Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1989-144

1989-144Kanag

Texte intégral

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL December 6, 1989
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 89- 144
Curtis E. Campbell
Gray County Attorney
222 S. Main
Cimarron, Kansas 67835
Re: Taxation--Property Valuation, Equalizing
Assessments, Appraisers and Assessment the federal
Statewide Reappraisal--Statewide Reappraisal of
Real Property; Methods of Establishing Values;
CRP Land
Synopsis: The provision of K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 79-1476 which
requires land subject to thesubjectal conservation
reserve program to be valued on the basis of the
agricultural income or productivity attributable to
the inherent capabilities of the land in its usage
immediately prior to being su§§ct to the program
is not in violation of the uniformity in assessment
requirement of article 11, section 1 of the Kansas
Constitution. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1988 Supp.
79-1476; Kan. Const., Art. 11, §§. 1, 12; U.S.
Const., Amend. 14th.
Dear Mr. Campbell:
You request our opinion regarding the constitutionality of
K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 79-1476 as it applies to agricultural land
subject to the federal conservation reserve program (CRP).
You advise that CRP land which was irrigated prior to
becoming subject to the program is being assessed differently
than CRP land which was not irrigated prior to becoming
subject to the program despite the fact that CRP rental
income is the same for both. You question whether assessing
this property based on potential productivity rather than
actual income constitutes nonuniform or unequal treatment in
violation of article 11, section 1 of the Constitution of the
State of Kansas.
Article 11, section 1 provides in pertinent part:
"Except as otherwise hereinafter
specifically provided, the legislature
shall provide for a uniform and equal
basis of valuation and rate of taxation of
all property subject to taxation. . . .
Property shall be classified into the
following classes for the purpose of
assessment and assessed at the percentage
of value prescribed therefore:
"Class 1 shall consist of real
property. Real property shall be further
classified into four subclasses. Such
property shall be defined by law for the
purpose of subclassification and
assessed uniformly as to subclass at the
following percentages of value:
"(B) Land devoted to agricultural use
which shall be valued upon the basis of
its agricultural income or agricultural
productivity pursuant to section 12 of
article 11 of the constitution . . .
30%." (Emphasis added).
Article 11, section 12 of the Constitution provides in part:
"Land devoted to agricultural use may be
defined by law and and valued for ad
valorem tax purpose upon the basis of its
agricultural income or agricultural
productivity, actual or potential, and
when so valued such land shall be assessed
at the same percent of value and taxed at
the same rate as real property subject to
the provisions of section 1 of this
article. . . ." (Emphasis added).
Because this section is not self-executing [see Attorney
General Opinion No. 85-135; Nelson, Differential Assessment
of Agricultural Land in Kansas, 25 U. Kan. L. Rev. 215,
218 (1977)], K.S.A. 79-1476 was enacted to implement its
provisions. The portion of K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 79-1476 with
which you are concerned states:
"[V]aluations shall be established for
each parcel of land devoted to
agricultural use upon the basis of the
agricultural income or productivity
attributable to the inherent capabilities
of such land in its current usage or, in
the case of such land which is subject to
the federal conservation reserve program,
in its usage immediately prior to being
subject to such program, under a degree of
management reflecting median production
levels in the manner hereinafter
provided." See Attorney General Opinion
No. 89-63 for a discussion of the
procedures involved.
By means of this statute, the legislature has implemented the
constitutional provision authorizing agricultural land to be
assessed based on use value rather than fair market value.
According to one authority, the method chosen by the
legislature, the capitalization of income. method, is common.
Nelson, supra at 219, 220. However, even though, pursuant
to article 11, section 1(b)(1)(B) and section 12, land devoted
to an agricultural use may be valued differently than other
subclasses of real property, the subclass of land devoted to
an agricultural use must itself be assessed uniformly.
In discussing the requirement of uniformity in assessment, the
Kansas Supreme Court has consistently quoted the following
statement:
"Mach man in city, county, and state
is interested in maintaining the state and
local governments. The protection which
they afford and the duty to maintain them
are reciprocal. The burden of supporting
them should be borne equally by all, and
this equality consists in each one
contributing in proportion to the amount
of his property." Wheeler v.
Weightman, 96 Kan. 50, 58 (1915)
(emphasis added).
See Kansas City Southern Rly. Co. v. Board of County
Commissioners, 183 Kan. 675, 682 (1958); Addington v.
Board of County Commissioners, 191 Kan. 528, 532 (1963);
Topeka Cemetery Association v. Schnellbacher, 218 Kan.
39, 43 (1975); State ex rel. Stephan v. Martin, 227 Kan.
456, 461 (1980). The court has further stated:
"Unlike the income tax, the property tax
is based on the value of the property
itself, not on the income or economic
condition of the property's owner."
State v. Martin, supra at 466
(emphasis in original).
If CRP property were to be assessed based on its actual
income of rental payments from the federal government rather
than its potential income as is other agricultural land, in
our opinion the result would be nonuniform. CRP rental
payments are not based on the value of the property, so the
basis of valuing CRP property would differ from that used
for valuing other agricultural property and, though the actual
