Jones v. Lafourche Parish Correctional Complex et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KEITH R. JONES

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 25-1804

LAFOURCHE PARISH
CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX, ET AL.

SECTION “P”(4)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct a hearing,
including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary, and to submit proposed findings and
recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), § 1915e(2), and
§ 1915A, and as applicable, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) and(2). Upon review of the record, the Court
has determined that this matter can be disposed of without an evidentiary hearing.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Keith R. Jones (“Jones”) was an inmate housed in the Jackson Parish Jail when he
filed this pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the conditions of his
confinement. ECF No. 1 (Deficient Complaint). At the time of filing, Jones did not pay the filing
fee or submit an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Jones was notified of this deficiency
and was instructed to either pay the filing fee or submit a pauper application by September 25,
2025. ECF No. 2. On October 7, 2025, the undersigned Magistrate Judge issued a Show Cause
order for Jones to cure his deficiencies and cautioned him that failure to do so may result in a
recommendation that his suit be dismissed. ECF No. 3. The order was mailed to Jones at his
address of record. On October 28, 2025, the envelope containing the order mailed to Jones was
returned marked “RETURN TO SENDER” and “HUNT.” ECF No. 6 at 1.
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On October 23, 2024, Jones filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis which was granted
by this Court on October 28, 2025. ECF Nos. 5, 7. The order granting pauper status was mailed to
Jones at his address of record. On November 14, 2025, the envelope containing the order was
returned marked “RETURN TO SENDER” and “RELEASED.” ECF No. 8 at 1.
On December 19, 2025, the undersigned issued an order requiring Jones to file a written
change of address with the Court by January 19, 2026, and cautioned Jones that failure to do so
may result in his case being dismissed for failure to prosecute. ECF No. 10 at 1. A curtesy copy of
the order was also mailed to Jones at Elayn Hunt Correctional Center in the event he was
transferred. ECF No 10. at 2. As of the date of this order, Jones has not responded to or complied
with the order nor provided the Court with his current address.
II. Standard of Review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides that a court may,
in its discretion, dismiss a plaintiff’s claim for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any order of the court. A Rule 41(b) dismissal is
considered an adjudication on the merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). In determining whether to dismiss
a claim, courts have traditionally considered the extent to which the plaintiff, rather than his
counsel, has been responsible for any delay or failure to comply with a rule or order. See, e.g.,
Markwell v. County of Bexar, 878 F.2d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1989); Price v. McGlathery, 792 F.2d
472, 474-75 (5th Cir. 1986); Silas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 586 F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1978);
Ramsay v. Bailey, 531 F.2d 706, 708-09 (5th Cir. 1976).
When a plaintiff is without counsel, he is responsible for the prosecution of his case. A
pro se litigant is not exempt from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive
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law. Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981); Beard v. Experian Info. Solutions Inc., 214
F. App’x 459, 462 (5th Cir. 2007). A pro se litigant who fails to comply with procedural rules has
the burden of establishing excusable neglect, which is a strict standard requiring proof of “more
than mere ignorance.” See Kersh v. Derozier, 851 F.2d 1509, 1512 (5th Cir.1988) (quotation
omitted); Birl, 660 F.2d at 593.
Furthermore, all litigants are obligated to keep the court advised of any address change.
See EDLA Local Rules 11.1 and 41.3.1. “[T]he failure of a pro se litigant to notify the district
court of an address change may be considered by the district court as an additional cause for
dismissal for failure to prosecute.” Lewis v. Hardy, 248 F. App’x 589, 2007 WL 2809969, at *4
n.1 (5th Cir. 2007). This policy was adopted in EDLA Local Rule 41.3.1 which specifically
provides that a pro se litigant’s failure to notify the Court of a postal address change within 35
days of the Court’s receipt of returned mail may be considered cause for dismissal for failure to
prosecute. In addition, the complaint form used by plaintiff to institute this action contains the
following declaration: “I understand that if I am released or transferred, it is my responsibility to
keep the Court informed of my whereabouts and failure to do so may result in this action being
dismissed with prejudice.” ECF No. 4, ¶VI, at 5 (Plaintiff’s Declaration).
III. Analysis
Jones has not replied to the order nor provided the Court with his current address within
92 days from the return of the first undeliverable envelope despite his acknowledged obligation to
do so. The Court’s prior orders mailed to him at his address of record were returned as
undeliverable. Jones is proceeding pro se, and his failure to comply with the Court’s order is solely
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the result of his own actions or inactions. This failure has resulted in the Court’s inability to move
forward with this case and its docket.
For these reasons, Jones’s § 1983 complaint should be dismissed without prejudice under
F
ED. R. CIV. PROC. 41(b) for failure to prosecute.
RECOMMENDATION
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Keith R. Jones’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
complaint therein be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute pursuant to
FED. R. CIV. PROC. 41(b).
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days
after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by
the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will
result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir.
1996).
1

New Orleans, Louisiana, this ____ day of January, 2026.

_____________________________________
KAREN WELLS ROBY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1
Douglass referenced the previously applicable ten-day period for the filing of objections. Effective
December 1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) was amended to extend the period to fourteen days.
29th
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