Clark v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
YELDY CLARK
VERSUS
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPAN
Y
CIVIL ACTION
N
O: 23-2005
SECTION: “P” (3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two Motions to Fix Attorneys’ Fees and Costs filed by
Defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty”). The first (R. Doc. 103)
seeks fees relative to Liberty’s Motion to Compel
1
and the second (R. Doc. 104)
relative to Liberty’s Motion for Sanctions.
2
Plaintiff Yeldy Clark filed an opposition
only to Liberty’s request for fees as to its Motion to Compel.
3
Having reviewed the
pleadings, record, and the applicable law, the Court will grant in part and deny in
part both motions.
I.Background
The factual and procedural background of this matter is laid out in detail in
the Court’s Order granting Liberty’s motion for sanctions and recommending the
1
R. Doc. 26.
2
R. Doc. 70.
3
R. Doc. 107. In entering a description of her brief while e-filing, Ms. Clark indicated
her memorandum was intended as an opposition to R. Doc. 104—i.e., Liberty’s Motion
for Attorneys’ Fees relative to its Motion for Sanctions. The substance of Ms. Clark’s
opposition, however, focuses exclusively on R. Doc. 103—i.e., the Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees for the Motion to Compel. The Court thus construes Ms. Clark’s
memorandum, as written, as an opposition to R. Doc. 103.
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District Court dismiss Ms. Clark’s claims.
4
In brief, Ms. Clark filed this suit after an
alleged automobile accident; then, throughout the discovery process, repeatedly
defied court discovery orders and manifested continued disregard for the rules of
litigation.
5
As a result, Liberty moved the Court to compel Ms. Clark’s discovery
responses and requested Ms. Clark be sanctioned for her extreme noncompliance.
6

The Court granted the Motion to Compel in part and granted the Motion for
Sanctions.
7

Liberty’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees and costs from Ms. Clark is undisputed.
The Court has already held that attorneys’ fees and costs are appropriate with respect
to both of Liberty’s motions.
8
See Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A); (b)(2)(C). And, although
Ms. Clark raised certain objections to the undersigned’s Report and Recommendation
relative to dismissal of this action, Ms. Clark did not appeal the Court’s order relative
to Liberty’s entitlement to fees.
9
Ms. Clark substantially disputes only the proper
amount of fees to be rewarded relative to Liberty’s Motion to Compel.
10

Liberty seeks $25,885.00 in attorneys’ fees for efforts in preparing and raising
its Motion to Compel and $26,675.00 for its Motion for Sanctions.
11
Although the fee
demand for the sanctions motion has not been challenged, the undersigned has

4
R. Doc. 108.
5
Id. at 1–7.
6
R. Docs. 26, 70.
7
R. Docs. 66, 98, 108.
8
Id.; see also R. Doc. 52 at 17:8–9.
9
R. Doc. 113.
10
R. Doc. 107.
11
R. Docs. 103-1 at 1, 104-1 at 1.
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reviewed it for reasonableness in the interest of justice. In addition, as contemplated
by Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned has considered
Ms. Clark’s status as an individual, rather than a corporate entity; her claim that
counsel was to blame for certain failings;
12
and the fact that Ms. Clark may not obtain
any award in this matter from which attorneys’ fees would be drawn in determining
the appropriate award of fees.
13

II. Standard of Law
“The calculation of attorney’s fees involves a well-established process.” Migis
v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998). “First, the court calculates
a ‘lodestar’ fee by multiplying the reasonable number of hours expended on the case
by the reasonable hourly rates for the participating lawyers.” Id. (quoting Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995)). Second, courts
consider whether to adjust the lodestar amount. See id. “There is a strong
presumption that the lodestar award” is a reasonable fee. Hoenninger v. Leasing
Enterprises, Ltd., 2023 WL 5521058, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 25, 2023) (citing Heidtman
v. Cnty. of El Paso, 171 F.3d 1038, 1044 (5th Cir. 1999). Still, courts must consider
the Johnson factors to determine whether to adjust the lodestar. Hoenninger, 2023

