USA v. Castro Garcia et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MANELY ENRIQUEZ, )
BOP Reg. #50374-069, )
)
Movant, )
) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-00159-JB-N
v. )
) CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 1:19-00033-JB-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Respondent. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MANELY ENRIQUEZ, a federal prisoner proceeding without counsel (pro se),
filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255 dated
April 26, 2023 (Doc# 247), seeking relief from the judgment entered against him in
the above-numbered criminal action.
1
The assigned District Judge has referred
Enriquez’s § 2255 motion to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for appropriate action
under 28 U.S.C. §636(a)-(b), Rule 10 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings
for the United States District Courts, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a). See S.D. Ala.
GenLR72(b); (5/4/2023 electronic reference notation). Under S.D. Ala. Gen. LR
72(a)(2)(R), the undersigned is authorized to require responses, issue orders to show
cause and any other orders necessary to develop a complete record, and to prepare a
report and recommendation to the District Judge as to the appropriate disposition of

1
All “Doc#” citations herein refer to the docket of the above-numbered criminal
action. The companion civil action has been opened for administrative and statistical
purposes only, and does not contain or receive any filings.
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the §2255 motion, in accordance with 28 U.S. §636(b)(1) and Rule 8(b) of the Rules
Governing Section 2255 Proceedings.
Following examination of the § 2255 motion under Rule 4(b) of the Rules
Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, the Court
ordered the Government to answer or otherwise appropriately respond to the motion,
and also set a deadline for Enriquez’s reply.
2
(See Docs# 254, 262). The Government
timely filed its response in opposition (Doc# 267), and Enriquez timely filed a reply
(Doc# 272) to the response. Enriquez’s § 2255 motion (Dos# 247) is now under
submission.
Upon due consideration of the § 2255 motion, the Government’s response,
Enriquez’s reply, and the record of prior proceedings under Rules 7 and 8(a) of the
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, the
undersigned finds that neither expansion of the record nor an evidentiary hearing is
warranted, and RECOMMENDS that Enriquez’s § 2255 motion be DENIED and
DISMISSED with prejudice.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
For purposes of these findings and recommendations, the undersigned adopts
in part the factual summary of the trial evidence contained in the decision of the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirming Enriquez’s convictions on direct appeal:

2
See Rule 5(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States
District Courts (“The moving party may file a reply to the respondent’s answer or
other pleading. The just must set the time to file unless the time is already set by
local rule.”).
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On Christmas Eve 2018, the United States Coast Guard intercepted a
small, homemade boat on the verge of sinking in choppy waters of the
high seas between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. The crew of
a Coast Guard airplane first spotted the boat while patrolling the
narcotics-trafficking route northeast of the Dominican Republic and
northwest of Puerto Rico. The guardsmen considered the boat suspicious
because it carried a large number of fuel containers, lacked a visible
name or registration number, and used no navigation lights. They
reported it to a nearby Coast Guard cutter, the Richard Dixon, which
detached a small “over-the-horizon” boat to intercept the suspicious
boat.

The Coast Guard's boat caught up to the suspicious boat about 50
nautical miles from the coast of the Dominican Republic. It approached
with its lights off and shined a spotlight when it was 20 or 30 feet away
from the suspicious boat. Coast guardsmen saw “frantic” activity aboard
the suspicious boat as two men threw things overboard. When the
guardsmen stopped the boat, they found six bales in the water tied to
each other and to a seventh bale still inside the boat.

***
A Coast Guard officer asked the men “who was the master, who was in
charge.” No one answered, so he asked who piloted the boat. One of the
men answered that they all took turns. The others appeared to agree,
based on their body language. The boat had a hand tiller that each
person could operate for only about three hours at a time. The men said
they were traveling from Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic to
Dorado, Puerto Rico....
***
Then the guardsmen searched the smugglers’ boat. They found that the
serial number had been filed off the outboard motor. And the boat
contained no fishing or recreational equipment and only a few personal
items.
***
...The over-the-horizon boat returned the smugglers to the Richard
Dixon. On board, the four men identified themselves as Pedro Dino
Cedado Nunez, Manely Enriquez, Angel Castro Garcia, and Mike Castro
Martinez.

The Richard Dixon brought the smugglers to Saint Thomas in the Virgin
Islands about 10 days later. There, a Homeland Security agent met the
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smugglers and flew with them to Mobile, Alabama. He interviewed all
four men individually that day.
***
The bales weighed about 180 kilograms, and the four men stipulated
that they contained cocaine.

(Doc# 226, PageID.1488-1492); United States v. Cedado Nunez, 1 F.4th 976, 981–982
(11th Cir. 2021). To the extent it is necessary, this Court will further cite to the trial
transcript when discussing the merits of Enriquez's substantive claims.
Enriquez and his co-defendants were initially arrested on a criminal complaint
(Doc# 1), and Enriquez was appointed counsel at his initial appearance on January
4, 2019. (See Docs# 16, 18). On January 31, 2019, the grand jury for this district
returned an initial indictment that charged the defendants with the following
violations of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA): conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute approximately 182 kilograms of
cocaine on board a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction contrary to Title 46 U.S.C.
§70503(a)(1) in violation of Title 46 U.S.C. §70506(b) (Count One); and possession
with intent to distribute approximately 182 kilograms of cocaine on board a vessel
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in violation of Title 46 §70503(a)(1)
(Count Two). (Doc# 40). Enriquez, along with his co-defendants, was arraigned on
February 12, 2019, and pleaded not guilty to both counts. (Doc# 46).
Prior to trial, the Government moved for a pretrial ruling on jurisdiction and
venue (Doc# 110). The motion was supported by the statements of U.S. Coast Guard
members that the involved vessel was 50 nautical miles northeast of the Dominican
Republic and had no indicia or documentation of vessel nationality or registry, so they
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were unable to ascertain who the master was. Further, when asked who was in
charge, the suspects advised that all four of them had driven the vessel. (Doc#110-1,
PageID.248-52). For their part, Enriquez and two other defendants filed motions to
dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction. (Docs# 111, 112, and 116).
At a pretrial hearing, the Court made a preliminary finding of jurisdiction,
stating that the yola was a stateless vessel in international waters. (Doc# 144,
PageID.410). The Court observed that the United States recognizes a foreign nation’s
territorial waters up to12 nautical miles from the coast of that nation and, here, the
U.S. Coast Guard gained control of the vessel approximately 50 nautical miles off the
coast of Cabo San Rafael, Dominican Republic.
3
(Doc# 144, PageID.409-10). The
Court noted that the vessel yielded no flag, registration documents, or indicia of
nationality and that no crew member claimed nationality or registry of the vessel.
(Doc# 144, PageID.410). The Court rejected the argument that an evidentiary hearing
was required but stated it would hear any additional evidence on jurisdiction at trial
outside of the presence of the jury. (Doc# 144, PageID.413). The Court also made a
finding as to venue. (Doc# 144, PageID.411). Enriquez joined in the other defendants’
objections on the need for an evidentiary hearing on jurisdiction. (Doc# 144,
PageID.417).
At trial, Government witnesses with the Coast Guard and the Department of
Homeland Security testified the yola was intercepted approximately 50 nautical

3
Although Enriquez raised the issue that the Coast Guard’s initial observation of
the vessel was 15 miles off the coast, the Court reasoned that the relevant point was
where the vessel was apprehended. (Doc# 144, PageID.410).
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miles from the Dominican Republic. (Doc# 207, PageID.1052, 1072). Chief Petty
Officer Alejandro Cordova, who was fluent in Spanish, asked the crew members “who
was the master, who was in charge,” but no one replied. (Doc# 207, PageID.1332).
When he asked who was driving the boat, one responded that they all took turns.
(Doc# 207, PageID.1132, 1147). He asked the others if they all took turns, and he
interpreted their body language in response as agreement. (Doc# 207, PageID.1147-
48).
The defendants again objected to jurisdiction at trial. (Doc# 208, PageID.1376-
1377). All defendants unsuccessfully moved for acquittal on the grounds that
government failed to prove jurisdiction at the close of the government’s case and
again after they rested. (Doc# 208, PageID.1280, 1376-78). The Court concluded that
the small boat, known as a “yola,” was a stateless vessel
4
and the Court had subject
matter jurisdiction. (Doc# 208, PageID.1378). The jury found Enriquez and his
codefendants guilty of both charges. (Doc# 208, PageID.1381-83).
The Court sentenced Enriquez to concurrent terms of 188 months in prison on
each count,
5
followed by a 5-year term of supervised release. (Doc# 189). Following

4
The undersigned notes that the relevant statute uses the term “vessel without
nationality,” 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A), but the parties and many of our cases
colloquially refer to such vessels as “stateless” vessels. See, e.g., United States v.
Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 818 n.1 (11th Cir. 2024); United States v. Hernandez, 864 F.3d
1292 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016);
United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014). The Court utilizes the
terms “stateless” and a “vessel without nationality” interchangeably herein.

