:2–5. More specifically, he
stated: “I’m not proceeding against anything having to do with Mr. Frangos. He would be a
witness.” Id. 10:8–10. Judge Ruoff made clear that he “was willing to proceed with the trial on
the merits on today’s date but” that Attorney Flagg, “requested a short continuance” to seek relief
from stay in the bankruptcy court, “out of an abundance of caution”. Id. 22:17–23:2. The May
31, 2024 trial may have proceeded but for Attorney Flagg’s intervention.
49. The Court thus concludes that the Plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the Defendants violated the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
B. The Defendants Did Not Commit a Violation of the Codebtor Stay

50. The Plaintiffs’ second claim is that the Defendants violated the 11 U.S.C. § 1301
codebtor stay. The codebtor stay provides that “a creditor may not act, or commence or continue
any civil action, to collect all or any part of a consumer debt of the debtor from any individual
that is liable on such debt with the debtor, or that secured such debt”. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(a). To
prove a violation of the codebtor stay: “(1) there must be an action to collect a consumer debt;
(2) the consumer debt must be one owed by the debtor; and (3) the action to collect must be
against an individual that is liable on such debt with the debtor.” Alvarez Velez, 617 B.R. 158,
166 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). The codebtor stay exists “to protect the debtor, not
the co-debtor.” In re Brooks, 340 B.R. 648, 655 (Bankr. D. Me. 2006) (citations omitted).
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51. In the Court’s view, the only potential codebtor stay violations in the record are
the same three instances discussed above: (1) when Attorney Flagg gave a position regarding the
notice of bankruptcy to Superior Court staff by e-mail the afternoon of March 30, 2024;
(2) during a conference call when Attorney Flagg indicated that he would have to subpoena Mr.
Frangos or read Mr. Frangos’s deposition into the record if the March 31, 2024 State Court
Action trial went forward and Mr. Frangos did not appear; and (3) when Attorney Flagg indicated
to Judge Ruoff at the May 31, 2024 hearing that he was ready to go forward with trial.
52. Attorney Flagg did not violate the codebtor stay in the first action because the
Superior Court already decided to hold the May 31, 2024 hearing, notwithstanding the filing of
the Bankruptcy Case. Ms. Touma informed the parties at 1:43 p.m. on May 30, 2024 that, “I
noticed that [the Notice of Bankruptcy] only pertains to one Defendant. Therefore, the Bench
Trials remain on the docket tomorrow for Defendants [Mrs. Frangos and the Trust].” Pl. Ex. 2.
Ms. Touma reiterated that decision after Mr. Flagg made his position known. ECF No. 29 at 3.
That is, Attorney Flagg took no affirmative action in the State Court Action to advance the trial.
53. The Plaintiffs appear to argue, at least implicitly, that any statement of position
regarding whether the automatic stay or codebtor stay applies to a proceeding is itself a violation
if made outside of bankruptcy court. This cannot be squared with the fact that state courts have
“concurrent jurisdiction” with the bankruptcy court to decide whether the automatic stay applies
to a given proceeding. See In re Angelo, 480 B.R. 70, 83 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012); In re Bagley, --
B.R. --, 2025 WL 3030022, at *13 (Bankr. D.R.I. Oct. 29, 2025) (citation omitted); 3 Collier on
Bankruptcy ¶ 362.08 (Resnick & Sommer eds., 16th ed.) (“A nonbankruptcy court may
determine the applicability of the automatic stay with respect to litigation pending before it, but
the bankruptcy court is not bound by that determination.” (collecting cases)); 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1334(b) (granting “original but not exclusive jurisdiction” over civil proceedings arising under
the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added)). While Attorney Flagg had a duty to inform the Superior
Court of the Bankruptcy Case if he knew it was unaware, In re Soares, 107 F.3d 969, 978 (1st
Cir. 1997), the Plaintiffs provide no authority to suggest that he was required to accept the
Defendants’ theory of the codebtor stay before the Superior Court. Opposing attorneys should be
able to engage in post-petition discussions with each other about whether the automatic stay
applies to a matter, provided they do not engage in “coercive or harassing” tactics. See Knowles,
442 B.R. at 160 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011).
54. Attorney Flagg also did not violate the codebtor stay in the second action. As
discussed above, Attorney Flagg never issued a subpoena or read Mr. Frangos’s testimony into
the record. The record is at least unclear whether Attorney Flagg even said he would do so.
