Main Pass Oil Gathering Company, LLC v. Subsea 7 Marine (US) Inc.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MAIN PASS OIL GATHERING
COMPANY, LLC

VERSUS

SUBSEA 7 MARINE (US) INC.

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 25-890

SECTION "B " (3)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are two related motions. In the first (R. Doc. 52), Intervenor
Plaintiffs Anadarko Petroleum Corporation and Anadarko U.S. Offshore, LLC
(collectively, “Anadarko”) seek leave to file a First Supplemental and Amended
Complaint. In the second (R. Doc. 53), Defendant Subsea 7 Marine (US) Inc. (“Subsea
7”) requests leave to file a Third-Party Complaint. Both motions are opposed. Having
carefully considered the parties’ briefing and the record of this matter in the light of
the applicable law, the Court grants both motions.
I. Background
This action arises out of a crude oil leak off the coast of Louisiana.
1
Plaintiff
Main Pass Oil Gathering Company, LLC (“MPOG”) is the owner and operator of the
oil pipeline that leaked.
2
According to MPOG, Subsea 7 designed, manufactured, and

1
R. Doc. 1, ¶ 1.
2
Id.
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sold a defective connector (“Connector”) that caused the spill.
3
MPOG seeks damages
from Subsea 7.
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Subsea 7 seeks to implead MPOG’s parent company and several of its
subsidiaries (“Third Coast Entities”).
5
According to Subsea 7, its Connector did not
cause the leak. Instead, Subsea 7 maintains that Third Coast Entities’ insufficient
integrity management program caused the spill.
6
Subsea 7 denies any fault and,
alternatively, asserts that any fault was caused by the acts, omissions, negligence, or
fault of the Third Coast Entities.
7

Anadarko, an oil and gas producer, intervened to assert claims under the Oil
Pollution Act (“OPA”) against MPOG.
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Anadarko alleges that the pipeline leak caused
Anadarko to lose the use of two production platforms.
9
Andarko now seeks to add
claims against MPOG’s affiliates and alter-egos and supplement the factual
allegations asserted in its Intervenor Complaint.
10

The District Court’s Amended Scheduling Order set the deadline for
amendment of pleadings as July 16, 2026.
11

3
Id.
4
Id.
5
R. Doc. 53-1 at 1.
6
R. Doc. 53-3, ¶ 38.
7
Id. ¶ 12.
8
R. Docs. 10, 15, 16.
9
R. Doc. 16.
10
R. Doc. 52 at 1.
11
R. Doc. 48 at 2.
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II. Law and Analysis
A. Subsea 7 is granted leave to file a Third-Party Complaint.

“A defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and
complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against
it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1). “But, the third-party plaintiff must, by motion, obtain the
court's leave if it files the third-party complaint more than 14 days after serving its
original answer.” Id. The district court is given wide discretion in determining
whether to permit leave. McDonald v. Union Carbide Corp., 734 F.2d 182, 184 (5th
Cir. 1984). The court considers several factors when determining whether to grant a
party leave to file a third-party complaint, including “avoiding circuitous actions,
promoting judicial efficiency, obtaining consistent results, avoiding possible prejudice
to other parties, the unreasonableness of the delay, and the lack of substance of the
third-party complaint.” Martin v. Lafon Nursing Facility of the Holy Fam., Inc.,
CIV.A. 06-5108, 2007 WL 4163678, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2007) (citing Am. Fid. &
Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 232 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1956)). “Impleader is [ ] only
permitted in those cases in which a third party is derivatively or secondarily liable to
the defendant.” Id. (citing United States v. Joe Grasso & Son, Inc., 380 F.2d 749, 751
(5th Cir.1967)).
MPOG opposes Subsea 7’s motion based on the delay in filing it and the
likelihood that granting it will complicate an already complex case.
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The record does

12
R. Doc. 56 at 2–3.
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not support the conclusion that Subsea 7’s delay was so undue as to support denial of
its motion. Further, the mere fact that additional parties will complicate a complex
case does not justify denying Subsea 7 the opportunity to amend.
The relevant factors weigh in favor of granting leave. Subsea 7 has alleged
plausible theories of indemnity and contribution. The parties will not be prejudiced
by the proposed impleader as the discovery deadline is months away.
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Granting
Subsea 7 leave to file its third-party complaint promotes the important goals of
judicial efficiency and consistent results.
B. Anadarko is granted leave to file its First Supplemental and
Amended Complaint in Intervention.

