ALEXANDRA WARD V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY — MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING

IMPORTANT NOTICE “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION” THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED” PURSUANT TO RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE (RAP) 40(D). THIS OPINION SHALL NOT BE CITED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE. UNDER RAP 41, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF KENTUCKY APPELLATE COURTS RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, THAT ARE FINAL UNDER RAP 40(G), MAY BE CITED BY A PARTY FOR CONSIDERATION BY A COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSES THE POINT OF LAW BEING ARGUED BY A PARTY. IF AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION IS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY A COURT THE OPINION SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION IN THE DOCUMENT IN WHICH THE UNPUBLISHED OPINION IS CITED.

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RENDERED: OCTOBER 22, 2026 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Supreme Court of Kentucky 2025-SC-0240-MR ALEXANDRA WARD APPELLANT V. ON APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE PAUL K. WINCHESTER, JUDGE NO. 23-CR-00154 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING A Whitley County jury convicted Alexandra Ward (“Ward”) on one count of complicity to commit murder and one count of complicity to commit first- degree strangulation. The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Ward to life in prison for complicity to commit murder and five years in prison for complicity to commit first-degree strangulation.1 She now appeals as a matter of right.2 On appeal, Ward raises three issues of trial error. First, Ward argues that the trial court abused its discretion under KRE 403 by denying her motion to 1 The jury also recommended that Ward serve her sentences consecutively; however, the judge did not accept this recommendation and instead held that the two sentences are to run concurrently. 2 Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) (“Appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court imposing a sentence of … imprisonment for twenty years or more shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court.”).

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2 exclude allegedly prejudicial evidence of A.S.’s injuries, rendering the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Second, Ward asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce incriminating text messages between Ward and Taylor. Third, Ward argues that the trial court erred in denying her change-of-venue request. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. BACKGROUND Jordan Blake Taylor (“Taylor”) was Ward’s fiancé. The couple met on Facebook 34 days before Ward’s three-year-old daughter, A.S., was murdered.3 On February 19, 2023, while Ward was at work, Taylor called 911 to report that A.S. was unresponsive. Emergency responders were dispatched to Ward’s home. When they arrived, they found Taylor administering CPR to A.S. They also observed several bruises on A.S.'s body and blood coming from her mouth. A.S. was transported to Baptist Health in Corbin, where she eventually died. Dr. Stephen Ford treated A.S. at the hospital and testified to the extent of her condition when she arrived. A.S. exhibited no neurological responses, could not breathe on her own, suffered apparent head trauma, and had bruises in irregular locations including across her chest, back, buttocks, and lower legs. A.S. also had additional injuries to her face, behind her ears, and inside her mouth.4 The doctor described A.S.’s trauma as “suspicious” and testified that 3 Ward is also the mother of K.S., who was seven months old at the time of the murder. 4 Dr. Sarah Manes from the Kentucky Office of the Medical Examiner testified that she counted 52 injuries to A.S.’s torso and extremities and 21 injuries on her

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3 by the time he examined her, she was “brain dead”. After A.S. was declared dead, her body was transferred to the coroner. The coroner noted A.S.’s blunt- force injuries and opined that the trauma was not an accident. He concluded that the manner of A.S.’s death was a homicide. At the hospital, Ward told the doctor that Taylor had been watching A.S. at the time of the 911 call but insisted he was not responsible for A.S.'s various injuries. On April 17, 2023, both Ward and Taylor were indicted on charges stemming from the murder of A.S. Taylor was charged with murder, first- degree strangulation, and first-degree sodomy. On October 9, 2024, he pleaded guilty to all three charges and was sentenced by the trial court to life in prison without the possibility of parole.5 Ward was charged with complicity to commit murder and complicity to commit first-degree strangulation but pleaded not guilty. Ward’s trial began on March 25, 2025. Over the course of the trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Ward was aware of the abuse A.S. endured. For example, the Commonwealth introduced Google search queries from Ward’s phone less than a week before A.S. was killed that included “how head, for a total of 73 injuries. She also testified that these wounds were in various stages of healing. This finding indicates the injuries resulted from ongoing abuse rather than the product of a single incident. 5 Taylor was also later indicted by a Clay County Grand Jury on August 4, 2023, on a murder charge related to the death of his son. His jury trial in that case was set to begin on September 9, 2026. See Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Jordan Blake Taylor, No. 23-CR-00066. However, pursuant to an agreed order filed August 17, 2026, the trial date was set aside, and the matter was set for review on November 30, 2026.

