VAUGHN v. THOMAS COUNTY GEORGIA et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
LISA ANN VAUGHN,
Plaintiff,
v .
THOMAS COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al,
Defendants.
ORDER
CASE NO:
7:26-cv-224-WLS
On August 5, 2026, pro se Plaintiff Lisa Ann Vaughn filed a Verified Complaint for Civil
Rights Violations (Doc. 1) ("Complaint') against Thomas County, Georgia, Thomas County
Sherif I's Office; Thomas County Department of Family and Children Services; the following
individuals in their individual and official capacities: Ulexia West, Yolonda Gurly, Alicia
Jackson, Ms. Tippins a/ k/ a Brandy Nicole E ngland, Taya Bow Ling, Taylor \Valker T itus,
Sheriff Tim Watkins, D eputy H anberry, L t. Investigator Ken D ennis; and Cindy Williamson
Minjarez ( collectively, " D efendants").
P resently before the Court is P laintif I's Application to P roceed in D istrict Court
\Vitl10ut Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form AO 239) (Doc. 2) ("IFP Application"). Also
pending before the Court is P laintif I's Request for E xpedited Service of Emergency Motion
for T emporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction by United States Marshal
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (Doc. 3) ("TRO Service Motion") .
For the following reasons, Plaintiffs IFP Application (Doc. 2) is GRANTED, and
thus, P laintiffs Complaint is ripe for preliminary review. The TRO Service Motion is
DENIED.
DISCU SSION
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) , the Court "may authorize ... any suit, action or
proceeding ... without prepayment of fees or security tl1erefor, by a person who submits an
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affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable
to pay such fees or give security therefor."
1
See also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,324 (1989)
( explaining that § 1915 is designed to provide indigent litigants with meaningful access to
courts) . In determining whether a litigant may proceed without prepayment of the filing fee,
the Court must follow a two-step process. Procup v. Strick/and, 7 60 F.2d 1107, 1114 (11th Cir.
1985). First, the Court assesses Plaintiff's ability to prepay the cost and fees associated with
filing a civil case in district court. Id Second, " [o]nly after making a finding of poverty," the
Court reviews the sufficiency of the complaint, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) . Id
I. IFP APPLICATION
Beginning at the first step, the Court finds that Plaintiff meets the poverty requirements
of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff has no cash on hand and no money in any bank accounts or
financial institutions (Doc. 2 at 2) and owns no assets (Id at 3) . Plaintiff lists monthly expenses
of $850 but has not included an expense for food. (Id at 4). Her only income is disability
income of $940 per month. (Id at 2). On these facts, the Court finds P laintiff is exempt from
prepaying filing fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's I FP Application (Doc. 2) is GRANTED.
II. PLAIN TIFF'S COMPLAIN T
Plaintiff is the biological grandmother and "de facto custodian of L.G.V-C," P laintiff's
granddaughter. (Doc. 1 ,r 5). P laintiff is also the founder of ITZ ITart Medical Fund ("IMF"),
a G eorgia 501 ( c)(3) nonprofit company. (Id.) . Plaintiff does not state that she has been awarded
custody of L.G.V-C by court order .
On May 13, 2025, T homas County D epartment of Family and Children Services
(" D FACS") removed L.G .V-C from Plaintiff's custody on allegations that L.G .V-C was found
wandering alone on H ighway 19 at night. Plaintiff asserts this allegation is false. (Id ,r 24). The
D ependency Removal Order signed by Brian D . Bellamy, Judge, Thomas County Juvenile
Court, and entered June 5, 2025, states:
1
Although Congress used the word "prisoner" here, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 applies to non-prisoner indigent litigants
as well as prisoners. Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004) .
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The agency became involved with this family due to concerns of inadequate
supervision allegations on 5 /13/20 as the child was found wandering alone on
Highway 19 at night. The agency made contact with the mother and
grandmother who were charged with cruelty to children due to inadequate
supervision and concern of drug use. It was reported that [L.G.V-C] did not
just wander away but instead walked to Highway 19 after her mother told ~1er]
to go find her grandmother. The mother was in jail at Bobby Hines Justice
Center, and she was released today. The mother had signed a safety plan when
she was in jail stating that the child could be placed at the home of Mrs. Cindy
Minjarez. There are additional concerns about the child' s safety due to
additional information the agency received that the mother is possibly using
methamphetamine. In assessing the grandmother as a possible caregiver there
are concerns with the grandmother voluntarily leaving [L.G.V-C] with the
mother who she states, " is always high on something" and there are concerns
that the grandmother may also abuse substances. The agency has also attempted
to screen other relatives unsuccessfully.
(Doc. 1 at 16) .