12
To be clear, the undersigned continues to believe based on the record, including
extensive live testimony, that this claim is without merit. Nonetheless, and to avoid
unnecessary litigation on this issue, that contention will be taken essentially at face
value for purposes of calculating the fee award.
13
This analysis assumes, solely for purposes of argument, that the District Court will
adopt the Report and Recommendation. Given that the undersigned has assumed
arguendo that the present lawsuit will not generate funds from which Ms. Clark may
pay Liberty’s fees, Liberty may file a motion for reconsideration relative to the fee
award should Ms. Clark’s lawsuit not be dismissed.
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WL 5521058, at *2 (discussing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–
19 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87,
90 (1989)). “The lodestar may not be adjusted due to a Johnson factor, however, if the
creation of the lodestar award already took that factor into account.” Heidtman, 171
F.3d at 1043 (citing Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 319–20 (5th Cir. 1993)).
III. Lodestar Amount
A. Reasonable Hourly Rates
“‘[R]easonable’ hourly rates ‘are to be calculated according to the prevailing
market rates in the relevant community.’” McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d
374, 381 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). “[T]he
burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the
attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing
in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,
experience, and reputation.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. “An attorney’s requested
hourly rate is prima facie reasonable when she requests that the lodestar be
computed at her ‘customary billing rate,’ the rate is within the range of prevailing
market rates and the rate is not contested.” White v. Imperial Adjustment Corp., 2005
WL 1578810, at *5 (E.D. La. June 28, 2005) (citing Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50
F.3d at 328).
Liberty seeks fees on behalf of Kristen Beckman and Elizabeth Higdon of the
law firm Pipes Miles Beckman, L.L.C.
14
Ms. Beckman charged hourly rates in this

14
R. Docs. 103-1 at 4, 104-1 at 5.
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case of $300 from 2019 through 2023 and $350 beginning January 1, 2024.
15
Ms.
Higdon charged an hourly rate of $225 for her work in this matter.
16

Ms. Beckman is a 2005 graduate of Loyola University New Orleans School of
Law where she served as the Substance and Citation Editor for the Loyola Law
Review.
17
Following graduation, Ms. Beckman joined the law firm of Barrasso Usdin
Kupperman Freeman & Sarver, where she became an equity partner.
18
In 2019, she
formed the law firm of Pipes Miles Beckman, L.L.C., where her practice focuses on
defense of high-exposure bad faith and coverage litigation.
19

Ms. Higdon graduated from Tulane University Law School, where she served
as a member and managing editor of the Tulane Maritime Law Journal, in 2021.
20

Ms. Higdon joined Pipes Miles Beckman, L.L.C., in 2022 and her practice has since
focused on first- and third-party disputes, bad faith, and bodily injury claims.
21

Together with the qualifications and experience listed above, Liberty points to
case law in this District in support of the hourly rates sought.
22
Ms. Clark argues, as
to fees sought for Liberty’s Motion to Compel only, that the rates of both attorneys
“exceed prevailing market rates in the Eastern District of Louisiana for similar
work.”
23
Ms. Clark, however, cites no case law supporting that proposition and makes

