Kuchler v. Lee et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SETH KUCHLER, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

v. NO: 25-2064

JOE LEE, ET AL. SECTION: C (5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Equitable Tolling (R. Doc. 12) filed
on December 22, 2025. The motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 2, 2025, Seth Kuchler filed a collective action for himself and
those similarly situated alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
the Louisiana Wage Payment Act, and for retaliation under the FLSA as applied to
Kuchler.
1
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the initial complaint.
2
On December
2, 2025, Kuchler filed his first amended complaint (FAC), asserting the same claims
as his initial complaint.
3
That resulted in defendants’ motion to dismiss the original
complaint being denied as moot.
4
Defendants then answered the FAC.
5

1
R. Doc. 1.
2
R. Doc. 6.
3
R. Doc. 8.
4
R. Doc. 13.
5
R. Doc. 11.
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On December 22, 2025, Kuchler filed the instant motion seeking equitable
tolling for potential class members in the FLSA action.
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Kuchler, a former officer
with the Pearl River Police Department, alleged that defendants employed a policy
of failing to compensate employees for hours worked in excess of forty hours per
week in violation of the FLSA.
7
On March 23, 2026, plaintiff’s counsel submitted
a Notice of Additional Named Plaintiffs bearing the written consents of Sean Dancer,
Jayson Germann, and Destini Navarro to adopt the earlier allegations made by
Kuchler.
8

II. ANALYSIS
A cause of action under the FLSA “may be commenced within two years after
the cause of action accrued, and every such action shall be forever barred unless
commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except that a cause
of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years
after the cause of action accrued.” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). A FLSA cause of action
accrues on each regular payday immediately following the work period for which
overtime compensation is claimed. Mata v. Caring For You Home Health, Inc., 94
F. Supp. 3d 867, 878 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (citing Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., 821 F.2d
261, 271 (5th Cir.1987)). Generally, an action starts when the complaint is filed. Id.

6
R. Doc. 12.
7
Id. at 1–2.
8
R. Doc. 21.
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§ 256(a).
9
However, in a collective action this holds true only for named plaintiffs
who file a written consent to be a plaintiff on that date. Id. In the absence of a
written consent, and for unnamed opt-in plaintiffs, a FLSA action starts on the date
written consent is filed. Id. § 256(b).
10

Equitable tolling preserves a claim when enforcement of the statute of
limitations would be unjust. Lambert v. United States, 44 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir.
1995). Federal statutes of limitations are generally presumed subject to equitable
tolling unless Congressional policy dictates otherwise. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez,
572 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2014). Equitable tolling may allow the action to be considered
started at an earlier date for unnamed opt-in plaintiffs, permitting an otherwise
expired claim to survive.
The Fifth Circuit strictly construes the FLSA statute of limitations provision.
Atkins v. General Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1130 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1983); see also
Granger v. Aaron’s, Inc., 636 F.3d 708, 712 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Equitable tolling is to
be applied sparingly.”) (internal quotations omitted). Courts apply equitable tolling
most frequently where “the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the
cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.”

9
Because Kuchler’s complaint was filed October 2, 2025, the look back period for his FLSA claims extends
to October 2, 2023 for non-willful violations and October 2, 2022 for willful violations.
10
For Dancer, Germann, and Navarro, because their written consents were filed March 23, 2026, the look
back period for their FLSA claims extends to March 23, 2024 for non-willful violations and March 23, 2023
for willful violations.

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Teemac v. Henderson, 298 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The
Supreme Court has outlined reasons for equitable tolling, including inadequate
notice of claimants, pending appointment of counsel beyond the plaintiff’s control,
misleading or incorrect information from the court, and affirmative misconduct by
the defendant. Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984).
The litigant seeking equitable tolling must show: “(1) that he has been pursuing his
rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).
Kuchler argues he has acted with reasonable diligence prosecuting this case,
including attempting to secure a tolling agreement with defendants, commencing
this lawsuit, filing an amended complaint, and filing the instant equitable tolling
motion. He also argues that Swales v. KLLM Transp. Servs., LLC, 985 F.3d 430 (5th
Cir. 2021) implemented a new legal framework for certification of a collective action
under FLSA that imposes a procedural hardship on claimants, which should
potentially give courts a reason to grant equitable tolling.
11

11
In Swales, the Fifth Circuit rejected the previously used two-step conditional certification method for
FLSA collective actions which afforded leniency to plaintiff employees’ requests to issue notice to
prospective parties and strictly scrutinized decertification motions typically filed by employers. 985 F.3d
at 443.

Post-Swales, courts within the Fifth Circuit must “identify, at the outset of the case, what facts and legal
considerations will be material to determining whether a group of ‘employees’ is ‘similarly situated’ and
conduct preliminary discovery accordingly. In other words, the district court, not the standards
from Lusardi [v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987)], should dictate the amount of discovery needed
to determine if and when to send notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs.” Id. at 441.
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This litigation has now proceeded for over ten months in a regular and orderly
fashion. No activity by either party suggests delay tactics or a lack of diligence.
Likewise, nothing before the court reflects extraordinary circumstances preventing
Kuchler or any prospective party from prosecuting a case. See Sandoz v. Cingular
Wireless, L.L.C., 700 F. App’x 317, 321 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e will not transform
routine litigation into an extraordinary circumstance.”). And there is no legal support
for the argument that complying with the post-Swales mandates warrants the
application of equitable tolling.
The subject claims relate to an alleged policy denying overtime pay. Kuchler
correctly notes that the nature of the accrual of prescription means that each day a
plaintiff can lose part of his or her claim. But, that is the nature of prescription; one
day the claim exists, and the next day it may not. See, e.g., Mosley v. Bristow U.S.,
LLC, No. CV 23-2674, 2023 WL 6976891, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 23, 2023). The
statutory prescriptive period is at least two years from the end of the pay period
during which the employee was allegedly denied overtime pay. That is a substantial
period allowing for suit to be filed to collect payments which an employee knows or
should know are not paid at the moment he or she is not paid. Also, Kuchler’s
complaint is replete with references to communications between him and his fellow
Pearl River police officers about the compensation issue. Nothing suggests
extraordinary circumstances that justify extending the prescriptive period by
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equitable tolling. This argument is without merit. See Lee v. Metrocare Servs., 980
F. Supp. 2d 754, 770 (N.D. Tex. 2013); Escobedo v. Dynasty Insulation, Inc., 694 F.
Supp. 2d 638, 655 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (rejecting equitable tolling for FLSA claim on
the grounds that opt-in plaintiffs were not “excusably unaware” of their claims if
they worked more than forty hours per week and knew they were entitled to overtime
compensation).
Kuchler alleges a retaliatory environment at the Pearl River Police
Department that could prevent unnamed opt-in plaintiffs from joining this lawsuit.
But, three plaintiffs have joined the case in the last five months, suggesting potential
opt-in plaintiffs are likely aware of their rights.
Plaintiff fails to establish the extraordinary circumstances required for
equitable tolling. The motion is denied.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Motion for Equitable Tolling (R. Doc. 12) filed on December 22,
2025 is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 5th day of August 2026

__________________________________
WILLIAM J. CRAIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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