Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-035

1988-035Kanag

Texte intégral

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY G ENER AL March 11, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 35
The Honorable Betty Jo Charlton
State Representative, Forty-Sixth District
State Capitol, Room 272-W
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Navigation and Navigable Waters--Protection of
Navigable Waters and of Harbor and River
Improvements Generally--In General; Obstruction of
Navigable Waters
Synopsis: The United States Army Corps of Engineers, pursuant
to the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §403,
and other federal enactments, has the authority to
prohibit dredge and fill or excavation activities
on navigable rivers for the purposes of interstate
commerce, navigation and conservation. This
authority is superior to any interest the state may
have in the lands beneath such navigable waters.
Cited herein: 16 U.S.C.A. §§661 et seq.;
1531 et seq.; 33 U.S.C.A. §§403; 1151 et
seq.; 1251 et seq.; 42 U.S.C.A. §§4331
et seq.; 43 U.S.C.A. §§1311, 1314; U.S.
Const., Art. I, §8.
Dear Representative Charlton:
As State Representative for the Forty-Sixth District, you
request our opinion regarding the authority of the State of
Kansas over the bed and banks of the Kansas River,
particularly with regard to a plan of the United States Army
Corps of Engineers to terminate sand dredging on the river
from Kansas City to a point above Manhattan. Specifically you
ask whether the Corps of Engineers has legal authority to stop
dredging operations on the Kansas River and if so, whether the
state, through executive or legislative action, has legal
authority to overrule the Corps' decision.
In Attorney General Opinion No. 82-240 we discussed ownership
of the bed of the Kansas River. It was opined that, for
purposes of determining a riparian owner's right to use the
river channel, title to the river bed is held by the state and
therefore any private use of the river bed must be approved by
the state. Attorney General Opinion No. 82-240, p. 2, citing
Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682 (1881), Siler v. Dreyer,
183 Kan. 49 (1958). This conclusion is supported by the
Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. S51301 et seq., which
states in part:
"(a) It is hereby determined and declared
to be in the public interest that (1)
title to and ownership of the lands
beneath navigable waters within the
boundaries of the respective States, and
the natural resources within such lands
and waters, and (2) the right and power to
manage, administer, lease, develop, and
use the said lands and natural resources
all in accordance with applicable State
law be, and they are hereby, subject to
the provisions hereof, recognized,
confirmed, established, and vested in and
assigned to the respective States or the
persons who were on June 5, 1950, entitled
thereto under the law of the respective
States in which the land is located, and
the respective grantees, lessees, or
successors in interest thereof;
"(b)(1) The United States hereby releases
and relinquishes unto said States and
persons aforesaid, except as otherwise
reserved herein, all right, title, and
interest of the United States, if any it
has, in and to all said lands,
improvements, and natural resources;
"(d) Nothing in this subchapter or
subchapter I of this chapter shall affect
the use, development, improvement, or
control by or under the constitutional
authority of the United States of said
lands and waters for the purposes of
navigation or flood control or the
production of power, or be construed as
the release or relinquishment of any
rights of the United States arising under
the constitutional authority of Congress
to regulate or improve navigation, or to
provide for flood control, or the
production of power. . . ." 43 U.S.C.A.
§1311.
We would thus confirm the opinion that title to the bed and
banks of the Kansas River, to the ordinary high water mark, is
vested in the state within the boundaries of which such lands
are located, the State of Kansas having title to the bed and
banks located in Kansas.
The ability of the state to dictate the usage of the bed and
banks of the Kansas River is not without exception, however.
Subsection (d) of 43 U.S.C.A. §1311 (quoted above) sets forth
a reservation in the United States of the "use, development,
improvement, or control by or under the constitutional
authority of the United States of said lands and waters for
the purposes of navigation or flood control or the production
of power. . . ." Additionally, §1314(a) of the Submerged
Lands Act specifically retains in the federal government:
"[A]11 of its navigational servitude and
rights in and powers of regulation and
control of said lands and navigable waters
for the constitutional purposes of
commerce, navigation, national defense and
international affairs, all of which shall
be paramount to . . . proprietary rights
of ownership, or the rights of management,
administration, leasing, use, and
development of the lands and natural
resources which are specifically
recognized, confirmed, established and
vested in and assigned to the respective
States and others by section 1311 of this
title." (Emphasis added.)