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4 to get rid of bruises,” “how to get rid of bruises fast,” and “does hydrocortisone help bruises?” The Commonwealth also introduced text messages between Taylor and Ward that included Taylor’s threats to kill Ward, Ward’s pleas to Taylor to stop hitting her and A.S., and Ward’s desire to hide the bruises covering A.S.’s body. In addition, the Commonwealth introduced photos of A.S.’s injuries both before and after her death, photos from inside Ward’s home that depicted a bloodstained pillow, a video found on Taylor’s phone that depicted him choking, slapping, and smothering A.S., and the coroner's report detailing A.S.’s injuries. On April 1, 2025, the jury found Ward guilty of both charges and recommended a sentence of life in prison for complicity to commit murder and five years in prison for complicity to commit strangulation to be served consecutively. The judge accepted the jury’s recommendation but ran the sentences concurrently. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. ANALYSIS 1. Noncompliance Before reaching the merits, we must address Ward’s noncompliance with our Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”).6 When a party fails to substantially comply, RAP 10(B) permits “such action as the appellate court deems 6 Our current RAPs were adopted on January 1, 2023. Ward’s brief was submitted October 29, 2025.

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5 appropriate,” up to and including “[s]triking of filings, briefs, record or portions thereof” and “dismissal of the appeal.” See also RAP 31(H)(1) (a brief “may be stricken for failure to substantially comply with the requirements of these rules”). The severity of the consequence, however, should correspond to the nature of the defect. See Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147 (Ky. 2021) (holding that manifest injustice review is an “inappropriate sanction for briefing errors that relate only to the formatting rules” because that standard “is reserved only for errors in appellate briefing related to the statement of preservation”). Ward’s brief is deficient in three respects, and each warrants a different response. First, Ward’s statement of the case lacks “ample references to the specific location in the record supporting each of the statements contained in the summary.” RAP 32(A)(3). More than ten material assertions have no record citation. Others, including Ward’s description of the evidence she claims was improperly admitted, cite only hours of video trial record with no specific timestamp. “It is well-settled that an appellate court will not sift through a voluminous record to try to ascertain facts when a party has failed to comply with its obligation under [our rules of procedure] ... to provide specific references to the record.” Commonwealth v. Roth, 567 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Ky. 2019). We nonetheless decline to strike the brief. “As long as a good faith effort is made, this Court will consider the arguments presented to it.” Id. In Roth, we exercised our discretion to strike the Commonwealth’s noncompliant brief and dismiss its appeal. Id. However, the brief in Roth contained no record citations

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6 at all. In contrast, Ward’s brief includes some citations, and its omissions do not appear deliberate. However, our forbearance has its limits–we will not supply citations that the brief omits. We therefore disregard any factual assertion that lacks a citation to a specific location in the record, unless confirmed by the Commonwealth’s citations or otherwise readily apparent. Second, Ward’s brief uses A.S.’s full name throughout, despite RAP 31(B)’s requirements that “[i]nitials or a descriptive term” be used “instead of a name in cases involving juveniles.” The rule contains no exception for a deceased juvenile. Moreover, the privacy interests it protects also survive the child’s death, particularly here where naming A.S. necessarily identifies her minor sibling. Because this defect does not impair our review, we do not strike the brief on this basis. However, counsel is reminded to omit such identifying information. Third, Ward’s brief lacks the issue-specific preservation statement RAP 32(A)(4) requires. The brief offers one global statement for three distinct claims. For none of those claims does it state whether the objection was a motion in limine or a trial objection, whether the trial court ruled, or where in the record that ruling appears. “If a party fails to inform the appellate court of where in the record his issue is preserved, the appellate court can treat that issue as unpreserved,” and review it only for palpable error resulting in manifest injustice. Ford, 628 S.W.3d at 155; RCr 10.26. In Slone v. Commonwealth, this Court faced similarly noncompliant preservation citations. There, the “[a]ppellant merely provided a list of citations to the record without indicating