Under Rule 15(a)(1), a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course
no later than 21 days after serving it, or “if the pleading is one to which a responsive
pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after
service of a motion under Rule 12(b).” Under Rule 15(a)(2), if more than 21 days have
passed after service of a 12(b) motion and no scheduling order has been entered, then
the party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or
the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
The language of Rule 15(a)(2) “evinces a bias in favor of granting leave
to amend.” Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v. Harry L.L. Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1163 (5th
Cir. 1982); see also Mayeaux v. Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420,

13
R. Doc. 48 at 1.
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425 (5th Cir. 2004). The Fifth Circuit has instructed that the “district court must
possess a ‘substantial reason’ to deny a request for leave to amend.”

Smith v. EMC
Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004). Although leave to amend is to be freely given
under Rule 15(a)(2), “that generous standard is tempered by the necessary power of
a district court to manage a case.” Yumilicious Franchise, LLC v. Barrie, 819 F.3d
170, 177 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp. Inc., 342 F.3d 563,
566 (5th Cir. 2003)). Factors relevant to the consideration of a motion for leave
under Rule 15(a) include “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and
futility of the amendment.” Schiller, 342 F.3d at 566. Denial of leave to amend is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Mayeaux, 376 F.3d at 425. “[A]bsent a ‘substantial
reason’ such as undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failures to cure
deficiencies, or undue prejudice to the opposing party, ‘the discretion of the district
court is not broad enough to permit denial.’” Id. (quoting Martin’s Herend Imports,
Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading United States of Am. Co., 195 F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir.
1999)).
The Rule 15 factors weigh in favor of allowing amendment. Anadarko timely
moved for leave to amend.
14
This is Anadarko’s first request to amend its complaint.

14
MPOG nonetheless argues that Anadarko’s delay, although allowed by the
Amended Scheduling Order, was undue. R. Doc. 55 at 5. As with Subsea 7’s motion,
Anadarko’s delay was not so undue as to warrant denial of a facially timely motion.
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Discovery is still in the early stages, and MPOG has not identified any concrete
prejudice that would result from allowing amendment. See Mayeaux v. Louisiana
Health Services & Indemnity Company, 376 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2004).
MPOG primarily argues that the amendment should be denied as futile
because Anadarko failed to comply with the OPA’s mandatory presentment process.
An amendment is futile if it would fail to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378
(5th Cir. 2014) (citing Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir.
2000)).
Although MPOG raises substantial arguments regarding the viability of
Anadarko’s newly asserted claims, at this stage, the Court cannot conclude on the
present record that the proposed amendment is so clearly foreclosed from previous
precedent as to warrant denial of leave under Rule 15. Anadarko’s proposed
amendment arises from the same underlying dispute and supplements its Intervenor
Complaint. To the extent MPOG contends that the newly asserted claims fail as a
matter of law, those arguments may be more appropriately addressed through a Rule
12 motion. Accordingly, considering Rule 15’s liberal amendment policy and the
procedural posture of this litigation, the Court grants Anadarko leave to amend.

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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint (R.
Doc. 53) is GRANTED and the Third-Party Complaint (R. Doc. 53-3) be filed in the
record.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to File First
Supplemental and Amended Complaint in Intervention (R. Doc. 52) is GRANTED
and the First Supplemental and Amended Complaint in Intervention (R. Doc. 52-3)
be filed in the record.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 5
th
day of August, 2026.

EVA J. DOSSIER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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