Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1989-108

1989-108Kanag

Texte intégral

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
August 25, 1989
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 89- 108
Dr. Harry Anthony
Chairman
Kansas Racing Commission
3400 Van Buren
Topeka, Kansas 66611
Re: State Boards, Commissions and Authorities--
Parimutuel Racing--Effect of Surrender of Facility
Owner/Manager License
Synopsis: The application deposit required by K.S.A. 1988
Supp. 74-8815(d) is forfeited upon voluntary
surrender of a facility owner license. An
organization license is not affected by voluntary
surrender of the licenses of the facility owner and
facility manager with whom it has contracted. The
organization license remains intact unless and
until the organization licensee violates a
provision of the racing act, a regulation of the
commission, or a term of the license. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 74-8803; 74-8813;
74-8815; K.A.R. 112-3-3; 112-3-5; 112-3-18.
Dear Dr. Anthony:
On behalf of the Kansas Racing Commission and at your
direction, Assistant Attorney General Warren Wiebe has
requested our opinion regarding the effects of surrender of a
facility owner's or facility manager's license. Specifically
your questions are these:
"(1) What is the status of the application deposit
required by K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 74-8815(d) if
the facility owner licensee voluntarily returns the
conditional facility owner license to the commission?
May the deposit be refunded, and if so, under what
circumstances and statutory procedure; and
"(2) What is the status of the organization licensee's
license, K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 74-8813, when the facility
owner licensee and facility manager licensee,
contracted to construct and operate a racetrack,
voluntarily return the conditional facility owner
and conditional facility manager licenses to the
commission."
Your first question requires a consideration of K.S.A. 1988
Supp. 74-8815(d) which specifies the conditions under which an
application deposit may be returned:
"If an applicant for a facility owner
license is proposing to construct a
racetrack facility, such applicant, at the
time of submitting the application, shall
deposit with the commission, in such form
as prescribed by rules and regulations of
the commission, the sum of (1) $500,000,
if the number of racing days applied for
by organization licensee applicants
proposing to race at the facility is 150
days or more in a racing season; (2)
$250,000, if such number of racing days
applied for is less than 150 days; or (3)
a lesser sum established by the
commission, if the applicant is the state
or a political subdivision of the state.
Only one such deposit shall be required
for a dual racetrack facility. The
executive director shall promptly remit
any deposit received pursuant to this
subsection to the state treasurer. The
state treasurer shall deposit the entire
amount in the state treasury and credit it
to the racing applicant deposit fund
created by K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 74-8828 and
amendments thereto. If the application
is denied by the commission, the
deposit, and any interest accrued
thereon, shall be refunded to the
applicant. If the license is granted by
the commission in accordance with the
terms of the application or other terms
satisfactory to the applicant, the
deposit, and any interest accrued
thereon, shall be refunded to the
licensee upon completion of the racetrack
facility in accordance with the terms of
the license. If the licensee fails to
complete the racetrack facility in
accordance with the terms of the license,
the deposit, and any interest accrued
thereon, shall be forfeited by the
applicant." (Emphasis added.)
Mindful that the racing commission is a creature of statute,
K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 74-8803, and thus has only such powers as
expressly conferred by or necessarily implied from the
relevant statutes, Olathe Community Hospital v. Kansas
Corporation Comm'n, 232 Kan. 161, 167 (1982), it is our
opinion that the commission does not have the authority to
refund the applicant deposit upon voluntary surrender of a
facility owner license prior to the completion of the
racetrack facility. We believe the language of the statute
expresses the legislative intent to insure applicants'
earnestness to provide a racetrack facility meeting the
commission's standards, and to compensate for any unauthorized
delay in providing that facility. If the racetrack facility
is not completed within the time agreed upon, for whatever
reason, the deposit is forfeited. However, several arguments
have been presented in favor of refunding the deposit which
are deserving of comment.
A deposit is not forfeited pursuant to K.S.A. 1988 Supp.
74-8815(d) unless the licensee has "failed" to complete a
racetrack facility in accordance with the terms of the
license. It is argued that there has been no "failure" on the
part of the facility owner licensee if the commission requests
a voluntary surrender of the license. However, the commission
generally should not be in a position of having to request
surrender of a license if problems with the license do not
exist. It is our understanding that, in the specific
situation before us, the licensee's request for approval of a
transfer of ownership triggered the commission's concern with
proceeding under the current license. To the extent the
facility owner licensee does not carry through its original
proposal (which is incorporated into the license) or any
approved amendment to that proposal, it has "fail[ed] to
complete the racetrack facility in accordance with the terms
of the license." [The commission is under no obligation to
approve a proposal to convey control of a facility owner
license. See K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 74-8815(f)(6); K.A.R.
112-3-18. We note, however, that the commission should take
care not to arbitrarily deny such a proposal.]
Similarly, it is argued that the provisions of K.S.A. 1988
Supp. 74-8815(d) do not preclude the return of an applicant
deposit any time before construction of a racetrack facility
is commenced. The theory is that use of the language "fail to
complete" necessarily implies that the statute contemplates
only those situations where construction is under way. We
disagree. The statute requires the deposit at the time
applications are submitted, not at the time construction is
commenced. Thus, we believe a failure to commence
construction is a failure to complete the racetrack facility
in accordance with the terms of the license, triggering
forfeiture of the deposit.
It is argued that if the commission does not accept the
facility owner licensee's proposal for financing, K.S.A. 1988
Supp. 74-8815(j) operates to void the license ab initio