15
R. Docs. 103-1 at 5–7, 104-1 at 5–8.
16
R. Docs. 103-1 at 8–9, 104-1 at 8–9.
17
R. Docs. 103-1 at 5, 104-1 at 5.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
R. Docs. 103-1 at 8, 104-1 at 8.
21
Id.
22
R. Docs. 103-1 at 6, 8–9; 104-1 at 6–7, 9.
23
R. Doc. 107 at 5.
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no challenge to those rates relative to Liberty’s Motion for Sanctions. When the hourly
rate is unopposed, it is prima facie reasonable. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 F.3d
at 328 (quoting Islamic Ctr. of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Starkville, Miss., 876 F.2d
465, 469 (5th Cir. 1989)).
The Court finds that Ms. Beckman’s hourly rates of $300 and $350 are
reasonable with respect to both the Motion to Compel and the Motion for Sanctions
given her qualifications, the supporting declarations, and case law in this District.
See, e.g., Kingsbery v. Paddison, 2022 WL 393564, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 9, 2022)
(finding $375/hour to be a reasonable rate for an attorney with 30 years of
experience); Hubert v. Curren, 2018 WL 4963595, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 15, 2018)
(reducing rate of partner with 17 years of experience from $400.00/hour to
$300.00/hour as prevailing rate in this district); Ranger Steel Servs., LP v. Orleans
Materials & Equip., Co., 2010 WL 3488236, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2010) (finding
$395.00 per hour to be a reasonable fee for a partner-level attorney in New Orleans).
Similarly, upon review of rates deemed reasonable in this District, the Court
finds that Ms. Higdon’s hourly rate of $225 is reasonable given her qualifications, the
supporting declarations, and case law in this District. See, e.g., Metro Serv. Grp., Inc.
v. Waste Connections Bayou, Inc., 2022 WL 17830466, at *8 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 2022)
(finding $200/hour to be reasonable for an associate with 5–6 years of experience);
Grant v. Gusman, 2023 WL 315937, at *13 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 2023) (finding $225/hour
for a senior associate and $200/hour for less experienced associates reasonable); Girod
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LoanCo, LLC v. Heisler, 2020 WL 3605947, at *8 (E.D. La. July 2, 2020) (finding
$235/hour for an associate to be reasonable).
B. Hours Expended
The party seeking the fee bears the burden of documenting and supporting the
reasonableness of all time expenditures for which compensation is sought. Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a
good faith effort to exclude from fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, and
otherwise unnecessary[.]” Id. at 434. The party seeking the award must show all
hours actually expended on the case but not included in the fee request. Leroy v. City
of Houston, 831 F.2d 576, 585 n.15 (5th Cir. 1987). Hours that are not properly billed
to one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434
(quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc)). Fee
requests must thus demonstrate “billing judgment.” Id. The remedy for failing to
exercise billing judgment is to exclude from a fee award hours that were not
reasonably expended. Id. Courts may do so either by “reduc[ing] the hours awarded
by a percentage” or via line-by-line analysis of the movant’s billing. Walker v. City of
Mesquite, 313 F.3d 246, 251 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Walker v. HUD, 99 F.3d 761, 770
(5th Cir. 1996)); Green v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 662
(5th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Burlington Northern and Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)).
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1. Billing Judgment
Courts may determine whether a party has met its obligation to exercise billing
judgment in good faith by considering the complexity of the prevailing motion for
which it seeks fees in the factual and procedural context of a given case. See, e.g., Drs.
Le & Mui, Fam. Med. v. St. Paul Travelers, 2007 WL 4547491, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec.
19, 2007); Davis v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 2008 WL 2228896, at *4 (E.D. La. May 28, 2008).
Liberty argues that it exercised billing judgment and that its detailed time sheets
demonstrate that the hours sought relative to both motions are reasonable, justified,
and grounded in fact.
24
The time sheets submitted by Liberty reflect the bills sent to
it by its counsel. See Leroy, 831 F.2d at 585. With respect to fees sought for the Motion
to Compel,
25
however, Ms. Clark argues that Liberty’s hours should be reduced
significantly based on excessive billing, duplicative entries, and failure to exercise
billing judgment.
26

Ms. Clark asserts that, despite her delay in producing discovery responses, the
hours sought by Liberty as to the Motion to Compel are excessive given the simplicity
of the underlying discovery dispute.
27
This argument captures one of the central
issues presented by Liberty’s fee motions. True, Liberty has been thorough, precise,
and careful throughout its briefing and attached fee itemization.
28
And the

24
R. Docs. 103-1 at 9–10, 104-1 at 10.
25
Ms. Clark does not dispute the reasonableness of the hours claimed for Liberty’s
Motion for Sanctions.
26
R. Doc. 107 at 3–4.
27
Id.
28
See R. Docs. 103-3, 104-3. Ms. Clark claims that, by having cut certain billing
entries, Liberty’s submission “casts doubt on the accuracy and thoroughness of the
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discounted items discussed below constitute exceptions to, rather than a pattern in,
Liberty’s time-entry practice. Nonetheless, Liberty’s total fee request is higher than
the undersigned can assess against Ms. Clark given the nature of the motions and
the issues on which Liberty prevailed.
The asymmetry between Liberty’s careful approach to fees and the high
amount demanded seemingly arises from a strategy used in the defense of this
matter. Liberty confronted discovery responses that were deficient in myriad ways
throughout the litigation. And it worked to obtain supplemental responses from Ms.
Clark for months, visiting and revisiting multiple deficiencies. Yet, as a strategy
matter, Liberty opted to focus on the most egregious—and the simplest—discovery
violations and the instances in which Ms. Clark disobeyed court orders when
litigating its motion to compel and motion for sanctions. This was a sound strategy.
It likely contributed to Liberty’s success in the matter. It certainly contributed to the
efficiency of the litigation. But it resulted in a circumstance in which the legitimate,
reasonable efforts undertaken by Liberty’s counsel to address discovery deficiencies
go beyond the efforts for which Liberty can recover in its fee motions. In short, the
issues that Liberty chose to bring to court were narrower and simpler than the
universe of issues confronting Liberty in its defense.