In construing these provisions the United States Supreme Court
has held that "[n]othing in the Act was to be construed as
the release or relinquishment of any rights of the United
States arising under the constitutional authority of Congress`
to regulate or improve navigation, or to provide for flood
control, or the production of powers," and that "[t]he Act
left congressional power over commerce and the dominant
navigational servitude of the United States precisely where it
found them." United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 127,
88 S.Ct. 265, 269, 19 L.Ed.2d 329, 335 (1967). Thus, though
title to the bed and banks of navigable rivers may be vested
in the state, the federal government retains control of these
lands for purposes of commerce, navigation, etc. See
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S.
690, 703, 19 S.Ct. 770, 43 L.Ed. 1136, 1141 (1899) (the
jurisdiction of the federal government over interstate
commerce and its natural highways vests in that government the
right to take all needed measures to preserve the navigability
of the navigable waters of the country even against any state
action.)
The Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§401 et seq.,
(a product of the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution, Art. I, §8) prohibits the creation of any
obstruction, not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States.
Section 403 further provides that "it shall not be lawful to
excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the
course, location, condition, or capacity of, any . . . channel
of any navigable water of the United States, unless the work
has been recommended by the Chief of [the Corps of] Engineers
and authorized by the Secretary of [the Army]." By the terms
of this provision, the Secretary of the Army, acting upon the
recommendation of the Chief of Engineers, is to determine what
constitutes an unreasonable obstruction. Sierra Club v.
Andrus, 610 F.2d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 1979). It has been
held that this language does not constitute a prohibition of
any obstruction to the navigation, but any obstruction to the
navigable capacity, and "anything wherever done or however
done, within the limits of the jurisdiction of the United
States which tends to destroy the navigable capacity of one of
the navigable waters of the United States, is within the terms
of the prohibition." United States v. Rio Grande Dam &
Irrigation Co., 43 L.Ed. at 1143. The authority of the
United States to prevent or remove obstructions to interstate
commerce is superior to that of the states to provide for the
welfare or necessities of their inhabitants. Sanitary
District of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 426, 45
S.Ct. 176, 69 L.Ed. 352, 363 (1925); Wyandotte
Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201, 88
S.Ct. 379, 19 L.Ed.2d 407, 415 (1967).
Several cases have held that pursuant to the Rivers and
Harbors Act, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, (16
U.S.C.A. §§ 661 et seq.), and the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C.A. §S4331 et seq.), the
Corps of Engineers may deny a permit to dredge on
conservational grounds. See, e.g., United States v.
Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 607 (3d Cir. 1974)
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927, 95 S.Ct. 1124, 43 L.Ed.2d
397 (1975); Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v.
Volpe, 302 F.Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd., 425
F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949, 91
S.Ct. 237, 27 L.Ed.2d 256 (1970); Zabel v. Tabb, 430
F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
910, 91 S.Ct. 873, 27 L.Ed.2d 808 (1971). See also
Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 512
(10th Cir. 1985) (Army Corps of Engineers is required,
under both the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§1251 et
seq., and the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§1531
et seq., to consider the environmental impact of
permit); United States v. Holland, 373 F.Supp. 665 (M.D.
Fla. 1974) (pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control
act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§1151 et seq., Congress has power to
regulate activities such as dredging and filling which cause
water pollution.)
The federal control of the nation's waterways is dependant
upon their navigable capacity for purposes of interstate
commerce. 33 U.S.C.A. §403; United States v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irrigation Co., 43 L.Ed. at 1143. The case of Miami
Valley Conservancy Dist. v. Alexander, 692 F.2d 447
(6th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1123, 103
S.Ct. 3096, 77 L.Ed.2d 1355 (1983), is instructive in
determining the navigable capacity of a river:
"The question of navigability turns on
whether the river has ever or is now used
as a water highway for interstate commerce.
• • •
"The earliest and most frequently cited
definition of navigability appeared in
The Daniel Ball v. United States, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563, 19 L.Ed. 999
(1871). The Supreme Court held:
"'Those rivers must be regarded as public
navigable rivers in law which are
navigable in fact. And they are navigable
in fact when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used, in their
ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are
or may be conducted in the customary
modes of trade and travel on water.'
