Pritchett v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TERI PRITCHETT CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS No. 25-2456

ADMINISTRATORS OF THE TULANE SECTION I
EDUCATIONAL FUND

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Administrators of the Tulane Educational
Fund’s (“Tulane”) motion
1
to partially dismiss plaintiff Teri Pritchett’s (“Pritchett”)
claims, i.e., counts three, five, six, and seven of Pritchett’s first amended complaint
(“complaint”), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Pritchett’s complaint
2
pleads seven causes of action against Tulane, pursuant
to: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), hostile work environment
(count one); 42 U.S.C. § 1981, hostile work environment (count two); Title VII, race
discrimination (count three); 42 U.S.C. § 1981, race discrimination (count four); Title
VII, sex discrimination (count five); Title VII, retaliation (count six); and the Family
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), retaliation (count seven). For the following reasons, the
Court denies Tulane’s motion to dismiss counts three, five, six, and seven of
Pritchett’s complaint.

1
R. Doc. No. 19.
2
R. Doc. No. 16.
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2

I. BACKGROUND
Pritchett is an African American female who was employed as a Tulane
University police officer for four years, from approximately October 25, 2019, until
October 10, 2023.
3

According to Pritchett, in 2020 she began experiencing “discriminatory and
hostile treatment surrounding her work schedule and family responsibilities,”
4
based
on her sex.
5
From November 2020 to September 2021, while her husband was
deployed and she was the “sole caretaker for her young child,” Tulane allegedly
required her to work night shifts and rejected her requests for scheduling assistance.
6

Pritchett alleges that Captain Troy Williams (“Williams”) responded to her by saying,
“[t]he department didn’t issue you the kid, so figure it out.”
7
Pritchett also states that
even though she was granted an accommodation to switch to day shifts, in or about
June 2021, “the Chief overruled the decision and forced Plaintiff back to nights, even
as white male officers with less seniority were moved to day shifts or allowed
preferential scheduling.”
8
Similarly, in October 2021, after Pritchett was promoted to
sergeant, she claims that she was denied a reassignment to openings in the day shift
which were instead given to less senior “Caucasian male sergeants.”
9

3
Id. ¶¶ 7, 9, 12.
4
Id. ¶ 13.
5
Id. ¶¶ 13–14.
6
Id. ¶ 13.
7
Id.
8
Id. ¶ 14.
9
Id. ¶ 16.
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Additionally, Pritchett alleges that she received differential treatment with
respect to other aspects of her employment. Around June 2021, she requested to
attend “a Taser [i]nstructor certification course” that she “independently sought out,”
yet “two male officers, including one who later resigned, and one who was known to
be ineffective in instruction,” were selected instead.
10
In February 2022, Tulane
awarded a “Field Training Officer (FTO) Coordinator position” to “a white male
sergeant with less experience, who admitted he had not planned to apply until a
deputy chief encouraged him to do so.”
11
According to Pritchett, that decision was
made despite her previously performing “many of the duties associated with the role,”
having “drafted program materials,” and being the “only applicant” at the time.
12

Pritchett’s complaint also describes a series of Internal Affairs (“IA”) actions
lodged against her. She alleges that between December 2021 and January 2022,
Williams submitted IA complaints that questioned her “‘pink handcuffs,’ which had
previously been approved by a superior,” and Pritchett “removing her shoes after
stepping in animal waste.”
13
According to Pritchett, these trivial matters “were
escalated into IA investigations, unlike similar or more serious conduct by male
officers, who were not disciplined.”
14
Later, in October 2022, after Pritchett “earned
the top ranking on the Lieutenant promotional list,” Officer C. Collins (“Collins”),
whom she had previously reported for “insubordination, leaving a crime scene, and

10
Id. ¶ 15.
11
Id. ¶ 18.
12
Id.
13
Id. ¶ 17.
14
Id.
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misclassifying a suicide attempt,” filed an Office of Institutional Equity (“OIE”)
15

complaint against her.
16
Pritchett characterizes the OIE complaint as retaliatory and
claims that it was “improperly converted into a lengthy” IA investigation, “from
October 2022 until February 2023, delaying [her] promotional eligibility and pushing
her from the top to the bottom of the [lieutenant promotional] list.”
17
The months-
long IA investigation culminated in Pritchett receiving a “three-day suspension
[based] on an allegation of ‘unprofessionalism,’” her reassignment “to the downtown
medical district,” and her being ineligible for promotion for one year.
18

