Brown v. Wallace

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________

No. 25-30135
____________

Ternell L. Brown,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Matthew Wallace, in his individual capacity; Katherinne F.
Alvarado-Cruz; Troy Lawrence, Jr., in his individual capacity,

Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:23-CV-1313
______________________________

Before Richman, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
*

Three members of the Baton Rouge Police Department, Matthew
Wallace, Troy Lawrence, Jr., and Katherinne Alvarado-Cruz, were involved
in the arrest and subsequent strip and body cavity search of Ternell Brown.
The officers have appealed the district court’s denial of their 12(b)(6)
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 14, 2026

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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motions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. We affirm in light of the
limited record before us and remand to permit discovery and further
proceedings as appropriate limited to the qualified immunity issues.
I
The following factual allegations are taken from Ternell Brown’s
Second Amended Complaint (Complaint).
1
Detective Matthew Wallace and
Officer Troy Lawrence, Jr., two members of the Baton Rouge Police
Department’s Street Crimes Unit, were patrolling the 2500 block of Plank
Road, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, when Detective Wallace “elected to conduct
a traffic stop” of Brown’s vehicle. After Brown and her husband “complied
by stopping” the vehicle in response to the activation of police lights,
Detective Wallace “ordered Mrs. Brown and her husband to exit the
vehicle.” Officer Lawrence arrived on the scene within fifteen seconds to
assist Detective Wallace. Officer Lawrence, who was “immediately next to
the passenger side door when” Brown exited, instructed “Brown to place her
hands behind her back[,] . . . placed [her] in handcuffs,” and ordered her “to
come stand beside his vehicle.” Officer Lawrence “guard[ed] Mrs. Brown
to allow Wallace” to search “the vehicle without Mrs. Brown or her
husband’s consent” and without a warrant.
Detective Wallace’s search of Brown’s vehicle uncovered “several
bottles of prescription medication belonging to Mrs. Brown,” including one
that contained “multiple prescriptions in the same bottle.” Brown
“informed Lawrence and Wallace at least four times that she was in lawful
possession of the pills . . . and offered to show proof.” Officer Lawrence and
_____________________
1
See Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Generally,
a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may rely on only the complaint and its proper
attachments.”).
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Detective Wallace responded by informing Brown that “she was not allowed
to carry multiple prescriptions in the same bottle,” and they refused to
“view[] her prescriptions while still on-scene.” Detective Wallace told
Brown that they were unable to determine if the prescription drugs were
“something [she] bought off the streets,” and he and Officer Lawrence told
her that “a judge would sort it out.” Officer Lawrence then “falsely” told
Brown that she would be taken to jail for possession of a firearm with a
controlled dangerous substance.
Officer Lawrence and Detective Wallace ordered Brown into a Baton
Rouge Police Department (BRPD) vehicle driven by Officer Doe. Officer
Doe “forcibly” transported Brown to the Brave Cave, an “unmarked BRPD
facility,” because they “suspected she might be involved in illegal drug
activity.” Officer Lawrence and Detective Wallace drove separately,
meeting Brown and Officer Doe there.
The Brave Cave was “a warehouse that the Street Crimes Unit [had]
adopted as their home base over the past several years . . . where BRPD
[took] suspects to interrogate them, gather intelligence, and attempt to ‘flip’
them to begin cooperating with BRPD.” The Brave Cave was “not a jail or
detention facility,” and “no correctional staff work[ed]” there. It “was
closed” a few months after the events at issue here when “reports of torture
committed by members of the Street Crimes Unit became public.” Brown
was held at the Brave Cave “for over two hours” so the officers could
investigate whether there was probable cause to arrest her for a drug offense.
She was not brought to the Brave Cave to be processed “for eventual transfer
to the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison . . . [but] to be further searched and
questioned.”
Detective Wallace and Officer Lawrence instructed Officer