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7 how any particular point relates to any particular allegation of [prosecutorial] misconduct.” Id. (citing Slone v. Commonwealth, 2013-SC-000446-MR, 2014 WL 5410289, at *3 (Ky. Oct. 23, 2014)). Here, the Ward’s citations either refer to the wrong portion of the record, reference an entire day of trial with no indication of where within it the objection or ruling appears, or are omitted altogether. This falls short even of the “collage of citations” to the video record we found insufficient in Slone, where the appellant at least directed us to discrete points in the record. Id. Notwithstanding this error, and in the interests of justice, we will treat Ward’s claims as preserved to the extent the Commonwealth’s brief supplies record citations to the relevant objections and ruling. We caution counsel that future noncompliance of this kind may result in the brief being stricken and the appeal dismissed. RAP 10(B); RAP 31(H)(1). 2. The trial court did not err by admitting photos and video of Jordan Taylor abusing A.S. First, Ward argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion in limine to exclude the photos and video of Taylor abusing A.S. Ward argues that the evidence was highly prejudicial and, alternatively, cumulative, and that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting it.7 7 Ward’s brief provides no citation to a decision by the trial court with respect to the other pieces of evidence mentioned in her supplemental motion in limine. Therefore, as explained above, we will not search the record for these rulings and will instead treat these alleged errors as unpreserved. Ward’s actual motion in limine sought to exclude “all evidence concerning or relating to Jordan Taylor’s murder the minor child.” However, Ward’s brief only provides citations to rulings by the trial court overruling motions to exclude the photos and videos of Taylor’s abuse.

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8 Ward claims she preserved this issue by filing a motion in limine on February 11, 2025. In it, Ward argued that “all evidence pertaining to the murder” of A.S. by Taylor should be excluded because “it is not necessary for the Commonwealth to prove the murder” and such evidence “either has no probative value or low probative value.” Ward’s motion requested that the trial court exclude “all video, audio, or written evidence concerning or relating to [A.S.’s] murder” by Taylor. On March 5, 2025, the trial court ordered Ward to “propound a list of documentary evidence she requests be excluded.” In response, Ward supplemented the motion with an eleven-part list of evidence she sought to be excluded.8 On March 19, 2025, the trial court heard argument on the photos. During the hearing, Ward’s counsel and the Commonwealth approached the bench to address the photographs individually. The Commonwealth stated its reason for admitting each photo and described the testimony that would accompany each photo or set of photos. The court reviewed 21 photographs (out of 300 possessed by the Commonwealth) over 13 minutes. The photographs were graphic depictions of A.S.’s injuries in the days leading up to 8 The list included [A] the Facebook video of Jordan Taylor murdering the minor child, A.S., as well as any and all testimony concerning or relating to the video. [B] The Hospital photos and any and all testimony concerning or relating to said photos and the injuries sustained by A.S. [C] The autopsy report of A.S., including, without limitation, the photographs that are the subject matter of the report. [D] Any and all testimony concerning or relating to the autopsy of A.S. [E] Search warrant photographs of the crime scene. [F] WSCO Deputy Patrick’s photographs. [G] Autopsy photos by 982. [H] Hospital photos by 917. [I] The testimony taken of Dr. Segueira on February 26, 2025, concerning or relating to the autopsy of the brain of A.S. [J] Any and all photographs of A.S. with Hand, Foot, and Mouth Disease (HFMD). [K] Any and all photographs of injuries sustained by A.S.