remaining fee application.” R. Doc. 107 at 5. To the contrary, the exercise of billing
judgment requires removing billing entries, and Liberty’s time is accounted for quite
thoroughly in its detailed time sheets.
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Liberty’s Motion to Compel
29
was complicated by the avoidance and persistent
noncompliance of Ms. Clark, the need to analyze the law of two different states, and
the need to explain specific inadequacies within the discovery responses. Yet, the
increased complexity of the Motion to Compel (and the sanctions motion) does not
fully reconcile the wide disparity between the hours sought here and the hours found
to be reasonable in other cases in this District. Cf. Kingsbery, 2022 WL 393564, at *2;
Jackson v. Scott, 2008 WL 5216225, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 11, 2008); Aker Sols. Inc. v.
Shamrock Energy Sols., L.L.C., 2021 WL 291256, at *4– 5 (E.D. La. Jan. 28, 2021).
Thus, the undersigned will reduce Liberty’s requested fee award to reflect that—
although legitimate work performed to the client’s benefit—not all of Liberty’s efforts
directly correlate to the issues on which Liberty prevailed and for which it is entitled
to fees. In addition, the undersigned will impose a reduction for the reasons discussed
below.
2. Duplicative Billing
Liberty asserts that it removed duplicative billing from its billing records for
both its Motion to Compel and Motion for Sanctions.
30
Ms. Clark, without reference
to any specific timesheet entries, claims that multiple attorneys billed for attending
the same conferences, preparing similar filings, and reviewing the same documents.
31

Courts often exclude entries that are duplicative. See, e.g., Alfasigma USA, Inc.
v. EBM, 2018 WL 3869496, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2018). “[W]hen a party chooses

29
R. Doc. 26.
30
R. Docs 103-1 at 11, 104-1 at 11.
31
R. Doc 107 at 4.
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two attorneys to represent it in a lawsuit, the opposing party is not required to pay
for duplicative work incurred by the attorneys.” Creecy v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 548 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286 (E.D. La. 2008) (citing Riley v. City of Jackson, 99 F.3d
757, 760 (5th Cir. 1996)). Similarly, when multiple attorneys attend hearings, courts
may exclude hours based on the level of individual contribution by any or all of the
attorneys. Alfasigma USA, 2018 WL 3869496, at *5 (citing W. Virginia Univ. Hosps.,
Inc. v. Casey, 898 F.2d 357, 365 (3d Cir. 1990)).
The Court’s review of the billing record of the Motion to Compel and the Motion
for Sanctions revealed some duplicative billing, although it does not rise to any
significant level. For example, in the billing record for the Motion to Compel, Ms.
Beckman and Ms. Higdon both billed for attending a status conference.
32
See Sciacca
v. Louisiana, 2005 WL 8173894, at *6 (E.D. La. June 6, 2005) (reducing hours for
duplicative billing when multiple attorneys billed for attending the same conference).
Similarly, in the billing records for the Motion for Sanctions, Ms. Beckman and Ms.
Higdon both billed for appearing for an off-record conference with the undersigned.
33

The undersigned notes that familiarity with the respective efforts of both attorneys
supports their joint participation. Nonetheless, the Court finds it appropriate to
reduce the hours sought for each motion by a minimal amount considering the overall
fee submission. See Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir.
2006); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 279 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding no abuse of