Katherinne Alvarado-Cruz to conduct “Strip and Body Cavity searches [of
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4
Brown].” Heeding their “request,” Officer Alvarado-Cruz then “examined
Mrs. Brown, forc[ing] her to spread her vagina and buttocks for inspection,
and examined her vagina using a flashlight.” None of the officers had “a
warrant . . . or consent to conduct” the strip or body cavity search of Brown.
The officers released Brown from the Brave Cave without charge after
concluding that she “was not hiding a weapon or contraband in her rectum
or vagina.” There is no footage of the events at the Brave Cave because the
officers “intentionally turned off their body-worn cameras.”
Detective Wallace, Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz
subjected Brown to the strip and body cavity search pursuant to BRPD
policy, which states in pertinent part:
III. Strip Search
A. Arrestees will not be subjected to strip searches
unless the officer has articulate [sic], reasonable suspicion that
this particular arrestee may have weapons or contraband on his
person. Reasonable suspicion will be based on the following
factors:
1. The nature of the offense charged.
2. The arrestee’s appearance and conduct.
3. The circumstances of the arrest.
4. The arrestee’s prior record . . . .
C. Strip searches may be conducted on non-arrestees
based on individualized articu[l]able reasonable suspicion to
frisk, probable cause to search, consent, or a court order.
1. Reasonable suspicion and probable cause will be based upon
the same factors listed in III A.
Brown attempted to file a complaint about the strip and body cavity
search at BRPD headquarters but was “told that the officers had done
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nothing wrong.” She then filed the instant lawsuit asserting, among other
things,
2
a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for both an unreasonable search and
an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment against Detective
Wallace, Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz. Specifically, she
alleges that Detective Wallace, Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz
violated her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches by
subjecting her to a strip and visual body cavity search inside the Brave Cave,
and violated her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure by
forcibly transporting her to the Brave Cave and holding her there for hours.
Brown also sought to enjoin all defendants from implementing the
BRPD policy outlined above. Brown’s claim for injunctive relief and another
case involving the same BRPD policy were consolidated before a different
judge in the Middle District of Louisiana “for the limited purpose of reaching
a determination” of “whether the BRPD’s strip search policy regarding non-
arrestees is constitutional.”
3
That judge held Section III.C of the BRPD
policy, which applies to non-arrestees, unconstitutional on its face.
4
That
ruling is not involved in this appeal, nor is it at issue here. Brown was an
“arrestee” at the time of the strip and body cavity search. “An arrest occurs
when, ‘in view of all [of] the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’”
5
After
_____________________
2
Brown also asserted Monell liability against the city and state-law claims against
all defendants. Those claims are not at issue.
3
Lee v. Lawrence, Civil Action 23-1229, Civil Action 23-1313, 2024 WL 3385644, at
*1 (M.D. La. July 12, 2024).
4
Id.
5
United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 522 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)); see La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 201 (“To
constitute arrest there must be an actual restraint of the person. The restraint may be
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Wallace stopped Brown’s vehicle and ordered Brown and her husband out of
the vehicle, Lawrence placed her in handcuffs. He “guard[ed] Mrs. Brown
to allow Wallace to conduct his search [of the vehicle] more efficiently.”
Lawrence then informed Brown she was being taken to jail, which was
actually the Brave Cave, for possession of a firearm with a controlled
dangerous substance. Brown remained in handcuffs while BRPD Officer Doe
transported her to the Brave Cave in a BRPD vehicle. Brown was then held
at the Brave Cave for over two hours as a “detainee.” Under these
circumstances, a reasonable person would not have believed she was free to
leave. Nor did Brown, the person involved here. Brown was therefore an
“arrestee” under the circumstances at issue.
6