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9 and following her death. Before admitting them, the trial court stated that “none of these [photos] show the same injury.”9 Later during trial, Ward objected to the Commonwealth playing a video of Jordan Taylor abusing A.S. The Commonwealth sought to play the video, which was found on Taylor’s phone, during the testimony of Kentucky State Police Detective Gray. Taylor recorded the video himself two days before A.S.'s death. It shows Taylor covering A.S.’s mouth and nose with his hand for thirty-nine seconds to smother her. The video also depicts Taylor using his left knee to pin A.S. to the ground, telling her, “Smother b*tch” and slapping A.S. on the right cheek while zooming in on her injured face. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision as to the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. Stephens v. Commonwealth, 680 S.W.3d 887, 898 (Ky. 2023) (quoting Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 313, 320 (Ky. 2006)). Relevant evidence is generally admissible. KRE 402. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” KRE 401. Relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 9 Ward’s brief contends, without citation, that the trial court overruled her motion in limine on March 18, 2025. We will not search the record for this alleged ruling because the Commonwealth supplies us with an alternative and seemingly accurate citation to the trial court’s March 19, 2025 ruling with respect to this evidence.

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10 considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” KRE 403. Thus, the rules of evidence require the trial court to assess four things: the evidence's relevance, its probative value, its prejudicial effect, and whether that harm substantially outweighs its probative value. Evidence is only excluded under KRE 403 when the harm of undue prejudice substantially outweighs the probative worth. Two aspects of this inquiry are relevant to the instant case. KRE 403 guards against undue prejudice, not the existence of prejudice. Evidence is only unduly prejudicial when it “appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or otherwise may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case.” Richmond v. Commonwealth, 534 S.W.3d 228, 232 (Ky. 2017). Second, the trial court has discretion to strike the right balance in admitting probative yet prejudicial evidence because it is best positioned to observe the evidence in the context of the trial. We will not disturb its judgment unless it was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Ward contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting photographs of A.S.’s injuries and a video of Taylor smothering her. She argues the evidence was irrelevant because Taylor’s conduct was undisputed and did not need to be proved, and that it was unduly prejudicial because its graphic character substantially outweighed its probative value.

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11 Whether a piece of evidence is relevant turns on what facts were “of consequence” in Ward’s trial for complicity to commit murder and complicity to commit strangulation. Complicity is not a freestanding offense but rather a theory of liability by which one person is held responsible for an offense committed by another. KRS 502.020 provides. In relevant part: (1) A person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when, with the intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he: … (c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make a proper effort to do so … (2) When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, a person who acts with the kind of culpability with respect to the result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense is guilty of that offense when he: … (c) Having a legal duty to prevent the conduct causing the result, fails to make a proper effort to do so. KRS 502.020(1)(c), (2)(c). A parent with a legal duty to protect her child who fails to do so may be liable as an accomplice to the person who harms the child. See Tharp v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 356 (Ky. 2000). Accordingly, the Commonwealth had to prove that Taylor committed each underlying offense (murder and strangulation) because Ward could not be complicit in an offense that was not committed. Second, the Commonwealth had to prove Ward’s own mental state, including that she knew of the conduct, had a legal duty to prevent it, and failed to make a proper effort to do so. Ward’s relevance argument rests on the premise that Taylor’s conduct was not in issue because he pleaded guilty and she did not dispute it. Neither

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12 point relieves the Commonwealth of its burden to prove every element of the charged offenses. Moreover, a defendant cannot narrow the Commonwealth’s proof by concession because “the prosecution is permitted to prove its case by competent evidence of its own choosing, and the defendant may not stipulate away the parts of the case that he does not want the jury to see.” Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Ky. 1998). The nature, extent, and duration of A.S.’s injuries therefore remained facts of consequence to both whether Taylor committed the offenses and whether Ward could have failed to know about them. The photographs tend to make two consequential facts more probable. As to the underlying offenses, they corroborate the treating physician’s and the coroner’s testimony that A.S. suffered repeated blunt-force trauma over an extended period, that her injuries were inconsistent with an accident, and that her death was a homicide. As to Ward’s mental state, the predeath photographs show injuries visible across A.S.’s face, chest, back, and legs in the days before her death, while she was in Ward’s care. Whether Ward could have failed to notice those injuries, or could reasonably attribute them to something other than abuse, was a central question for the jury. Evidence bearing on that question is relevant under KRE 401. The photos were also probative because they provided visible proof that added context to the testimony and allowed the jury to weigh the evidence for itself. The jury could assess for itself what Ward would have seen. These