Pritchett claims that also in early 2023, when her husband was once again
scheduled for deployment, Tulane failed to help her facilitate a scheduling
accommodation and that as a result, she “was ultimately forced to seek FMLA
protection.”
19
Her request “was initially denied and . . . Tulane . . . refused to finalize
scheduling accommodations until July 18, 2023.”
20

Finally, beginning and throughout 2023, Pritchett alleges that she endured
“escalating harassment and discriminatory treatment by Lieutenant John Miller”
(“Miller”). According to Pritchett, Miller “regularly lied about her” to “Captain
Porter,” “refused to respond to Plaintiff’s calls for assistance,” and in one instance
“left a TUPD vehicle running unattended.” Pritchett alleges these are policy

15
See R. Doc. No. 1-2.
16
R. Doc. No. 16 ¶ 20.
17
Id.
18
Id. ¶ 21.
19
Id. ¶ 22.
20
Id.
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violations for which discipline up to and including suspension or termination may be
appropriate, but Miller was not disciplined at all because of Tulane’s “favoritism
toward white male officers.”
21

The situation with Miller escalated in August 2023, when Miller, according to
Pritchett, canceled a “felony apprehension operation” she had planned with approval
from Porter, after arriving at the briefing 90 minutes late. Pritchett alleges that
around the same time period,
22
Miller made overtly discriminatory comments to her,
including: telling her that he treated her differently “because she was not a white
male sergeant”;
23
“criticizing her” and “asserting that she was ‘not a real sergeant’
because she worked an 8-hour shift under her approved FMLA accommodation
instead of a 12-hour shift”;
24
“warn[ing]” that she “‘needed to be quiet’ before she ‘got
herself in trouble’”;
25
and “mock[ing] her when she said she intended to report his
comments.”
26

However, before Pritchett was able to report Miller’s treatment of her, she
claims that he “filed a retaliatory IA complaint against her on August 17, 2023.”
27

Pritchett alleges that Porter did not meet with her before commencing an IA
investigation and he admitted that if he had, it “would not have been issued.”
28

21
Id. ¶ 23.
22
See id. ¶¶ 25, 27, 67.
23
Id. ¶ 26.
24
Id. ¶¶ 24, 26.
25
Id. ¶ 24.
26
Id.
27
Id. ¶ 27.
28
Id.
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According to Pritchett, the investigation was assigned to “Lt. N. Raziano, who had
previously shown clear bias in IA investigations against” her, and “Tulane refused to
assign an impartial investigator.”
29
Pritchett states that, during this period, she
reported additional concerns regarding Williams’s “harassment and retaliation”
against her, but supervisory officials “failed to intervene or address misconduct.”
30

Despite Pritchett allegedly possessing evidence corroborating her version of
events, and not receiving an opportunity to defend herself, Tulane informed her that
it was “preparing to terminate her and that she should ‘look for other employment.’”
31

Rather than wait for termination, Pritchett states that she felt pressured to resign
from her position with Tulane on October 10, 2023.
32
She alleges that the events
leading up to her resignation—“years of discrimination, retaliation, hostile work
environment, denial of opportunities, . . . biased internal investigations, . . .
discriminatory and retaliatory conduct . . . [, and] intolerable working conditions”—
amounted to a constructive discharge “in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Family and Medical Leave Act.”
33

Plaintiff filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
charge of discrimination against Tulane, “on or about July 9, 2024.”
34
She received

29
Id. ¶ 28.
30
Id. ¶ 29.
31
Id. ¶ 30.
32
Id. ¶ 31.
33
Id. ¶¶ 31, 32.
34
Id. ¶ 153.
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her notice of right to sue “on or about September 16, 2025,” and filed this lawsuit on
December 8, 2025.
35

II. STANDARDS OF LAW
A. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss a complaint or part of
a complaint when a plaintiff fails to set forth well-pleaded factual allegations that
“raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). The
complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547).
A facially plausible claim is one in which “the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. If the well-pleaded factual allegations “do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” then “the complaint has
alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at
679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration in original).
In assessing the complaint, a court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true
and liberally construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). However, “plaintiffs
must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to make