Detective Wallace, Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz
each filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
raising the defense of qualified immunity. The district court considered each
motion separately and denied each officer qualified immunity. Detective
Wallace, Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz have each timely
appealed.
II
“[A] district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the
extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”
7
But this court is “restricted to
_____________________
imposed by force or may result from the submission of the person arrested to the custody
of the one arresting him.”).
6
Cf. Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep’t, 86 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that
“arrestees [are] a subset of pretrial detainees”).
7
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); see Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568
F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss predicated on a defense
of qualified immunity is a collateral order capable of immediate review.”).
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determinations ‘of question[s] of law’ and ‘legal issues,’ and [does] not
consider ‘the correctness of the plaintiff’s version of the facts.’”
8
We
“review[] de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on
qualified immunity grounds or for failing to state a claim, accepting all well-
pleaded facts as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.”
9
“In doing so, we . . . do not accept conclusory allegations,
unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.”
10
This “court also has
jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of a complaint on interlocutory appeal
when that issue is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the denial of qualified
immunity.”
11

III
“The defense of qualified immunity protects state officials from civil
suit and liability when they could have reasonably believed that their actions
were legal.”
12
“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing
room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal
questions.”
13
“[P]roperly applied, it protects all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law.”
14
“When a defendant invokes
_____________________
8
Club Retro, L.L.C., 568 F.3d at 194 (first alteration in original) (quoting Atteberry
v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 251-52 (5th Cir. 2005)).
9
Bevill v. Fletcher, 26 F.4th 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Brown v. Miller, 519
F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2008)); see also Club Retro, L.L.C., 568 F.3d at 194.
10
McKay v. LaCroix, 117 F.4th 741, 746 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Arnold v. Williams,
979 F.3d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 2020)).
11
Bevill, 26 F.4th at 274 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 673 (2009)).
12
McKay, 117 F.4th at 746.
13
McCreary v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)).
14
Id. (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743).
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qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the
inapplicability of the defense.”
15
“[A] plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified
immunity must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged
and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.”
16
A
plaintiff “must show that (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional
right and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct.”
17

This court “may address either prong first,”
18
and if either condition is
lacking, the defendants are protected by qualified immunity.
19

We address the claims of qualified immunity for Detective Wallace,
Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz in that order.
A
Detective Wallace argues he is entitled to qualified immunity for
arresting Brown and for instructing Officer Alvarado-Cruz to conduct a strip
and body cavity search of Brown while she was held at the Brave Cave.
_____________________
15
McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
16
Zapata v. Melson, 750 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Backe v. LeBlanc,
691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012)).
17
Parker v. Blackwell, 23 F.4th 517, 522 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Morgan v. Swanson,
659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
18
McKay v. LaCroix, 117 F.4th 741, 746 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Cope v. Cogdill, 3
F.4th 198, 204 (5th Cir. 2021)).
19
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
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Detective Wallace contends he had probable cause for the arrest and that a
post-arrest strip and body cavity search did not violate clearly established law.
“The Fourth Amendment protects against ‘unreasonable searches
and seizures.’”
20
“The stopping of a vehicle and detention of its occupants
constitutes a ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment.”
21
“The legality of a
traffic stop is analyzed under the framework articulated in Terry v. Ohio,” a
“two-part . . . reasonable suspicion inquiry.”
22
Under that “inquiry, we ask
whether the officer’s action was: (1) ‘justified at its inception’; and
(2) ‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.’”
23
“For a traffic stop to be justified at its
inception, an officer must have an objectively reasonable suspicion that some
sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is about to
occur, before stopping the vehicle.”
24
In other words, “[r]easonable
suspicion must exist before the initiation of an investigatory detention.”
25

“[I]n making a reasonable suspicion inquiry, a court ‘must look at the
totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer
_____________________
20
United States v. Martinez, 102 F.4th 677, 683 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting U.S.
Const. amend. IV).
21
Id. (quoting United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004) (en
banc)).
22
United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005); see Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
23
Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d at 430 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
24
Id.
25
United States v. McKinney, 980 F.3d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing United States
v. Monsivais, 848 F.3d 353, 359 (5th Cir. 2017)).
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has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.’”
26

“We have stated previously that reasonable suspicion exists when the officer
can point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the search and seizure.”
27

“Warrantless searches and seizures are ‘per se unreasonable unless
they fall within a few narrowly defined exceptions.’”
28
Among those
exceptions is the automobile exception.
29
Under that exception,
“warrantless searches of automobiles are permitted by the Fourth
Amendment if the officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contains contraband or other evidence of a crime.”
30
Still, “whether the
initial stop was permissible under the Fourth Amendment” is a “threshold
matter.”
31

Additionally, “[i]t is well established that under the Fourth
Amendment a warrantless arrest must be based on probable cause.”
32