5
Subsequent to filing the instant Motion to Vacate, Enriquez filed a Motion for
Reduction Under Retroactive Sentencing Guideline Amendment 821. (Doc# 277). The
motion was granted, and his sentence was reduced to 151 months. (Doc# 289).
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sentencing, the Court entered a final judgment as to Enriquez. (Doc# 189). All
defendants appealed their convictions to the Eleventh Circuit (Doc# 173, 176, 180,
199), and Enriquez was appointed new counsel for his appeal. (See Docs# 181, 191).
In his appeal, Enriquez advanced three arguments: (1) that the government
did not prove the defendants’ boat was a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States” under the MDLEA; (2) that the District Court erred in failing to grant
his motion for acquittal because the government failed to prove an essential element
of the offenses for which he was convicted; and (3) the District Court abused its
discretion and violated his right to present a complete defense when it excluded
testimony concerning the circumstances of his transportation to the U.S. on board a
Coast Guard cutter. (Doc# 267-1, PageID.2046, 2051, 2055). In his initial brief,
Enriquez also attempted to adopt by reference, without further specification, “all
arguments of his co-appellants not otherwise included [in Enriquez’s brief] and
applicable to Enriquez.” (Doc# 267-1, PageID.2046).
6
The Court takes judicial notice
that Enriquez also filed a motion to adopt co-appellant Mike Castro Enriquez’s
arguments in his appellate reply brief concerning the necessity of a pre-trial hearing

6
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 states, “In a case involving more than one
appellant or appellee, including consolidated cases, any number of appellants or
appellees may join in a brief, and any party may adopt by reference a part of another's
brief. Parties may also join in reply briefs.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(i). According to our
circuit’s local rules, parties wishing to adopt any part of the brief of another party
“shall include a statement describing in detail which briefs and which portions of
those briefs are adopted.” 11th Cir. R. 28–1. A defendant in a consolidated appeal
may adopt a codefendant's argument by specific reference in the initial appellate
brief. United States v. Gonzalez, 322 F. App'x 963, 968 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).
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on the question of jurisdiction under the MDLEA, which motion was granted. The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed Enriquez’s conviction on June 17, 2021, in a published
opinion. United States v. Cedado Nunez, 1 F.4th 976, 992 (11th Cir. 2021).
With respect to jurisdiction, Enriquez argued on direct appeal that there was
insufficient evidence the vessel was a “vessel without nationality” subject to U.S.
jurisdiction under the MDLEA because “[a]fter learning that the men took turns
piloting the [boat], the Coast Guard failed to ask the men, individually or collectively,
if they wished to make a claim of nationality or registry for the vessel.” (Doc# 267-1,
PageID.2025, 2047-2048). Enriquez cited the Second Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Prado, 933 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2019), in support of his “direct request”
argument. (Id. at PageID.2050). He reasoned that because the men took turns
piloting the boat, they took turns being “individuals in charge” who could have each
made a claim for registry or nationality for the vessel upon request. (Id. at
PageID.2048).
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the District Court had jurisdiction under
the MDLEA; that neither the statute nor the Confrontation Clause required an
evidentiary hearing on jurisdiction because the MDLEA made it clear that
jurisdiction was a preliminary question of law to be determined by the trial judge and
the defendants never identified any contested facts or evidence they wanted to
introduce; and that Enriquez was not deprived of the opportunity to present a
complete defense. United States v. Cedado Nunez, 1 F.4th 976 (11th Cir. 2021).
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Examining jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit observed that the three ways to
establish that a vessel is “without nationality” and “subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States” set forth in § 70502(d)(1)
7
did not constitute an exhaustive list, as
Section 70502(d)(1) used the word “includes,” rather than the phrase “includes only”
used in the next subsection of the statute. United States v. Cedado Nunez, 1 F.4th at

7
At the time of Enriquez’s indictment, 46 U.S.C. §70502(d)(1) provided:

(d) Vessel without nationality.—

(1) In general.--In this chapter, the term “vessel without
nationality” includes--

(A) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in
charge makes a claim of registry that is denied by the nation
whose registry is claimed;

(B) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in
charge fails, on request of an officer of the United States
authorized to enforce applicable provisions of United States law,
to make a claim of nationality or registry for that vessel; and

(C) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in
charge makes a claim of registry and for which the claimed nation
of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that
the vessel is of its nationality.

46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(d)(1).
Section 70502(d)(1) was amended on December 23, 2022, see James M. Inhofe
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263, §
11519, 136 Stat. 2395, 4142 (2022), to add § 70502(d)(1)(D), which defines “vessel
without nationality” as “a vessel aboard which no individual, on request of an officer
of the United States authorized to enforce applicable provisions of United States law,
claims to be the master or is identified as the individual in charge, and that has no
other claim of nationality or registry under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (e).”
The amendment is not relevant to the instant case because Enriquez was indicted
prior to the amendment.
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984. The Eleventh Circuit found that the yola fell within the meaning of “vessel
without nationality” under both the MDLEA and international law because “[i]t
carried no documents, it flew no flag, and it had no name or identifying numbers that
would permit entry into a national registry.” Id. at 985. Further, “[n]o one on the
vessel verbally claimed that it had any nationality, nor was the vessel ‘in a position
to provide’ evidence of any nationality.” The Eleventh Circuit observed that “a Coast
Guard officer asked the smugglers who was the master or individual in charge, and
no one claimed to be....The record contains no evidence of a hierarchy amount the
smugglers.” Cedado Nunez, 1 F.4th at 985. The Eleventh Circuit stated that “[t]he
smugglers’ boat had no master or individual in charge who could make a verbal claim
of registry under Section 70502(e)” and found that the Coast Guard was not required
to ask the crew to make a claim of nationality in the absence of the master or
individual in charge. Id. at 985-986.
The Eleventh Circuit held that the yola was a stateless vessel and the District
Court had jurisdiction under the MDLEA:
We conclude that the district court had jurisdiction under the Act. The
smugglers’ vessel had no indicia of nationality: no registry papers,
identification markings, flag, or verbal claim of nationality by anyone,
let alone a master or individual in charge. In the absence of any claim
of registry, the vessel lacked nationality.

Id. at 986.
The defendants jointly filed with the United States Supreme Court a petition
for a writ of certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit on the issue of whether the ways to
identify stateless vessels enumerated in §70502(d)(1) were exhaustive. (Doc# 267-2,
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PageID.2065). The Court denied the petition on May 2, 2022, Cedado Nuñez v. United
States, 142 S. Ct. 2675 (Mem), 212 L. Ed. 2d 762, thus making Enriquez’s conviction
final. See Drury v. United States, 507 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that
a federal prisoner’s conviction becomes final for purposes of AEDPA’s limitations
period when the Supreme Court denies a petition for certiorari). Enriquez is deemed
to have filed the present § 2255 motion, his first, on April 26, 2023, the date he signed
it. See Daniels v. United States, 809 F.3d 588, 589 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
(“Under [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act]’s statute of limitations,
a federal prisoner must ordinarily file his §2255 petition within one year of the date
on which his judgment of conviction becomes final. We apply the prison mailbox rule,
under which a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date on the date it
is delivered to prison authorities for mailing. We assume, absent evidence to the
contrary, that a prisoner delivered a filing to prison authorities on the date that he
signed it.” (citations and quotations omitted)).
A one-year statute of limitations period applies for filing a §2255 motion to
vacate. 28 U.S.C. §2255(f). This one-year period begins to run following one of four
possible triggering events. Id. The relevant trigger here is “the date on which the
judgment of conviction becomes final,” and Enriquez does not argue another
triggering event applies. See 28 U.S.C. 2255(f). Enriquez’s conviction became final
on May 2, 2022. His §2255 motion was filed less than one year later, and there is no
dispute that it was timely filed.
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In the form motion, Enriquez lists two grounds: (1) the District Court was not
the proper venue and (2) the District Court lacked jurisdiction. (Doc# 247,
PageID.1683-1684). Enriquez submitted a 40-page memorandum in support of his
motion. (Doc# 247-1). While organized under the general headings of “Ground One -
The District Court of Alabama Was Without Venue Provision To Try Movant For the
Offense In This Case” and “Ground Two - The District Court Was Without
Jurisdiction To Try Movant In This Case” (Doc# 247-1, PageID.1698, 1707), Enriquez
asserts additional constitutional claims in his memorandum, in particular, ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, a Felonies Clause challenge to jurisdiction under the
MDLEA, and a Sixth Amendment challenge to the jurisdictional inquiry process of
the MDLEA. (See Doc# 247-1).
Construing Enriquez’s §2255 motion and supporting memorandum liberally,
the Court summarizes the grounds for relief raised as follows:
(1) the Southern District of Alabama was an improper venue;

(2) the Court erred as a matter of law in finding jurisdiction under 46 U.S.C.
§70502(d)(1)(B) because there was insufficient evidence the yola was a
“vessel without nationality” under the MDLEA;

(3) Congress exceeded its authority under the Felonies Clause because it
treats vessels as stateless that would otherwise not be recognized as
without nationality under international law;

(4) Section 70504(a) of the MDLEA is ambiguous on its face and violates
the Sixth Amendment insofar as the judge’s determination of
jurisdiction encroaches on the fact-finding role of the jury;

(5) Ineffective assistance of counsel, including

(a) Failure to object to venue;

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(b) Counsel stood by as a “potted plant” and failed to introduce or
elicit on cross-examination any evidence concerning jurisdiction;

(c) Counsel was ignorant of the law;

(d) Counsel failed to give competent and professional advice;

(e) Counsel failed to investigate and present appropriate litigation;
and

(f) Counsel did not explain the law to him “as applicable in lieu of
legislative and judicial developments in the law, prior to taking
him to trial.”

(See Doc# 247-1). For the sake of clarity and efficiency of review, the Court has
(re)numbered Enriquez’s claims within this Report and Recommendation.
Enriquez also filed a Reply in which he attempts to raise additional claims for
the first time in this §2255 proceeding, which the Court numbers as follows:
(6) The vessel was in the “fishery zone” of the Dominican Republic, yet there
was no evidence the Dominican Republic was contacted to establish
jurisdiction under 46 U.S.C. §70502(c)(1)(E);

(7) Jury Instruction Number 4 (prohibiting jurors from visiting or viewing
premises or places involved in the case) violated the trial-by-jury
requirement of the Sixth Amendment;

(8) The Court’s limiting defendants’ counsel to cross-examining government
witnesses on jurisdictional evidence outside of the presence of the jury
caused extreme prejudice and violated Eleventh Circuit precedent;

(9) The trial court’s grant of the government’s motion in limine to bar
defendants from introducing evidence about the conditions of
confinement on board the U.S. Coast Guard vessel was an abuse of
discretion;

(10) His trial counsel failed to “stay abreast of,” and bring to Movant’s
attention, the 2018 amendments to the First Step Act extending safety
valve eligibility to cases brought under the MDLEA, which Movant
would have considered in evaluating whether to enter a plea or go to
trial;
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(11) The prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by presenting false
Google satellite photos showing a larger vessel than a yola;

(12) “[T]he reading of the MDLEA as to Movant is ambiguous and violates
the Supremacy Clause”; and

(13) Liberally construing his reply, Enriquez seems to argue that the Coast
Guard’s involvement in his apprehension violated the Posse Comitatus
Act.