32
R. Doc. 103-3 at 23–24.
33
R. Doc. 104-3 at 21.
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discretion in district court’s reduction of fee award by 25% for inadequate time
entries, duplicative work product and lack of billing judgment).
3. Attorneys’ Fees for Drafting the Instant Fee Motions
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) permits awarding attorneys’ fees
incurred in “making the motion” on a successful motion to compel. Fees awarded
under that provision are therefore limited to those incurred in raising the motion to
compel and may not include fees relative to a subsequent motion to fix fees. See, e.g.,
Idel v. LeBlanc, 2019 WL 2088526, at *3 (E.D. La. May 13, 2019) Rock the Ocean
Productions, LLC v. H1 Events LLC, 2016 WL 4272931, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 20
Fed. R. Civ. P 37(b)(2)(C) authorizes the award of fees for a successful motion for
sanctions and does not include the same restriction. It stipulates, however, that the
sanctioned party must pay attorneys’ fees “caused by the failure, unless the failure
was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”
(emphasis added).
Liberty seeks fees for significant time spent drafting the instant motions to fix
fees.
34
Neither Rule 37 nor the interest of justice supports imposing fees for that time
under the circumstances of this case. Thus, the time spent drafting the fee motions
also warrants a reduction in the fee award.

34
R. Docs. 103-3 at 36, 39–40, 42–43, 52–54; 104-3 at 24–26.
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4. Lodestar Total
Liberty seeks $25,885.00 in attorneys’ fees for its Motion to Compel and
$26,675.00 for its Motion for Sanctions.
35
In the light of the record of this matter, the
applicable law, and the other relevant circumstances discussed above (including the
assumption, for purposes of argument, that Ms. Clark’s lawsuit will be dismissed),
the undersigned finds that a 45% reduction of those amounts is appropriate.
Accordingly, the lodestar comprises $14,236.75 in attorneys’ fees for the Motion to
Compel and $14,671.25 in attorneys’ fees for the Motion for Sanctions.
C. The Johnson Factors
After calculating the lodestar, the court may make an upward or downward
adjustment if warranted by the Johnson factors. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19.
The Johnson factors are:
(1) time and labor required, (2) novelty and difficulty of the issues, (3)
skill required to perform the legal services properly, (4) preclusion of
other employment, (5) customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by client or circumstances, (8)
amount involved and results obtained, (9) experience, reputation and
ability of the attorneys, (10) undesirability of the case, (11) nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) award in
similar cases.

Id. As noted above, the lodestar is presumed to yield a reasonable fee. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 50 F.3d at 324. The lodestar should thus be modified only in
exceptional cases. Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing City of
Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)). Finally, “to the extent that any

35
R. Docs. 103-1 at 1, 104-1 at 1.
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Johnson factors are subsumed in the lodestar, they should not be reconsidered when
determining whether an adjustment to the lodestar is required.” Migis, 135 F.2d at
1047.
As to its Motion for Sanctions, Liberty argues that the lodestar is reasonable,
but, if there were to be a Johnson adjustment, an upward adjustment would be
reasonable based on factor (8), the results obtained.
36
Liberty makes additional
arguments as to its Motion to Compel, citing factors (1), (2), and (4).
37
Ms. Clark
makes no mention of the Johnson factors and instead relies solely on a challenge to
the lodestar calculation relative to one of the two underlying motions.
38

The Court concludes the Johnson factors were subsumed in the above
calculation of the lodestar. Any factors left unanalyzed are either inapplicable or not
persuasive enough to overcome the lodestar’s presumed reasonableness. See City of
Burlington, 505 U.S. at 562 (“[T]he fee applicant who seeks more than [the lodestar
bears] the burden of showing that ‘such an adjustment is necessary to the
determination of a reasonable fee.’”) (emphasis original) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at
898)). As to Ms. Clark’s request for sanctions, the arguments made in support are
baseless. No sanctions or adjustment of the lodestar are warranted.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons,

36
R. Doc. 104-1 at 10.
37
R. Doc. 103-1 at 10–11.
38
R. Doc. 107 at 5–6.
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IT IS ORDERED that Liberty’s Motion to Fix Attorneys’ Fees (R. Doc. 103) is
GRANTED IN PART and that Liberty is hereby awarded a total of $14,236.75 in
attorneys’ fees relative to its Motion to Compel.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Liberty’s Motion to Fix Attorneys’ Fees (R.
Doc. 104) is GRANTED IN PART and that Liberty is hereby awarded a total of
$14,671.25 in attorneys’ fees relative to its Motion for Sanctions.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motions are DENIED in all other
respects.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 23
rd
day of December, 2024.
_________________________________________
EVA J. DOSSIER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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