“Probable cause justifying an arrest ‘means facts and circumstances within
the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or
_____________________
26
Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d at 430 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).
27
Id.
28
United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.
Roberts, 274 F.3d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 2001)).
29
Rountree v. Lopinto, 976 F.3d 606, 609 (5th Cir. 2020).
30
Degenhardt v. Bintliff, 117 F.4th 747, 755 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States
v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 686 (5th Cir. 1995)).
31
United States v. Castelo, 415 F.3d 407, 409 (5th Cir. 2005).
32
Hogan v. Cunningham, 722 F.3d 725, 731 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States
v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 733 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc)).
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one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.’”
33

When “qualified immunity is asserted at the pleading stage, the
precise factual basis for the plaintiff’s claim or claims may be hard to
identify.”
34
“[F]acts crucial to the resolution of the qualified immunity issue
remain unknown at this juncture.”
35
“A seizure must be ‘justified at its
inception’”—“[r]easonable suspicion must exist before the initiation of an
investigatory detention”
36
—and an officer must have “probable cause”
before an officer may search a vehicle without a warrant.
37
Brown’s
allegations “fail to state”
38
why Detective Wallace elected to pull over the
vehicle and order Brown and her husband out of the vehicle,
39
why Detective
_____________________
33
Id. (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)).
34
Hobbs v. Warren, 838 F. App’x 881, 882 (5th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (quoting
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 238-39 (2009)).
35
Id.
36
United States v. McKinney, 980 F.3d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hiibel v.
Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004)).
37
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996); see Rountree v. Lopinto, 976
F.3d 606, 609 (5th Cir. 2020).
38
Morgan v. Hubert, 335 F. App’x 466, 472 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).
39
See United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(explaining that “[t]he stopping of a vehicle and detention of its occupants constitutes a
‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment” and that “routine traffic stops” must be
“justified by probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a violation”); see also Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (“Under the Fourth Amendment . . . a policeman who
lacks probable cause but whose ‘observations lead him reasonably to suspect’ that a
particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain
that person briefly in order to ‘investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.’”
(footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975)));
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 331 (2009) (explaining that “[i]n Mimms, the Court held
that ‘once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police
officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth
Amendment[]’” (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977))). Wallace’s
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Wallace searched the vehicle, and why Detective Wallace searched her purse
containing the drugs and gun that led to her arrest and subsequent strip and
body cavity search.
40
We accordingly find ourselves “in the difficult position
of having to determine whether [Detective Wallace’s] conduct was
objectively reasonable without the facts typically relied upon to do so.”
41