(See Doc# 272, PageID.2211-2226).

II. Legal Standard
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255, a person in federal custody may move to vacate,
set aside, or correct his sentence. This statute permits collateral challenges in four
circumstances: (1) the imposed sentence violated the Constitution or laws of the
United States, (2) the Court exceeded its jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) the
imposed sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4) the imposed
sentence is otherwise subject to a collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. §2255(a).
However, “a collateral challenge, such as a §2255 motion, may not be a
surrogate for a direct appeal.” Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir.
2004) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165, 102 S. Ct. 1584,
71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982) (collecting cases)). “Once the defendant’s chance to appeal
has been waived or exhausted,” a court is “entitled to presume he stands fairly and
finally convicted, especially when, as here, he already has had a fair opportunity to
present his federal claims to a federal forum.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,
164, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982). “Because collateral review is not a
substitute for a direct appeal, the general rules have developed that: (1) a defendant
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must assert all available claims on direct appeal, and (2) relief under 28 U.S.C. §2255
is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of
other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned,
result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1232 (internal citations, quotations,
and footnote omitted).
The first general rule is commonly known as procedural default (not to be
conflated with the procedural bar), which “is neither statutory nor a constitutional
requirement, but it is a doctrine adhered to by the courts to conserve judicial
resources and to respect the law’s important interest in the finality of judgments.”
McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1196 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Massaro v.
United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2003)). The
procedural default rule “applies to all claims, including constitutional claims,” and
“the question is not whether legal developments or new evidence has made a claim
easier or better, but whether at the time of the direct appeal the claim was available
at all.” Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234-35 (citations omitted). As the Eleventh Circuit
recently clarified:
The terms “procedurally barred” and “procedurally defaulted” have
distinct meanings. A procedural bar prevents a defendant from raising
arguments in a §2255 proceeding that he raised and we rejected on
direct appeal. Stoufflet v. United States, 757 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir.
2014) (collecting cases). A defendant can overcome a procedural bar
when ... there is a change in law. See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S.
333, 342, 94 S. Ct. 2298, 41 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1974).

By contrast, a “procedural default” occurs when a defendant raises a new
challenge to his conviction or sentence in a §2255 motion. Lynn v.
United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). If a defendant fails
to raise an issue on direct appeal, he may not present the issue in a
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§2255 proceeding unless his procedural default is excused. McKay v.
United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1196 (11th Cir. 2011). To overcome a
procedural default, a defendant must show either (1) cause and
prejudice, or (2) a miscarriage of justice, or actual innocence. Id.

Seabrooks v. United States, 32 F.4th 1375, 1383-84 (11th Cir. 2022). A movant on
collateral review can “avoid the procedural default bar ... if the alleged error is
jurisdictional.” United States v. Bane, 948 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted).
Under the “cause and prejudice” exception, a movant may overcome procedural
default “by showing cause for not raising the claim of error on direct appeal and actual
prejudice from the alleged error.” McKay, 657 F.3d at 1196. To show cause, “a
defendant must prove that some objective factor external to the defense impeded
counsel’s efforts to raise the claim previously.” Lynn, F.3d at 1235, n. 20 (internal
quotations and citation omitted). Ineffective assistance of counsel may satisfy the
cause exception to a procedural bar, but only where the claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel has merit. United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000).
Cause must also result in “actual prejudice” – that is, it must have “worked to his
actual and substantial disadvantage.” Lomelo v. United States, 891 F.2d 1512, 1515-
16 (11th Cir. 1990).
The “actual innocence” exception means exactly what it says. See McKay, 657
F.3d at 1196 (citation omitted) (explaining “movant’s procedural default is excused if
he can show that he is actually innocent either of the crime of conviction or, in the
capital sentencing context, of the sentence itself.”). This narrow exception permits a
court to allow a defendant to proceed under §2255 “despite his failure to show cause
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for procedural default if a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1235-36 (citations and
internal quotation omitted). Actual innocence in this context – whether applied to
the crime itself or the associated sentence – “means factual innocence, not mere legal
insufficiency.” McKay, 657 F.3d at 1197-98 (citations omitted).
The federal habeas statute provides that when a §2255 motion is filed, “[u]nless
the motion and the files and records of the case conclusive show that the prisoner is
entitled to no relief, the court shall ... grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the
issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. 28
U.S.C. §2255(b).
A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he “alleges facts that,
if true, would entitle him to relief.” Aron [v. United States], 291 F.3d
[708,] 715 [(11th Cir. 2002)] (quoting Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d
1545, 1552 (11th Cir. 1989)). “[A] petitioner need only allege—not
prove—reasonably specific, non-conclusory facts that, if true, would
entitle him to relief. Id. at 715 n. 6. However, a district court need not
hold a hearing if the allegations are “patently frivolous,” “based upon
unsupported generalizations,” or “affirmatively contradicted by the
record.” Holmes, 876 F.2d at 1553 (quoting United States v. Guerra, 588
F.2d 519, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1979)); see, e.g., Lynn v. United States, 365
F.3d 1225, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Because the ... affidavits submitted
by Lynn amount to nothing more than mere conclusory allegations, the
district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the
issues and correctly denied Lynn’s §2255 motion.”).

Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2014) (footnote
omitted). Accord Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2015). In
making this determination, a court must “liberally construe pro se filings, including
pro se applications for relief pursuant to §2255.” Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1215.
With these standards as a guide, the undersigned turns to Enriquez’s claims for relief.
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III. Analysis
a. MDLEA
The MDLEA prohibits any person from “knowingly or intentionally ...
possess[ing] with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance” on
board “a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” 46 U.S.C. §
70503(a)(1) and (c)(1), and from conspiring to do the same, id. § 70506(b). Section
70503(a)(1) provides that, “[w]hile on board a covered vessel, an individual may not
knowingly or intentionally ... possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a
controlled substance.” Id. § 70503(a)(1) (emphasis added). The definition of a “covered
vessel” includes “a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. §
70503(c). Under the statute, a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”
includes “a vessel without nationality.” Id. § 70502(c)(1)(A).
Congress amended the MDLEA in 1996 to provide that “[j]urisdiction of the
United States with respect to a vessel subject to this chapter is not an element of an
offense.” 46 U.S.C. § 70504(a); United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 586
(11th Cir. 2020). Section 70504(a) goes on to state that “[j]urisdictional issues arising
under this chapter are preliminary questions of law to be determined solely by the
trial judge.” 46 U.S.C. § 70504(a). Moreover, in 2017 Congress amended the MDLEA’s
venue provision, 46 U.S.C. § 70504(b), in 2017 to state as follows: “A person violating
section 70503 or 70508 — (1) shall be tried in the district in which such offense was
committed; or (2) if the offense was begun or committed upon the high seas, or
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elsewhere outside the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, may be tried in
any district.”
1. Venue
Enriquez argues that venue was improper in the Southern District of Alabama.
(Doc# 247, PageID.1682-83; Doc# 247-1, PageID.1700). Embedded within this
argument is an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim concerning his trial counsel’s
failure to raise an objection to venue. (Id.). Enriquez conclusorily asserts that “[v]enue
is proper only where the acts constituting the offense, the crime’s essential conduct
of elements took place.” .” (Doc# 247-1, PageID.1703).
Alternatively, he argues that venue for his crimes was governed not by §
70504(b), but by 18 U.S.C. § 3238, which states:
The trial of all offenses begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere
out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the district
in which the offender, or any one of two or more joint offenders, is arrested or
is first brought; but if such offender or offenders are not so arrested or brought
into any district, an indictment or information may be filed in the district of
the last known residence of the offender or of any one of two or more joint
offenders, or if no such residence is known the indictment or information may
be filed in the District of Columbia.

Enriquez asserts that § 3238 required he be tried in the District of the U.S. Virgin
Islands, where he was first brought following his arrest at sea. (Doc# 247-1,
PageID.1703-04
In response, the United States argues that Enriquez cannot mount a direct
challenge to venue, which is typically waived if not asserted prior to trial. (Doc# 267,
PageID.2000). The Government takes the position that a mere allegation of improper
venue is not cognizable under § 2255, reasoning that a defendant may waive venue,
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and that Enriquez has not shown he suffered any prejudice from a trial in the
Southern District of Alabama. Alternatively, the Government argues that, even if the
issue is cognizable on collateral review, it is procedurally defaulted in this case due
to Enriquez’s failure to press venue in the initial stages. (Doc# 267, PageID.2001-
2002). Finally, the Government argues that Enriquez is not entitled to relief on his
venue claim because he has not established an obvious legal error with respect to
venue, which the Government contends is governed by the venue provision of the
MDLEA, and because Enriquez failed to identify any ambiguity in the statute. (Id.
at PageID.2003-2004). In his Reply, Enriquez equates venue with subject matter
jurisdiction and argues that waiver cannot be presumed from a silent record. (Doc#
272, PageID. 2201, 2203).
Although the Eleventh Circuit does not appear to have addressed this precise
issue, other courts have found that a claim of improper venue is not subject to
collateral attack in a § 2255 proceeding. See Alvarez-Cuan v. United States, No. 8:12-
CR-519-T-27AEP, 2020 WL 5407559, at *6–7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2020); Ogrizovich v.
United States, 805 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1986); Entrekin v. United States, 508 F.2d
1328, 1330 (8th Cir. 1974). Whether a claim is cognizable in a §2255 proceeding is a
“threshold issue.” Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004).
Assuming without deciding that Enriquez’s venue claim is cognizable under § 2255,
it is nevertheless both procedurally defaulted and without merit.
“Venue is non-jurisdictional and can be waived.” United States v. Salazar-
Marcano, No. 22-12182, 2023 WL 3244596, at *2 (11th Cir. May 4, 2023) (per curiam)
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(citing Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 167-68 (1939) and
Baeza v. United States, 543 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir. 1976)) (holding venue challenge
was waived where plea agreement did not reserve the right to appeal denial of motion
to dismiss for improper venue and plea colloquy did not include request to reserve
that right).
8
Enriquez failed to raise this argument in either a Rule 12(b) motion
before the District Court or on direct appeal.
To overcome this procedural default, Enriquez must show either (1) cause and
prejudice, or (2) a miscarriage of justice, or actual innocence. McKay, 657 F.3d at
1196. In his form § 2255 motion, Enriquez states that he failed to raise his improper
venue claim on direct appeal due to ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc# 247,
PageID.1682). To the extent Enriquez asserts such ineffective assistance as cause to
excuse his procedural default, he cannot succeed because, as explained below, his
venue challenge is meritless, and counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a
meritless issue. See United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000)
(counsel “is not ineffective for failing to raise claims reasonably considered to be
without merit” (quotation omitted)); Denson v. United States, 804 F.3d 1339, 1342
(11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Failing to make a meritless objection does not
constitute deficient performance.”). Additionally, Enriquez does not claim in his
§2255 motion that he is actually innocent, and he has not presented any evidence of