35
See id. ¶ 154; R. Doc. No. 1.
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out a valid claim,” and the Court does “not accept as true ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.’” City of
Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 152–53 (5th Cir. 2010) (first
citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; and then quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Furthermore, “the Court must typically limit itself to the contents of the
pleadings, including attachments thereto.” Admins. of the Tulane Educ. Fund v.
Biomeasure, Inc., No. 08-5096, 2011 WL 4352299, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2011)
(Vance, J.) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir.
2000)). The Court may consider all “documents incorporated into the complaint by
reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”
36
Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). “It is clearly proper in deciding
a 12(b)(6) motion to take judicial notice of matters of public record.” Jenkins v.
Tahmahkera, 151 F.4th 739, 747 (5th Cir. 2025) (quotations omitted). Courts may
also consider documents that are a matter of public record without converting a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment. See Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631
F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011).
“Dismissal is appropriate when the complaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to
relief.’” Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 F. App’x 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Clark v.
Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986)) (alteration in original).

36
Courts “may consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss that are referred
to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claim.” Sullivan v. Leor
Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).
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III. ANALYSIS
Tulane moves to dismiss counts three, five, and six of Pritchett’s complaint—
alleging Title VII race discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation—as
untimely pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Tulane also moves to dismiss
plaintiff’s Title VII and the FMLA retaliation claims, counts six and seven, arguing
that she has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the following
reasons, the Court finds that Pritchett’s Title VII race and sex discrimination claims
and retaliation claim are timely, and that she plausibly alleges causes of action for
Title VII retaliation and FMLA retaliation.
A. Pritchett’s Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims are timely.
Tulane argues that the discrete acts and adverse employment actions, which
serve as the basis of Pritchett’s Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims, do not
satisfy Title VII’s timeliness requirements, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1).
“Title VII requires employees to exhaust their administrative remedies before
seeking judicial relief.” McClain v. Lufkin Indus., 519 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir. 2008).
“Exhaustion occurs when the plaintiff files a timely charge with the EEOC and
receives a statutory notice of right to sue.” Ganheart v. Brown, No. 17-43, 2017 WL
3991182, at *2 n.1 (E.D. La. Sep. 11, 2017) (Africk, J.) (quoting Taylor v. Books A
Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2002)). Title VII plaintiffs in Louisiana
must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of when the
alleged discriminatory act occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1); see also Conner v.
Louisiana Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 247 F. App’x 480, 481 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining
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that the 300-day rule for filing an EEOC charge in deferral states applies to claims
arising in Louisiana).
The discrete discriminatory acts and retaliatory adverse employment actions
that Pritchett alleges for her Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims are
identical. Similarly, the § 2000e–5(e)(1) timeliness requirements are unchanged
regardless of whether a plaintiff alleges Title VII discrimination or retaliation. Thus,
as long as one of her alleged discrete adverse actions is timely, then counts three, five,
and six of Pritchett’s complaint allege timely claims for Title VII race discrimination,
Title VII sex discrimination, and Title VII retaliation, respectively.
Tulane asserts that Pritchett’s claims in counts three, five, and six rely on
discrete discriminatory acts and adverse employment actions that occurred before
September 13, 2023, more than 300 days before Pritchett filed her EEOC charge on
July 9, 2024.
37

Plaintiff counters that her “escalation of disciplinary actions, threats of
termination,”
38
and “constructive discharge,” stemming from her resignation on
October 10, 2023, amount to a timely adverse employment action which serve as the
basis of her Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims.
39
Tulane does not dispute
that Pritchett’s EEOC charge describes her alleged constructive discharge,
40
and
acknowledges that her resignation falls within the requisite 300-day period.

37
R. Doc. No. 19-1, at 6–7.
38
R. Doc. No. 16 ¶ 105.
39
R. Doc. No. 24, at 4.
40
See R. Doc. No. 1-2
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Pritchett’s constructive discharge claim is indeed timely. She alleges that her
resignation amounted to a constructive discharge, which is “actionable under Title
VII” as an adverse employment action. See Brown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d 556,
566 (5th Cir. 2001). For a constructive discharge claim, timeliness is measured from
the date of the plaintiff’s resignation. See Stone v. Louisiana Dep’t of Revenue, 590 F.
App’x 332, 337–38 (5th Cir. 2014) (determining that the prescriptive period for the
plaintiff to file a timely EEOC charge ended 300 days from the date of her
resignation). Pritchett filed her EEOC charge on July 9, 2024, less than 300 days
after her resignation on October 10, 2023.
Pritchett also alleges as additional discrete adverse employment actions:
denial of career advancement opportunities, including training and promotion; denial
of assignment and shift preferences; disparate discipline; “escalation of disciplinary
actions”; and “threats of termination.”
41
However, even assuming arguendo that these
additional allegations would otherwise qualify as adverse employment actions, they
are time-barred as independent Title VII discrimination and retaliation causes of
action because Pritchett’s complaint fails to allege that they occurred within 300 days
of when she filed her EEOC charge.
42