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13 predeath photographs are among the most direct evidence available of what Ward knew. The photographs are indeed disturbing. But “a photograph, otherwise admissible, does not become inadmissible simply because it is gruesome and the crime is heinous.” Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 271 (Ky. 2006). Photographs of a victim’s injuries are admissible, even if gruesome, so long as their probative value is not substantially outweighed by their inflammatory effect. See Hall v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.3d 814 (Ky. 2015). Here, any prejudice flows from the nature of the crime, not from anything the Commonwealth added. KRE 403 does not require the Commonwealth to sanitize a disturbing offense, and a defendant charged with complicity in the fatal abuse of a child cannot insulate herself from proof of that abuse on the ground that the proof is hard to look at. The trial court’s process reflects the care with which it balanced these competing interests. In Burdette v. Commonwealth, we upheld the admission of graphic autopsy photographs because the trial court “considered each photo individually, and comparatively, and assessed the purpose for which the photo was being offered.” 664 S.W.3d 605, 617 (Ky. 2023). The trial court here did the same. It required Ward to identify with specificity the evidence she sought to exclude; held a hearing at which the Commonwealth justified each photograph and described the testimony that would accompany it; reviewed 21 photographs out of nearly 300 in the Commonwealth’s possession; and expressly found that none depicted the same injury. This method yields a

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14 ruling that is neither arbitrary nor unsupported by sound legal principles. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs. The video presents a closer question because it has a greater capacity to inflame the jury. But the same four-step analysis yields the same result. A person commits first-degree strangulation when, without consent, he “intentionally impedes the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of another person by applying pressure on the throat or neck of the other person or blocking the nose or mouth of the other person.” KRS 508.170(1). The video depicts Taylor doing exactly that by covering A.S.’s nose and mouth with his hand while pinning her to the floor with his knee and announcing his purpose to smother her. The video therefore tends to prove every element of the offense underlying the complicity in strangulation count. It is also relevant to Ward’s mental state. It was recorded two days before A.S. died. The Commonwealth established that Ward saw A.S. between the recording and the 911 call, and the video shows A.S.’s facial condition at that time. This demonstrates what Ward would have seen in the days leading up to A.S.’s death. It further shows that Taylor’s abuse was ongoing in Ward’s home rather than a single unforeseeable outburst, which underpins the Commonwealth’s theory that Ward failed in her duty to protect. The video’s probative value was at its highest. Although the physician and coroner testified to blunt-force injuries, and the text messages referred to choking, no evidence in the record establishes that Taylor strangled A.S. within the meaning of KRS 508.170. Without the video, the jury would have had little

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15 on which to find that the strangulation occurred at all, let alone that Ward was complicit in it. Evidence that supplies the only proof of an element of a charged offense is among the most probative. We do not minimize the video’s capacity to disturb. A recording of an adult smothering a three-year-old, narrated by the perpetrator, is as inflammatory as evidence comes. We also recognize that in a prosecution for complicity by omission, there is a risk that the jury, revolted by Taylor’s conduct, will punish Ward for what he did rather than for what she failed to do. But KRE 403 does not exclude evidence simply because it is prejudicial. Instead, the statute focuses on whether the danger of undue prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value. Where the evidence is the direct and only proof of a charged offense and of the defendant’s knowledge, that balance does not tip toward exclusion just because the proof is hard to watch. See Meredith v. Commonwealth, 677 S.W.3d 452, 456 (Ky. 2023) (affirming admission of a video defendant recorded of himself sexually abusing the victim’s corpse because, although “inherently prejudicial,” the clip “constituted direct evidence” of the charged offense). The conduct that provokes the jury’s revulsion is the very conduct Ward had a legal duty to prevent, and the evidence that proves the conduct is the evidence that proves she knew. Like photographs, a gruesome but relevant video does not become inadmissible because “the crime is heinous.” Ratliff, 194 S.W.3d at 271. Here, the trial court’s conclusion that the danger of undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh the video’s probative value was within its discretion.