8
The Eleventh Circuit adopted as precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
decided prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.
1981) (en banc).
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actual innocence. Therefore, Enriquez has procedurally defaulted his improper venue
claim.
Enriquez’s venue claims are also meritless. First, the United States
Constitution gives Congress plenary power to set venue for criminal offense
committed outside of any state, such as the ones at issue here, without regard to
where any part of the crime was committed. Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 of the
Constitution provides that when a crime is “not committed within any State, the Trial
shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.” U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). True, the later-ratified Sixth Amendment
provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law....”
U.S. Const. amend. VI. However, the United States Supreme Court has long
interpreted the Sixth Amendment’s “previously ascertained” clause as indicating that
amendment “has reference only to offenses against the United States committed
within a state.” Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 181, 11 S. Ct. 268, 34 L. Ed. 906
(1891). The Court explained:
The second section of article 3 had provided, in respect to crimes committed
in the states, that the trial by jury should be had within the state where the
crime was committed. The sixth amendment added the further guaranty,
in respect to the place of trial, that the district should have been previously
ascertained by law, leaving the trial of offenses not committed within any
state to be controlled by the second section of article 3. The requirement in
the latter section is that the trial ‘shall be at such place or places as the
congress may by law have directed.’ ‘As crimes,’ said Mr. Justice Story,
commenting upon this section, ‘may be committed on the high seas and
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elsewhere, out of the territorial jurisdiction of a state, it was indispensable
that in such cases congress should be enabled to provide the place of trial.’
2 Story, Const. § 1781.

Id. at 181–82. See also Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312, 324 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[W]hen an
offense was not committed within a state but in territory assigned to a district for
judicial purposes, the ‘previously ascertained’ provision was held to be inapplicable
and Congress could, pursuant to Article III, Section 2, clause 3, fix another district
for trial of such offenses after they were committed.” (citing Cook, 138 U.S. at 181-82)
(reaffirmed in United States v. Cuevas-Almonte, 156 F.4th 319, 330 (3d Cir. 2025)).
In an attempt to avoid a straight-forward application of the MDLEA’s venue
provision, Enriquez contends §§ 70503 and 70504 are ambiguous and must be read
in pari materia with 18 U.S.C. § 3238, which he argues controls here. (Doc# 247-1,
PageID.1705-1706). Enriquez does not specify how §70504(b) is ambiguous. Instead,
he relies on United States v. Ahumado-Avedano, 872 F.2d 367 (11th Cir. 1989), a case
interpreting the meaning of the term “United States” in 46 U.S.C. 1903(f), an older
venue provision in the MDLEA. (Doc# 247-1, PageID.1702-1703).
The prior MDLEA venue statute, 46 U.S.C. 1903(f), provided:
Any person who violates this section shall be tried in the United States
district court at the point of entry where that person enters the United
States, or in the United States District Court of the District of
Columbia.

In Ahumedo-Avendano, the Eleventh Circuit had to determine whether the
naval installation at Guantanamo Bay, where the defendant was first bought but
which was outside of any judicial district, was part of the “United States” for purposes
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of determining venue under the MDLEA. United States v. Ahumedo-Avendano, 872
F.2d 367, 371 (11th Cir. 1989). Relying on Ahumedo-Avendano, Enriquez argues that
46 U.S.C. §70504’s venue provision is ambiguous regarding the meaning of “United
States” and whether the district courts in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands
had authority to try offenders for violations of the MDLEA. The problem with this
argument is that the MDLEA’s venue provision was revised in 2017
9
and now differs
from the language at issue in Ahumedo-Avendano, see supra.
Section 70504(b)’s unambiguous discretionary venue provision permits
Enriquez to be tried in any district. The MDLEA “makes clear that ‘if the offense was
begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere outside the jurisdiction of any
particular State or district,’ the accused ‘may be tried in any district.’ ” United States
v. Gonzales-Cahvec, 750 F. App'x 853, 855 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting 46 U.S.C. §
70504(b)(2)). That provision clearly applies to Enriquez’s crimes, and the Court need
not rely on a canon of construction to interpret the unambiguous statute. See United
States v. Warren, 820 F.3d 406, 408 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Courts generally apply in pari
materia only when a legal text is ambiguous.”)). Moreover, Enriquez’s argument still

9

[T]he Crimes Act of 1790, enacted by the First Congress, ... provided that trial
for [high seas] offenses “shall be in the district where the offender is
apprehended, or into which he may first be brought.” Ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112,
114 (1790). Congress...codified that provision’s modern progeny as Section
3238. Until 2017 the MDLEA’s venue provision likewise provided venue to the
district where the accused was first brought. Pub. L. No. 109-304, § 10(2), 120
Stat. 1485, 1688 (2006).

United States v. Cuevas-Almonte, 156 F.4th 319, 331 (3d Cir. 2025).
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fails to the extent there is a conflict between the two statutes. “The Eleventh Circuit
has held that when two statutes conflict, the later-enacted statute controls to the
extent it conflicts with the earlier-enacted statute. Moreover, a specific statutory
provision trumps a general one.” Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 619 F.3d 1289, 1299 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Under either
of those rules, § 70504(b) controls here. The current version of § 70504(b) was enacted
in 2017, well after § 3238 was last amended in 1963, see Pub. L. No. 88-27, 77 Stat.
48 (2022). Moreover, § 70504(b)(2) sets venue for certain specified high seas offenses,
while § 3238 only applies to high seas offenses generally.
Enriquez’s prosecution in the Southern District of Alabama complied with both
the Constitution and venue statutes. His improper-venue claim is without merit.
2. Jurisdiction
Enriquez contends this Court lacked jurisdiction to try him for the subject
offenses, and that the finding that it had jurisdiction under the MDLEA was
erroneous as a matter of law. (Doc# 247, PageID.1683; Doc# 247-1, PageID.1700,
1707). He challenges both the constitutionality of the MDLEA and whether the
government met its burden of proof that the yola was a “vessel without nationality”
subject to United States jurisdiction under the MDLEA. (See Doc# 247-1). In
response, the Government acknowledges that jurisdictional defects cannot be
procedurally defaulted, but argues that Enriquez has not called into question the
Eleventh Circuit’s ruling on the jurisdictional issue in his direct appeal, which is
binding precedent. (Doc# 267, PageID.2009-2011).
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“Habeas corpus has long been available to attack convictions and sentences
entered by a court without jurisdiction.” Yency Nunez v. United States, 858 Fed.
App’x. 320, 322 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quoting United States v.
Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185, 99 S. Ct. 2235, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1979)). “While a habeas
proceeding generally cannot ‘do service for an appeal,’ a challenge to a court’s
jurisdiction is an exception.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
“Because parties cannot by acquiescence or agreement confer jurisdiction on a federal
court, a jurisdictional defect cannot be waived or procedurally defaulted—instead, a
judgment tainted by a jurisdictional defect must be reversed.” McCoy v. United States,
266 F.3d 1245, 1249 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)
(“A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground...that the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence...”).
The Eleventh Circuit has “interpreted the ‘on board a vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States’ provision of the MDLEA as a congressionally
imposed limit on a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” United States v. Mejia, 734 F.
App'x 731, 732 (11th Cir. 2018). “Jurisdiction...is not an element of an [MDLEA]
offense[,]” and jurisdictional issues “are preliminary questions of law to be
determined solely by the trial judge.” 46 U.S.C. §70504(a). “The government bears
the burden of establishing that the statutory requirements of MDLEA subject-matter
jurisdiction are met.” United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 588 (11th Cir.
2020) (citation omitted). “Due process in the context of extraterritorial jurisdiction
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requires only that the exercise of jurisdiction not be arbitrary or fundamentally
unfair.” United States v. Gonzales-Cahvec, 750 F. App’x 853, 856 (11th Cir. 2018)
(citing United States v. Batson, 818 F.3d 651, 669 (11th Cir. 2016)).
Enriquez argues that the Court erred as a matter of law in finding jurisdiction
under 46 U.S.C. §70502(d)(1)(B) under the circumstances of the case. (Doc# 247-1,
PageID.1710-1711). Enriquez contends there was insufficient evidence to support the
court’s finding that the vessel was a “vessel without nationality” subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act.
(Id., PageID.1708-1710). Enriquez admits the vessel was “on the high seas between
the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico,” when it was intercepted by the U.S. Coast
Guard, but contends that there was insufficient proof that it was a stateless vessel.
10

(Id., PageID.1697).
Enriquez relies on the Second Circuit case of United States v. Prado, 933 F.3d
121 (2d Cir. 2019), in support of his position that an officer of the United States must
request a claim of registry and the master or individual in charge must fail to answer
this request before a vessel can be deemed stateless under § 70502(d)(1)(B). (Doc#
247-1, PageID.1713). He concedes that the U.S. Coast Guard officials asked the
defendants for the master of the vessel, but he argues the U.S. Coast Guard officers
should have gone further and asked the crew members to make a claim of nationality