and thus the application has effectively been denied. The
language of subsection (j), however, signifies that a license
was granted, but it expires if the condition contained
therein is not met. Providing for expiration of the license
in lieu of revocation procedures (compare K.S.A. 1988 Supp.
74-8815(k)(2)] indicates a legislative intent to avoid
stigmatizing licensees with a revocation merely for failure to
obtain financing. But, in our opinion, it does not evidence
an intent to allow refund of the applicant deposit. In
Attorney General Opinion No. 88-120 we concluded that "the
final agency action which denies a license occurs when a
competing applicant is granted a license. No distinction is
made between a conditional license and any other license." It
follows from this that even though the license was conditioned
on the timely submission of an acceptable financial
commitment, the license was indeed granted regardless whether
the condition was fulfilled.
As a practical matter, all regulatory licenses are
"conditional" in that licensees must continue to meet certain
standards and obligations in order for the license to
continue. 31 Am.Jur.2d Licenses and Permits §45 (1970).
It would not be reasonable to conclude that the license of a
licensee who fails to meet the conditions of licensure is
necessarily void ab initio. In any event, we have opined
previously that "if a facility owner license expires pursuant
to K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 74-8815[(j)], the deposit required by
subsection (d) of 74-8815 will be forfeited." Attorney
General Opinion No. 88-64 [subsequent to the issuance of this
opinion, subsection (i) of K.S.A. 74-8815 was amended to be
subsection (j)].
Finally, it is argued that K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 74-8815(d) and
(j) should be interpreted as operating similar to a typical
residential house sale contract:
"Nearly all residential house sale
contracts have a condition subsequent to
the contract requiring that the buyer
produce a financial commitment within a
specified time frame. At the execution of
the contract, a security deposit is placed
with an escrow agent by the proposed
purchaser. In the event that the
purchaser is unable to satisfy the
financial conditions subsequent, the
contract provides that it is void ab
initio and the security deposit or escrow
deposit is returned to the purchaser in
full."
Contrary to a typical residential house sale contract, there
is no provision in the license granted the facility owner for
return of the deposit upon failure to obtain financing.
Neither, in our opinion, does the statute authorize such a
refund. (We have stated previously our reasons for not
deeming the license void ab initio upon its expiration for
failure of the licensee to timely submit an acceptable
financial commitment.) We believe the applicant deposit is
more analogous to a combination bid bond/performance bond. A
bid bond is a "[t]ype of bond required in public
construction projects which must be filed at the time of the
bid and which protects the public agency in the event that the
bidder refuses to enter into a contract after the award to
him. . . ." Black's Law Dictionary 147 (5th Ed. 1987). A
performance bond is generally defined as a "[t]ype of
contract bond which protects against loss due to the inability
or refusal of a contractor to perform his contract. . . ."
Id., at 163. The application deposit serves as compensation
for lost time in the event a racetrack facility is not in
place by a time certain.
In summary, the application deposit required by K.S.A. 1988
Supp. 74-8815(d) is forfeited if the facility owner licensee
voluntarily surrenders the license to the commission.
Your second question concerns the status of an organization
licensee's license upon surrender of the licenses of the
facility owner and facility manager who have contracted with
the organization licensee to construct and operate the
racetrack facility. We believe that the organization license
is independent of the facility owner and facility manager
licenses and remains intact regardless whether the other two
licenses are surrendered.
K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 74-8815(e) provides that "[a] facility
manager license shall be granted only to an applicant that has
a facility management contract with an organization licensed
pursuant to K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 74-8813 and amendments
thereto." Facility owner applicants are not specifically
required to have a contract with an organization licensee to
be eligible for licensure, but various provisions of the
racing act appear to contemplate such an arrangement. See
K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 74-8815(f)(4); 74-8813(n). Additionally,
the commission, through regulations, has indicated a desire to
have the three license applications submitted as a package.
K.A.R. 112-3-3; 112-3-5. Beyond the initial application
process, however, the statutes and regulations do not tie the
maintenance of one license to that of the others. For
instance, if the facility manager license is revoked pursuant
to K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 74-8815(i), nothing requires that the
organization license also be revoked. An organization license
may only be revoked for violation of applicable statutory or
regulatory provisions, K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 74-8813(j), and
pursuant to the due process proceedings prescribed in K.S.A.
1988 Supp. 74-8813(k) & (j). See Rydd v. State Board of
Health, 202 Kan. 721, 726 (1969). Surrender of a facility
owner or facility manager license is not listed as a ground
for revocation under these provisions.
Further, we believe the intent of the legislation, K.S.A.
74-8801 et seq., was to have an organization licensee
independent of the for-profit facility manager and facility
owner licensees, where the dealings would be at arm's length.
See K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 74-8813(n) ("The commission shall
reject any such contract or agreement [of an organization
licensee] which . . . in the case of a contract or agreement
with a facility owner licensee or a facility manager licensee,
would not protect the organization licensee from incurring
losses due to contractual liability); K.S.A. 1988 Supp.
74-8813(p). For these reasons, we conclude that the
organization license is not effected by the surrender of the
facility owner's and facility manager's licenses. The
organization license remains intact unless and until the
organization licensee violates a provision of the act, a
regulation of the commission, or a term of its license.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
JuleneL.Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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