Attorney Flagg does not remember making these statements, and presented a compelling
explanation as to why it was not in his interest to do so beyond issues regarding the automatic
stay: if the State Court Action went forward on May 31, 2024, Mr. Frangos’ failure to appear
meant that Attorney Flagg could use deposition testimony as he wished, with no opportunity for
Mr. Frangos to respond. Trial Tr. 221:24–222:8 (“[I]f I don’t have an opponent show up, I’m the
happiest guy on the planet.”). And if Attorney Flagg in fact made those statements, they did not
compel Mrs. Frangos’s appearance; instead, she appeared because of the decision of the Superior
Court to hold the May 31, 2024 hearing. Simply put, however “exasperated” or “pushy” Attorney
Flagg was towards Attorneys Harman and McKenzie during the conference call, the Plaintiffs
presented no evidence that his words harassed or coerced the Plaintiffs into doing anything. See
In re Sherkanowski, 2000 WL 33679425, at *7 (Bankr. D.N.H. Aug. 15, 2000) (“The respite is
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not from communications with creditors, but from the threat of immediate action by creditors,
such as a foreclosure or lawsuit.”).
55. Finally, Attorney Flagg did not violate the codebtor stay in the third instance.
While he argued that the codebtor stay did not apply and made clear that he was prepared to go
forward with trial on May 31, 2024, the Superior Court had jurisdiction to determine whether the
codebtor stay applied to the State Court Action. At the hearing, Attorney Flagg persuaded the
Superior Court not to exercise that jurisdiction in favor of allowing the bankruptcy court to
decide the issue. Attorney Flagg took no action on May 31, 2024 that advanced the State Court
Action, or attempted to collect a debt against Mrs. Frangos. For these reasons, this Court finds
that the Defendants did not violate the codebtor stay.
C. The Plaintiffs Did Not Suffer Damages from the Defendants’ Purported
Violations of the Automatic Stay and Codebtor Stay

56. While the Court has concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to prove a violation of the
automatic stay or codebtor stay occurred and are thus not entitled to damages, the Court finds it
prudent to address the alleged damages in this case. In doing so, this Court concludes that even if
it had found that a violation occurred, the Plaintiffs did not successfully demonstrate that they
suffered any damages.
57. Section 362(k)(1) “provides that an individual injured by any willful violation of a
stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees
and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” In re Duby, 451 B.R. 664,
670 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011) (citation modified) (emphasis added). Notably, the 11 U.S.C. § 1301
codebtor stay contains no similar provision. See In re Karmi, 638 B.R. 804, 819 (Bankr. D. Kan.
2022) (noting that § 362(k) only allows damages for violations of § 362, not § 1301); Harris v.
Margaretten & Co., 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (denying attorney fees under § 1301 “in the
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absence of a statutory authorization” (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421
U.S. 240, 247–255 (1975)).
58. Some courts have nevertheless awarded damages for codebtor stay violations, or
at least found them permissible, on a civil contempt theory. See, e.g., In re Burkey, 2012 WL
5959991, at *5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2012) (implying contempt of court is a basis for
awarding damages under § 1301, but finding insufficient evidence to do so); In re Tucker, 2017
WL 2773523, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa June 26, 2017) (awarding attorney fees under § 105(a)
because § 1301 provides for none). The Court declines to do so for two reasons.
59. First, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) cannot be used in a manner “inconsistent with any other
Code provision” or to “alter other substantive rights set forth in the Code.” In re Nosek, 544 F.3d
34, 44 (1st Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). The Court believes it would be inconsistent with the
Bankruptcy Code to authorize damages for violations of the codebtor stay when Congress chose
not to include a provision like 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), despite knowing how to do so. That is, where
a creditor violates only the codebtor stay, and not the automatic stay, the Court does not think it
appropriate to award damages where the Bankruptcy Code expressly allows damages for the
latter, but not the former.
60. Second, the Plaintiffs fail to prove that the Defendants engaged in civil contempt,
which requires finding that “(1) the alleged contemnor had notice that it was covered by the
order; (2) the order was clear and unambiguous; (3) the contemnor had the ability to comply with
the order; and (4) the order was in fact violated.” Escamilla v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 661 B.R. 676,
691 (D. Mass. 2024) (citing United States v. Saccoccia, 433 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2005)).
Substantial compliance is a defense to civil contempt sanctions. Morales Feliciano v. Rosello
Gonzalez, 124 F. Supp. 2d 774, 786 (D.P.R. 2000) (collecting cases). Where a party takes “all
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reasonable steps within its power to insure compliance with” a court order, “technical or
inadvertent violations of the order will not support a finding of contempt.” Id. (citations omitted).