value of the property would be the same as similar property
not subject to the program, owners of CRP land would pay
less tax.
"Uniformity in taxation implies equality
in the burden of taxation, and this
equality cannot exist without uniformity
in the basis of valuation. Uniformity in
taxation does not permit a systematic,
arbitrary, or intentional higher valuation
than that placed on other similar property
within the same taxing district." Board
of Johnson County Commissioners v.
Greenhaw, 241 Kan. 119, 127 (1987).
On the other hand, to value CRP property based on its usage
immediately prior to being subject to the program rather than
its current usage causes CRP land currently used as
grassland (see Attorney General Opinion No. 88-144) to be
valued instead as irrigated land or dry cropland or whatever
it was used as prior to entering the program. This too
creates a difference in the basis of valuation. [If the
property owner elects for any other reason to use the land as
grassland it will be valued as grassland even though
irrigation or other cultivation is possible. See Kansas
Department of Revenue, Division of Property Valuation,
Procedures for Identification and Classification of
Agricultural Land 13 (Feb. 15, 1988).]
In determining the constitutionality of tax statutes under the
Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution,
U.S. Const., 14th Amend., the Kansas Supreme Court has
consistently held that "the equal protection clause of the
federal constitution and the state constitutional provisions
pertaining to equality and uniformity of taxation are
substantially similar and that, in general, what violates one
will contravene the other and vice versa." Topeka Cemetery
Ass'n v. Schnellbacher, 218 Kan. 39, 43 (1975). See
also Associated Rly. Equipment Owners v. Wilson, 167
Kan. 608 (1949); State ex rel. Tomasic v. City of Kansas
City, 237 Kan. 572, 584 (1985). Thus it appears the test
for determining the constitutionality of a statute under
article 11, section 1 of the Kansas Constitution would be the
same as that used for determining the constitutionality of a
statute under the Equal Protection clause.
"The Supreme Court of the United States
has addressed the issue of the states'
powers to levy taxes and grant exemptions
as well as the parameters within which
they must operate to avoid impinging on
equal protection limitations. The
principles are set out at some length in
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358
U.S. 522, 3 L.Ed.2d 480, 79 S.Ct. 437
(1959). In that case, an Ohio statute
exempted from ad valorem taxation
merchandise warehoused by nonresidents if
it were held in a storage warehouse for
storage only. Plaintiff, a resident who
operated several department stores and
maintained warehouses for his merchandise,
claimed denial of equal protection. In
rejecting the challenge, the Supreme Court
noted the states are subject to the Equal
Protection Clause in the exercise of their
taxing power but enjoy wide discretion
nonetheless. The court observed the Equal
Protection Clause 'imposes no iron rule of
equality, prohibiting the flexibility and
variety that are appropriate to reasonable
schemes of state taxation.' 358 U.S. at
526. The state taxation scheme must have
a rational basis with classifications
based on differences having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the
legislation. In Allied Stores of Ohio
the court found 'a statute which
encourages the location within the State
of needed and useful industries by
exempting them, though not also others,
from its taxes is not arbitrary and does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.' 358 U.S. at
528. Other cases also affirm the power of
the states to establish classification
schemes and grant exemptions. See,
e.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto
Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 35 L.Ed.2d 351,
93 S.Ct. 1001 (1973); Carmichael v.
Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 81 L.Ed.
1245, 57 S.Ct. 868 (1937)." State ex
rel. Tomasic v. Kansas City, Kansas Port
Authority, 230 Kan. 404, 425, 426
(1981).
We have been advised that the purpose of the provision of
K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 79-1467 which requires CRP property to be
valued based on its usage immediately prior to entering the
program rather than its current usage was to prevent counties
which have large volumes of CRP property from losing a large
part of their tax base. For instance, a county with 50 per
cent of its land subject to the CRP, using current usage as
a basis, would probably value that land as grassland which
would lower its valuation, and thus its taxes. Other
agricultural properties and residential and commercial
properties would then shoulder the burden of the shift of the
taxes from the CRP land. Evidently the legislature
determined that this too would be unequitable and thus
passed the provision in question. We believe this is a
rational basis for creating the distinction in question and
the result of the distinction achieves the purpose of the
legislation.
We are also mindful of the court established rules of
construction that "the constitutionality of a statute is
presumed; that all doubts must be resolved in favor or its
validity, and before a statute may be stricken, it must
clearly appear that the statute violates the Constitution."
State ex rel. Stephan v. Martin, 230 Kan. 759, 760
(1982). In our judgment, the statutory provision cannot be
said to clearly violate the Constitution.
In conclusion, the provision of K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 79-1476
which requires land subject to the federal conservation
reserve program to be valued on the basis of the agricultural
income or productivity attributable to the inherent
capabilities of the land in its usage immediately prior to
being subject to the program is not in violation of the
uniformity in assessment requirement of article 11, section 1
of the Kansas Constitution.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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