Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-131

1988-131Kanag

Texte intégral

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL September 9, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 131
The Honorable Alfred G. Schroeder
Chairman
Kansas Racing Commission
128 North Kansas Avenue
Topeka, Kansas 66603-3621
Re: State Boards, Commission and Authorities--
Parimutuel Racing; Kansas Parimutuel Racing
Act--Prohibited Acts; Ability of County Fair
Associations to Wager On or Participate in Horse
Race Meetings
Synopsis: A criminal statute should not be extended to
embrace conduct not clearly included within the
statute's prohibition. K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
74-8810(d)(3) and (e), criminal provisions, do not
clearly include a county fair association licensed
only as an organization licensee within their
prohibition. Thus, it is our opinion that county
fair associations, their directors, officers and
employees are not statutorily prohibited from
wagering on or participating in horse race meetings
conducted in this state. Cited herein: K.S.A.
2-125 et seq.; K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 74-8802;
74-8804, as amended by L. 1988, ch. 315, §3;
74-8810; Kan. Const., Bill of Rights, §1; U.S.
Const., Amend. Fourteenth.
Dear Chairman Schroeder:
You request our opinion as to whether an officer, director,
member, or employee of the Greenwood County Fair Association
may place a wager on an entry or participate in a race meeting
conducted in this state.
The Greenwood County Fair Association is a nonprofit
organization licensed by the Kansas racing commission to
conduct parimutuel races at Eureka Downs during the calendar
year 1988. In other words, Greenwood County Fair
Association is an organization licensee as defined by K.S.A.
1987 Supp. 74-8802(o). However, this organization will also
perform the functions of a facility manager licensee and a
facility owner licensee in that it will own and manage the
racetrack facility. This office opined previously that an
organization licensee could conceivably perform all three
functions without having to obtain three separate licensees.
Attorney General Opinion No. 88-64. Consequently, the
Greenwood County Fair Association, though owning and
managing the racetrack facility as well as conducting the
races thereon, holds only an organization license.
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 74-8810 provides in part:
"(d) It is a class A misdemeanor for any
officer, director or member of an
organization licensee, other than a county
fair association, to:
"(3) place a wager on an entry in a horse
or greyhound race conducted by an
organization licensee.
"(e) It is a class A misdemeanor for any
facility owner licensee or facility
manager licensee, or any officer, director
or employee thereof, to:
"(1) Participate directly or indirectly
as an owner, owner-trainer or trainer of a
horse or greyhound, or as a jockey of a
horse, entered in a race meeting conducted
in this state; or
"(2) place a wager on an entry in a horse
or greyhound race conducted by an
organization licensee."
We note initially that this is a criminal statute. While the
rule of strict construction of criminal statutes does not
permit or justify disregard of manifest legislative intent
appearing from plain and unambiguous language used in the
statute [State v. Walden, 208 Kan. 163 (1971)1,
ambiguity concerning the ambit of a criminal statute should be
resolved in favor of lenity. U.S. v. O'Brien, 686 F.2d
850 (10th Cir. 1982). A criminal statute should not be
extended to embrace conduct not clearly included within the
statute's prohibition. State v. Sexton, 232 Kan. 539
(1983).
County fair associations are specifically excluded from the
provisions of K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 74-8810(d)(3). Thus, the
prohibition enunciated in this subsection is not applicable to
the Greenwood County Fair Association, and, according to the
rules of construction cited above, cannot be construed as
applicable even in an attempt to save the statute from an
equal protection challenge.
While less clear, it is our opinion that the Greenwood
County Fair Association officers, directors and employees are
also excluded from the prohibitions enunciated in K.S.A. 1987
Supp. 74-8810(e). By its terms, subsection (e) applies only
to facility owner licensees, facility manager licensees, and
officers, directors and employees thereof. "Facility owner
licensee" is defined as "a person, partnership, corporation or
association, or the State of Kansas or any political
subdivision thereof, licensed by the commission to construct
or own a racetrack facility but does not mean an organization
licensee which owns the racetrack facility in which it
conducts horse or greyhound racing." K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
74-8802(g) (emphasis added). Greenwood County Fair
Association is an organization licensee which owns the
racetrack facility in which it conducts horse racing.
"Facility manager licensee" is defined as "a person,
partnership, corporation or association licensed by the
commission and having a contract with an organization
licensee to manage a racetrack facility." K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
74-8802(f) (emphasis added). Greenwood County Fair
Association is the organization licensee and need not contract
with itself to manage Eureka Downs. Attorney General
Opinion No. 88-64. In that it does not meet the statutory
definition of a facility owner licensee or a facility manager
licensee, and does not hold such licenses, we cannot conclude
that subsection (e) of K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 74-8810, a criminal
provision, applies to the Greenwood County Fair Association
or its directors, officers and employees, even though the Fair
Association performs the functions of a facility owner and
facility manager licensee.
Further, we do not believe construing K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
74-8810(d) and (e) in this way constitutes a violation of the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution or
section 1 of the Kansas Bill of Rights.
"The Equal Protection Clause generally
provides that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike.
Edwards v. Valdelz, 789 F.2d 1477,
1482 (10th Cir. 1986). (Citing
Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102
S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982).
Traditionally, two standards have been
used to determine whether state
legislation runs afoul of that clause.
The first, and by far the most commonly
applied, is the rational basis test.
Under this test, the court seeks only the
assurance that the classification at issue
bears some fair relationship to a
legitimate public purpose. Pyler, 457
U.S. at 216, 102 S.Ct. at 2394.
"The second standard labeled strict
scrutiny, is applied when the challenged
classification involves a suspect class or
impinges upon a fundamental right."
Ferguson v. Garmon, 643 F.Supp. 335,
338 (D.Kan. 1986).
The classification here in question does not impinge upon a
fundamental right or involve a suspect class, so the rational
basis test is applicable. In our opinion, the distinctive
characteristics of a nonprofit organization entitled to an
organization license, and particularly county fair
associations, are sufficient to justify their differential
treatment under the provisions of K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 74-8810(d)
and (e). County fair associations must be organized and
operated pursuant to statute, K.S.A. 2-125 et seq., and
thus are regulated to some degree by the local unit of
government and the state board of agriculture. Additionally,
it is believed that organization licensees other than county
fair associations are more likely to be influenced by the for
profit developers with whom they are in business.
Finally, we should note that the statutes would allow the
racing commission to promulgate rules and regulations
prohibiting county fair associations and their officers,
directors and employees from participating as a horse owner,
trainer or jockey in horse race meetings. The commission has
broad authority to adopt rules and regulations consistent with
the parimutuel racing act. K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 74-8804(p), as
amended by L. 1988, ch. 315, 53. While the rule of strict
construction of criminal statutes precludes the application of
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 74-8810(d) and (e) to county fair
associations licensed as organization licensees, we find no
clear legislative intent to preclude the commission from
applying similar prohibitions through rules and regulations,
and invoking the appropriate administrative action upon
violation of the regulation. Indeed, legislative history in
this regard indicates some confusion as to the scope of K.S.A.
1987 Supp. 74-8810(e) and would thus encourage administrative
action.
In conclusion, a criminal statute should not be extended to
embrace conduct not clearly included within the statute's
prohibition. K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 74-8810(d)(3) and (e),
criminal provisions, do not clearly include a county fair
association licensed only as an organization licensee within
their prohibition. Thus, it is our opinion that county fair
associations, their directors, officers and employees are not
statutorily prohibited from wagering on or participating in
horse race meetings conducted in this state.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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