Plaintiff alleges that she was physically banned from the Thomas County courtroom
where L.G.V-C's dependency proceedings were conducted. Plaintiff asserts that as ''L.G.V-C's
biological grandmother and de facto custodian and a party with direct legal interest in those
proceedings," this exclusion violated Plaintiffs constitutional right to due process and access
to the Courts. (Id. 1 44). According to Plaintiff, "the judge presiding over L.G.V-C's case
denied Plaintiffs filings on 14 separate occasions, based in part on criminal charges that arose
directly from Plaintiffs protected petitioning activity." (Id.).
Plaintiff asserts the following claims:
Count I : Section 1983 claims against Defendants for violating her Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process rights by (1) removing L.G.V-C without serving any legal
process on Plaintiff; (2) failing to produce any Emergency Removal Order for 23 days; (3)
signing a Dependency Removal Order containing fabricated facts; ( 4) excluding Plaintiff from
dependency proceedings; (5) charging P laintiff witl1 harassment for protected petitioning
activity; and (5) denying 14 filings based on charges arising from protected activity. (Id 149).
Count II: Violation of Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process/
familial association rights. (Id 1 50) .
Count III: Violation of Fourth Amendment by seizing L. G. V-C witl1out a valid warrant
and continued detention of L.G.V-C. (Id. 151).
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Count IV: Fabrication of Evidence/ Judicial Deception in violation of the due process
rights of both Plaintiff and L.G.V -C. (Id. if 52) .
Count V: Unlawful detention claim against Defendant Cindy Williamson Minjarez for
allegedly holding L.G.V-C "without documented legal authority served on P laintiff
constituting unlawful detention of a child under color of state law." (Id if 53) .
Count VI: Monell Municipal L ability asserting 1110mas County, 1110mas County
Sheriffs Office and Thomas County DFACS maintain official policies that are the moving
force behind every constitutional violation alleged in Plaintif Ps Complaint. (Id ,r 54) .
Count VII: First Amendment retaliation claims based on various alleged activities of
Defendants including threats of false arrest and fabricated warrants; unauthorized $200 fee
increase; courthouse exclusion; harassment charges for contacting D FACS; 14 denied filings;
13 months of coordinated social media harassment by named defendants under aliases; luring
Plaintiff to trap locations multiple times; targeting her nonprofit with IRS harassment; and
witness intimidation. (Id ,r 55) .
Count VIII: Malicious prosecution and entrapment by luring Plaintiff to Defendant
Minjarez's property under false pretenses and then arresting her on trespassing warrants.
Count IX : Violation of Plaintif Ps Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment based on complete denial of allowing Plaintiff to have any contact with
L.G.V-C and other alleged actions. Plaintiff asserts such action constitutes cruel and unusual
treatment of herself and L.G.V-C that shocks the conscience of any reasonable person. (Id. if
57).
Count X : Conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of equal protection of the law in violation of
§ 1985.
Count XI: P laintiff "seeks a declaration that: (a) every order flowing from the May 13,
2025 removal is void as fruit of the poisonous tree; (6) L.G.V-C. is being held without
documented legal authority; ( c) Defendants violated Plaintiffs rights under the First, Fourth,
and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985; and (d) Plaintiffs criminal
charges arising from protected petitioning activity are constitutionally infirm and must be
dismissed.
As further relief, Plaintiff seeks:
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1. Immediate return L.G.V-C to P laintiffs custody per the emergency temporary
restraining order filing with the Complaint;
2. Compensatory damages of $100,000,000;
3. Punitive damages of $100,000,000;
4. Attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
5. Referral of each individual D efendant to various state and federal agencies for
investigation of their alleged unlawful conduct and public declaration naming each D efendant
and their specific conduct for reporting by any news outlet.
Ill. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAIN T
Next, the Court reviews the sufficiency of tl1e claims in Plaintiffs Complaint. I n doing
so, the Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the Complaint. Hughes v. utt, 350 F.3d
1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003); Watkins v. Joy, 782 F . App'x 892, 895 (11th Cir. 2019) (per
curiam) (citing Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11t11 Cir. 2008)). Moreover, because
Plaintiff proceeds prose, tl1e Court construes tl1e filings liberally. Tannenbaum v. United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) ("Prose pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard tl1an pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.") . I t is
wortl1 emphasizing, however, tl1at this leniency does not give Plaintiff " special advantages not
bestowed on other litigants," nor does it excuse P laintiff from obeying all local and procedural
rules, including those governing pleadings. Procup v. Strick/and, 7 60 F.2d 1107, 1115 (11th Cir.
1985). The Court will neither be apro se litigant's lawyer, see Jar?)lnka v. St. Thomas Univ. of La1v,
310 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1264 (S.D . Fla. 2004) , nor will it rewrite or fill in the blanks of a defective
pleading, see Brinson v. Colon, 2012 WL 1028878, at *1 n.2 (S.D . Ga. Mar. 26, 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted) .