41
R. Doc. No. 16 ¶¶ 77, 105, 129–131, 134.
42
Although Pritchett alleges that Tulane told her it intended to terminate her in
September 2023, she does not allege this occurred prior to September 13, 2023. Thus,
the Court cannot infer that Tulane telling her this is timely with respect to
establishing an adverse employment action independent from her constructive
discharge.
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Pritchett is not foreclosed from alleging these otherwise untimely discrete acts
as part of a timely hostile work environment claim, and she does so in count one of
her complaint.
43
For “a hostile work environment claim, ‘as long as an employee files
her complaint while at least one act which comprises the hostile work environment
claim is still timely, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be
considered by a court for the purpose of determining [Title VII] liability.’” Heath v.
Bd. of Supervisors for S. Univ. and Agric. and Mech. Coll., 850 F.3d 731, 737 (5th Cir.
2017) (citation modified) (quoting Hartz v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 275 F. App’x
281, 289 (5th Cir. 2008)). However, Pritchett “cannot breathe new life into” untimely
claims as independent causes of action “by simply incorporating [them] into her
hostile work environment claim.” Hartz, 275 F. App’x at 289. “‘Each incident of
discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision’ constitutes a
separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice’ for which administrative
remedies . . . must be timely challenged and exhausted before the Court will consider
that act as the basis for an independent claim.” See Ekaidi v. Bd. of Supervisors of
the S. Univ. Sys., No. 16-7523, 2017 WL 699821, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2017) (Africk,
J.) (citation modified) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114)). Thus, although time-barred
as independent claims, evidence of the untimely discrete acts may still be admissible
as evidence. However, the Court need not, and will not, reach evidentiary issues in
deciding the present motion.

43
Id. ¶¶ 34–56.
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Accordingly, with respect to her resignation and corresponding constructive
discharge, counts three, five, and six of Pritchett’s complaint respectively allege
timely claims for Title VII race discrimination, Title VII sex discrimination, and Title
VII retaliation.
B. Pritchett plausibly alleges Title VII retaliation.
To state a claim for Title VII retaliation, Pritchett must allege facts supporting
plausible inferences that “(1) she was engaged in a protected activity; (2) she was
subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection
between the protected activity and adverse employment action.” Norsworthy v.
Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.4th 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2023)
Tulane avers that Pritchett has failed to sufficiently plead that she engaged in
protected activity, and that even if she had, she has not plausibly alleged a causal
link between her protected activity and constructive discharge.
44
Pritchett counters
that she has sufficiently alleged facts demonstrating that she reported incidents of
race and sex discrimination to her superiors.
45
Additionally, she argues that it is
plausible to infer a causal link between her reporting discriminatory activity and her
ultimate resignation because of the escalating events leading to her resignation, the
actions of her superiors and others at Tulane with respect to her reports of
discrimination, and the “actual knowledge” the decisionmakers had with respect to
her protected activity.
46