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16 Ward argues in the alternative that the photographs and the video were “needlessly cumulative” within the meaning of KRE 403. Her argument is brief: she asserts that the Commonwealth introduced the video merely to “pile on,” and that it depicted matters already established by other evidence. KRE 403 permits exclusion of relevant evidence for “needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Evidence is cumulative when it is duplicative of other evidence already before the jury such that its marginal probative value is negligible. This targets repetition that serves no purpose but delay or emphasis. Here, the photographs were not cumulative. The trial court reviewed each one and found that none depicted the same injury, and it admitted twenty-one of the three hundred photographs available to the Commonwealth. The trial court pared the Commonwealth’s proof down to a set of images, each of which showed the jury something the others did not. Nor was the video cumulative. It depicted the strangulation which no other evidence in the case established. It also depicted A.S.'s condition on a specific date two days before her death, which bore directly on Ward's knowledge and which Ward herself contested through evidence from the same period. Evidence that supplied the sole proof of one charged offense and rebuts the defendant’s theory on the other is, by definition, not needlessly cumulative. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting either the videos or photos. 3. The trial court did not err when it admitted Ward’s text messages. Ward next argued that the trial court erred by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce text messages between Ward and Taylor

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17 discussing the conduct underlying the two charges. Ward claims the messages were “not authenticated” and admitted “without a declarant,” violating her constitutional right to confront her accusers.10 Ward preserved these claims by objecting to a motion in limine the Commonwealth filed on February 13, 2025. At a hearing on March 19, the trial court said it reviewed the filings and found the messages admissible. We agree. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. Stephens, 680 S.W.3d at 898. The test is whether the trial court’s decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” English, 993 S.W.2d at 945. Ward argues that the text messages were not authenticated because the Commonwealth did not call the declarants (Ward and Taylor) as witnesses to authenticate the content and context of the messages. However, this misrepresents Kentucky's rule on authenticating evidence. “The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” KRE 901(a). “The Commonwealth’s burden under KRE 901 to authenticate a writing is slight, requiring only a prima facie showing.” Sanchez v. Commonwealth, 680 S.W.3d 911, 926 (Ky. 2023) (quoting Kays v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.3d 260, 270 (KY. App. 2016)). 10 Ward’s use of “declarant” is confusing given neither claim of error relates to hearsay.

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18 The Commonwealth fulfilled its burden. Our rules of evidence allow authentication by showing a “process or system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.” KRE 901(b)(9). Here, the Commonwealth elicited testimony from Kentucky State Police Computer Forensic Examiner Amanda Moses. Moses testified that Ward and Taylor’s iPhones were brought to the Richmond KSP Lab for examination. There, Moses used “proprietary software” to extract data from the phones. Because police had the phone’s passcodes, they were able to get the “full file system.” They then put the system on a physical drive and examined the contents using forensic analysis tools which have “proven to be reliable.” Based on the contents, including Snapchat and iCloud accounts, Moses confirmed the phone belonged to Ward. That testimony establishes that the extraction accurately reproduced the contents of Ward’s phone. Whether Ward authored the messages is a distinct question. KRE 901(b)(4) allows evidence to be authenticated by its “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.” At trial, the Commonwealth elicited testimony from a Kentucky State Police detective who seized Ward’s phone from her when he interviewed her at the hospital. At that time, he observed correspondence between Ward and Taylor, her fiancé. Among the topics discussed in the correspondence was the abuse A.S. was enduring. This information corresponded to the facts the detective already knew about the case. The detective’s knowledge of those facts, coupled with the fact that he seized the phone directly from Ward, is sufficient to