Furtl1er, notwithstanding any grant of IFP status, "the court shall dismiss the case at
any time if the court determines that-... the action or appeal-(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); see W atkins, 782 F . App'x at
893 ("A district court is obligated to dismiss an in jorma pauperis complaint if it determines that
tl1e action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." (internal quotation marks
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omitted) (citation omitted)) . Plaintiff must also comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8, which requires that pleadings contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief' as well as "a demand for the relief sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a).
Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," it must provide "more
tl1an labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of tl1e elements of a cause of action
will not do." Bell Atl Corp. v. T1vomb!J, 550 U .S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U .S.
662, 678 (2009) (explaining tl1at Rule 8 (a)(2) 's pleading standard "demands more tl1an an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation"). Similarly, a complaint may not
rest on "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of ' further factual enhancement."' Iqbal, 556 U .S. at 678
(alterations in original) (quoting T1vomb!J, 550 U .S. at 557). " Factual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above tl1e speculative level." T1vomb!J, 550 U .S. at 555.
A. Rooker-Feldman
Plaintiff seeks relief from the Dependency Removal Order entered June 5, 2025, by
Brian D . Bellamy, Judge, Thomas County Juvenile Court. Specifically, Plaintiff asks tl1at this
Court order the immediate return of L.G .V -C to Plaintiffs custody and declaratory judgments
finding that every order flowing from the May 13, 2025 removal is constitutionally void. Under
Rooker-Feldman,
2
iliis Court lacks jurisdiction to grant P laintiff such relief.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine makes clear that federal district courts cannot
review state-court final judgments because that task is reserved for state
appellate courts or, as a last resort, the United States Supreme Court. The
doctrine applies to claims that were actually raised in the state court and those
inextricably intertwined witl1. that state judgment.
Figueroa v. Merscorp, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1315-16 (S.D . Fla. 2011), af/'d, 477 F. App'x
558 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) ( citations omitted) . It appears, as pled,
tl1at Plaintiffs claims here would be inextricably intertwined witl1 state court proceedings, and
Plaintiff has tl1e ability to challenge termination of her alleged custodial rights
3
or such other
state court orders which she seeks to void in tl1e pending state court proceedings.
2
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine arose out of two Supreme Court cases: Rookerv. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)
and D .C. Ct of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
3
As previously noted, Plaintiff does not state whether she had custody of L.G.V-C through a court order or
the basis for her custody ofL.G.V-C.
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Thus, to the extent Plaintiff's Complaint seeks to challenge final judgments entered by
the Thomas County Juvenile Court or such other state court orders, Plaintiffs claims with
respect thereto must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman D octrine.
B . Younger Abstention
Plaintiff also seeks a declaratory judgment that Plaintiffs criminal charges "arising from
protected petitioning activity are constitutionally infirm and must be dismissed." (Doc. 1 at
45) . Under Younger v. H arris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court finds that it should abstain from
interfering with any state criminal charges pending against Plaintiff.
In Youngerv. H arris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the
Supreme Court held that a federal court should not act to restrain an ongoing
state court criminal prosecution. By abstaining from exercise of their
jurisdiction, the federal courts promote the value of comity between the states
and the federal government and avoid unnecessary determinations of federal
constitutional questions.
Liedel v. J uv. Ct. of Madison Cnry., Ala., 891 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir. 1990) ( some citations
omitted) . " In Moore v. Sims, 442 U .S. 415, 99 S. Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed .2d 994 (1979) , the Supreme
Court held that the principles of Younger also apply in the context of state child custody cases
involving child abuse[,]" and " [u]nder Younger and Sims federal district courts may not interfere
with ongoing child custody proceedings." Id H ere, Plaintiff alleges constitutionally infirm
criminal charges have been filed against her for engaging in protected petitioning activity.
Plaintiff does not specify what criminal charges she is challenging. H owever, in any event, she
alleges they are ongoing and wants this Court to dismiss those state charges. Under Younger
and Sims, Plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed to the extent it asks the Court to interfere
with or dismiss state court criminal prosecutions.
C. Remaining Allegations and Requests for Relief
Plaintiff brings § 1983 claims against the above individuals in their individual and
official capacities and against Thomas County, Georgia, TI1omas County Sheriff's Office, and
TI1omas County D FACS.