44
R. Doc. No. 19-1, at 13–14.
45
R. Doc. No. 24, at 10.
46
Id. at 11–12.
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First, for a Title VII retaliation claim, “protected activity can consist of either:
(1) ‘opposing any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII]’ or (2)
‘making a charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].’” EEOC v. Rite Way Serv., Inc.,
819 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)) (alterations
omitted and added). The first form of activity is known as the “opposition clause;” the
second is known as the “participation clause.” See id.
The opposition clause does not actually require the opposed conduct to, in fact,
violate Title VII. Instead, it is “enough that [the plaintiff] reasonably believed the
employment practice to be unlawful.” Id. at 240 (citing Payne v. McLemore’s
Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1137–40 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also Cuellar
v. Southwest General Emergency Physicians, P.L.L.C., 656 F. App’x 707, 710 (5th Cir.
2016) (per curiam) (“[A] viable Title VII retaliation claim does not necessarily depend
on a viable harassment or discrimination claim.” (emphasis omitted)). While the
reasonable belief standard is “in tension with the plain text” of the statute, Royal v.
CCC & R Tres Arboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 401 n.2 (5th Cir. 2013), it “remains good
law.” Rite Way, 819 F.3d at 240.
The Fifth Circuit has indicated that, in some circumstances, “[a]n informal
complaint to a supervisor regarding an unlawful employment practice may satisfy
the opposition” clause. Tureaud v. Grambling State Univ., 294 F. App’x 909, 914–15
(5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). However, the opposition must indicate that the plaintiff
views the employment practice as discriminatory. See Breeding v. Dep’t of Interior,
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No. 14-948, 2015 WL 1809977, at *8 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 2015) (Africk, J.) (finding that
the opposition clause was not satisfied where the plaintiff did not explain how her
opposition “implicated her protected status or how a ‘reasonable employer would have
understood [it] to be an expression of opposition to unlawful discrimination at work’”
(emphasis in original) (quoting Stewart v. RSC Equip. Rental, Inc., 485 F. App’x 649,
652 (5th Cir. 2012))); see also Allen v. Envirogreen Landscape Professionals, Inc., 721
F. App’x 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2017) (“In a claim of protected opposition, an employee
must at least have referred to conduct that could plausibly be considered
discriminatory in intent or effect, thereby alerting the employer of its discriminatory
practices.”); Stewart, 485 F. App’x at 652 (affirming a grant of summary judgment
finding that the plaintiff failed to establish retaliation because the plaintiff’s
opposition to discrimination was “indistinguishable from non-race-based grumbling
by an employee” and “had no racial element”).
Pritchett alleges that in August 2023 she alerted Miller that she believed he
treated her differently than white male sergeants.
47
According to Pritchett, Miller
acknowledged that he treated her differently “because she was not a white male
sergeant,” “warned [her] that she ‘needed to be quiet’ before she ‘got herself in
trouble,’ and mocked her when she said she intended to report” him.
48
Shortly
thereafter, Pritchett informed Captain Porter of Miller’s discriminatory statements

47
R. Doc. No. 16 ¶¶ 24–27. Miller had the authority to cancel “a felony apprehension
operation” that Pritchett had planned.
48
Id.
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and that Miller “treat[ed] her differently ‘than a white male sergeant.’”
49
At a
minimum, Pritchett alleges two instances of reporting discriminatory treatment
based on her race and/or sex to two different superiors—Lieutenant Miller and
Captain Porter.
50
Therefore, Pritchett has alleged that she engaged in a protected
activity sufficient to survive the 12(b)(6) stage. See DeJean v. Jefferson Par. Sheriff
Off., No. 22-165, 2023 WL 3434986, at *3 (E.D. La. May 12, 2023) (Fallon, J.) (finding
that the plaintiff’s allegation that he reported alleged discrimination to multiple
supervisors was sufficient to plead that he engaged in a Title VII protected activity).
Second, Tulane does not contest that Pritchett’s complaint alleges an adverse
employment action sufficient to satisfy the second element of Title VII retaliation.
Third, at the pleading stage, Pritchett only needs to allege sufficient facts to
plausibly infer a causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse
employment action, i.e., her constructive discharge. See Wright v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 990 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 2021). Contrary to Tulane’s assertion,
51
Pritchett is
not required to establish but-for causation at this stage. See Blanchard v. Tulane

49
Id. ¶ 122.
50
Pritchett’s complaint also suggests that she informed superiors other than Porter
and Miller that she intended to pursue recourse for Miller’s discriminatory conduct
and requested an opportunity to substantiate her claims, but Tulane did not allow
her to do so. Id. ¶ 52. However, her allegation that in August 2023 she reported
“concerns about harassment and retaliation by Captain Williams, including being
instructed to alter findings in a citizen complaint investigation,” does not support her
retaliation claim. The misconduct she claims to have reported with respect to Captain
Williams does not allege activity that is violative of Title VII. See Saketkoo v. Tulane
Univ. Sch. of Med., 510 F. Supp. 3d 376, 294–95 (E.D. La. 2020) (Africk, J.), aff’d sub
nom. Saketkoo v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990 (5th Cir. 2022).
51
R. Doc. No. 19-1, at 14; R. Doc. No. 25, at 7–8.
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Univ., 636 F. Supp. 3d 642, 660 (E.D. La. 2022) (“At the motion to dismiss stage . . .
‘[t]he causal connection standard [for Title VII retaliation] . . . is much less stringent
than the ultimate but-for cause determination in such a case.’” (quoting Gogreve v.
Downtown Dev. Dist., 426 F. Supp. 2d 383, 391 (E.D. La. 2006) (Africk, J.))); see also
Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “the
but-for standard does not apply [until after] the prima facie case stage”).
Pritchett alleges that, as a result of her threatening to report Miller for his
discriminatory conduct, in mid-August 2023, he preemptively filed an IA grievance
against her, triggering an investigation. During the same time period, in or about
mid-August 2023, Pritchett informed her superior, Porter, of Miller’s ongoing
discrimination. Additionally, during the IA investigation, triggered by Miller’s
complaint and before her resignation, Pritchett requested an opportunity to
substantiate her claims, but she was denied the same. She also asserts that in
September 2023, Tulane informed her that she would be terminated and indicated
that her “continued employment was unwelcome and unsupported.”
52