10
Enriquez briefly states, in passing, in his supporting memorandum that the vessel
was “seized ... in Archipelagic waters of Dominican Republic, which falls under the
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea....” (Doc# 247-1, PageID.1699). He
does not tie this contention to any specific jurisdictional or constitutional argument
in his form motion or his supporting memorandum.
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or registry for the vessel. (Id., PageID.1714-1715). Enriquez contends that “[b]ecause
the Coast Guard failed to ask...it is equally possible one of the four defendants
possessed the authority as the individual in charge to make the registry of nationality
for the vessel.” (Id., PageID.1714). Based on this, Enriquez argues the government
failed to prove there was no one on board who could make a claim of registry or
nationality. (Id., PageID.1715).
This is the same argument that Enriquez raised, and the Eleventh Circuit
expressly rejected, on direct appeal. (See Doc# 267-1, PageID.2025, 2045, 2050-51;
Cedado Nunez, 1 F.4th at 984-86. A procedural bar prevents a defendant from raising
the same arguments in a § 2255 proceeding that were raised and rejected on direct
appeal. Stoufflet v. United States, 757 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014) (collecting
cases). “Once a matter has been decided adversely to a defendant on direct appeal it
cannot be re-litigated in a collateral attack under section 2255[,]” United States v.
Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted),
unless “there is an intervening change in law.” Seabrooks v. United States, 32 F.4th
1375, 1383 (11th Cir. 2022). Enriquez’s claim that there was insufficient evidence
the vessel was a “vessel without nationality” subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the
MDLEA was adversely decided against him by the Eleventh Circuit on direct appeal,
see Cedado Nunez, 1 F.4th at 984-86, and there is no indication an intervening change
in controlling law would change that result. Thus, Enriquez is procedurally barred
from attempting to re-litigate this issue by means of a § 2255 claim, regardless of its
jurisdictional nature. See United States v. Roberts, 79 F. App'x 368, 370 n.2 (10th Cir.
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2003) (unpublished) (“[B]ecause Roberts’ assertions regarding the district court's
jurisdiction were raised and decided on direct appeal, they cannot be raised in a §
2255 motion...”).
11

3. Constitutionality of the MDLEA
While much of Enriquez’s memorandum is devoted to the issue of whether the
prosecution met its burden of demonstrating that the yola was a stateless vessel
under the MDLEA, Enriquez also argues the MDLEA is unconstitutional. First,
Enriquez argues that MDLEA’s definition of stateless vessel in Section 70502(d)(1)(C)
does not comport with international law and that Congress exceeded its authority
under the Felonies Clause because it treats vessels as stateless that would otherwise

11
The undersigned is mindful that defects in subject matter jurisdiction cannot
be waived or procedurally defaulted. See McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1249. However,
Enriquez’s claim that there was insufficient evidence the defendants’ boat was a
“vessel without nationality” to confer subject matter jurisdiction is not procedurally
barred because it was not raised on direct review; it is procedurally barred because it
was raised, and decided adversely, on direct appeal. See Seabrooks, 32 F.4th at 1383-
84 (explaining the difference between “procedurally barred” and “procedurally
defaulted” with regard to § 2255 motions).
The Government does not argue procedural bar in its response. However, in
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 126 S. Ct. 1675, 164 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2006), the
Supreme Court confronted the question of ‘whether a federal court lacks authority,
on its own initiative, to dismiss a habeas petition as untimely, [if] the State has
answered the petition without contesting its timeliness,’ 547 U.S. at 202, 126 S. Ct.
at 1679, or has erroneously conceded the timeliness issue, see id. at 205, 126 S. Ct. at
1681. The Supreme Court ruled that a district court may act on its own initiative to
dismiss a petition in such a circumstance, provided the court ‘accord[s] the parties
fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions.’ Id. at 210, 126 S. Ct. at
1684.” Paez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 654 (11th Cir. 2020) (per
curiam). Day’s holding is readily applicable to procedural-bar claims. To the extent
either party objects to the sua sponte invocation of procedural bar here, that party
can raise it as part of the objections permitted to this Report and Recommendation.
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not be recognized as without nationality under international law. (Doc# 247-1,
PageID.1707-1708, 1727-1728). Second, Enriquez argues § 70504(a) of the MDLEA is
“ambiguous on its face, because a requirement of judicial fact-finding, instead of jury
fact-finding, violates the trial by jury requirement of the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution.” (Doc# 247-1, PageID.1726). Enriquez’s Felonies Clause and
jurisdictional inquiry arguments are foreclosed by Eleventh Circuit precedent.
As to the first argument, § 70502(d)(1)(C) defines one way that a vessel may
qualify as a “vessel without nationality” and describes a “vessel about which the
master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry and for which the claimed
nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is
of its nationality.” These circumstances are not present in this case, as there was no
master or individual in charge who made a claim of registry for the yola. His
argument that § 70502(d)(1)(C) is unconstitutional as applied to him lacks merit.
More importantly, the Eleventh Circuit recently considered and rejected
Enriquez’s exact Felonies-Clause argument with respect to § 70502(d)(1)(C). In
United States v. Canario-Vilomar, the Eleventh Circuit rejected an argument on
direct appeal that Congress had “overstepped its bounds” by defining a “vessel
without nationality” in 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) to include vessels that are not
recognized as stateless under international law. 128 F.4th 1374, 1376 (2025).
Reviewing the jurisdictional challenge de novo, the Eleventh Circuit found that
Congress was not constrained by international law in crafting its definition of a
stateless vessel or in defining the boundaries of the high seas, expressly stating that
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“the Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law.” 128 F.4th 1374,
1380–81 (11th Cir. Feb. 18, 2025) (quoting United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815
826 (11th Cir. 2024)). The Eleventh Circuit held that Congress “did not act beyond
the grant of authority in the Felonies Clause when defining ... a ‘vessel without
nationality.’ ” Id. at 1380–81. Accord United States v. Martinez, 172 F.4th 1306, 1313
(11th Cir. 2026) (per curiam). Accordingly, Enriquez’s Felonies-Clause and
international law arguments are foreclosed by Eleventh Circuit precedent.
12

As to Enriquez’s claim that § 70504(a) violates the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury, the Eleventh Circuit has held that, “because the MDLEA’s jurisdictional
requirement goes to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts and is not an
essential element of the MDLEA substantive offense, it does not have to be submitted
to the jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Cabezas-Montano,
949 F.3d 567, 587 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088,
1109-12 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 715, 722 (11th Cir. 2019);
United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1192 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v.

12
Embedded in this claim is a brief argument that the exercise of jurisdiction over
him violated the “hot pursuit” doctrine of international law. (Doc# 247-1,
PageID.1718-1719). However, a person charged with a violation of the MDLEA “does
not have standing to raise a claim of failure to comply with international law as a
basis for a defense.”46 U.S.C. § 70505; see United States v. Hernandez, 864 F.3d 1292,
1301–02 (11th Cir. 2017). Such a claim “may be made only by a foreign nation” and
“does not divest a court of jurisdiction.” 46 U.S.C. § 70505. Accordingly, “any battle
over the United States’[s] compliance with international law in obtaining MDLEA
jurisdiction should be resolved nation-to-nation in the international arena, not
between criminal defendants and the United States in the U.S. criminal justice
system.” United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374,1379 (11th Cir. 2025)
(quoting Hernandez, 864 F.3d at 1302).
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Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 809 (11th Cir. 2014); and United States v. Rendon 354 F.3d
1320, 1326-28 (11th Cir. 2003)). Enriquez’s argument that 46 U.S.C. §70504(a)
violates his Sixth Amendment rights is also foreclosed by Eleventh Circuit precedent
and is without merit.
b. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Although not clearly identified as a standalone constitutional claim in his form
motion, Enriquez does assert in his form motion that he failed to raise his arguments
concerning venue and jurisdiction on appeal due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
13

(Doc# 247-1, PageID.1682, 1684). Further, Enriquez expressly argues in his
memorandum in support of his §2255 motion that ineffective assistance of counsel
deprived him of his right to Due Process under the Fifth Amendment and his Sixth
Amendment rights. (Doc# 247-1, PageID.1693). Specifically, Enriquez argues that his
trial counsel “failed to raise objections based on the defects in the institution of the
prosecution’s case before this court.”
14
(Id., PageID.1698).
Enriquez argues that trial counsel’s failure to object to venue constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel that caused him extreme prejudice. (Doc# 247-1,
PageID.1706-07). Enriquez acknowledges that his trial counsel moved for an

13
The undersigned observes that Enriquez’s trial counsel and appellate counsel
challenged whether the United States met its burden of proving jurisdiction under
the MDLEA both in the trial court and on direct appeal. (Doc# 116; Doc# 208,
PageID.1280-1281, 1376-1377; Doc# 267-1).