Plaintiff alleges violations of L. G .V-C's constitutional rights as follows: Count III
(seizing L.G.V-C without a valid warrant and continued detention of L. G .V-C); Count IV
(fabrication of evidence/ judicial deception in violation of due process rights of Plaintiff and
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L.G.V-C); Count V (unlawful detention claim against Cindy \Villiamson Minjarez for holding
L.G.V-C), and Count IX ( cruel and unusual treatment ofL.G.V-C and Plaintiff by not allowing
Plaintiff to have any contact with L.G.V-C). An individual has a right to represent herself in a
proceeding prose, see 28 U.S.C. § 1654, and a parent may sue on behalf of a minor child, see
Fed. R. Civ. P . 17(c), but "a nonlawyer parent has no right to represent a child in an action in
the child's name." Whitehurst v. Wal-Mart, 306 F. App'x 446, 448-49 (11th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) . Based on her allegations, Plaintiff is not L. G .V -C's parent and the source of her
alleged right to custody of L.G.V-C is not established. Thus, to the extent that any allegations
are made or claims are filed on behalf of L.G.V-C, such allegations and claims are dismissed,
without prejudice.
Finally, P laintiff's actions against Thomas County, Georgia, Thomas County Sheriff's
Office, and Thomas County D FACS may be precluded under 28 U .S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii)
which provides that "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
. . . the action ... seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief."
At this time, the Court is unable to conclude that Plaintiff's action is frivolous or malicious,
that it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or that it seeks monetary relief
against any defendant, such as Thomas County, Georgia, Thomas County Sheriff's Office, and
Thomas County D FACS, who may be immune from such relief.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that service of Summons and Complaint be
made on all Defendants by the United States Marshals Service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)
(providing Court must order service by United States Marshals Service if plaintiff is authorized
to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 1915; see also§ 1915(d)). All Defendants
shall file an Answer, or other response as they deem appropriate under the Federal Rules, 28
U.S.C. § 1915, and the Prison L tigation Reform Act. Defendants are also reminded of the
duty to avoid unnecessary service expenses, and the possible imposition of expenses for failure
to waive service.
D. Conclusion as to Sufficiency of Plaintiffs Complaint
1. D ismissed Claims and Requests for Reli~(Denied
For the reasons stated above, the following claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE and the following requests for relief are DENIED:
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Counts III and Vin their entirety as they only assert claims on behalf of L.G.V-C;
Counts IV and IX to the extent they assert claims on behalf of L.G.V-C;
Count XI in its entirety seeking a declaratory judgment that: (a) every order flowing
from the May 13, 2025 removal is void as fruit of the poisonous tree; (b) L.G .V-C. is being
held without documented legal authority; ( c) Defendants violated Plaintiff's rights under the
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U .S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985;
4
and (d)
Plaintiff's criminal charges arising from protected petitioning activity are constitutionally
infirm and must be dismissed.
Plaintiff's requests for (1) an Order requiring the immediate return of L.G.V-C to her
custody, (2) a declaratory judgment that every order flowing from the May 13, 2025 removal
ofL.G.V-C from her custody is constitutionally void, (3) a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff's
pending state court criminal charges are constitutionally infirm and must be dismissed, and ( 4)
a public declaration, other than as appropriate in any Order issued by this Court, naming each
Defendant and their documented conduct for reporting by any news outlet are DENIED.
2. Claims and Requests for Reli~(All01vs to Proceed
The following claims are allowed to go forward for further factual development and
tl1e following requests for relief remain pending a determination as to Plaintiff's entitlement
tl1ereto:
Counts I and IV: claims against Defendants for allegedly violating Plaintiff's
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights;
Count II: claim for allegedly violating Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process/ familial association rights;
Count VI: Monell Municipal Lability claims against Thomas County, Thomas County
Sheriff's Office and Thomas County D FACS;
Count VII : Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim;
Count VIII: P laintiff's malicious prosecution and entrapment claims;
Count L"'X: to the extent it includes P laintiff's own claim for violation of her Eighth
Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; and
4
Subsection ( c) of Count XI is dismissed as duplicative of some of Plaintiffs other Counts.
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Count X : Alleged conspiracy claim to deprive Plaintiff of equal protection of the law
in violation of § 1985.
Plaintiff's request for (1) compensatory damages, (2) punitive damages, (3) attorney
fees and costs pursuant to § 1988, ( 4) referral of each individual D efendant to various state
and federal agencies for investigation of their alleged unlawful conduct, and (5) such other
relief as deemed just, proper, and necessary are permitted to go forward pending the Court's
determination of the appropriateness of and P laintiff's entitlement to such relief.
IV. PLAIN TIFF'S TRO SERVICE MOTION
Plaintiff requests that, pursuant to § 1915(d) and Federal Rule of Civil P rocedure
4(c)(3), tl1e United States Marshal Service be directed to serve her E mergency Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and P reliminary I njunction (''TRO Motion"). H owever, to date,
Plaintiff has not filed a separate T RO Motion, and while§ 1915(d) and Rule 4(c)(3) require
service of Summonses and Complaint by tl1e United States Marshal Service if in jorma pauperis
status is granted, service of all other pleadings is the responsibility of tl1e P laintiff.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's TRO Service Motion (Doc. 3) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 17th day of August 2026.
/s / W. Louis Sapds
W. LOUIS SANDS, SR. JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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