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19 authenticate that the messages were written by or intended for Ward. Taken together, this evidence supports a finding that Ward typed, sent, and received the messages. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them. Ward also argues that admitting the messages without Taylor's testimony violates her 6 th Amendment right to confront witnesses against her. This claim fails because the messages are not the kind of statements governed by the Confrontation Clause. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Section Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution likewise secures the accused’s right “to meet the witnesses face to face”. In Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of “testimonial” statements of a witness who does not appear at trial unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). In contrast, statements that are non-testimonial do not implicate the Confrontation Clause at all. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006). Crawford did not exhaustively define “testimonial,” but it identified the “core class” of statements the Clause was designed to reach: ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent such as affidavits, custodial examinations, and prior testimony the defendant could not cross-examine; extrajudicial statements contained in formalized materials such as depositions

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20 or confessions; and “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” 541 U.S. at 51-52. “An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” Id. The Court subsequently explained that a statement is testimonial when its “primary purpose” is to “establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 826. This Court has applied the same framework. In Baldwin v. Commonwealth, we recently reiterated that “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the … use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.” 723 S.W.3d 676, 689 (Ky. 2025). Consistent with this principle, federal courts applying Crawford have uniformly held that private communications between friends, family members, and intimates fall outside the Clause. See United States v. Boyd, 640 F.3d 657 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[S]tatements made to friends and acquaintances are non-testimonial.”) and United States v. Franklin, 415 F.3d 537, 545 (6th Cir. 2005) (statements made to a "friend and confidant" found to be non-testimonial). Here, the messages between Ward and Taylor are plainly nontestimonial. They were private text messages exchanged between two people who lived together and were engaged to be married. They were not made to police or any government officer but rather the ordinary, unguarded communications of a romantic relationship. Moreover, given the contents of the messages, Taylor’s

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21 threats, Ward’s pleas that he stop hitting her and A.S., and Ward’s expressions of concern about concealing bruises on her daughter's body, it strains credulity to suggest that in typing those messages, either Ward or Taylor reasonably believed they were creating evidence for a criminal trial. Indeed, the messages were incriminating precisely because neither participant anticipated that anyone else would ever read them. They are precisely the “casual remark to an acquaintance” that Crawford placed outside the reach of the Confrontation Clause. Because the text messages were nontestimonial, the Confrontation Clause did not apply, and the trial court did not err in admitting them. To the extent Taylor’s messages were offered not for their truth but to establish Ward’s awareness of Taylor’s violence toward A.S., they are not hearsay at all and present “no Confrontation Clause concerns.” Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985). Moreover, it should go without saying that half of the messages at issue are Ward’s own comments. A defendant has no right to confront herself, and her own statements are admissible against her as party-opponent admissions. KRE 801A(b)(1). 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ward a venue change. Ward’s third and final claim of error is that the trial court erred in denying her petition to change venue. We find no error. On March 11, 2025, Ward filed a Renewed Verified Petition for Change of Venue requesting the change of venue to either Pulaski or Rockcastle County. The petition included two supporting affidavits, as required by KRS 452.220(2). It also referenced news coverage and an online petition demanding the

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22 maximum sentence for Ward and Taylor that received fewer than 100 signatures. The petition for change of venue emphasizes the potential effect of pretrial publicity on Ward’s ability to receive a fair trial. The trial court verbally denied Ward’s petition at a March 19, 2025, hearing. “Whether to grant a change of venue is within the sound discretion of the trial court. A trial court's decision in this regard will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Gill v. Commonwealth, 7 S.W.3d 365, 369 (Ky. 1999). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Hubers v. Commonwealth, 617 S.W.3d 750, 775 (Ky. 2020), as modified on denial of reh'g (Feb. 18, 2021). "[T]he trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine the prejudicial effect of extra-judicial information.” Hubers, 617 S.W.3d at 764. A change of venue is warranted when it “appears that the defendant or the state cannot have a fair trial in the county where the prosecution is pending” KRS 452.210. The petition must be verified and accompanied by “the filing of the affidavits of at least two (2) other credible persons, not kin to or of counsel for the defendant, stating that they are acquainted with the state of public opinion in the county objected to, and that they verily believe the statements of the petition for the change of venue are true.” KRS 452.220. The defendant bears the burden of establishing that a fair trial cannot be had. See Sluss v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 215 (Ky. 2012). “It is not the amount of publicity which determines that venue should be changed; it is whether public