The close temporal proximity of approximately two months between her first
reporting the discrimination, sometime after August 17, 2023, and the adverse
employment action, i.e., her constructive discharge on October 10, 2023, is sufficient
to allege causation at the pleading stage. Cf. Brown, 969 F.3d at 578 (explaining that
the Fifth Circuit has found that, at the prima facie stage, “to establish causation by
timing alone,” periods of two-and-a-half months, two months, and six-and-a-half

52
R. Doc. No. 16 ¶ 52.
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weeks between the protected act and adverse employment action are sufficient).
Thus, the Court finds that the contemporaneous nature of Pritchett reporting Miller’s
conduct in August 2023, the corresponding alleged threat to terminate her
employment without investigating her claims in September 2023, and her ultimate
resignation in October 2023, are sufficient to infer causation. See Wright, 990 F.3d at
434. Accordingly, Pritchett has sufficiently pleaded a claim for Title VII retaliation.
C. Pritchett plausibly alleges FMLA retaliation.
To establish an FMLA retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege “that (1) he is
protected under the FMLA; (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision; and
either (3a) that the plaintiff was treated less favorably than an employee who had not
requested leave under the FMLA; or (3b) the adverse decision was made because of
the plaintiff’s request for leave.” Hester v. Bell-Textron, Inc., 11 F.4th 301, 305 (5th
Cir. 2021). Tulane does not challenge that Pritchett was protected pursuant to the
FMLA. However, it argues that she has failed to sufficiently allege the second and
third elements of FMLA retaliation—an adverse action causally related to the
exercise of her FMLA rights.
Pritchett alleges that she sought an FMLA accommodation for her work
schedule on or about January 7, 2023, and that her schedule accommodation went
into effect on July 18, 2023.
53
She alleges that as a result of her exercising her FMLA
rights, Tulane retaliated with the following adverse actions: “1) initiation of Internal

53
Id. ¶¶ 22, 145.
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Affairs investigations, 2) interference with promotional opportunities, 3) disparate
disciplinary treatment, 4) increased scrutiny, and 5) constructive discharge.”
54

Pritchett’s allegations of decreased promotional opportunities and constructive
discharge are recognized forms of adverse employment actions that “‘involve a
discharge,’ ‘loss of pay,’” or “a term, condition, or privilege of employment.” See
Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Landgraf v. USI
Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 254 (1994)); Lemonia v. Westlake Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No.
22-30630, 2023 WL 6878915, *8 (5th Cir. Oct. 18, 2023) (recognizing retaliatory
constructive discharge as a form of adverse employment action).
However, with respect to Pritchett’s claims of retaliation in the form of unfair
IA investigations, “disparate disciplinary treatment,” and “increased scrutiny,” the
Court finds that she has failed to provide sufficient facts and context, or legal
precedent, to support an inference that each of these events independently qualifies
as an adverse employment action. See Bye v. MGM Resorts Int'l, Inc., 49 F.4th 918
(5th Cir. 2022) (“[A]llegations of unpleasant work meetings, verbal reprimands,
improper work requests, and unfair treatment do not constitute actionable adverse
employment actions as discrimination or retaliation.” (alteration in original) (citation
omitted)); Lindsley v. TRT Holdings, Inc., 984 F.3d 460, 470 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e
have previously observed that criticism, such as a supervisor’s oral threats or abusive
remarks, does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action.” (citation
modified) (quotation omitted)); Tate v. Louisiana Dep't of Transp. & Dev., No. 11-