In the Court’s view, the Defendants’ alleged violations of the codebtor stay are technical at worst.
While Attorney Flagg may have argued in favor of the Superior Court proceeding with trial, he
only did so after Ms. Touma made clear by e-mail that the May 31, 2024 hearing would go
forward despite Mr. Frangos filing the Bankruptcy Case. Pl. Exs. 2 & 3; ECF No. 29 at 3.
Attorney Flagg did not follow through on his statement that he would subpoena Mr. Frangos, if
he made it at all, and they would have had to attend the May 31, 2024 hearing anyway, given the
Superior Court made clear its intent to proceed if it concluded that the codebtor stay did not
apply. Moreover, it was Attorney Flagg that ultimately persuaded the Superior Court to continue
the trial so the Defendants could obtain relief from stay in bankruptcy court. That is, if any of
Attorney Flagg’s actions on May 30 and 31, 2024 violated the codebtor stay, he nevertheless
substantially complied because his actions compelled no response from the Plaintiffs not already
required by the Superior Court, and he ultimately prevented the State Court Action from going
any further.
61. As for the Plaintiffs’ damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), there are three
categories: (1) emotional distress damages; (2) lost wages and travel expenses; (3) attorneys’
fees; and (4) punitive damages. In the Court’s view, the Plaintiffs are entitled to none. Starting
with the Plaintiffs’ alleged emotional distress, the First Circuit holds that “emotional damages
qualify as ‘actual damages’ under” 11 U.S.C. § 362(k). Fleet Mortg. Grp., Inc. v. Kaneb, 196
F.3d 265, 269 (1st Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). However, the Plaintiffs must provide “evidence
supporting the award of a definite amount”, and the Court concludes that they have provided “no
tangible evidence” to support an award of emotional distress damages in this case. See In re
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Mosher, 432 B.R. 472, 476–77 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2010) (quoting Sherkanowski, 2000 WL
33679425, at *7). Other than repeatedly stating he was “angry,” Mr. Frangos’ testimony gave the
Court no basis to find emotional distress or award a definite amount of money for such distress.
Mr. Frangos’ deposition testimony also undercuts his claims to emotional distress, as Mr.
Frangos has “been on the edge of death so many times” that he does not “ worry about anything.”
Trial Tr. 140:15–141:7; Def. Ex. 2 at 44:23–45:3. The Court will not “speculat[e], guess or
conjecture” whether Mr. Frangos suffered damages from emotional distress. In re Heghmann,
316 B.R. 395, 404 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); Hitt v. Connell, 301 F.3d 240, 250
(5th Cir. 2002) (“hurt feelings, anger and frustration are part of life, and are not the types of
emotional harm that could support an award of damages”) (citations omitted). The Plaintiffs
failed to offer any concrete evidence of any emotional distress damages.
62. As for Mrs. Frangos, she testified that she was nervous on the May 31, 2024
hearing date. Trial Tr. 118:24–119:8. Mrs. Frangos’s testimony revealed that her distress and
anger were because she was “forced to actually go and sit in court while” Mr. Frangos “would
just be sitting in the parking lot.” Id. 162:3–6. Given that Mrs. Frangos was compelled to attend
the hearing by the Superior Court, not Attorney Flagg, the Court sees no basis to hold Attorney
Flagg liable for alleged emotional distress that he did not cause. See Heghmann, 316 B.R. at
404–05 (plaintiffs must “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “they “suffered damages
as a result of the stay violation.” (emphasis added)). Any ongoing emotional distress caused by
the State Court Action moving forward later cannot be attributed to any stay violation by
Attorney Flagg, which ended at the latest with the conclusion of the May 31, 2024 hearing. The
Court finds no basis in the record to award Mrs. Frangos emotional distress damages.
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63. The Plaintiffs also claim travel expenses and lost wages as damages. The Court
will not award travel expenses, as Mrs. Frangos attended the May 31, 2024 hearing at the
direction of her attorneys and the Superior Court, not Attorney Flagg. As for lost wages, Mrs.