Facts may exist regarding the knowledge of Detective Wallace that support
his claim of qualified immunity.
42
However, given that only Brown’s
_____________________
brief in support of his motion to dismiss acknowledged that the Complaint did not disclose
the reasons for the stop and stated that it was because of “illegal tint and a computer check
indicating lapsed auto insurance.” But see Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338
(5th Cir. 2008) (stating that “a court ruling on a motion to dismiss . . . reviews only the
well-pleaded facts in the complaint” and “it may not consider new factual allegations made
outside the complaint, including those made on appeal”); Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 498
(5th Cir. 2011) (stating that under the 12(b)(6) standard, this court “generally confine[s]
[its] analysis to the complaint and its proper attachments”); Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that “[d]ocuments that a defendant
attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to
in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to her claim” (alteration in original) (quoting
Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993))).
40
See Degenhardt v. Bintliff, 117 F.4th 747, 755-56 (5th Cir. 2024) (noting that
warrantless searches of automobiles are permitted if officers have probable cause to believe
the vehicle has contraband or evidence of a crime and affirming the district court’s
dismissal of an unreasonable search of a vehicle claim when the complaint stated that
“alcoholic beverages were in plain view of the officers before they opened the door of the
vehicle”); see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that “when a
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as
a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that
automobile . . . [and] examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger
compartment” (footnote omitted)).
41
Hobbs v. Warren, 838 F. App’x 881, 883 (5th Cir. 2021) (unpublished).
42
See United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005)
(“[R]easonable suspicion exists when the officer can point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the
search and seizure.” (emphasis added)); see also Hogan v. Cunningham, 722 F.3d 725, 731
(5th Cir. 2013) (noting that an officer has probable cause for an arrest when the facts and
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complaint is before us, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity at this stage of the litigation. On remand, discovery should be
limited to the issue of qualified immunity, and further proceedings should
resolve that issue before general discovery or trial occur.
B
Officer Lawrence argues he is entitled to qualified immunity because
he was not personally involved in any alleged violation of Brown’s
constitutional rights. He states that at “best . . . [he] handcuffed [Brown],
ordered [Brown] to stand beside his vehicle, and instructed [Brown] to get
into the vehicle being driven by Officer Doe.” But as we recognized above,
“[t]he stopping of a vehicle and detention of its occupants constitutes a
‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment,”
43
warrantless searches of
automobiles are allowed under the Fourth Amendment when “the officers
have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other
evidence of a crime,”
44
and “a warrantless arrest must be based on probable
cause.”
45
Officer Lawrence admits the Complaint alleges that he was
personally involved in the handcuffing and detention of Brown while
Detective Wallace searched the vehicle and that he “instructed [Brown] to
get into the vehicle being driven [to the Brave Cave] by Officer Doe.” As
with Detective Wallace’s claim of qualified immunity, we find ourselves “in
_____________________
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge would cause a person of reasonable caution
to believe that a suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense).
43
United States v. Martinez, 102 F.4th 677, 683 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting United
States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)).
44
Degenhardt, 117 F.4th at 755 (quoting United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 686
(5th Cir. 1995)).
45
Hogan, 722 F.3d at 731 (quoting United States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 733 (5th
Cir. 1999) (en banc)).
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the difficult position of having to determine whether [Officer Lawrence’s]
conduct was objectively reasonable without the facts typically relied upon to
do so.”
46
We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity as to Officer Lawrence, but proceedings on remand should first
resolve the qualified immunity issue.
47

C
Officer Alvarado-Cruz contends she is entitled to qualified immunity
because the law governing strip and body cavity searches of arrestees was not
clearly established as to the particular level of suspicion required at the time
she conducted the strip and body cavity search of Brown. She also contends
that conducting the strip and body cavity search was objectively reasonable
because “she was following the directives [of] senior officers,” who had
reasonable suspicion, and BRPD policy required Brown’s strip and body
cavity search to “be conducted by an officer of the same sex as the arrestee.”
She argues that, under the collective knowledge doctrine, she was entitled to
rely on Detective Wallace and Officer Lawrence’s “reasonable suspicion” in
carrying out the “ordered search.”
1
“In determining what constitutes clearly established law, this [court]
first looks to Supreme Court precedent and then to [its] own.”
48
“When
there is no direct controlling authority, ‘this [court] may rely on decisions
from other circuits to the extent that they constitute a robust consensus of
_____________________
46
Hobbs v. Warren, 838 F. App’x 881, 883 (5th Cir. 2021) (unpublished).
47
See Morgan v. Hubert, 335 F. App’x 466, 473 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).
48
Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 186 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Shumpert v. City
of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 320 (5th Cir. 2018)).
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cases of persuasive authority.’”
49
“Ultimately, the touchstone is fair
warning: The law can be clearly established despite notable factual
distinctions between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the
[c]ourt, so long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the
conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights.”
50
In other words, we do
“not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed
the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”
51
In addition, the
Supreme Court has instructed us “not to define clearly established law at a
high level of generality,”
52
but to undertake this inquiry “in light of the
specific context of the case.”
53

Furthermore, a “Government official’s conduct violates clearly
established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours
of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would [have
understood] that what he is doing violates that right.’”
54
At the motion to
dismiss stage, “it is the defendant’s conduct as alleged in the complaint that is
scrutinized for objective legal reasonableness.”
55
“[T]he question is whether
the officer’s actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and
_____________________
49
Id. (quoting Shumpert, 905 F.3d at 320).
50
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shumpert, 905 F.3d at 321).
51
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
52
Id. at 742.
53
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S.
194, 198 (2004)).
54
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
55
McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996)).
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No. 25-30135
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circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.”
56