54
Id. ¶ 149.
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1212, 2013 WL 796015, at *15 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2013) (Milazzo, J.) (reasoning that
an employee facing increased scrutiny while on leave was insufficient to allege a
retaliatory adverse employment action).
Nevertheless, these events, taken together with Pritchett’s other factual
allegations surrounding her resignation, may be considered as part of her retaliatory
constructive discharge claim. For example, these facts may ultimately help her show
that she suffered a “reduction job responsibilities,” was “reassign[ed] to menial or
degrading work,” experienced “badgering, harassment, or humiliation” by Tulane
“calculated to encourage [her] resignation,” or that Tulane otherwise made her
“working conditions so intolerable that [she had] no other choice but to resign.”
Lemonia, 2023 WL 6878915, *8 (explaining relevant considerations for establishing
a retaliatory discharge claim on a motion for summary judgment). Regardless, the
only actionable independent adverse employment actions that Pritchett alleges, with
respect to her FMLA retaliation claim, are interference with promotional
opportunities and constructive discharge.
Pritchett alleges that in February 2023 she was moved to the bottom of the
lieutenant promotional list because of a suspension she received with respect to an
ongoing IA investigation. She states that her FMLA accommodation motivated the
denial of promotional opportunity, and she suggests the disciplinary action was
pretextual. However, she first notified Tulane of her intent to exercise FMLA rights
in January 2023, while the IA investigation originated in October 2022. She does not
plead any facts to suggest an inference that her punishment or ultimate discipline
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was motivated by her request for FMLA leave, and she does not provide any other
allegations plausibly supporting a causal link between her promotional opportunities
and FMLA leave. Thus, she has failed to plausibly allege that any promotional
interference she suffered is causally linked to her FMLA accommodation.
Comparatively, the Court finds that Pritchett has plausibly alleged facts to
support an inference of causation between her exercise of FMLA rights and her
constructive discharge. First, Pritchett details a months-long struggle to obtain
approval from Tulane for her FMLA accommodation. She also alleges that after she
began her FMLA accommodated schedule, on July 18, 2023, she was treated
differently. Shortly thereafter, in August 2023, Miller told her that treatment was, at
least in part, because “she worked an FMLA-approved shift” and was “not a real
sergeant.”
55
Pritchett reported Miller’s comments, yet in September 2023, Tulane
informed her that it intended to terminate her employment, she would not receive an
opportunity to present evidence of discriminatory treatment in rebuttal, and that she
should seek new employment.
56
As a result, she resigned on October 10, 2023.
Miller’s alleged comments and the surrounding events are sufficient to support
a plausible inference that Pritchett’s FMLA accommodation motivated Tulane’s
actions, leading to Pritchett’s constructive discharge.
57
See Moreno v. Dealer

55
Id. ¶ 148.
56
Id. ¶¶ 130, 148.
57
It is unclear whether Pritchett was still working an FMLA accommodated schedule
at the time of her constructive discharge. If she was, the temporal proximity to her
actively exercising her FMLA rights and Tulane allegedly leaving her no choice but
to resign, would also support a causal link for FMLA retaliation. See Hester v. Bell-
Textron, Inc., 11 F.4th 301, 305–06 (5th Cir. 2021) (finding that a temporal link
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Integrated Servs., L.L.C., No. 25-20470, 2026 WL 1286835, at *5 (5th Cir. May 11,
2026) (reasoning that an employer’s statements, suggesting that he preferred to
retain two employees who were not taking FMLA leave over the plaintiff, supported
an inference of FMLA retaliation); see also Luebano v. Off. Depot, L.L.C., No. 22-
50767, 2023 WL 4249268, at *5 (5th Cir. June 29, 2023) (Luebano took her FMLA
leave in June 2020 . . . In November 2020, she was essentially warned that she was
being terminated. In early January 2021, it became official. Based on this alleged
timeline, and in light of the fact-intensive nature of the causation question, Luebano
has sufficiently alleged a causal link.”). Thus, Pritchett has plausibly alleged a claim
for FMLA retaliation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Tulane’s motion
58
to dismiss counts three, five, six, and
seven of Pritchett’s complaint is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, August 6, 2026.

LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

supported inference of retaliation because plaintiff was terminated during FMLA
leave).
58
R. Doc. No. 19.
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