14
Although Enriquez does not specify whether his ineffective assistance claims are
directed at trial counsel or appellate court, the Court deduces they are directed at
trial counsel based on the errors alleged.
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acquittal on the basis of lack of jurisdiction but contends that his counsel’s arguments
“lacked substance” and that trial counsel failed to cross examine the Coast Guard
witnesses at trial concerning alleged jurisdictional defects in the institution of the
prosecution. (Id., PageID.1699). Enriquez also generally alleges, without further
explanation, factual support, or citations to the record, that trial counsel was
“ignorant of the law and was not ... capable of addressing erroneous findings of facts
for clear error,” “failed to give competent and professional advice,” “failed to
investigate and present appropriate litigation,” and “was a mere ‘potted plant.’ ”
(Doc# 247-1, PageID.1695-1696, 1713). Enriquez submits that counsel “did not
explain the law to [Enriquez], as applicable in lieu of legislative and judicial
developments in the law, prior to taking him to trial.” (Id., PageID.1696).
The Sixth Amendment gives criminal defendants the right to effective
assistance of counsel. U.S.
CONST. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 684-86, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). “[F]ailure to raise an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being
brought up in a later, appropriate proceeding under §2255.” Massaro v. United States,
538 U.S. 500, 509, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2003). Indeed, “in most cases a
motion brought under §2255 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of
ineffective assistance.” Id. at 504. See also United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260,
1267 (11th Cir. 2013) (“An ineffective assistance claim should usually be raised in a
motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255,” (citing United States v. Patterson, 595 F.3d 1324,
1328 (11th Cir. 2010))). “To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
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defendant must show that (1) ‘counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness’ and (2) that such failure prejudiced him in that ‘there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.’ ” United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 941
(11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694).
“ ‘Conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance are insufficient.’ ” Wilson v.
United States, 962 F. 2d 996, 998 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (quoting United States
v. Lawson, 947 F.2d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1991). Moreover, “[b]cause both parts of the
test must be satisfied in order to show a violation of the Sixth Amendment, the court
need not address the performance prong if the defendant cannot meet the prejudice
prong, or vice versa.” Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted). See also Osley v. United States, 751 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A
habeas petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must carry his burden on
both Strickland prongs, and a court need not address both prongs if the defendant
has made an insufficient showing on one.”); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176
(11th Cir. 2001) (“The petitioner bears the burden of proof on the ‘performance’ prong
as well as the ‘prejudice’ prong of a Strickland claim, and both prongs must be proved
to prevail.”). “The Strickland test is not easily met; ... ‘the cases in which habeas
petitioners can properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are
few and far between. []’ ” Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1176 (quoting Waters v. Thomas, 46
F.3d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citation omitted))).
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“The test for ineffectiveness is not whether counsel could have done more;
perfection is not required.” Waters, 46 F.3d at 1518. Accord, e.g., Burt v. Titlow, 571
U.S. 12, 24, 134 S. Ct. 10, 187 L. Ed. 2d 348 (2013) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does not
guarantee the right to perfect counsel; it only promises the right to effective
assistance...”). “A lawyer can almost always do something more in every case. But
the Constitution requires a good deal less than maximum performance.” Atkins v.
Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 960 (11th Cir. 1992).
In evaluating the first, or “performance,” prong of Strickland, “[j]udicial
scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.”
[Strickland, 466 U.S.] at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. Because retrospective
evaluation of a lawyer’s performance can be difficult, “a court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant
must overcome the presumption that ... the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). A
petitioner must identify specific acts or omissions that were not the
result of reasonable professional judgment, and a court should deem
these acts or omissions deficient only if their “were outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at
2066. Simply put, the deference afforded an attorney’s decision is great
and the bar for proving a Sixth Amendment violation is high. In light
of the “strong presumption” in favor of competence,”...in order to prove
deficient performance, “a petitioner must establish that no competent
counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.”
Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (en
banc).

Under the second, or “prejudice,” prong of Strickland, a petitioner must
“affirmatively prove prejudice” by showing that counsel’s errors
“actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.
Ct. at 2067. This requires a showing of more than “some conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. Instead, the petitioner
“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.
Although this standard is difficult to meet, it is significant that a
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petitioner must show only a reasonable probability that the outcome
would have been different; he “need not show that counsel’s deficient
conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.” Id. at
693, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. When evaluating this probability, “a court
hearing on an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the
evidence before the judge or jury.” Id. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1059-60 (11th Cir. 2002). “The reasonableness of
counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the
alleged error and in light of all the circumstances. In making the competency
determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel’s function, as elaborated
in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in
the particular case.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 394, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 91
L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-91) (citations and quotations
omitted).
To the extent Enriquez seeks to raise an independent claim that counsel was
ineffective in failing to raise a venue objection, counsel is not ineffective in failing to
raise an argument that has no legal basis. Freeman v. Attorney General, State of
Florida, 536 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2008). The MDLEA “makes clear that ‘if the
offense was begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere outside the
jurisdiction of any particular State or district,’ the accused ‘may be tried in any
district.’ ” United States v. Gonzales-Chavec, 750 F. App’x 853, 855 (11th Cir. 2018)
(unpublished) (quoting 46 U.S.C. §70504(b)(2)). Any ineffective assistance of counsel
claim related to Enriquez’s venue challenge is likewise without merit for the reasons
outlined above.
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With respect to jurisdiction, Enriquez appears to fault his trial counsel for
failing “to introduce or elicit on cross examination on the jurisdictional defects in the
institution of the Prosecution” and, instead, moving for a judgment of acquittal on the
ground of the government’s failure to prove jurisdiction. (Doc# 247-1, PageID.1699).
Enriquez does not develop this argument any further. Liberally construing this
statement, he appears to fault his trial attorney relative to cross-examining the
Government’s witnesses and possibly for failing to call other witnesses to offer
testimony concerning jurisdiction.
“The decision as to whether to cross-examine a witness is ‘a tactical one well
within the discretion of a defense attorney.” Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1219
(11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). A petitioner cannot establish an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim unless he shows at least “a single specific instance where
cross-examination arguably could have affected the outcome of either the guilt or
sentencing phase of the trial.” Id. “Ineffective assistance ... will not be found merely
because ‘other testimony might have been elicited from those who testified.’ ” Id.
(quoting Waters, 46 F.3d at 1514).
Under this reasoning, Enriquez’s ineffective assistance claim fails. Enriquez
has not identified any specific questions that should have been asked of any specific
Coast Guard witnesses. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Enriquez’s boat was a
stateless vessel because “[t]he smugglers’ vessel had no indicia of nationality: no
registry papers, identification markings, flag, or verbal claim of nationality by
anyone, let alone a master or individual in charge.” Cedado Nunez, 1 F. 4th at 986.
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Enriquez has not shown how a cross-examination of the Government’s witnesses
would have elicited any new facts that would have would have affected the “vessel
without nationality” determination or changed the outcome of his trial. Enriquez's
conclusory allegations regarding cross-examination of the Coast Guard witnesses do
not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Enriquez’s attorney pursued his
jurisdictional objections throughout the proceedings.
Movant also generally alleges, without further explanation, factual support, or
citations to the record, that trial counsel was “ignorant of the law and was not ...
capable of addressing erroneous findings of facts for clear error,” “failed to give
competent and professional advice,” “failed to investigate and present appropriate
litigation,” and “was a mere ‘potted plant.’ ” (Doc# 247-1, PageID.1695-1696, 1713).
Enriquez submits that counsel “did not explain the law to [Enriquez], as applicable
in lieu of legislative and judicial developments in the law, prior to taking him to trial.”
(Id., PageID.1696).
To the extent these contentions can be considered independent claims for relief,
they do not afford Enriquez any. Enriquez’s factually unsupported, bare allegations
are insufficient to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Enriquez has
not identified any facts counsel failed to investigate or evidence counsel failed to
obtain. “Speculation is insufficient to carry the burden of a habeas corpus petitioner
as to what evidence could have been revealed by further investigation.” Aldrich v.
Wainwright, 777 F.2d 630, 636 (11th Cir.1985). Enriquez does not explain what
counsel did, what counsel failed to do, how it prejudiced Enriquez, or how the outcome
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of his case may have been different. “A movant's conclusory statements, unsupported
by specific facts or by the record, are insufficient to state a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel.” Davis v. United States, No. 24-12295, 2024 WL 5319154, at *1
(11th Cir. Dec. 2, 2024) (citing Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir.
1991)). He fails to show that his counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness or that he was prejudiced by counsel's allegedly deficient
performance. Consequently, he is entitled to no relief on this claim.
The undersigned does not find merit in Enriquez’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.
c. New Arguments Raised in Reply
In his reply dated September 27, 2023, Enriquez attempts to raise new claims
for the first time in this action. (Doc# 272). Buried within his other arguments,
Enriquez raises new claims, numbered by the Court as follows:
(6) The vessel was in the “fishery zone” of the Dominican Republic, yet there
was no evidence the Dominican Republic was contacted to establish
jurisdiction under 46 U.S.C. §70502(c)(1)(E);
15
;

15
Enriquez asserts that 50 nautical miles is within a 200 mile “fishery zone” and
that there was no evidence that the Dominican Republic was contacted. (Doc# 272,
PageID.2211-2212). To the extent that this argument could be considered as falling
under the more general umbrella of the jurisdictional objection asserted in Enriquez’s
§2255 form motion and supporting memorandum, rather than a “new” claim, the
Court will address it. The MDLEA at 46 U.S.C. §70502(c)(1)(A)-(F) sets forth six
paths by which the Government can establish Enriquez was on board a “vessel subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Here, the yola was a “vessel without
nationality” for purposes of §70502(c)(1)(A), which renders it “a vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.”
Enriquez has not advanced or articulated an argument that application of the
MDLEA to vessels beyond the 12-mile territorial waters limit, yet in this 200-mile
“fishery zone,” exceeds congressional authority and is unconstitutional. Nonetheless,
the Court points out that under Eleventh Circuit precedent, stateless vessels
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(7) Jury Instruction Number 4 (prohibiting jurors from visiting or viewing
premises or places involved in the case) violated the trial-by-jury
requirement of the Sixth Amendment;

(8) The Court’s limiting defendants’ counsel to cross-examining government
witnesses on jurisdictional evidence outside of the presence of the jury
caused extreme prejudice and violated Eleventh Circuit precedent;

(9) The trial court’s grant of the government’s motion in limine to bar
defendants from introducing evidence about the conditions of
confinement on board the U.S. Coast Guard vessel was an abuse of
discretion;

(10) His trial counsel failed to “stay abreast of,” and bring to Movant’s
attention, the 2018 amendments to the First Step Act extending safety
valve eligibility to cases brought under the MDLEA, which Movant
would have considered in evaluating whether to enter a plea or go to
trial;

(11) The prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by presenting false
Google satellite photos showing a larger vessel than a yola;

(12) “[T]he reading of the MDLEA as to Movant is ambiguous and violates
the Supremacy Clause”; and

(13) Liberally construing his reply, Enriquez seems to argue that the Coast
Guard’s involvement in his apprehension violated the Posse Comitatus
Act.

(See Doc# 272, PageID.2211-2226).