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23 opinion is so aroused as to preclude a fair trial.” Gill v. Commonwealth, 7 S.W.3d 365, 369 (Ky. 1999). “In cases alleged to be affected by prejudicial news coverage, such as this one, the defendant must show ‘that (1) there has been prejudicial news coverage, (2) it occurred prior to trial, and (3) the effect of such news coverage is reasonably likely to prevent a fair trial.” Hubers, 617 S.W.3d at 777. “The mere fact that jurors may have heard, talked or read about a case is not sufficient to sustain a motion for change of venue, absent a showing that the accounts or descriptions of the investigation and judicial proceedings have prejudiced the defendant.” Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293, 298 (Ky. 1997), overruled on other grounds by McQueen v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 441 (Ky. 2011). Ward’s petition fails to satisfy any of the three steps. As to the first two requirements, Ward asserts that the case received media coverage before trial, but her brief does not direct us to any place in the record where the trial court was presented with that coverage, and we will not search for it.11 More fundamentally, Ward does not cite specifically to any coverage that went beyond reporting the facts of A.S.’s death and the charges against Ward and Taylor and instead disseminated inflammatory or inaccurate information. The existence of coverage is insufficient in and of itself to establish the necessary 11 This omission is another instance of their briefing deficiencies discussed in Part 1. Ward’s brief refers to pretrial news coverage but cites no exhibit, affidavit, or portion of the video record in which that coverage was placed before the trial court. Consistent with our approach above, we disregard the assertion to the extent it is not confirmed by the record as cited by the Commonwealth or otherwise readily apparent.

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24 prejudice. The third element is also unmet. The only evidence Ward offered of the state of public opinion in Whitley County was the two affidavits accompanying her petition.12 However, neither affidavit supports her position. The first stated that she herself did not “have much of an opinion” because she did not “know all the facts.” That statement undermines Ward’s claim that Whitley County residents have formed a preconception about her guilt. The second affiant does not reside in Whitley County and, although she saw information about the case on Facebook, admitted she was in no position to be acquainted with the “state of public opinion in the county objected to” as required by KRS 452.220(2). Moreover, Ward’s brief does not point to a single indication that any prospective juror formed an opinion about Ward’s guilt because of pre-trial publicity. In Bowling, this Court found no abuse of discretion in denying a venue change where multiple prospective jurors questioned had heard of the case, but only one had formed an opinion. Bowling, 942 S.W.2d at 298. If the showing in Bowling, where at least one juror had formed an opinion, was insufficient to compel a change of venue, the showing here where no one did is likewise insufficient. Ward bore the burden of showing that public opinion in Whitley County was so aroused that she could not receive a fair trial. She failed to meet that burden. The trial court, present in the county and best positioned to gauge the community’s sentiment, concluded that a fair trial was possible. During voir 12 Ward does not mention these affiants in her brief.

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25 dire, the trial court asked the panel whether anyone had heard anything about Ward’s case in the news, online, or through another medium. Six jurors approached the bench, and the trial court asked them individually (1) whether, having not heard any evidence thus far, they had formed an opinion based on their exposure to the case; and (2) whether, if selected, they could base their opinion solely on the evidence presented at trial. All six jurors answered affirmatively to the latter question. One juror stated that a Facebook post by Whitley County law enforcement led her to form an opinion about the case, but she answered affirmatively when asked whether she could base her opinion solely on the evidence—just as the others did. The court dismissed none of the six prospective jurors, and none were struck. Nothing in the record suggests the trial court’s decision to deny Ward’s petition for a change of venue was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ward’s petition. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Whitley Circuit Court is affirmed. All sitting. Lambert, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Goodwine, Keller, and Nickell, JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only.

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26 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: John A. Combs Combs Law PLLC COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Russell M. Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky Joseph Crawford White Assistant Solicitor General

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