2
In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,
57
the Supreme Court held
constitutional routine intake searches (i.e., suspicionless searches) of
detainees prior to being released into the “general population,” “regardless
of the circumstances of the [detainee’s] arrest.”
58
As relevant here, part of
the intake searches at issue included an officer looking at the detainee’s
“body openings,” and requiring the detainee to “lift his genitals, turn
around, and cough in a squatting position.”
59
The Court expressly reserved,
however, what types of searches “would be reasonable” when “a detainee
[is] held without assignment to the general jail population and without
substantial contact with other detainees.”
60
The Court explained that the
“circumstances before the Court . . . [did] not present the opportunity to
consider . . . whether an arrestee whose detention has not yet been reviewed
by a magistrate or other judicial officer, and who can be held in available
facilities removed from the general population, may be subjected to the types
_____________________
56
Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)).
57
566 U.S. 318 (2012).
58
Id. at 324, 334, 339.
59
Id. at 324.
60
Id. at 338-39.
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No. 25-30135
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of searches at issue” in that case.
61
Here, Brown was not released into the
general population.
To be sure, “Florence abrogated some . . . decisions to the extent they
required that persons arrested on minor offenses be excepted from blanket
strip searches even when they were entering a general prison population.”
62

However, “Florence did not . . . disturb recognized Fourth Amendment
restrictions against such searches of persons held apart from the general
prison population.”
63

In Kelly v. Foti,
64
this court held that jail officials may “strip and cavity
search” “a person arrested for a minor offense and detained pending the
posting of bond only if they possess a reasonable suspicion that [the arrestee]
is hiding weapons or contraband.”
65
In Stewart v. Lubbock County,
66
this court
held unconstitutional a department policy permitting strip searches of any
arrestee, including minor offenders awaiting bond, when “no reasonable
suspicion existed that they . . . might possess weapons or contraband,” and
explained that officers must have reasonable suspicion that an individual
might possess weapons or contraband to conduct a strip search.
67
In
_____________________
61
Id. at 339.
62
Johnson v. Gov’t of D.C., No. 11-5115, 2014 WL 12579819, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
1, 2014) (Pillard, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
63
Id.
64
77 F.3d 819 (5th Cir. 1996).
65
Id. at 820-21 (emphasis added); see id. at 820-22 (confirming the principle that a
“strip and cavity search” “is permissible only if the official has an individualized suspicion
that the arrestee is hiding weapons or contraband”).
66
767 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1985).
67
Id. at 156-57.
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No. 25-30135
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Williams v. Kaufman County,
68
this court described its previous holdings that
officers must have reasonable suspicion to strip search individuals who have
committed minor offenses “in custodial situations” and that “outside the
prison context” officers need at least individualized reasonable suspicion to
conduct a strip search.
69
In Jimenez v. Wood County,
70
our en banc court
acknowledged that “longstanding precedent” requires reasonable suspicion
to conduct strip searches of individuals who were arrested for minor offenses
for weapons or contraband.
71

At least four other circuits have required a more particularized
suspicion that contraband is concealed for an officer to lawfully conduct a
body cavity search. The First Circuit in United States v. Barnes
72
concluded
that there must be “a more particularized suspicion that contraband is
concealed” prior to conducting a visual body cavity search of the defendant,
even though the “initial strip search” of the defendant “was clearly justified
given [his] arrest for a drug trafficking crime.”
73
The Second Circuit in Sloley
v. VanBramer
74
held that “a visual body cavity search conducted as an
incident to a lawful arrest for any offense must be supported by ‘a specific,
articulable factual basis supporting a reasonable suspicion to believe the
arrestee secreted evidence inside a body cavity.’”
75
The Seventh Circuit in
_____________________
68
352 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 2003).
69
Id. at 1005-07.
70
660 F.3d 841 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
71
Id. at 844, 847.
72
506 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2007).
73
Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
74
945 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2019).
75
Id. at 38 (quoting People v. Hall, 886 N.E.2d 162, 168 (N.Y. 2008)).
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No. 25-30135
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Campbell v. Miller
76
held “that the police needed to have a reasonable
suspicion that [the arrestee] was concealing contraband in order to justify the
[strip and body cavity] search under . . . [the Supreme Court’s decision
in] Robinson.”
77
The Ninth Circuit stated in United States v. Mendez-
Jimenez
78
that “[a] clear indication or plain suggestion that the suspect is
concealing contraband within his body is required before a search beyond the
body’s surface may be authorized.”
79

