Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-104

1988-104Kanag

Texte intégral

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL July 19, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 104
The Honorable George Teagarden
State Representative, Twelfth District
Route 2, Box 89A
LaCygne, Kansas 66040
Re: Mentally Ill, Incapacitated, Dependent Persons --
Social Welfare -- Powers and Duties of Secretary of
Social and Rehabilitation Services; KanWork
Program
Synopsis: The purpose and intent of the legislature governs
when that intent can be ascertained from the
statute. 1988 Senate Bill No. 572 (L. 1988, ch.
31, § 3, and 1988 House Bill No. 2644 (L. 1988,
ch. 141), allow the Secretary of Social and
Rehabilitation Services (SRS) to establish the
KanWork program and use funds appropriated for
that program. These enactments do not prohibit or
limit participation to certain counties. Thus, the
legislature has granted to the Secretary of SRS
authority to decide in which counties to establish
the KanWork program. Absent proof that the
Secretary's decision is fraudulent, arbitrary or
capricious, Barton county may participate in the
program. Cited herein: K.S.A. 39-708c; 39-710;
1988 Senate Bill No. 752, L. 1988, ch. 31, § 3;
1988 House Bill No. 2644, L. 1988, ch. 141.
Dear Representative Teagarden:
As state representative for the twelfth district, you request
our opinion on the legality of expenditures by the Kansas
Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS)
whereby the KanWork program will be established in Barton
county. You ask this question in light of 1988 Senate Bill
No. 572 and the conference committee's report explaining this
bill. You state that the report recommended that the counties
in which KanWork is implemented be selected from a list of
ten specified counties. Barton County was not contained in
this list. You therefore question the legality of
establishing the program in Barton County as you are of the
opinion that "the clear legislative intent was not to
appropriate funds for this purpose."
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the
purpose and intent of the legislature governs when that intent
can be ascertained from the statute. Harris Enterprises,
Inc. v. Moore, 241 Kan. 59, 65 (1987); In The Matter of The
Estate of Estes, 239 Kan. 192, 195 (1986); In re Tax
Protests of Midland Industries, Inc., 237 Kan. 867, 871
(1985); State v. Dubish, 236 Kan. 848, 853 (1985);
State v. Keeley, 236 Kan. 555, 559 (1985). See 82
C.J.S. Statutes § 321 (1953). When the language in a
statute is plain and unambiguous, the intent expressed by the
words used in the statute should be followed. State v.
V.F.W. Post No. 3722, 215 Kan. 693, 695 (1974). Where the
language in the statute is plain and unambiguous there is no
need to search for the reasons which prompted the legislature
to enact the statute. State v. Bagemehl, 213 Kan. 210
(1973). See Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin
Employ. R. Bd., 336 U.S. 301, 69 S.Ct. 584, 93 L. Ed. 691
(1948). See also 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes, § 170
(1974); 82 C.J.S. Statutes, § 322 (1953). Explanatory
statements of members of the legislature cannot control, or
even be considered, where the language of the enactment is
clear. United States v. Missouri P.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 49
S.Ct. 133, 73 L.Ed. 322 (1928). See 73 Am. Jur. 2d
Statutes § 176 et seq. (1974). When the language of the
statute is not clear, determining legislative intent allows a
consideration of the historical background of enactment.
Jackson v. City of Kansas City, 235 Kan. 278, 319 (1984);
State ex rel. Ludwick v. Board of Johnson County
Comm'rs, 233 Kan. 79 84 (1983). Moreover, when a statute
is ambiguous and intent of legislature is not clear, agency
interpretation should be considered. D S G Corp. v.
Shelor, 239 Kan. 312, 315 (1986); Lincoln American Corp.
v. Victory Life Insurance Co., 375 F. Cupp. 112, 118 (10th
Cir. 1974).
Thus, the issue becomes whether the language in this
particular legislative enactment is clear and unambiguous.
1988 House Bill No. 2644 establishes the KanWork program
while 1988 Senate Bill No. 572 appropriates funds for the
program for fiscal year 1989. Neither of these enactments
specifies which counties the KanWork program is to be
administered.
H.B. 2644 (L. 1988, ch. 41, § 3), sets forth the authority
of the Secretary of SRS in implementing the KanWork
program:
"(a) The secretary of social and
rehabilitation services shall be
responsible for the planning, integration
and coordination of employment and related
services for public assistance recipients.
All appropriate state and local agencies
shall cooperate with the secretary in the
planning, integration and coordination of
employment and related services as
provided under the KanWork act.
"(b) Within the limits of appropriation
therefor, the secretary shall establish
and administer the KanWork program for
recipients of public assistance which
shall consist of the following
components: Evaluation for eligibility
and services; job preparation, training
and education; support services; and
transitional services."
S.B. 572 (L. 1988, ch. 31, § 3), appropriates funding for
SRS programs for the fiscal year 1989. In State ex rel.,
Stephan v. Carlin, 230 Kan. 252 (1981), the court stated
that
"[a]ppropriation bills may direct the
amounts of money which may be spent, and
for what purposes; they may express the
legislature's direction as to
expenditures. . . ." 230 Kan. at 258
S.B. 572 discusses the expenditure from the public assistance
account for the KanWork program and states in pertinent part:
"And provided further, That expenditures
from this account shall include
expenditures for the KanWork program and
other job programs, including expenditures
for transitional medical assistance under
the KanWork program: And provided
further, That expenditures from this
account for the KanWork program shall
include expenditures for a director of
KanWork shall be in the unclassified
service under the Kansas civil service act
and shall be in addition to other
positions in the department of social and
rehabilitation services in the
unclassified service under the Kansas
civil service act as prescribed by
law:. . . ."
There is no provision in the legislative enactments concerning
the KanWork program which prohibits SRS from establishing
the KanWork program in Barton county. The legislature can
and in many instances does limit expenditures of public funds
by administrative agencies. For example, Section 3 of S.B.
572 specifically limits expenditures from the social welfare
fund for the Topeka or Kansas City workshop for the blind.
Absent specific legislative directives or prohibitions,
however, discretionary authority may be reasonably exercised
by the agency delegated that authority. Matzke v. Block,
542 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (10th Cir. 1982); Tew v. Topeka
Police & Fire Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 237 Kan. 96, 100
(1985).
The Secretary of SRS has the power and duty to administer
and supervise general policies relating to social welfare
programs. K.S.A. 39-708c. Under K.S.A. 39-710, the Secretary
has broad discretion in making expenditures in order to
perform duties and services necessary to promote social
welfare in the state of Kansas. Thus, the Secretary may
exercise that authority where not inconsistent with state
law. We find no provision in the new law prohibiting the
Secretary from establishing the KanWork program in Barton
county. While the committee reports prepared by Legislative
Research discuss certain target counties, legislative
enactment does not reflect a legislative consensus on the
issue.
In summary, when the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous on its face, inquiry into the history of its
enactment need not be made. The legislation enacting and
appropriating funds for the KanWork program clearly
delegates much discretion to the Secretary of SRS. Absent
specific directives or prohibitions, appropriated funds may be
spent for any legal purpose the receiving public agency has
the authority to make expenditures for. The legislative
enactments concerning the KanWork program do not direct or
prohibit a specific county's participation in the KanWork
program. It is assumed that if the legislature desired such a
restriction it would have been included in the law. In the
absence of such a provision, it is our opinion that, without
any evidence that the agency acted fraudulently, arbitrarily
or capriciously, SRS has been legislatively granted the
authority to establish the KanWork program in Barton
county.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Theresa Marcel Nuckolls
Assistant Attorney General
Rita L. Noll
Assistant Attorney General
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