(emphasis added).
"Subsequent cases have refined the
definition of navigability. A river is
navigable if it can be made useful through
reasonable improvements. United States
v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311
U.S. 377, 409, 61 S.Ct. 291, 300, 85 L.Ed.
243 (1940). The use of navigable streams
may be limited to travel during seasonal
water level fluctuations. Economy Light
and Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S.
113, 122, 41 S.Ct. 409, 412, 65 L.Ed. 847
(1921). Moreover, a river is still
navigable despite 'occasional natural
obstructions or portages. . . Id.
However, where commercial use or
susceptibility of use is 'sporadic and
ineffective,' the river is not navigable.
United States v. State of Oregon, 295
U.S. 1, 23, 55 S.Ct. 610, 619, 79 L.Ed.
1267 (1935). A waterway is not navigable
when 'its use for any purpose of
transportation has been and is
exceptional, and only in times of
temporary high water.' United States v.
Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174
U.S. 690, 699, 19 S.Ct. 770, 773, 43 L.Ed.
1136 (1899).
"The Supreme Court has emphasized
repeatedly that a navigable waterway of
the United States must be 'of practical
service as a highway of commerce.'
Economy Light, 256 U.S. at 124, 41 S.Ct.
at 413. A navigable river is one of
'general and common usefulness for
purposes of trade and commerce.'
Oregon, 295 U.S. at 23, 55 S.Ct. at
619. The Rivers and Harbors Act protects
'the Nation's right that its waterways be
utilized for the interests of the commerce
of the whole country.' Appalachian
Electric, 311 U.S. at 405, 61 S.Ct. at
298.
"Under the historical use test of
navigability a river is 'indelibly
navigable.' State of Oklahoma ex rel.
Phillips v. Guy F. Atkins, 313 U.S.
508, 61 S.Ct. 1050, 85 L.Ed. 1487 (1941).
That is, a river is navigable as a matter
of law if it has ever been navigable. For
a river to be considered a navigable water
of the United States, it is sufficient
that the river has been used as a
commercial highway even though it no
longer is or can be used as such.
"The test of navigability has been stated
and restated by the federal courts for the
last one hundred years. Navigability has
been defined in countless ways but its
essential elements have remained
constant. The District Court here
properly identified these elements: A
navigable waterway of the United States
must (1) be or have been (2) used or
susceptible of use (3) in the customary
modes of trade and travel in water (4) as
a highway for interstate commerce." 692
F.2d at 449, 450.
Thus, if the Kansas River meets these criteria, it is subject
to the control of the United States Army Corps of Engineers
under the Rivers and Harbors Act. (But see United States
v. Holland, 373 F.Supp. at 673 where the court finds that
Congress is not limited by the "navigable waters" test in its
authority to control pollution under the commerce clause.)
The Supreme Court of Kansas has opined that the Kansas River
is a navigable stream in contemplation of federal law. Kaw
Valley Drainage District v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 99
Kan. 188, 202 (1916); Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682, 687,
688 (1882). It would thus appear that the Kansas River is a
"navigable water of the United States" for purposes of the
Rivers and Harbors Act, and any dredge and fill or excavation
activities on this river are subject to the control of the
Corps of Engineers.
Your final question involves the legal standing of the state,
a private citizen or private company to take action in the
courts against the Corps of Engineers. In general, a
plaintiff who can show 1) an actual and direct interest
(injury in fact) and 2) a personal stake (a distinct injury
caused by the challenged conduct), is deemed to have standing
to sue in federal court. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 985 S.Ct. 2620, 57
L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). A state normally does not have standing,
as a representative of its citizens, to enjoin enforcement of
a federal statute, for the interests of its citizens are
protected by their political representatives in Congress.
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 252 U.S. 447 (1926). However, if
the state has a propriety interest of its own at stake, it
will be accorded standing. Alfred C. Snapp, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982).
Application of these basic principles to the facts and
circumstances will determine a party's legal standing.
In conclusion, the United States Army Corps of Engineers,
pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §403, and
other federal enactments, has the authority to prohibit dredge
and fill or excavation activities on navigable rivers for the
purposes of interstate commerce, navigation and conservation.
This authority is superior to any interest the state may have
in the lands beneath such navigable waters.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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