In other words, both our precedent and “a robust consensus of cases
of persuasive authority”
80
require an officer to have at least a reasonable
suspicion that an arrestee not being released into the general population is
hiding or concealing weapons or contraband before subjecting the arrestee to
a strip and body cavity search.
81
We therefore conclude that it is clearly
established that, at a minimum, Officer Alvarado-Cruz needed reasonable
suspicion that Brown was hiding or concealing weapons or contraband in a
body cavity to justify her search of Brown’s vagina and buttocks.
3
Brown alleged in her complaint that Detective Wallace found “several
bottles of prescription medication,” including one that contained “multiple
prescriptions in the same bottle,” along with a “firearm.” Brown also alleged
that Detective Wallace informed Brown that he suspected she could have
_____________________
76
499 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2007).
77
Id. at 717; see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
78
709 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1983).
79
Id. at 1302 (emphasis added).
80
Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 186 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Shumpert v. City
of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 320 (5th Cir. 2018)).
81
See supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
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No. 25-30135
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“bought [the pills] off the streets,” and that she was transported to the Brave
Cave due to the officers’ suspicions that she was “involved in illegal drug
activity.” Brown stated that Officer Alvarado-Cruz conducted the strip and
body cavity search “[a]t the request of Wallace and Lawrence,” and that after
the officers were “satisfied that [she] was not hiding a weapon or
contraband in her [body cavities], she was released from [the Brave Cave]
without charge.”
“Under the collective knowledge doctrine, an officer initiating the
stop or conducting the [strip and body cavity] search need not have personal
knowledge of the evidence that gave rise to the reasonable suspicion or
probable cause, so long as he is acting at the request of those who have the
necessary information.”
82
“In other words, the collective knowledge theory
applies so long as there is ‘some degree of communication’ between the
acting officer and the officer who has knowledge of the necessary facts.”
83

Officer Alvarado-Cruz was “acting at the request of” Detective
Wallace and Officer Lawrence, “those who [had] the necessary
information.”
84
Therefore, under the collective knowledge doctrine,
Detective Wallace and Officer Lawrence’s knowledge and observations may
be imputed to Officer Alvarado-Cruz.
85
However, the collective knowledge
doctrine does not apply to Officer Alvarado-Cruz until a “reasonable
_____________________
82
United States v. Zuniga, 860 F.3d 276, 283 (5th Cir. 2017).
83
Id. (quoting United States v. Ibarra, 493 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007)).
84
Id.
85
See United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753, 759-60 (5th Cir. 1999).
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No. 25-30135
21
suspicion that could have been transferred between” she, Detective
Lawrence, and Officer Wallace existed.
86

The complaint is devoid of factual allegations suggesting Detective
Wallace and Officer Lawrence had reason to believe Brown was hiding
contraband or a weapon in her body cavities. In Officer Alvarado-Cruz’s
motion to dismiss before the district court, she argued that “combining pills
in the same container was . . . ‘suspicious,’ and, because of [that] suspicious
behavior, BRPD officers required [Brown] to undergo a visual strip and body
cavity search ‘to show that she was not hiding contraband.’” Although
“narcotics violation[s]” are “the kinds of crimes . . . that might give rise to a
reasonable belief that [an] arrestee was concealing an item in a body cavity,”
87