Frangos was unable to remember which, if any, of her three jobs she was scheduled to work on
May 31, 2024, Trial Tr. 156:25–157:3, 20–24, preventing the Court from determining the amount
of any lost wages. Mr. Frangos’s calculated his lost wages by estimating the total value of his
project divided by the number of days he thought the project should take to complete. The Court
received no documentary evidence to corroborate his testimony that he earned $6,000 a day. This
Court did not find his testimony credible in any regard. Moreover, Mr. Frangos could not
remember whether he went back to work after the hearing on May 31, 2024: “Possibly I did. I
just don’t recall.” Trial Tr. 153:8–19. Mr. Frangos’s testimony is also inconsistent with his sworn
Schedule I, which indicates that he receives only $1,000 per month from his business.
Bankruptcy Case ECF No. 21 at 26. To date, Mr. Frangos has made no effort to amend Schedule
I, despite the Court noting this inconsistency. Trial Tr. 241:6–21. The Plaintiffs either fail to show
they incurred travel expenses and lost wages, or their testimony is so inconsistent with the record
that the Court will discredit their testimony.
64. As for attorneys’ fees, the Court received as evidence invoices indicating that the
Plaintiffs have incurred approximately $79,250 in fees litigating this case. Def. Ex. 2 at 31–32,
83–90, 93–99. Testimony at trial indicated that the Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees may have reached
$125,000 as of September 2025, Trial Tr. 46:4–21, meaning that fees incurred to date are likely
higher. But as discussed above, any stay violation by the Defendants ended, at the latest, when
the May 31, 2024 hearing concluded. Section 362(k)’s purpose in awarding damages for stay
violations is to “return the debtor to the status quo”. Duby, 451 B.R. at 677. Returning to the
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status quo of course includes determining and enforcing sanctions under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k).
Sherkanowski, 2000 WL 33679425, at *8. The Court has already concluded that the Plaintiffs
suffered no other damages from the Defendants’ purported stay violations. The pre-Bankruptcy
Case status quo was achieved the moment the Superior Court concluded the May 31, 2024
hearing at Attorney Flagg’s request.
65. The Plaintiffs have requested that this Court award them punitive damages.
Regarding punitive damages, they are only “awarded when the defendant’s conduct is
“malicious, wanton, or oppressive”, as “necessary to punish and deter the defendant’s conduct.”
Mosher, 432 B.R. at 477 (citing Romano v. U-Haul Int’l, 233 F.3d 655, 672 (1st Cir. 2000))
(internal quotations omitted). Put differently, a stay violation must involve “egregious,
intentional misconduct” to merit punitive damages. Heghmann, 316 B.R. at 405–06 (citation
modified). The Court finds no such conduct based on the record in this case. At worst, Attorney
Flagg was rude to Attorneys McKenzie and Harman during a conference call after learning less
than an hour before that he had to prepare for trial the next morning. An emotional reaction to
that situation is understandable under the circumstances.
66. Finally, it is worth nothing the following: The alleged violation of the automatic
stay stopped at the conclusion of the Superior Court hearing at 10:32 A.M. on Friday May 31,
2024. Two business days later, Attorney Flagg filed a motion for relief in the Bankruptcy Case
seeking permission to proceed in the Superior Court on an expedited basis. Bankruptcy Case
ECF Nos. 12 – 13. Yet, the Plaintiffs incurred tens of thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees after
that in litigating this action two months after the violation had stopped and after Attorney Flagg
obtained relief from this Court to proceed with the State Court Action.
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67. Additionally, the Court notes a troubling fact elicited at trial: the Plaintiffs were
working on a draft complaint against the Defendants on May 31, 2024, the very day that any
violation of the stay in this case ceased. See Def. Ex. 2 at 73. But on that date, Attorney Flagg
had already returned the State Court Action to the status quo before Mr. Frangos filed the
Bankruptcy Case by persuading the Superior Court to stay the trial. Given the Plaintiffs’ total
failure to prove that they suffered any damages, the timing of the Plaintiffs’ decision to prepare
litigation against the Defendants raises substantial questions regarding the Plaintiffs’ motives in
filing this case.
V. CONCLUSION
Because the preponderance of evidence presented in this case proves that the Defendants
did not violate the 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) automatic stay or the 11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) codebtor stay,
the Court orders that:
1. The Defendants are entitled to a judgment in their favor and against the Plaintiffs;
2. The Court shall enter a separate judgment promptly after entry of this
memorandum opinion.
This opinion constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052.

Date: February 13, 2026 /s/ Kimberly Bacher
Kimberly Bacher
Chief Bankruptcy Judge

Case: 24-01010-KB Doc #: 110 Filed: 02/13/26 Desc: Main Document Page 29 of 29