“Although Clisby [v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992)] requires a
district court to resolve every claim properly presented in a § 2255 motion, it does not

apprehended beyond the 12-mile boundary of territorial waters are considered to be
in international waters and subject to MDLEA jurisdiction. United States v. McPhee,
336 F. 3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2003). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit held, as a matter
of first impression, that a country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (beyond a nation’s
territorial waters but within 200 miles of the coastal baseline) is part of the “high
seas” for purposes of the Felonies Clause. United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815,
821-823 (11th 2024). Accord Martinez, 172 F.4th at 1312.
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require the court to address a claim that a movant waives by failing to raise it until
his reply brief.” Oliveiri v. United States, 717 F. App’x 966, 967 (11th Cir. 2018) (per
curiam) (unpublished). See also United States v. Howard, 28 F. 4th 180, 201, n. 6
(11th Cir. 2022) (“Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly
before a reviewing court.”) (quotations and alterations omitted).
These new arguments, raised for the first time in Enriquez’s reply
memorandum, are waived for failure to raise them in his initial § 2255 Motion. See
McLellan v. United States, No. CR 1:17-0093-KD-N, 2022 WL 3129584, at *4 (S.D.
Ala. Aug. 4, 2022)(arguments raised for the first time in a §2255 reply brief are
waived); United States v. Santoriello, 2021 WL 3549907, at *7 (N.D. Fla. July 8, 2021),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17CR57/RV/EMT, 2021 WL 3533736
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2021) (argument raised for the first time in a 2255 reply brief is
waived); McKiver v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't. of Corr., 991 F.3d 1357, 1364 n.1 (11th Cir. 2021)
(arguments raised for the first time in a party's reply brief are waived); see also
Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (finding that a
pro se litigant abandoned an issue that was not raised in his initial brief as the court
does “not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant's reply brief”).
Additionally, to the extent these claims do not implicate jurisdiction or ineffective
assistance of counsel, they are procedurally defaulted because they could have been,
but were not, raised on appeal.
Regardless, the undersigned also finds Enriquez’s new claims to be without
merit, for the following reasons:
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(6) The vessel was in the “fishery zone” of the Dominican Republic, yet there
was no evidence the Dominican Republic was contacted to establish
jurisdiction under 46 U.S.C. §70502(c)(1)(E).

Enriquez asserts that 50 nautical miles is within a 200 mile “fishery zone” and
that there was no evidence that the Dominican Republic was contacted. (Doc# 270,
PageID.2179-2180). However, § 70502(c)(1)(A)-(F) sets forth six alternative paths by
which the Government can establish a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.” Here, the yola was a determined to be a “vessel without nationality” under
§70502(c)(1)(A), and that determination was upheld on appeal. Thus, it was
unnecessary to determine whether the yola was also “a vessel in the territorial waters
of a foreign nation if the nation consents to the enforcement of United States law by
the United States” under § 70502(c)(1)(E), and any failure of counsel to address this
issue was harmless.
16

(7) Jury Instruction Number 4 (prohibiting jurors from visiting or viewing
premises or places involved in the case) violated the trial-by-jury
requirement of the Sixth Amendment.

Quite the opposite—unauthorized site visits by jurors are generally recognized
as violative of criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. See Sherman v. Smith,

16
Enriquez has not advanced or articulated an argument that application of the
MDLEA to vessels beyond the 12-mile territorial waters limit, yet in this 200-mile
“fishery zone,” exceeds congressional authority and is unconstitutional. Nonetheless,
under Eleventh Circuit precedent, stateless vessels apprehended beyond the 12-mile
boundary of territorial waters are considered to be in international waters and
subject to MDLEA jurisdiction. United States v. McPhee, 336 F. 3d 1269 (11th Cir.
2003). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit held, as a matter of first impression, that a
country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (beyond a nation’s territorial waters but within
200 miles of the coastal baseline) is part of the “high seas” for purposes of the Felonies
Clause. United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 821-823 (11th 2024). Accord
Martinez, 172 F.4th at 1312.
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89 F.3d 1134, 1137-40 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (finding that a juror’s authorized site
visit was not a structural trial error and instead holding that it was subject to
harmless error analysis); 2 F. Lee Bailey & Kenneth J. Fishman, Criminal Trial
Techniques § 53:11 (“A common violation of the rule against obtaining information
other than evidence given in open court is an unauthorized view of the scene of the
crime or of the weapon or instrument used in the commission of the offense. While a
juror's unauthorized visit to a location relevant to a case is not usually prejudicial per
se, it is a serious matter which requires an inquiry into whether an unauthorized
view actually occurred and the extent of the juror's activity at the scene.” (footnotes
omitted)). The Court did not err in giving this instruction, and counsel did not err in
failing to object to it.
(8) The Court’s limiting defendants’ counsel to cross-examining government
witnesses on jurisdictional evidence outside of the presence of the jury
caused extreme prejudice and violated Eleventh Circuit precedent.

As has been repeatedly noted, “jurisdiction of the United States with respect
to a vessel subject to t[he MDLEA] is not an element of an offense[, and] jurisdictional
issues arising under th[e MDLEA] are preliminary questions of law to be determined
solely by the trial judge.” 46 U.S.C. § 70504(a). The jury’s role at trial was to
determine whether the Government had proved each element of the charged offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence about a non-elemental issue, jurisdiction, was
simply not relevant to the jury’s deliberation, and indeed may have served to confuse
the issues and/or waste time. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more
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of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). None of the
cases Enriquez cites in support of this claim hold otherwise.
(9) The trial court’s grant of the government’s motion in limine to bar
defendants from introducing evidence about the conditions of
confinement on board the U.S. Coast Guard vessel was an abuse of
discretion.

This information was not clearly relevant to either the elements of any charged
offense, or to any known defense to those charges, see United States v. Machado, 886
F.3d 1070, 1085 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[A] district court may exclude defense-favoring
evidence where it ‘does not bear a logical relationship’ to an element of the offense or
affirmative defense, or where the relationship between the two is simply ‘too
attenuated.’ ... This Court has emphasized that ‘there comes a point—and a district
court is perhaps in the best position to judge this—when the chain of inferences
linking evidence and the legally relevant point to be proven is simply too long,
dubious, or attenuated to require that the evidence be introduced.’ ” (quoting United
States v. Hurn, 368 F.3d 1359, 1365-66 (11th Cir. 2004)); and any potential relevance
was likely substantially outweighed by the danger it could “mislead[] the jury” or
“confus[e] the issues...” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Moreover, even if a district court abuses
its discretion in making an evidentiary ruling, that ruling will be overturned “only if
it resulted in a substantial prejudicial effect.” Machado, 886 F.3d at 1085 n.14.
Enriquez has failed to allege facts showing how the exclusion of evidence about his
conditions of confinement on the Coast Guard vessel substantially prejudiced him at
trial.
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(10) His trial counsel failed to “stay abreast of,” and bring to Movant’s
attention, the 2018 amendments to the First Step Act extending safety
valve eligibility to cases brought under the MDLEA, which Movant
would have considered in evaluating whether to enter a plea or go to
trial.

“[T]he so-called safety-valve mechanism...operates in some circumstances to
provide a guidelines sentence even though a higher mandatory minimum sentence
would otherwise be required by statute.” United States v. Quirante, 486 F.3d 1273,
1273–74 (11th Cir. 2007). More specifically, the safety-valve mechanism states that
for certain offenses, “the court shall impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines
promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission...without regard to any
statutory minimum sentence” if it finds that certain conditions are met. 18 U.S.C. §
3553(f). Enriquez is correct that § 3553(f) applies to offenses under “section 70503 or
70506 of title 46.” However, Enriquez could not have benefitted from the safety-valve
mechanism in this case because the low end of his sentencing guideline range was
188 months’ imprisonment (see Doc# 164), which was still higher than the 10-year
statutory minimum imprisonment term each of Enriquez’s convictions. See 46 U.S.C.
§ 70506(a)-(b); 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1).
17
Thus, any failure by counsel to advise Enriquez
about safety-valve eligibility was harmless.

17
Even Enriquez’s preliminary guidelines calculations prepared early in the case
calculated the low end of his guideline sentence as 135 months’ imprisonment, still
above the 10-year minimum. (See Doc# 53).
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11) The prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by presenting false
Google satellite photos showing a larger vessel than a yola.

Even accepting this claim as true, Enriquez has failed to explain how he was
prejudiced by the introduction of these purported false photos—the size of the
involved vessel had nothing to do with either jurisdiction or any element of the case.
(12) “[T]he reading of the MDLEA as to Movant is ambiguous and violates
the Supremacy Clause.”

The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2, reads: “This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.” “It is apparent that this Clause creates a rule of decision:
Courts ‘shall’ regard the ‘Constitution,’ and all laws ‘made in Pursuance thereof,’ as
‘the supreme Law of the Land.’ They must not give effect to state laws that conflict
with federal laws.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324, 135
S. Ct. 1378, 191 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2015). Thus, the Supremacy Clause only places limits
on state law, and does not constrain federal laws such as the MDLEA. To the extent
Enriquez argues the MDLEA “is ambiguous” as to him, he fails to develop this
argument or cite any authority in support. Accordingly, Enriquez has also not shown
that counsel erred by failed to raise either of these issues.

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(13) Liberally construing his reply, Enriquez seems to argue that the Coast
Guard’s involvement in his apprehension violated the Posse Comitatus
Act.