_____________________
86
United States v. Alvarez, 40 F.4th 339, 352 (5th Cir. 2022); see id. (“We do not
blindly accept officers’ reliance on information obtained through police channels; the
government must substantiate the basis of the information.”); Ibarra, 493 F.3d at 531
(affirming the district court’s probable cause finding and concluding that “knowledge of
probable cause can be imputed . . . under the collective knowledge doctrine”); Zuniga, 860
F.3d at 283 (rejecting the appellant’s argument that “the officers failed to establish any
reasonable suspicion that could be transferred,” and holding that the “suspicion
transferred by the law enforcement agents who observed [the appellant’s] traffic violation
suffice[d]”); Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d at 759 (“[I]f [DEA Special Agent] Mattas possessed
sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop the van when he made his call to the dispatcher, then
the actual stop by the . . . officers, acting on the dispatcher’s bulletin, was also supported
by reasonable suspicion.”); United States v. Vasquez, 534 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1976)
(“[I]f Customs Patrol officers . . . possessed sufficient factual information to support a
determination of probable cause to arrest and detain, then the actual arrest and detention
one hour later by . . . police officers acting on the information relayed by Communications
Sector was supported similarly by probable cause.”); see also United States v. Patiutka, 804
F.3d 684, 691 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he instructing officer alone must have sufficient
information to justify an arrest or search in order for the acting officer to benefit from the
collective-knowledge doctrine.”); United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir.
2010) (“In order for the collective knowledge doctrine to apply . . . the officer providing
the information . . . must have facts supporting the level of suspicion required.”).
87
Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983); see also
Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Although we have
repeatedly held that the police may not conduct a suspicionless strip or body cavity search
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No. 25-30135
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we are unable to determine on this record whether Detective Lawrence and
Officer Wallace had a “particularized and objective basis” to support such a
belief.
88
As with Detective Lawrence and Officer Wallace, we find ourselves
“in the difficult position of having to determine whether [Officer Alvarado-
Cruz’s] conduct was objectively reasonable without the facts typically relied
upon to do so.”
89
We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity as to Officer Alvarado-Cruz and remand for discovery and further
proceedings regarding that issue.
90
We do not reach whether the strip and
body cavity search conducted by Alvarado-Cruz was objectively reasonable.
91

* * *
_____________________
of a person arrested for a misdemeanor, reasonable officers could disagree as to whether
that rule applied to those arrested for felony drug crimes, given the propensity of drug
dealers to conceal contraband in their body cavities.”); United States v. Draper, No. 5:22-
cr-0386, 2023 WL 3726506, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2023) (“[I]t is common for individuals
dealing in illegal drugs to hide drugs on their person.”). But see United States v. Barnes, 506
F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2007) (“The evidence before [the officer]—that [the defendant] was
a suspected drug dealer in possession of narcotics and that some drug dealers conceal drugs
between their buttocks—did not endow him with an individualized suspicion that [the
defendant] was ‘cheeking’ drugs.”).
88
See United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).
89
Hobbs v. Warren, 838 F. App’x 881, 883 (5th Cir. 2021) (unpublished).
90
See Morgan v. Hubert, 335 F. App’x 466, 473 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).
91
See Stewart v. Lubbock County, 767 F.2d 153, 155-57 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying the
Supreme Court’s four-factor reasonableness test from Wolfish to a department’s policy
permitting strip searches); Mabry v. Lee County, 849 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 2017) (applying
Wolfish to address the reasonableness of a search at a correctional facility); see also Swain v.
Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997) (“A strip and visual body cavity search . . . requires
independent analysis under the Fourth Amendment. In [Wolfish], the Supreme Court
noted that ‘[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979))); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981)
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No. 25-30135
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For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of
Detective Wallace, Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz’s 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds and REMAND for
discovery and further proceedings limited to the issue of Detective Wallace,
Officer Lawrence, and Officer Alvarado-Cruz’s qualified immunity before
general discovery or trial proceed.
92

_____________________
(“Strip searches of detainees are constitutionally constrained by due process requirements
of reasonableness under the circumstances.”).
92
See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“The district
court . . . may limit any necessary discovery to the defense of qualified immunity. . . . Even
if such limited discovery is allowed, at its end, the court can again determine whether the
case can proceed and consider any motions for summary judgment under Rule 56.”);
Wertenbroch v. Hardeman, 178 F.4th 186, 192 (5th Cir. 2026) (“[I]f qualified immunity is
denied because there is a need for clarification of the facts, the district court may . . . order
limited discovery that is ‘narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on
the immunity claim.’” (quoting Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 311 (5th Cir. 2022)));
Asante-Chioke v. Dowdle, 103 F.4th 1126, 1132 (5th Cir. 2024) (remanding and directing the
district court to “limit discovery to uncover only the facts necessary to rule on qualified
immunity”).
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