The Posse Comitatus Act states: “Whoever, except in cases and under
circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully
uses any part of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, or the Space
Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1385. The Coast
Guard is conspicuously excluded from that statute. Moreover, the Coast Guard is
statutorily authorized to “make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches,
seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has
jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the
United States.” 14 U.S.C. § 522(a).
d. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Subsequent to filing his reply, Enriquez filed a “Motion for Appointment of
Counsel” to assist him in his § 2255 proceedings, dated November 6, 2025. (Doc# 317).
Enriquez failed to sign that motion as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
Regardless, that motion is due to be DENIED.
There is no right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in proceedings for postconviction relief, see Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551, 555, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987) (“We have never held that
prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks
upon their convictions, see Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488, 89 S. Ct. 747, 750, 21
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L. Ed. 2d 718 (1969), and we decline to so hold today. Our cases establish that the
right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.”);
Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1231 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The Sixth Amendment
applies only to criminal proceedings ... [P]ostconviction relief is not part of the
criminal proceeding itself; rather, it is civil in nature. It is a collateral attack that
normally occurs only after the direct appeals process is completed and the defendant's
conviction has become final. Thus, the Sixth Amendment has no application to the
inmates’ claims for postconviction counsel.” (citations omitted)). However, an indigent
prisoner “could have a constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment’s due process
clause, which the Supreme Court has interpreted as requiring counsel to be appointed
whenever ‘fundamental fairness’ would demand it.” United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d
789, 794 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790, 93 S. Ct.
1756, 1763, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973)).
A prisoner does not have an absolute statutory right to counsel in federal
postconviction proceedings not involving a death sentence, as is the case here.
18

However, under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, a court “may” appoint counsel for an indigent
person who “is seeking relief under section 2241, 2254, or 2255 of title 28” if “the
interests of justice so require...” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). See also 28 U.S.C. §

18
Cf. Weeks v. Jones, 100 F.3d 124, 126–27 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Under the Anti–Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, § 7001(b), 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (1988), Congress established
an absolute right to counsel for indigent death-sentenced prisoners seeking federal
habeas relief ... On its face, this statute grants indigent capital defendants a
mandatory right to qualified legal counsel in any federal post conviction proceeding.”
(quotation omitted)).
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2255(g) (“Except as provided in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act, in all
proceedings brought under this section, and any subsequent proceedings on review,
the court may appoint counsel, except as provided by a rule promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Appointment of counsel under this
section shall be governed by section 3006A of title 18.”). “he Rules Governing 2255
Proceedings for the United States District Courts, “in turn, require counsel to be
appointed for indigent parties if necessary for effective discovery or if an evidentiary
hearing is warranted.” United States v. Johnson, 842 F. App’x 402, 405 (11th Cir.
2021) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Rules 6(a) and 8(c) of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, the provisions of which
discussing appointment of counsel are identical to the corresponding rules in the
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings). And “[w]hen a party does not have a
constitutional, statutory, or rule-based right to counsel, the district court may
exercise its discretion as to whether to appoint counsel.” Id.
Here, Enriquez has not established that “fundamental fairness” demands
appointment of counsel under the Fifth Amendment, that the “interests of justice”
require appointment of counsel under § 3006A, or that any exceptional circumstances
warrant discretionary appointment of counsel. Enriquez has shown sufficient ability
to file papers with, and present his position to, the Court, and his motion presents no
exceptional circumstances that warrant appointment of counsel.
19
Enriquez has also

19
The mere fact that a pro se prisoner has no legal training and is otherwise limited
in his legal knowledge does not, by itself, justify appointing counsel under any of the
foregoing circumstances, as this is true of most pro se prisoner litigants, and would
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not shown that any discovery is necessary, see Rule 6(a)-(b) of the Rules Governing
2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts (“A judge may, for good cause,
authorize a party to conduct discovery ... A party requesting discovery must provide
reasons for the request. The request must also include any proposed interrogatories
and requests for admission, and must specify any requested documents.”), much less
that appointed counsel is “necessary for effective discovery.” And a court is only
required to appoint counsel for a § 2255 evidentiary hearing if it first determines that
“an evidentiary hearing is warranted,” see Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing 2255
Proceedings for the United States District Courts. As is explained above, no
evidentiary hearing is warranted because the current record sufficiently establishes
that Enriquez is not entitled to relief on any of his § 2255 claims.
e. Certificate of Appealability
“The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it
enters a final order adverse to the applicant” in a § 2255 proceeding. Rule 11(a) of the
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. “Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from
the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of
arises out of process issued by a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A).
Where the district court “has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits,
the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must

in effect create a de facto right to counsel for any indigent non-lawyer prisoner
seeking collateral relief.
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demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120
S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000). Where habeas relief is denied on procedural
grounds without reaching the merits of the underlying constitutional claim(s), “a
COA should issue [only] when the prisoner shows . . . that jurists of reason would find
it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. See also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336,
123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003) (“Under the controlling standard, a
petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that
matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” (citations omitted and punctuation modified)). In all cases, “[a] certificate of
appealability may issue ‘only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.’ ” Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th
Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). While “a COA does not require
a showing that the appeal will succeed[,]” a “prisoner seeking a COA must prove
something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on
his or her part.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 337-38 (quotations omitted).
Upon due consideration, the undersigned finds that Enriquez should be
DENIED a certificate of appealability in conjunction with the dismissal of the
present §2255 motion because he has failed to make a substantial showing of the
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denial of a constitutional right for any of the grounds raised, and jurists of reason
would not find it debatable whether the Court is correct in finding those grounds
meritless.
20

f. Appeal In Forma Pauperis
“An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in
writing that it is not taken in good faith.” 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3).
21

A party demonstrates good faith by seeking appellate review of any issue
that is not frivolous when examined under an objective standard. See
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445, 82 S. Ct. 917, 921, 8 L. Ed.
2d 21 (1962). An issue is frivolous when it appears that “the legal
theories are indisputably meritless.” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393
(11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). In other words, an IFP action is
frivolous, and thus not brought in good faith, if it is “without arguable
merit either in law or in fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th
Cir. 2001). More specifically, “arguable means capable of being
convincingly argued.” Sun v. Forrester, 939 F.2d 924, 925 (11th Cir.
1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Nevertheless, where
a “claim is arguable, but ultimately will be unsuccessful,” it should be
allowed to proceed. Cofield v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512,
515 (11th Cir. 1991).

20
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings further provides:
“Before entering the final order, the court may direct the parties to submit arguments
on whether a certificate should issue.” If there is an objection to this recommendation
regarding the issuance of a certificate of appealability, the objecting party may bring
this argument to the attention of the district judge in the objections permitted to this
report and recommendation, see infra. Should the Court ultimately deny a certificate
of appealability as to some or all grounds for relief, the movant “may not appeal the
denial but may seek a certificate from the court of appeals under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 22.” Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings
for the United States District Courts.

21
A district court’s finding “that an appeal would not be in good faith because no
certificate of appealability had been issued ... is not enough to explain why the appeal
on the merits would not be in good faith, because the standard governing the issuance
of a certificate of appealability is not the same as the standard for determining
whether an appeal is in good faith. It is more demanding.” Walker v. O’Brien, 216
F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2000).
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Ghee v. Retailers Nat. Bank, 271 F. App’x 858, 859-60 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(unpublished).
Having considered the issues raised as set forth above, the undersigned will
recommend the Court certify that any appeal by Enriquez of the denial of the present
§ 2255 motion would be without merit and therefore not taken in good faith, thus
denying him entitlement to appeal in forma pauperis.
22

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the undersigned RECOMMENDS
that Enriquez’s § 2255 motion dated April 26, 2023 (Doc# 247), be DENIED and
DISMISSED with prejudice; that his unsigned motion for appointment of counsel
dated November 6, 2025 (Docs# 317) be DENIED; that Enriquez be DENIED a
Certificate of Appealability in relation to this dismissal; and that judgment be
accordingly set out by separate document under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
23

The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that the Court certify that any appeal by

22
Should the Court adopt this recommendation and deny leave to appeal in forma
pauperis, the movant may file a motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis with
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a)(5).

23
See Rule 12 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States
District Courts (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure..., to the extent that they are
not inconsistent with any statutory provision or these rules, may be applied to a
proceeding under these rules.”); Sassoon v. United States, 549 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1977)
(applying Rule 58’s separate-document requirement in a § 2255 proceeding); United
States v. Hassebrock, 21 F.4th 494, 497 (7th Cir. 2021) (in holding that Rule 58
applied to coram nobis proceedings, nothing that “[m]any [other] circuits have applied
Rule 58 to § 2255 motions”).
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Enriquez of the denial of the present § 2255 motion would be without merit and
therefore not taken in good faith, thus denying him entitlement to appeal in forma
pauperis.
NOTICE OF THE RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything
in it must, within 14 days of the date of service of this document, file specific written
objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Rule 8(b) of the Rules
Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts; S.D. Ala.
GenLR 72(c). The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party
failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a
report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-
to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for
objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a
proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary
in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must
identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the
basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that
merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge
is not specific.
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NOTICE TO PRO SE § 2255 MOVANT
Movant is advised that “[a]ll persons proceeding pro se shall be bound by, and
must comply with, all Local Rules of this Court,” as well as the applicable federal
rules of procedure, “unless excused by Court order.” S.D. Ala. GenLR 83.5(a). Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires that any paper filed with the Court be signed by
him personally and provide his “address, e-mail address, and telephone number.”
24

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). See also Rule 12 of the Section 2255 Rules (“The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to the extent that
they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or these rules, may be applied
to a proceeding under these rules.”). “The court must strike an unsigned paper unless
the omission is promptly corrected after being called to the attorney's or party's
attention.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a).
Movant is also advised that, under this Court’s local rules, “[a]ny person
proceeding pro se must, at all times during the pendency of the action to which he or
she is a party, keep the Clerk informed of his or her current address and ... must
promptly notify the Clerk of any change of address ... Failure to comply with this

24
Movant must handwrite his/her signature/mark (as opposed to, for example, typing
his name) in order to satisfy Rule 11(a). See Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 763–
64, 121 S. Ct. 1801, 149 L. Ed. 2d 983 (2001) (“Becker maintains that typing one's
name satisfies the signature requirement and that his original notice of appeal,
containing his name typed above “(Counsel of Record),” met Civil Rule 11(a)’s
instruction...[H]owever, we are not disposed to extend the meaning of the word
‘signed,’ as that word appears in Civil Rule 11(a), to permit typed names. As Rule
11(a) is now framed, we read the requirement of a signature to indicate, as a signature
requirement commonly does, and as it did in John Hancock's day, a name
handwritten (or a mark handplaced).”).
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Rule may result in sanction, including dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s action...” S.D.
Ala. GenLR 83.5(b). Additionally, any “request for Court action must be presented by
motion and may not be presented by informal means such as a letter.” S.D. Ala.
GenLR 7. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b).
DONE this the 22
nd
day of July 2026.
/s/ Katherine P. Nelson
KATHERINE P. NELSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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